Ukpai v. Continental Automotive Systems US, Inc.
Filing
125
OPINION and ORDER Granting Defendant's 104 MOTION for Summary Judgment. Signed by District Judge Gershwin A. Drain. (TMcg)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
UKPAI I. UKPAI,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 17-cv-12428
v.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
JUDGE
GERSHWIN A. DRAIN
CONTINENTAL AUTOMOTIVE SYSTEMS
US, INC.,
Defendant.
______________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT [#104]
I. INTRODUCTION
This case involves an employment discrimination dispute. Plaintiff Ukpai I.
Ukpai alleges that Defendant terminated his employment due to racial and national
origin discrimination. Before the Court is Defendant Continental Automotive
Systems US, Inc.’s (“Continental”) Motion for Summary Judgment. Dkt. No. 104.
For the reasons discussed below, this Court will grant Defendant’s Motion.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Ukpai I. Ukpai is an engineer who was born in Nigeria. Dkt. No.
120, pg. 8 (Pg. ID 5583). He moved to the United States in 1995 and has obtained
American citizenship while in the United States. Id. Plaintiff began working for
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Defendant Continental in 2013. Dkt. No. 35-1, pg. 11 (Pg. ID 301). In October
2015, Defendant sent Plaintiff to work at the Kansas City Assembly Plant
(“KCAP”). Id. at pg. 12 (Pg. ID 302). KCAP is an assembly plant belonging to the
Ford Motor Company. Id. Plaintiff’s job involved work on a project in which he
was required to carry out inspections on hardware that Continental supplied to
Ford. Id. Plaintiff alleges that he was discriminated against, harassed, and treated
disparately during his time at KCAP. Id. Plaintiff alleges that he promptly reported
these incidents to management but management neglected to take action. Id.
In December of 2015, Plaintiff’s supervisor Andrew Bayler and Human
Resources Manager Jaime Fisk informed him that he was banned from the KCAP
plant due to multiple grievances that had been filed against him. Dkt. No. 35-1, pg.
12 (Pg. ID 302). Defendant terminated Plaintiff on January 6, 2016. Id. at pg. 13
(Pg. ID 303). Plaintiff filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”) on July 21, 2016. Id. at pg. 32 (Pg. ID 322). The EEOC
issued Plaintiff a Dismissal and Notice of Rights on April 26, 2017, giving Plaintiff
90 days to file suit in federal court. Id. at pg. 31 (Pg. ID 321).
Plaintiff filed his complaint in this Court on July 25, 2017. Dkt. No. 1.
Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on December 1, 2017. Dkt. No. 24. On
February 1, 2018, Plaintiff moved to file a second amended complaint. Dkt. No.
35. This Court referred the motion to Magistrate Judge R. Steven Whalen on
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February 13, 2018. Dkt. No. 43. Magistrate Judge Whalen granted Plaintiff’s
motion to file a second amended complaint on February 15, 2018. Dkt. No. 44.
Defendant filed its Motion for Summary Judgment on October 15, 2018. Dkt. No.
104. Plaintiff filed his initial response on November 15, 2018. Dkt. No. 108.
Plaintiff then filed a corrected response on December 29, 2018. Dkt. No. 120.
Plaintiff has filed numerous exhibits in support of his response, as well as
declarations. Dkt. Nos. 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118. Defendant replied
on November 27, 2018. Dkt. No. 119. On February 4, 2019, Plaintiff retained
counsel. Dkt. No. 121. On March 14, 2019, Plaintiff, through counsel, moved to
adjourn the hearing on Defendant’s Summary Judgment Motion and to reopen
discovery for 90 days. Dkt. No. 122. Defendant opposed Plaintiff’s motion to
adjourn on March 15, 2019, asserting that it was a delay tactic. Dkt. No. 123. This
Court held oral argument on Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on
March 18, 2019.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) governs summary judgment. The Rule
states, “summary judgment shall be granted if ‘there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.’” Cehrs v. Ne. Ohio Alzheimer’s Research Ctr., 155 F.3d 775, 779 (6th Cir.
