Roberson v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co.

Filing 41

OPINION AND ORDER Adopting 39 Report and Recommendation, Granting 31 Motion for Sanctions, filed by Norfolk Southern Railway Co. Signed by District Judge Paul D. Borman. (DTof)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
KENNETH ROBERSON,
Case No. 16-cv-13166
Plaintiff,
v.

Paul D. Borman
United States District Judge

NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY
CO.,

R. Steven Whalen
United States Magistrate Judge

Defendant.
______________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER:
(1) ADOPTING MAGISTRATE JUDGE WHALEN’S MAY 31, 2020
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION (ECF NO. 39);
(2) OVERRULING PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS (ECF NO. 40); AND
(3) GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS
AND ATTORNEY’S FEES PURSUANT TO RULE 11
AND LOCAL RULE 83.22 (ECF NO. 31)
On May 31, 2020, Magistrate Judge R. Steven Whalen issued a Report and
Recommendation to Grant Defendant’s Motion for Sanctions and Attorney’s Fees
Pursuant to Rule 11 and Local Rule 83.22 (ECF No. 31), and recommending that
Plaintiff and his attorney be sanctioned, jointly and severally, in the amount of
$5,000.00, representing Defendant’s reasonable attorney fees. (ECF No. 39, Report
and Recommendation (“R&R”).) Plaintiff Kenneth Roberson filed Objections to the
R&R which are now before this Court for resolution. (ECF No. 40, Plaintiff’s
Objections to Report and Recommendation (“Pl.’s Obj.”).) Defendant Norfolk

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Southern Railway Company did not file a response. The Court, having conducted
de novo review under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) of those
portions of the R&R to which specific and timely objections have been filed,
OVERRULES Plaintiff’s Objections, ADOPTS the Report and Recommendation,
GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for Sanctions and Attorney’s Fees Pursuant to Rule
11 and Local Rule 83.22 (ECF No. 31), and AWARDS sanctions against Plaintiff
and his attorney, jointly and severally, in the amount of $5,000.00.
I.
A.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff’s Complaint and the Parties’ Settlement Agreement

On September 9, 2016, Plaintiff filed a civil complaint alleging that Defendant
violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq.
(ECF No. 1.) Following mediation on November 29, 2018, the parties reached a
settlement, the terms of which were subsequently memorialized in a written
Settlement Agreement and Release. (ECF No. 31-3, Executed Settlement Agreement
and Release (“Agreement”), PgID 694-702.)

Defendant’s counsel drafted the

Agreement and the parties exchanged the proposed and revised agreements,
eventually culminating in the agreed Agreement. (ECF Nos. 27-4 through 27-7.)
Plaintiff and his attorney had about three months to consider and discuss with
Defendant’s attorney any perceived flaws or terms that were inconsistent with what
was agreed to at the mediation. (See id.) They did not do so, and Plaintiff and his
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attorney signed the final Agreement on February 22 and 28, 2019, respectively.
(Agreement, PgID 702.)
Paragraph 1(a) of the Agreement provides as follows:
1.

Settlement Amount. Based upon and in consideration for the
representations, promises, covenants, and conditions stated
herein, and if Roberson signs and does not revoke this
Agreement as permitted by Section 10 below, the Parties agree
to the following:
(a)

Norfolk Southern will pay Roberson the total gross
amount of _________(“Settlement Amount”),1 less all
applicable deductions, liens (including any Railroad
Retirement Board liens), taxes, loans, or amounts owed.
The Settlement Amount will be allocated as follows:

(i)

_______ of the Settlement Amount will be considered as
back wages he alleges he would have earned from
September 17, 2015 to November 29, 2018 but for the
conduct alleged in his Lawsuit, for which an IRS Form W2 will issue, and will be subject to Railroad Retirement
Board liens and all local, state and federal withholdings
and other deductions and liens mandated by local, state,
and federal law.

(ii)

________ of the Settlement Amount will be considered as
non-wage damages for which an IRS Form 1099 will be
issued to Roberson.

