Golden v. UAW Chrysler National Training Center

Filing 40

OPINION and ORDER Granting Defendant's 35 MOTION for Summary Judgment. Signed by District Judge Laurie J. Michelson. (EKar)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
IRMA GOLDEN,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 17-13018
Honorable Laurie J. Michelson
Magistrate Judge Stephanie Dawkins Davis

v.
UAW-CHRYSLER NATIONAL
TRAINING CENTER,
Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [35]
Irma Golden was earning more than $55,000 when she left her job at the UAW-Chrysler
National Training Center (“NTC”) on May 31, 2017. She had worked at the organization for more
than a quarter of a century in a variety of support-staff positions.
Golden did not leave on the best terms. During the preceding decade, she had complained
to superiors that she was underpaid. And closer to her departure, she had lost some of her job
responsibilities and had been assigned tasks that she found to be menial. These changes, according
to Golden, amounted to a constructive discharge, giving her no choice but to quit.
Golden then sued the NTC. She alleges that the NTC discriminated against her based on
age and sex and retaliated against her for engaging in protected activity. In particular, Golden
argues that the NTC unlawfully paid her less than two similarly situated coworkers, Alfred Jones
and Michelle Adams. The NTC moved for summary judgment, arguing that Golden cannot
establish any of her claims.
For the reasons described below, the Court will grant the NTC’s motion.

I.
The NTC, an organization jointly operated by UAW and Fiat Chrysler Automobiles,
“provide[s] joint programs for the benefit of UAW-represented workers at FCA and provides
extensive training to FCA employees represented by the UAW.” (ECF No. 36-1, PageID.227–
228.)
The specifics of Golden’s role are central to this case, so the Court will discuss them in
some detail. Golden, who holds a bachelor’s degree, first joined the NTC as a security guard in
1990. (ECF No. 36-1, PageID.239; ECF No. 36-6, PageID.663.) Within several months, she
moved to the organization’s professional support staff. (Id.) Over the subsequent 26 years, in the
roles of communication specialist and then training specialist, Golden had many job
responsibilities. She worked on numerous conferences and trainings, such as the women’s
committee program and the employee assistance program, and coordinated a March of Dimes
event. (ECF No. 36-6, PageID.682–684.) According to Golden, her functions included planning
the agendas, arranging audiovisual technology, and registering participants. (ECF No. 36-6,
PageID.686–687.) Eventually, she also became responsible for entering information into a
database to track the list of training participants. (ECF No. 36-6, PageID.691–694.) The number
of trainings dwindled, though, in the aftermath of Chrysler’s 2009 bankruptcy and lack of new
hires. (ECF No. 36-4, PageID.489–490; ECF No. 36-9, PageID.1062–1063.)
Position data questionnaires from three separate points during Golden’s NTC career shed
light on her job responsibilities. Golden’s 1997 and 2005 questionnaires listed her title as “Training
Specialist.” (ECF No. 36-8, PageID.976; ECF No. 36-19, PageID.1198.) The 1997 report
described her principal role as providing “on-going technical expertise and assistance for the
development and implementation of NTC education and training programs,” which included

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“involvement with conferences, in-service training, small group sessions, and other activities.”
(ECF No. 36-19, PageID.1198–1200.) Golden’s duties ranged from planning the agendas of the
trainings to taking group pictures. (Id.) Her 2005 questionnaire summarized her position in roughly
the same manner. (ECF No. 36-8, PageID.976–977.) One new addition was that she had become
the program support administrator of TEDS, a “database designed to catalog and track NTC
sponsored training.” (Id.)
By 2015 Golden’s title had changed slightly to “Training Specialist/[Learning
Management System] Administrator.” (ECF No. 36-7, PageID.969–974.) Golden estimated that
she spent 60 percent of her time delivering trainings and developing training materials for various
programs. (Id.) She worked the remainder of the time providing “[a]dmin responsibilities” for the
Learning Management System (which tracked participant attendance), entering the information of
program attendees into the ToolingU database, and assisting in research for other trainings. (Id.)
The questionnaire confirmed that she had no budgetary duties or supervisory responsibilities. (Id.)
At some point in 2015, higher-ups at the NTC removed Golden from trainings that included
solely UAW workers. (ECF No. 36-5, PageID.560–573.) For trainings such as UAW new-hire
orientations, the sessions became facilitated by so-called Special Assigned and International
Reps—FCA or UAW employees, respectively, who had been assigned temporarily to the NTC.
(Id.) But as long as the training included some non-union employees, such as members of
management, Golden continued to conduct the trainings as usual. (Id.) According to Delrico Loyd,
who administered the training programs on behalf of UAW, this change aligned with the UAW
philosophy that its members should be trained by UAW-appointed trainers, a group that did not
include Golden. (ECF No. 36-5, PageID.535–536, 564–565.)