1998). “All factual inferences ‘must be viewed in the light most favorable to the
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party opposing the motion.’” Id. (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus., Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)). There is a genuine issue of material fact
“if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party.” Id. (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255
(1986)). Ultimately, the court evaluates “whether the evidence presents a sufficient
disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one
party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251–52.
IV. DISCUSSION
1. Wrongful Termination of Employment
The first count of Plaintiff’s complaint alleges wrongful termination. Dkt. No.
35-1, pg. 13 (Pg. ID 303). The complaint states that on January 6, 2016, Jaime Fisk
informed Plaintiff of his termination due to multiple grievances filed against him.
Id. at pg. 14 (Pg. ID 304). The allegation in Count I does not allege or state
anything further. See id.
Plaintiff states in his response to Defendant’s Motion that inspections were
suspended in November 2016 because the United Auto Workers (“UAW”) filed a
grievance based on violations of plant rules. Dkt. No. 120, pg. 12 (Pg. ID 5587).
Plaintiff further states that the narrative of him being responsible for the first
grievance is false. Id. at pg. 13 (Pg. ID 5588). However, Defendant acknowledges
that both Plaintiff and Radim Urban, Plaintiff’s inspection partner, did not follow
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all of the UAW rules. Dkt. No. 104, pg. 21 (Pg. ID 2255). After the initial
grievance, rules at the KCAP plant became stricter. Id. at pg. 22 (Pg. ID 2256).
Two UAW members were required to be present during the inspections with
Plaintiff. Id. Dawayne Gilley, Plaintiff’s manager, told Plaintiff not to conduct
inspections if no one showed up to do the inspections with him. Id.; Dkt. No. 1042, pg. 32 (Pg. ID 2365). However, Plaintiff had already conducted the inspections
without two union members present. Id. Mike Bayer, a Ford representative, was
informed of Plaintiff’s second violation. Id. Gilley spoke with Bayer and Bayer
informed Gilley that Plaintiff needed to be terminated. Id. at pg. 33 (Pg. ID 2366).
Gilley was obligated to follow Ford’s wishes because Ford was Defendant’s
customer. Dkt. No. 104, pg. 23 (Pg. ID 2257).
The record presents testimony that Ford decided to terminate Plaintiff due to his
multiple violations of the inspection policy. No evidence in the record refutes this
testimony, except for Plaintiff’s subjective allegations. Further, for the reasons
discussed infra, the record does not support Plaintiff’s allegations of discriminatory
treatment as the motivation for his termination. This Court will therefore grant
summary judgment in favor of Defendant on Count I.
2. Unequal Terms and Conditions of Plaintiff’s Employment
Count Two alleges unequal terms of employment. Dkt. No. 35-1, pg. 14 (Pg. ID
304). Plaintiff asserts that Dawayne Gilley, the resident Continental staff at KCAP,
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required Plaintiff to work the night shift even after Plaintiff had seniority over his
Caucasian inspection partner, Brandon White. Id. at pgs. 14–16 (Pg. ID 304–06).
Plaintiff’s complaint states that he began conducting inspections with Radim
Urban, a Caucasian male from the Czech Republic. Id. at pg. 14 (Pg. ID 304).
Dawayne Giley assigned Urban to do the day inspections and Plaintiff to do the
night inspections. Id. Gilley informed Plaintiff that Urban conducted the day
inspections because Urban had seniority over Plaintiff. Id. Urban then went back to
the Czech Republic, and Defendant assigned a new employee, Brandon White, to
conduct inspections with Plaintiff. Id. at pg. 16 (Pg. ID 306). Brandon White is a
Caucasian male. Id. Gilley assigned White to conduct the day inspections and
Plaintiff to conduct the night inspections, even though Plaintiff had seniority over
White. Id. Plaintiff asked Gilley why he was not doing the day inspections and
Gilley responded by telling Plaintiff that he (Gilley) was in charge. Id.