(Agreement, PgID 694-95 (emphases added).)
In satisfaction of the parties’ settlement, on March 26, 2019, Defendant sent
Plaintiff two settlement checks for non-wage payments and a third voided check for

1

The Settlement Amount is subject to a confidentiality agreement, and therefore has
been redacted.
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wages from which Defendant withheld $10,000 in order to satisfy a portion of the
$19,915.33 lien that the Railroad Retirement Board (“RRB”) held against Plaintiff.
(ECF No. 31-4, March 26, 2019 Letter and Enclosures, PgID 704-09.) Defendant
also enclosed a copy of U.S. Railroad Retirement Board Form ID-3u, which
describes the $19,915.33 lien held by the RRB against Plaintiff. (Id.)
When Plaintiff received the settlement check, he saw that money had been
deducted from the settlement amount to satisfy the RRB lien. On April 15, Plaintiff
emailed Defendant and advised that “our position is that [Defendant] does not have
any right to withhold any of the settlement proceeds by virtue of any RRB lien.”
(ECF 31-5, 4/15/19 Email, PgID 711.) Defendant advised in response that the lien
is required to be satisfied by law, pursuant to the Railroad Unemployment Insurance
Act, 42, U.S.C. § 351, et seq., and further directed Plaintiff to the specific language
in Paragraph 1(a) of the Settlement Agreement and Release. (ECF No. 31-6, 4/25/19
Email, PgID 714.)
B.

The Court Denies Plaintiff’s Motion to Enforce the Settlement
Agreement or in the Alternative to Set-Aside Settlement

On June 13, 2019, Plaintiff, through counsel, filed a Motion to Enforce
“Settlement Agreement” or in the Alternative to Set-Aside Settlement (“Motion to
Enforce”), which contained declarations of the Plaintiff and his wife to the effect
that during the mediation process, they overheard Defendant’s counsel make a
remark that there was no RRB lien. (ECF No. 24, Motion to Enforce.) Plaintiff
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sought to either have Defendant pay the lien, or to withdraw from the settlement
agreement. (Id.)
On September 25, 2019, following a hearing, Magistrate Judge Whalen filed
a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”), recommending that the Plaintiff’s Motion
to Enforce be denied. (ECF No. 37, 9/25/19 R&R.) Judge Whalen applied the well
settled principles of contract law to the Settlement Agreement, and found that its
terms were clear on their face:
The written Settlement Agreement in this case is clear on its face. It
states that the Settlement Amount will be subject to a RRB lien, and
bifurcates the payment into an amount representing back wages (which
explicitly would be subject to the RRB lien and for which an IRS Form
W-2 would be issued), and non-wage damages (which would not be
subject to the lien, and for which an IRS Form 1099 would be issued).
There being no ambiguity, the Agreement must be enforced as written,
which means that the RRB lien was properly withheld from that part of
the settlement that represented over two years of back wages.
(9/25/19 R&R at p. 7, PgID 777.)
The R&R also found that the Agreement contained an integration clause that
provides: “This Agreement contains the entire agreement between the parties hereto,
and that the terms of this Agreement are contractual and not a mere recital.” The
R&R found that this clause precluded Plaintiff from asserting parol evidence as a
basis for rescission. (Id. (citing UAW-GM Human Res. Ctr. v. KSL Recreation Corp.,
228 Mich. App. 486, 502 (1998).)

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The Magistrate Judge also rejected Plaintiff’s argument that notwithstanding
the integration clause, the Agreement was infected by a mutual mistake of fact, i.e.,
that there was no RRB lien, specifically finding, for “numerous reasons,” that
“Plaintiff was decidedly not justified in relying on defense counsel’s alleged hearsay
statement, even if we assume that Mr. Paxton actually made the comment.” (Id. at
pp. 8-9, PgID 778-79.) That finding was based on four factors: (1) the Railroad
Unemployment Insurance Act, 45 U.S.C. § 362(o) explicitly entitles the RRB to
reimbursement and a lien on any settlement; (2) Plaintiff had three months after the
mediation to consider the Agreement and discuss it with his attorney, exchanged
several drafts, and signed the Agreement, certifying that he “has carefully read [the
Agreement], that he understands its contents, that his attorney has explained all of
its contents and ramifications to him, and that he has executed it of his own free will,
act, and deed without coercion and with knowledge of the nature and consequences
thereof;” (3) Plaintiff did not allege that he informed his attorney about defense
counsel’s alleged remark before signing the Agreement, adding:
And although [Plaintiff’s lawyer] Mr. Kessinger states in his own
declaration that he first became aware of the RRB lien when he received
Mr. Paxton’s email on April 4, 2019, he spent months after the
mediation negotiating the language of the Agreement, including the
language regarding the RRB lien. It fell to him, not to defense counsel,
to ascertain the status of the lien and to so advise his client. A failure of
due diligence is not a ground to set aside a written agreement on the
basis of mistake. Mere expressions of opinion (such as defense
counsel’s alleged remark) will not support the rescission of a written
contract when the true facts can be easily and independently verified[;]
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and, (4) “Plaintiff’s request to ‘enforce’ the Agreement by requiring the Defendant
to reimburse the RRB finds no support in the law or in the language of the
Agreement.” (Id. at pp. 7-11, PgID 777-81.)
No objections were filed to this R&R, and this Court adopted it on November
13, 2019. (ECF No. 38.)
C.