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Golden was displeased by this change. On July 23, 2015, she sent an email to both Loyd
and Helen Smith, Loyd’s counterpart from the FCA side. Golden was “seeking explanation,” she
wrote, after learning that her “assignment to conduct the Diversity series training for New Hire
Orientation has been eliminated without notification.” (ECF No. 38-8, PageID.1289–1290.) In
response, Scott advised Golden to discuss the matter with her direct supervisor, Lamar Harris. (Id.)
When Harris then met with Golden, he assured her that he would “get to the bottom of it.” (ECF
No. 36-6, PageID.149.) When the two spoke several months later and nothing had happened,
Golden decided to “just let it go.” (Id.)
Around this time, Golden also was assigned to duties that she describes as “menial.” (ECF
No. 38, PageID.1240.) When she worked at the all-UAW training sessions, she provided support
for the trainers rather than doing the trainings herself. (ECF No. 36-6, PageID.810.) For instance,
Golden advanced the presenters’ slides and checked whether the microphones had batteries. (Id.)
At one weeklong conference, she sat in the back of the room and occasionally made photocopies
or poured coffee for people. (ECF No. 36-6, PageID.812–813.) She also was invited to fewer staff
meetings. (ECF No. 36-6, PageID.792–794.) But she continued to conduct various other trainings,
including the employee assistance program and workplace violence program, as well as organizing
the March of Dimes event. (ECF No. 36-6, PageID.802.)
In addition to Golden’s frustration with her role, there also was the issue of her
compensation. At several meetings from 2007 until her departure, she expressed to managers that
she desired a larger paycheck. (ECF No. 36-2, PageID.266–269; ECF No. 36-4, PageID.411–414;
ECF No. 36-5, PageID.553–556; ECF No. 36-6, PageID.735–736, 848–850.) As the record shows,
the NTC’s system for establishing wages was not simple. The board of the NTC, which controlled
Golden’s pay, had a system involving a third-party evaluator to set compensation ranges. (ECF

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No. 36-1, PageID.229; ECF No. 36-2, PageID.264–265.) But the frequency of this process was
erratic. (Id.) When a third party eventually presented a report in August 2015, the evaluator
suggested that employees in Golden’s category (“Specialists, Exec Asst”) earn between $46,750
and $63,250, with a midpoint of $55,000. (ECF No. 36-1, PageID.237–239.) At the time, Golden
made $26.54 per hour, which amounted to $55,203 per year. (Id.; ECF No. 38-6, PageID.1283.)
Golden also thought that the NTC had a bias against older employees and would ignore
their needs. (ECF No. 36-6, PageID.822–823.) In a 2015 meeting with Loyd, she asked him to
bring up the issue of her pay with UAW Vice President Norwood Jewell. (ECF No. 36-6, 820–
21.) A month or two later, Loyd and Golden spoke again. (Id.) According to Golden, Loyd told
her that management “want[ed] people to retire” and then asked her directly, “Have you ever
thought about retiring?” (Id.) (Loyd says he “never” had any conversations about retirement with
Golden (ECF No. 36-5, PageID.613), but the Court construes evidence in the light most favorable
to Golden at the summary-judgment stage.)
About two years later, Golden indeed retired. Soon after, she filed this lawsuit.
II.
Summary judgment is appropriate only “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). “An issue of fact is ‘genuine’ if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Hedrick v. Western Reserve Care Sys., 355 F.3d 444,
451 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). “A fact is
material only if its resolution will affect the outcome of the lawsuit.” Id. at 451–52 (citing
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, this Court views the