Defendant argues that there was no seniority between the temporary employees
at Continental. Dkt. No. 104, pg. 12 (Pg. ID 2246); Dkt. No. 104-2, pg. 27 (Pg. ID
2360). Further, Defendant states that it was essential for Urban to work the day
shift because of the time difference with the Czech Republic, where he remained
responsible for operations of a plant. Dkt. No. 104, pg. 12 (Pg. ID 2246); Dkt. No.
104-2, pg. 29 (Pg. ID 2362). Lastly, Defendant contends that White only assisted
the inspections at KCAP for one week, and he had to work the day shift in order
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for Gilley to train him. Dkt. No. 104, pgs. 12–13 (Pg. ID 2246–47); Dkt. No. 1044, pg. 54 (Pg. ID 2460).
Count II of Plaintiff’s complaint is fundamentally a claim of disparate
treatment. Disparate treatments requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that an employer
has treated him less favorably than others due to a protected trait, such as race or
national origin. Dunlap v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 519 F.3d 626, 630 (6th Cir. 2008).
Courts analyze alleged discrimination under the McDonnell-Douglas framework.
Id. Under the framework, (1) the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case
of racial discrimination; (2) the employer must articulate some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its actions; and (3) the plaintiff must prove that the
stated reason was in fact pretextual.” Id. A plaintiff can establish a prima facie case
of discrimination by showing “(1) that he is a member of a protected group, (2)
that he was qualified for the position at issue, and (3) that he was treated
differently than comparable employees outside of the protected class.” Id.
Proof of discriminatory motive is critical under a disparate treatment theory. Id.
Discriminatory motive can be inferred from the fact that there was a difference in
treatment, or “from the falsity of the employer’s explanation for the treatment.” Id.
Plaintiff establishes that he is a member of a protected group, that he was
qualified for his job position, and that Defendant required him to work the night
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shift while his white counterparts worked the day shift. However, Defendant
articulates nondiscriminatory reasons that Urban and White worked the night shift.
Urban was responsible for overseeing operations at a plant in the Czech Republic
with a 7 or 8 hour time difference between the KCAP plant. White needed Gilley
to train him, and Gilley worked during the day; therefore White was required to
work the day shift with Gilley. Plaintiff does not bring forth evidence to establish
that Defendant’s reasons are pretext. Plaintiff has therefore failed to meet his
burden of production to establish a claim of disparate treatment. Therefore, this
Court will grant Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Count II of
Plaintiff’s complaint.
3. Retaliation
Count Three alleges retaliation. Dkt. No. 35-1, pg. 16 (Pg. ID 306). Plaintiff
alleges that Defendant placed him in a hostile work environment as a form of
retaliation. Id. at pg. 17 (Pg. ID 307).
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1)
[he] engaged in activity protected by Title VII; (2) the defendant knew of [his]
exercise of her protected rights; (3) the defendant subsequently took an adverse
employment action against the plaintiff or subjected the plaintiff to severe or
pervasive retaliatory harassment; and (4) there was a causal connection between
the plaintiff's protected activity and the adverse employment action.
Barrett v. Whirlpool Corp., 556 F.3d 502, 516 (6th Cir. 2009). Plaintiff asserts that
the protected activity he engaged in was reporting the racial discrimination and
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disparate treatment that he faced at KCAP to Leon Koua, Jaime Fisk, Andrew
Bayley, and Adrian Aguayo. Dkt. No. 120, pg. 30 (Pg. ID 5605). He states that
after he reported the activity, Koua told him to follow Gilley’s instructions and to
lie low. Id. Plaintiff states that he was continuously demeaned, harassed, left to
work without lunch, and treated disparately as a result of having to listen to Gilley.
Id.
First, the record does not demonstrate that Defendant subjected Plaintiff to
severe or pervasive retaliatory harassment. Plaintiff states that Gilley berated him
for not driving a Ford and for not having a safety vest and goggles. Dkt. No. 35-1,
pg. 19 (Pg. ID 309). However, the record does not establish that this treatment was
severe or pervasive. Further, according to Plaintiff’s own statement, he went
without lunch on one occasion. Dkt. No. 120, pgs. 11–12, (Pg. ID 5586–87). This
treatment also does not rise to the severe or pervasive level. For these reasons and
for the reasons stated infra, this Court finds that the record does not establish that
Defendant retaliated against Plaintiff. Summary Judgment is granted in favor of
Defendant on Count III.
