Do v. Toyota Motor North America et al

Filing 21

OPINION and ORDER granting 15 defendants' MOTION to Compel Arbitration and Dimiss the Complaint (DISMISSING CASE) Signed by District Judge George Caram Steeh. (MBea)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

THANH DO,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 17-12984
vs.
HON. GEORGE CARAM STEEH
TOYOTA MOTOR NORTH
AMERICA, WAYNE POWELL,
AND PHILIP PAQUETTE,
Defendants.
____________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO
COMPEL ARBITRATION AND DISMISS THE COMPLAINT [DOC. 15]
Plaintiff, Thanh Do, is a former Senior Engineer for Toyota Motor
North America (“Toyota”). In January 2017, Do, who is Vietnamese, filed a
charge of discrimination with the EEOC against Toyota, alleging national
origin discrimination. The EEOC issued a right to sue letter on June 21,
2017. Plaintiff filed this Title VII discrimination lawsuit on September 11,
2017 against Toyota and two of its supervisory employees.
Plaintiff began to work for Toyota on April 30, 2012 in Saline,
Michigan. On April 13, 2015, as part of a consolidation plan, Toyota
introduced the One Toyota Arbitration Agreement and engaged in a rollout
process which included distributing the Agreement and making it available
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to employees in three different ways: company email accounts, hard copy
to the home address on file, and the Human Resources intranet portal.
Each communication included the Agreement, a letter of explanation, and
Frequently Asked Questions. Each communication included the following
statement: “If you remain employed after August 14, 2015, you will be
deemed to have agreed to the Agreement.” The Agreement went into
effect on August 15, 2015. Plaintiff continued to work for Toyota until his
voluntary resignation on July 10, 2017.
The Agreement requires the parties to resolve any and all arbitrable
claims through mandatory binding arbitration, including all “claims,
disputes, or controversies, whether or not arising out of or relating to
[Plaintiff’s employment or its termination] with Company . . . or that
[Plaintiff] may have against (1) Company [or] (2) Company’s officers,
directors, employees or agents in their capacity as such or otherwise . . . .”
The Agreement defines “arbitrable claims” to include:
(1) all statutory claims; (2) claims for wages or other
compensation due; (3) claims for breach of any
contract or covenant (express or implied); (4) tort
claims; (5) claims for harassment or discrimination; (6)
claims for retaliation; (7) claims for benefits; and (8)
claims for violation of any federal, state, or other
governmental law, statute, regulation . . . .
Agreement p.1 (emphasis added). The Agreement provides that the
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Federal Arbitration Act shall govern its interpretation and enforcement as
well as all proceedings pursuant to it. The Frequently Asked Questions
explain that “[a]ll legal claims of any kind are subject to arbitration, except
for the very limited exceptions specified in the [Agreement].” Frequently
Asked Questions No. 4.
The matter is presently before the court on defendants’ motion to
compel arbitration and to dismiss the complaint. The court held a hearing
on the motion on December 13, 2017 at which time it granted defendants’
motion. The court explained its reasoning to plaintiff, who is representing
himself in this matter, and indicated that it would follow its ruling with a
written opinion. Defendants’ counsel informed plaintiff how the arbitration
process is to be initiated and said she would send plaintiff the relevant
information by email.
ANALYSIS
When a party files a motion to compel arbitration, the party opposing
arbitration “must show a genuine issue of material fact as to the validity of
the agreement to arbitrate. The required showing mirrors that required to
withstand summary judgment in a civil suit.” Great Earth Cos. v. Simons,
288 F.3d 878, 899 (6th Cir. 2002). “As a matter of federal law, any doubts
concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of
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arbitration.” Masco Corp. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 382 F.3d 624, 626 (6th
Cir. 2004).
“[W]hether or not a company [or individual] is bound to arbitrate, as
well as what issues it must arbitrate, is a matter to be determined by the
court.” City of Detroit Pension Fund v. Prudential Sec. Inc., 91 F.3d 26, 30
(6th Cir. 1996). The Sixth Circuit has identified four factors to consider
when deciding a motion to compel arbitration:
First, [the court] must determine whether the parties
agreed to arbitrate; second, [the court] must determine