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evidence, and any reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence, in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
III.
A.
When claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) are based on
circumstantial evidence, the familiar three-step McDonnell Douglas framework applies. See
Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 154 F.3d 344, 350 (6th Cir. 1998) (citing McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)). First, the plaintiff has the burden to present
sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Loyd v. Saint Joseph Mercy
Oakland, 766 F.3d 580, 589 (6th Cir. 2014). To do so, the individual must demonstrate that “she
is a member of a protected class, (2) she suffered an adverse employment action, (3) she was
qualified for the position, and (4) she was replaced by someone outside the protected class or
treated differently from similarly situated, non-protected employees.” Id.1 If the plaintiff satisfies
those criteria, the burden of production in the second step shifts to the employer, who must provide
a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment action. See id. at 590. Finally, if the
employer meets its burden, the burden of production shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the
employer’s explanation is pretextual. See id.
In terms of an adverse employment action, an employee who quits her job instead of being
fired can assert that she was constructively discharged. “To demonstrate constructive discharge, a

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Golden’s brief proposed a substitute fourth factor: “circumstances that support an
inference of discrimination,” citing Blizzard v. Marion Tech. Coll., 698 F.3d 275, 283 (6th Cir.
2012). But Blizzard cited a Supreme Court case that solely restated the law from a different circuit.
See 698 F.3d at 283 (quoting Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510 (2002)). Under either
fourth factor, however, the result is the same. As discussed in the text below, the facts do not
support an inference of age discrimination.
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plaintiff must adduce evidence to show that (1) the employer deliberately created intolerable
working conditions, as perceived by a reasonable person, (2) the employer did so with the intention
of forcing the employee to quit, and (3) the employee actually quit.” Savage v. Gee, 665 F.3d 732,
739 (6th Cir. 2012) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). “Whether a reasonable
person would have [felt] compelled to resign depends on the facts of each case,” but the Sixth
Circuit considers the following factors: (1) demotion; (2) reduction in salary; (3) reduction in job
responsibilities; (4) reassignment to menial or degrading work; (5) reassignment to work under a
younger supervisor; (6) badgering, harassment, or humiliation by the employer calculated to
encourage the employee's resignation; or (7) offers of early retirement or continued employment
on terms less favorable than the employee's former status. Laster v. City of Kalamazoo, 746 F.3d
714, 728 (6th Cir. 2014) (alteration in original) (quoting Logan v. Denny’s, Inc., 259 F.3d 558, 569
(6th Cir. 2001)).
Here, the Court finds that no reasonable jury could conclude that the NTC deliberately
made Golden’s work conditions objectively intolerable, amounting to constructive discharge.
Therefore, Golden is unable to establish that she suffered an adverse employment action, an
element of her prima facie case.
Golden meets very few of the factors under Laster. She was not demoted. She suffered no
loss of pay or benefits. She was not reassigned to a younger supervisor. Except for one alleged
comment about whether Golden had thought about retirement, which was hardly badgering or
harassing, nobody encouraged her to leave the NTC.
Golden bases her constructive discharge claim on having her duties reduced to menial
tasks. (ECF No. 38, PagedID.1238–1241.) To be sure, some of Golden’s duties were eliminated
and she was asked to take on others. She no longer conducted certain trainings. She was sometimes

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bored. And to her frustration, she was asked for one week to occasionally get coffee and sometimes
had to operate someone else’s slideshow. “Changes in employee responsibilities or authority,
triggered by the company reorganization, without more, do not amount to intolerable conditions
constituting constructive discharge.” Keller v. Allstate Ins. Co., 146 F. App’x 764, 765 (6th Cir.
2005). Golden’s work conditions might have been difficult or unpleasant sometimes, but no
reasonable jury could find that they were objectively intolerable—a high bar.
Nor were the occasional new tasks, like getting coffee, so “menial or degrading” that a
reasonable person would have resigned. Cf. Logan, 259 F.3d at 571 (finding that a reasonable
restaurant server would have considered mopping floors as a busser to be menial work); Gibbs v.
Voith Indus. Servs., Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 780, 800 (E.D. Mich. 2014) (holding that an employee
was constructively discharged when she was reassigned to a work area that contained aggressive
rats and a “wide variety of animal pests (and their associated wastes)”). Finally, Golden cannot
demonstrate that her bosses “deliberately” changed some of her tasks “with the intention of forcing
[her] to quit.” See Savage, 665 F.3d at 739. Indeed, the record is undisputed that Golden’s removal
from certain trainings was due to a new policy that only UAW appointees should perform trainings
solely for UAW members.
Even if Golden could demonstrate constructive discharge, her prima facie case still would
fail. Golden alleges that the NTC treated her differently from and replaced her with Michelle
Adams, a younger employee.
Adams, who was 31 years old when she was hired in early 2015, is a relative of Nancy
Adams Johnson, Jewell’s administrative assistant. (ECF No. 36-4, PageID.429; ECF No. 36-6,
PageID.767; ECF No. 36-10, PageID.1102,1119.) Golden believed that Adams received
preferential treatment because of her familial connection to Johnson. (ECF No. 36-6, PageID.790.)