4. Harassment/Hostile Work Environment
The fourth count of the complaint alleges harassment. Dkt. No. 35-1, pg. 18
(Pg. ID 308). Plaintiff more specifically alleges hostile work environment in Count
III of his complaint and in his response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
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Judgment. Id. at pg. 17 (Pg. ID 307); Dkt. No. 120, pg. 19 (Pg. ID 5594). Plaintiff
alleges that when he arrived at the KCAP plant, Dawayne Gilley began to
complain that Plaintiff had parked in the wrong parking lot and that he was not
driving a Ford vehicle. Id. at pg. 19 (Pg. ID 309). Gilley then began shouting at
Plaintiff, telling him that he was “doing everything wrong” after Gilley realized
that Plaintiff did not have a safety vest and goggles. Id. Plaintiff alleges before that
point, no one ever told him that he needed a safety vest and goggles. Id. The
complaint next states that one day Gilley asked Plaintiff if he had acquired a Ford
vehicle yet. Id. at pg. 20 (Pg. ID 311). Plaintiff informed Gilley that the rental
company did not have a Ford vehicle available, and Gilley began to shout at
Plaintiff and said that he must get a Ford vehicle that day. Id. at pg. 21 (Pg. ID
311). Gilley then accompanied Plaintiff to get a Ford vehicle. Id. at pgs. 21–22 (Pg.
ID 311–12).
Plaintiff’s response to Defendant’s Motion also alleges that in November of
2015, Gilley offered to get lunch for Radim Urban and Plaintiff. Dkt. No. 120, pg.
11 (Pg. ID 5586). Plaintiff states that Gilley brought Plaintiff a lunch that was
“spilled” and contained ham; Plaintiff does not eat ham. Id. at pgs. 11–12, (Pg. ID
5586–87). Plaintiff’s response next asserts that Gilley berated him by telling him
not to talk to anybody, and just to conduct inspections. Id. at pg. 12 (Pg. ID 5587).
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Plaintiff lastly alleges that in November of 2015 Gilley made an accusation of theft
against him. Id.
Courts analyze discriminatory harassment under the hostile work environment
standard. See Barrett v. Whirlpool Corp., 556 F.3d 502, 514 (6th Cir. 2009).
To establish a prima facie case of a racially hostile work environment, a plaintiff
must demonstrate that (1) [he] was a member of a protected class; (2) [he] was
subjected to unwelcome racial harassment; (3) the harassment was based on race;
(4) the harassment unreasonably interfered with [his] work performance by
creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment; and (5) the
employer is liable.
Barrett, 556 F.3d at 515. A hostile work environment is one that is “permeated
with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive
working environment.” Id. at 514. Assessment of the fourth prong requires an
examination of the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 515. Courts consider the
frequency of the discriminatory conduct, the severity of the conduct, if the conduct
was physically threatening or humiliating, if the conduct was merely an offensive
utterance, and whether the conduct “unreasonably interfere[d] with an employee’s
work performance.” Id.
Plaintiff has established that he is a member of a protected class. However,
Plaintiff has not proved the other prongs of the prima facie case of hostile work
environment. Nothing in the record, either direct or circumstantial, supports the
proposition that Gilley’s treatment of Plaintiff was because of Plaintiff’s race or
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national origin. Further, Plaintiff does not establish that any adverse treatment
unreasonably interfered with his work. In contrast, Plaintiff asserts throughout his
pleadings that he was an exemplary worker. See Dkt. No. 35-1, pg. 15, 27 (Pg. ID
305, 317); Dkt. No. 104-16, pgs. 3–4 (Pg. ID 2623–24). For these reasons, the
Court will grant summary judgment in favor of Defendant on Plaintiff’s Count IV.