the scope of that agreement; third, if federal statutory
claims are asserted, [the court] must consider whether
Congress intended those claims to be nonarbitrable; and
fourth, if the court concludes that some, but not all, of the
claims in the action are subject to arbitration, [the court]
must determine whether to stay the remainder of the
proceedings pending arbitration.
Glazer v. Lehman Bros., Inc., 394 F.3d 444, 451 (6th Cir. 2005).
I. The parties entered into a valid and enforceable agreement
Federal courts look to state law to determine whether a valid
arbitration agreement exists between the parties. Under Michigan law, the
necessary elements of a contract are: (1) parties competent to contract;
(2) proper subject matter; (3) consideration; (4) mutuality of agreement; and
(5) mutuality of obligation. Thomas v. Leja, 468 N.W.2d 58, 60 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1991). Michigan courts additionally require that “the arbitration
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agreement does not waive the substantive rights and remedies of the
statute and the arbitration procedures are fair so that the employee may
effectively vindicate his statutory rights.” Williams v. Serra Chevrolet Auto.,
LLC, No. 12-11756, 2013 WL 183942, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 17, 2013)
(citing Rembert v. Ryan’s Family Steak Houses, Inc., 596 N.W.2d 208, 226
(Mich. Ct. App. 1999)).
Plaintiff and Toyota were competent to contract and statutory civil
rights claims are proper subject matters for arbitration. Toyota’s payment
of wages and plaintiff’s continued employment constitute valid
consideration for plaintiff’s promise to arbitrate his claims. The Agreement
is supported by mutuality of agreement and obligation – the Company and
plaintiff “mutually agree to resolve through mandatory arbitration any and
all past, present and future claims … that Company may have against
[Plaintiff] or that [Plaintiff] may have against (1) Company, (2) Company’s
officers, directors, employees or agents in their capacity as such or
otherwise[.]”
Finally, the Agreement does not waive any statutory right or any
remedy and provides for the right to be represented by counsel, the right to
engage in discovery, the right to a full evidentiary hearing, and the right to a
decision by a neutral decision maker.
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II. The Agreement clearly encompasses plaintiff’s claims
The only claims excluded under the Agreement are claims for
temporary restraining orders or preliminary injunctions, claims for workers’
compensation and unemployment compensation benefits, and
administrative charges and proceedings, such as those before the NLRB
and EEOC. Therefore, the Agreement expressly requires plaintiff to
arbitrate his claims for discrimination in violation of Title VII.
III. Plaintiff’s claims are not excluded from arbitration
Congress has not excluded from arbitration claims for violations of
federal and state civil rights statutes.
IV. Dismissal is appropriate
Where a plaintiff’s claims fall within the scope of a valid arbitration
agreement, the Sixth Circuit has held that a “compulsory arbitration
provision divests the District Court of jurisdiction[.]” Simon v. Pfizer inc.,
398 F.3d 765, 773 (6th Cir. 2005). Here, all of plaintiff’s claims are subject
to arbitration and there is “nothing for the district court to do but execute the
[arbitration] judgment”, so dismissal is appropriate. Andrews v. TD
Ameritrade, Inc., 596 Fed. App’x 366, 372 (6th Cir. 2014 (citations omitted).
V. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth at oral argument and in this opinion and
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order, the court GRANTS defendants’ motion to compel arbitration and
DISMISSES plaintiff’s complaint.
In addition, the court notes that by agreeing to arbitrate his claims,
plaintiff has not waived any substantive right or remedy under Title VII.
Rather, the Arbitration Agreement merely dictates the forum in which the
parties must litigate the claims. Arbitration is mutually beneficial as it is a
faster and less expensive process than litigation. Finally, this court
retains jurisdiction to enforce the arbitration award or to hear any
challenges regarding the award.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: January 3, 2018
s/George Caram Steeh
GEORGE CARAM STEEH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Copies of this Order were served upon attorneys of record on
January 3, 2018, by electronic and/or ordinary mail and also
on Thanh Do, 42211 Trotwood Court, Canton, MI 48187.
s/Barbara Radke
Deputy Clerk

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