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By mid-August 2015, Johnson had arranged for Adams to be hired by FCA, after which time
Adams became a UAW member. (ECF No. 36-4, PageID.429–439; ECF No. 36-10, PageID.1129).
From that point forward, Adams remained employed by FCA but tasked to work at the NTC as a
“Special Assigned.” (ECF No. 36-10, PageID.1111.) According to the UAW, FCA employees who
are temporarily assigned to the NTC “remain employees of the UAW or FCA” and “[t]heir
paychecks are issued from and their benefits are set by the UAW or FCA.” (ECF No. 36-1,
PageID.228–229.) Furthermore, the NTC does not have the ability to hire or fire these workers
and reimburses the UAW or FCA for their compensation. (Id.) Individuals who were assigned to
the NTC made about $40 per hour even though a new hire in an FCA plant might start at $15 per
hour. (ECF No. 36-4, PageID.432–433.)
Adams, who reported to UAW’s Delrico Loyd, was part of a four-person department that
consisted solely of UAW members. (ECF No. 36-10, PageID.1109,1131.) She was given certain
responsibilities that used to be assigned to Golden, such as diversity training. (ECF No. 36-10,
PageID.1113.) Golden and Adams also worked together on many projects, such as certain out-ofstate trainings. (ECF No. 36-10, PageID.1116–1117.) Unlike Golden, Adams did not work on data
entry. (ECF No. 36-10, PageID.1118.)
But Golden was not replaced by Michelle Adams. In fact, Golden’s position remains
vacant. (ECF No. 36-1, PageID.228.) “A person is replaced only when another employee is hired
or reassigned to perform the plaintiff’s duties.” Pierson v. Quad/Graphics Printing Corp., 749
F.3d 530, 537 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Barnes v. GenCorp Inc., 896 F.2d 1457, 1465 (6th Cir.
1990)). Adams was not hired or reassigned to perform Golden’s duties. Rather, Adams was
assigned to the NTC starting in 2015, two years before Golden quit. And their job responsibilities
did not overlap in many areas, such as Golden’s data-entry tasks. Although Adams took over

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certain duties that used to belong to Golden, “a person is not replaced when another employee is
assigned to perform the plaintiff’s duties in addition to other duties, or when the work is
redistributed among other existing employees already performing related work.” Id. (quoting
Barnes, 896 F.3d at 1465).
Nor were Golden and Adams similarly situated to each other. Whereas Golden worked for
the NTC, Adams was employed by FCA. Since Golden and Adams had different employers, they
were not similarly situated in all relevant aspects of employment. See Ercegovich, 154 F.3d at 352
(holding that comparators “must be similar in all of the relevant aspects” (emphasis and internal
quotation marks omitted)); Carter v. Arkansas, 392 F.3d 965, 969 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding that
two employees were not similarly situated because they had different employers).
So Golden cannot make out a prima facie case for this claim either.
In response to Golden’s allegations, the NTC said that Adams took over some of Golden’s
job responsibilities for various non-discriminatory reasons, including the policy that only UAW
members should train groups of exclusively UAW members. Golden herself believed that Adams
was hired because of her family connections rather than her age. However, because Golden cannot
satisfy step one of McDonnell Douglas, the Court need not proceed to step three (or even step two)
regarding the age-discrimination claims.
B.
Second, Golden argues that the NTC violated the ADEA’s antiretaliation provision. That
section makes it “unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any of [its] employees . . .
because such individual . . . has opposed any practice made unlawful by this section, or because
such individual . . . has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an
investigation, proceeding, or litigation under” the statute. 29 U.S.C. § 623(d).