5. Negligence
The fifth cause of action alleges negligence. Dkt. No. 35-1, pg. 24 (Pg. ID 314).
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant was negligent in investigating the grievances that
Plaintiff placed and also negligent in failing to reasonably supervise the
Continental Resident staff at KCAP. Id. at pgs. 24–26 (Pg. ID 314–16). Defendant
asserts that Plaintiff did not complain of discrimination until he filed his complaint
with the EEOC. Dkt. No 119, pg. 2 (Pg. ID 5473).
To establish a prima facie case of negligence, a plaintiff must prove:
“(1) a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, (2) a breach of that duty,
(3) causation, and (4) damages.” Finazzo v. Fire Equip. Co., 918 N.W.2d 200, 210
(Mich. Ct. App. 2018).
Continental has a written policy prohibiting discrimination based on race or
national origin. Dkt. No. 104-1, pg. 7 (Pg. ID 2273). Jaime Fisk, the Human
Resources Coordinator, testified under oath that complaints of discrimination
based on race or national origin are investigated. Id. at pg. 8 (Pg. ID 22774). Leon
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Koua similarly testified that it was custom for harassment complaints to be
reported to Human Resources and investigated. Dkt. No. 104-15, pgs. 3–5 (Pg. ID
2618–20). On December 17, 2015, Plaintiff wrote an email to Adrian Aguayo and
Leon Koua about his removal from the KCAP plant. Dkt. No. 104-16, pgs. 3–4
(Pg. ID 2623–24). The letter described that he was unsure why he was removed
from the plant because he always did what was required of him. Id. The letter does
not mention discrimination as a reason for why Plaintiff believed he was removed.
Id. Adrian Millan also testified that Plaintiff never informed him that Dawayne
Gilley treated him differently because of his race. Dkt. No. 104-6, pg. 19 (Pg. ID
2504).
Plaintiff’s complaint states that he informed Jaime Fisk and Andrew Bayley, his
manager, about disparate treatment, harassment, and discrimination that he
received from Gilley. Dkt. No. 35-1, pg. 25 (Pg. ID 315). Plaintiff alleges that
Leon Koua “promised” to investigate the issue, but never did. Id. Plaintiff also
asserts that he told Adrian Aguayo about the discrimination. Id. Aguayo told
Plaintiff to send him his concerns via email, which Plaintiff did without response
from Aguayo. Id. Plaintiff also maintains that he brought his discrimination
complaints to Human Resources, and the department likewise failed to investigate
his complaints. Id. Plaintiff’s response to Defendant’s summary judgment motion
states the Koua failed to address his complaint of discrimination and did not report
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it to HR. Dkt. No. 120, pg. 30 (Pg. ID 5605). However, Plaintiff’s citations to the
record do not point to any objective evidence of Plaintiff’s claims. See id.
Plaintiff’s response also re-states that Aguayo asked him to send an email with his
complaints of discrimination to which Plaintiff never received a response. Id. at pg.
32 9Pg. Id 5607). However, Plaintiff does not cite to any evidence in the record to
support this claim.
“[D]istrict courts [are] not required to accept unsupported, self-serving
testimony as evidence sufficient to create a jury question. Brooks v. Am. Broad.
Companies, Inc., 999 F.2d 167, 172 (6th Cir. 1993). Here, Plaintiff alleges that he
informed Fisk, Bayley, Koua, and Aguayo that Gilley subjected him to
discrimination. However, nothing in the record supports this claim, except for
Plaintiff’s subjective testimony. Further, evidence in the record supports the
conclusion that Plaintiff did not complain about racial or national origin
discrimination until he filed his EEOC complaint. No evidence suggests that
Defendant breached its duty to investigate claims of discrimination.
Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant was negligent in failing to supervise its
staff at KCAP. However, Plaintiff cannot establish that Defendant breached its
duty to supervise because the evidence does not support Plaintiff’s discrimination
allegations. See Section 2, Unequal Terms, supra.