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The McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework applies to this claim, too, so the
plaintiff first has the burden to make out a prima facie case of retaliation. See Weigel v. Baptist
Hosp. of E. Tenn., 302 F.3d 367, 381 (6th Cir. 2002). The requirements of a prima facie retaliation
case are “(1) that the plaintiff engaged in a protected activity; (2) that the defendant had knowledge
of the plaintiff’s protected conduct; (3) that the defendant took an adverse employment action
towards the plaintiff; and (4) that there was a causal connection between the protected activity and
the adverse employment action.” Id. Moreover, the plaintiff must prove but-for causation. See
E.E.O.C. v. New Breed Logistics, 783 F.3d 1057, 1066 (6th Cir. 2015) (explaining the standard in
Title VII cases); Fox v. Eagle Distrib. Co., 510 F.3d 587, 591 (6th Cir. 2007) (similarly construing
the antiretaliation provisions of Title VII and the ADEA).
When an individual suffers an adverse employment action “very close in time” to the
moment when her employer learned of her protected activity, there is sufficient evidence of a
causal connection. See Yazdian v. ConMed Endoscopic Techs., Inc., 793 F.3d 634, 650 (6th Cir.
2015) (quoting Mickey v. Zeidler Tool & Die Co., 516 F.3d 516, 525 (6th Cir. 2008)). Typically,
causation is “satisfied only where the adverse employment action occurred within a matter of
months, or less, of the protected activity.” Dye v. Office of the Racing Comm’n, 702 F.3d 286, 306
(6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Dixon v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 324, 334 (6th Cir. 2007)). “But where some
time elapses” between those two occurrences, “the employee must couple temporal proximity with
other evidence of retaliatory conduct to establish causality.” Yazdian, 793 F.3d at 650 (quoting
Mickey, 516 F.3d at 525).
Golden asserts that after she complained about her pay, the NTC retaliated against her by
taking an adverse employment action.

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The NTC concedes in its motion that Golden engaged in protected activity when she
complained about her pay. However, the organization disputes that it took an adverse employment
action toward Golden and, even if it did, it maintains there was no causal connection between that
action and Golden’s complaints about her pay.
The Court finds Golden’s retaliation argument to be unavailing. For starters, it is not clear
which conversation (or conversations) Golden is referencing. She spoke with two managers about
her pay during the period from 2003 to 2006; in 2008, someone in management told her, “[T]here’s
not going to be any raises, and if you want, I could just lay you off”; sometime between 2010 and
2014, she told the co-director of the NTC that she was paid less than Jones; in 2011, she had a
meeting about compensation with her coordinator and the UAW vice president; in 2012, she raised
the issue of pay with the personnel director, who told her that if management reviewed her
compensation, they might pay her less money based on figures from the Bureau of Labor Statistics;
multiple times between 2011 and 2014, she met with her coordinator to request greater
compensation; and in 2014, she complained about her pay to Delrico Loyd. (ECF No. 36-2,
PageID.266–269; ECF No. 36-4, PageID.411–414; ECF No. 36-5, PageID.553–556; ECF No. 366, PageID.735–736, 848–850.)
As discussed, the undisputed record does not support a claim of constructive discharge.
And even if the complained-about job changes constituted an adverse employment action, Golden
cannot demonstrate causality. When the NTC removed Golden from trainings that involved only
UAW members, it was mid-2015. As “some time elapse[d]” since the most recent complaints,
Golden must “couple temporal proximity with other evidence of retaliatory conduct to establish
causality.” See Yazdian, 793 F.3d at 650. On this issue, Golden’s brief is threadbare. Golden states
only that the NTC knew about her complaints and that she afterward suffered an adverse

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employment action. What is lacking is any evidence that somebody at the NTC who knew about
her complaints took action because Golden complained. And in the case of some of Golden’s
complaints, many years passed before her job responsibilities changed. In other words, she cannot
demonstrate that the harm would not have occurred “but for” her complaints. So she cannot make
out a prima facie case of unlawful retaliation under the ADEA.
To be sure, the “burden of establishing a prima facie case in a retaliation action is not
onerous.” Mickey, 516 F.3d at 523. Still, even if Golden could demonstrate a prima facie case, she
cannot satisfy the remainder of the McDonnell Douglas analysis. The NTC articulated a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for altering Golden’s job responsibilities: a new policy that required a
UAW member to conduct trainings of solely UAW members. This explanation satisfies the
organization’s burden of production under step two. See id. at 526. Under step three, the burden
shifts back to Golden to show pretext. See id. To do so, Golden “must produce sufficient evidence
from which the jury could reasonably reject [the NTC’s] explanation and infer that [the NTC] . . .
did not honestly believe in the proffered nondiscriminatory reason.” Id. (quoting Braithwaite v.
Timken Co., 258 F.3d 488, 493–94 (6th Cir. 2001)). “A plaintiff can demonstrate pretext by
showing that the proffered reason (1) has no basis in fact, (2) did not actually motivate the
defendant's challenged conduct, or (3) was insufficient to warrant the challenged conduct.” Id.
(quoting Dews v. A.B. Dick Co., 231 F.3d 1016, 1021 (6th Cir. 2000)).
Regarding the new training guideline, Golden mainly asserts that she “never heard such a
rule before” and it was “no coincidence” that she was the only person affected. (ECF No. 38,
PageID.1248–1249.) But skepticism and unfamiliarity are not enough. She has not produced
sufficient evidence that the NTC’s stated reason was factually untrue, that the organization was
actually motivated by another reason, or that the stated reason did not sufficiently explain why she

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was removed from the trainings. Since no jury could reasonably reject the NTC’s explanation as
pretextual on this record, Golden’s retaliation claim does not survive summary judgment.
C.
Finally, the Court reviews Golden’s allegation of sex discrimination under the Equal Pay
Act (“EPA”).
To establish a prima facie case under the EPA, a plaintiff must show that “an employer
pays different wages to employees of opposite sexes ‘for equal work on jobs the performance of
which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar
working conditions.’” Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1974) (quoting 29
U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)). To be considered equal work, two jobs may be “substantially equal” rather
than “identical.” Beck-Wilson v. Principi, 441 F.3d 353, 359 (6th Cir. 2006). In deciding whether
two jobs are substantially equal, one looks to an “overall comparison of the work, not its individual
segments.” Id. at 359–60 (quoting Odomes v. Nucare, Inc., 653 F.2d 246, 250 (6th Cir. 1981)). If
a plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to prove an
affirmative defense. See id. at 360.
Alfred Jones retired in 2013 after having been a longtime NTC employee—and Golden’s
former supervisor. In his final year at the NTC, Jones earned a salary of $78,395.10. (ECF No. 385, PageID.1275.) Jones received bachelor’s and master’s degrees before joining Chrysler in 1984
as a trainer of new employees. (ECF No. 36-9, PageID.983–985.) He moved over to the NTC as a
job training counselor in 1987, shortly after the center was established. (ECF No. 36-9,
PageID.994.) The NTC paid Jones a salary, rather than an hourly wage, from the beginning of his
employment. (ECF No. 36-9, PageID.1001,1004.) Early on, Jones helped to train facilitators,

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reviewed applications for the Tuition Assistance Program, and started the Youth School-to-Work
Program for high school students. (ECF No. 36-9, PageID.997–1000.)
Jones was Golden’s supervisor for about one year starting in 1997, taking on added
responsibilities and reviewing Golden’s time cards. (ECF No. 36-6, PageID.679,706,749; ECF No.
36-9, PageID.1033.) In 1997, when he led the Educational Services Department, Jones listed three
primary job responsibilities. He spent 40 percent of his time working on the “development,
implementation and presentation” of six worker participation conferences. (ECF No. 36-17,
PageID.1179–1182.) Jones devoted another 30 percent to his responsibilities as chair of the Tuition
Assistance Program (“TAP”). (Id.) And he spent the remaining 30 percent of his time as the
administrator of the School-to-Work Program, where he developed the budget, contracted with
vendors, and scheduled classes. (Id.) During that time, Jones “always” reviewed the drafts of
Golden’s program materials “for additional suggestions and feedback.” (ECF No. 36-19,
PageID.1202.)
Jones soon returned to his previous position as a “training facilitator” or “educational
services specialist,” where he remained until his retirement. (ECF No. 36-9, PageID.984,1006;
ECF No. 36-18, PageID.1196.) As described in Jones’ position questionnaire from 2005, the last
year provided in the record, his principal role was to provide “educational resources and support
services to various NTC programs, including service as the Chair of the Proposal Evaluation
Committee for [the Tuition Assistance Program].” (ECF No. 36-18, PageID.1196.) Among other
tasks, he assisted in developing workshops for seven NTC programs, assisted in developing
budgets, and designed print materials for conferences. (Id.) When asked to estimate how much of
his work overlapped with that of Golden, Jones estimated about “10 to 15 percent” usually and no
more than “30 percent” in a given year. (ECF No. 36-9, PageID.1054–1055.) Finally, Golden