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For these reasons, the Court will grant summary judgment in favor of
Defendant on Count V of Plaintiff’s complaint.
6. Implied Contract
Count Six of Plaintiff’s complaint alleges breach of implied contract. Dkt. No.
35-1, pg. 27 (Pg. ID 317). Plaintiff alleges that KCAP was a temporary project and
that it was implied that his regular job at Continental would continue at the
termination of the KCAP project. Id. Plaintiff asserts that he was in charge of at
least one other project for Continental with a third-party company and that he had
interviewed for other positions at Continental in Germany. Id. The complaint also
states that one of Plaintiff’s supervisors told him he was doing a “good job” at
KCAP, which also presents evidence that an implied contract existed between the
parties. Id.
A contract may be implied where (1) “there is a receipt of a benefit by a
defendant from a plaintiff”; and (2) “retention of the benefits is inequitable, absent
reasonable compensation.” Daimler-Chrysler Servs. N. Am., LLC v. Summit Nat.,
Inc., 289 F. App’x 916, 925 (6th Cir. 2008). Part of the rationale for implying a
contract-in-law is to prevent unjust enrichment. Id.
Plaintiff presents no evidence and the record does not demonstrate the existence
of an implied contract between the parties. Plaintiff was Defendant’s at-will
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employee. Dkt. No. 199, pg. 5 (Pg. ID 5476). Plaintiff does not present evidence in
the record to establish an inequitable relationship existed in which Defendant was
unjustly enriched. For these reasons, the Court will grant summary judgment in
favor of Defendant on Count VI of Plaintiff’s complaint.
7. Denial of Due Process
The last count of Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that Defendant denied him due
process by not following the internal rules and policies in investigating Plaintiff’s
complaints of discrimination. Dkt. No. 35-1, pg. 28 (Pg. ID 318). Plaintiff also
asserts a denial of due process because Defendant terminated him “with cause.” Id.
This Court presumes that Count VII alleges procedural due process violations,
considering that Plaintiff’s complaint alleges grievance procedure violations and
that Defendant failed to afford him “due process” before firing him. Id.
First, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant denied him due process by not properly
investigating his complaints of discrimination. To establish a procedural due
process claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) he had a life, liberty, or
property interest protected by the Due Process Clause; (2) he was deprived of this
interest; and (3) the state did not provide him with adequate procedural rights
before depriving him of the property interest. Crawford v. Benzie-Leenanau Dist.
Health Dep’t Bd. of Health, 636 F. App’x 261, 266 (6th Cir. 2016) (emphasis
added).
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First, Plaintiff’s employment was at-will and the record does not establish
that he had a property interest in his employment. Second, Plaintiff’s employment
was not with the government. For these reasons, Plaintiff cannot sustain a
procedural due process violation. Further, the record does not support Plaintiff’s
allegations that he complained to Defendant about Gilley’s discrimination. See
Section 5, Negligence, supra.
The second part of Count VII alleges a violation of due process because
Defendant terminated him “with cause.” However, Plaintiff was not a government
employee; he was an at-will employee who could be terminated at any time for
lawful reason. Dkt. No. 199, pg. 5 (Pg. ID 5476). Plaintiff does not dispute nor
does he present evidence that his employment was not at-will. As such, he had no
due process right in his employment. Gregory v. Hunt, 24F.3d 781, 785 (6th Cir.
1994) (an at-will public employee does not have a property interest in continued
employment”) (emphasis added).
Plaintiff cannot establish that he filed discrimination grievances against
Dawayne Gilley or that he had a property interest in his continued employment.
Defendant is therefore entitled to summary judgment on Count VII of Plaintiff’s
complaint.
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V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed herein, the Court will grant Defendant’s Motion.
SO ORDERED.
Dated:
March 26, 2019
s/Gershwin A. Drain
HON. GERSHWIN A. DRAIN
United States District Court Judge
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Copies of this Order were served upon attorneys of record on
March 26, 2019, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
/s/ Teresa McGovern
Case Manager
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