15

acknowledged in her deposition that she and Jones “didn’t have identical job responsibilities.”
(ECF No. 36-6, PageID.743.)
Before proceeding to the merits, the Court considers whether Golden timely filed her EPA
claim. The statute of limitations is two years or, in the case of a willful violation, three years.
Logan v. MGM Grand Detroit Casino, 939 F.3d 824, 830 (6th Cir. 2019); 29 U.S.C. § 255(a).
Since Golden does not allege willful conduct, the Court will consider her claims of unequal pay
during the two years prior to Golden’s filing of this suit, i.e., September 12, 2015, through
September 12, 2017. Each unequal paycheck constitutes a violation of the EPA. See Gandy v.
Sullivan Cty., 24 F.3d 861, 864 (6th Cir. 1994).
Golden resigned effective May 31, 2017. (ECF No. 36-6, PageID.873–874.) But Jones,
who is Golden’s lone comparator, left the NTC on August 2, 2013. (ECF No. 36-16, PageID.1177.)
August 2013, then, was the last time when Golden and Jones both received paychecks from the
organization. So although Golden received many paychecks in the two years before September 12,
2017, Jones received none.
The NTC argues that Golden waited too long to bring her case. In at least one Sixth Circuit
case, the defendant was granted summary judgment because the only man similarly situated to the
female plaintiff had retired outside the statutory period. See E.E.O.C. v. Penton Indus. Pub. Co.,
851 F.2d 835, 838 (6th Cir. 1988). The court reasoned that “no male employee was thereafter paid
more than a similarly situated female employee” and the plaintiff could not “demonstrate any
present disparity in wages.” Id. at 838–89.
A few years later, another in-circuit opinion somewhat limited Penton to its facts. See
Gandy, 24 F.3d at 865 (holding that the court was “not constrained by Penton” because the
plaintiff’s comparator was a predecessor rather than a coworker). In that opinion, the court also

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commented that “Penton does not suggest how the discrimination ceased since the female
employees continued to be compensated at the discriminatory wage rate.” Id. At least two other
circuits follow the rationale of Penton. See Snider v. Belvidere Twp., 216 F.3d 616, 618 (7th Cir.
2000) (“[T]he male’s departure ends the allegedly discriminatory wage differential.”); Pollis v.
New Sch. for Soc. Research, 132 F.3d 115, 118–19 (2d Cir. 1997). On the other hand, one Fourth
Circuit opinion strongly disagreed with Penton and held that a plaintiff could bring an EPA suit
even though her comparator had retired outside the limitations period. See Brinkley-Obu v. Hughes
Training, Inc., 36 F.3d 336, 345–51 (4th Cir. 1994); see also id. at 349 n.30 (criticizing Penton as
being contrary to EEOC regulations).
But the Court need not resolve this issue because Golden cannot make out a prima facie
case of sex discrimination. Simply put, she and Jones performed jobs that were not “substantially
equal” and did not require “equal skill, effort, and responsibility.”
By Jones’s estimation, no more than thirty percent of his work overlapped that of Golden.
Golden does not dispute this. In her response to the summary-judgment motion, she states that
roughly “80% of each one’s time was spent together training with teams, and the remainder of
their time was spent on related activities.” (ECF No. 38, PageID.1251.) She continues: “They
conducted training at NTC and trained around the country with teams, conducting sessions in
different plants, organizing conferences around the country.” (Id.) But spending time together on
projects does not equate to doing the same job. Nor do two members of the same team always have
equal job functions. Jones also had many responsibilities that Golden never shared. At one point,
Jones served as Golden’s supervisor and reviewed her work. He served as the chair of a committee
for the Tuition Assistance Program, administered the School-to-Work program, and assisted in

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developing budgets. Golden never had these responsibilities. Her job also consisted of functions,
like data entry, that were not a part of Jones’s portfolio.
By making an “overall comparison of the work,” see Beck-Wilson, 441 F.3d at 359, no
reasonable jury could find that the jobs were substantially equal. In at least some instances, such
as developing budgets, Jones’s work required more “skill, effort, and responsibility” than
Golden’s. And without demonstrating that she and a male comparator did equal work, Golden
cannot make out a prima facie case of sex discrimination.
IV.
Because the Court finds that the NTC is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all three
counts, the motion for summary judgment is hereby GRANTED. Therefore, the case is
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: November 14, 2019

s/Laurie J. Michelson
LAURIE J. MICHELSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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