Defendant’s Motion for Sanctions and Attorney’s Fees Pursuant to
Rule 11 and Local Rule 83.22

On August 2, 2019, Defendant filed its Motion for Sanctions and Attorney’s
Fees Pursuant to Rule 11 and Local Rule 83.22, arguing that Plaintiff’s motion to
enforce the settlement agreement was frivolous and unsupported by law. (ECF No.
31, Def.’s Mot.) Defendant asserts that Plaintiff’s Motion to Enforce “blatantly
ignores the plain and unambiguous RRB lien language in the Release” and, tellingly,
that “Plaintiff did not even bother to attach a copy of the Release to his Motion,
despite the fact that he and his counsel both executed it.” (Id. at p. 8, PgID 687.)
Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s motion “seeks to modify the RRB lien language in
the Release by having ‘the Court order Defendant to pay the lien off,’ or,
alternatively, “seeks to disavow and set-aside the Release in its entirety,” and that
such conduct warrants sanctions under Rule 11 and Local Rule 83.22. (Id. at p. 9,
PgID 688.)
Plaintiff filed a response to Defendant’s motion (ECF No. 34), and Defendant
filed a reply (ECF No. 35.)
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D.

The Magistrate
Recommendation

Judge’s

May

31,

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2020

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Report

and

On May 31, 2020, Judge Whalen issued his R&R, recommending that
Defendant’s motion be granted and that Plaintiff and his attorney be sanctioned,
jointly and severally, in the amount of $5,000.00, representing Defendant’s
reasonable attorney fees. (ECF No. 39, R&R.) He noted that “in this circuit, the test
for the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions is whether the individual attorney’s conduct
was reasonable under the circumstances.” (Id. at p. 5, PgID 789, citing Mann v.
G&G Mfg., Inc., 900 F.2d 953, 958 (6th Cir. 1990).) Applying this standard, Judge
Whalen agreed that Plaintiff’s motion to enforce settlement agreement was
“frivolous and unsupported by law,” finding:
Plaintiff’s motion flew in the face of long-standing principles of law,
particularly in light of the clear and unambiguous language of the
Agreement regarding the RRB lien, and the statutory requirement that
the Board had a lien on any settlement. As Defendant’s attorney points
out, Plaintiff’s counsel is experienced in railroad cases, and would have
been well aware that the Agreement could not have negated this
statutory requirement.
(Id. at p. 6, PgID 790 (emphasis in original).) Judge Whalen then found that “[t]here
was no reasonable objective basis for Plaintiff’s motion” and that “Rule 11 sanctions
are appropriate.” (Id.)
On June 15, 2020, Plaintiff filed Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Report and
Recommendation to Grant Defendant’s Motion for Sanctions and Attorney’s Fees.
(ECF No. 40.)
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II.

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STANDARD OF REVIEW

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1),
the Court conducts a de novo review of the portions of the Magistrate Judge’s Report
and Recommendation to which a party has filed “specific written objection” in a
timely manner. Lyons v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 351 F. Supp. 2d 659, 661 (E.D. Mich.
2004). A district court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the
findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1)(C). Only those objections that are specific are entitled to a de novo review
under the statute. Mira v. Marshall, 806 F.2d 636, 637 (6th Cir. 1986). “The parties
have the duty to pinpoint those portions of the magistrate's report that the district
court must specially consider.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). “A
general objection, or one that merely restates the arguments previously presented is
not sufficient to alert the court to alleged errors on the part of the magistrate judge.”
Aldrich v. Bock, 327 F. Supp. 2d 743, 747 (E.D. Mich. 2004). “‘[B]are disagreement
with the conclusions reached by the Magistrate Judge, without any effort to identify
any specific errors in the Magistrate Judge’s analysis that, if corrected, might warrant
a different outcome, is tantamount to an outright failure to lodge objections to the R
& R.’” Arroyo v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 14-cv-14358, 2016 WL 424939, at *3
(E.D. Mich. Feb. 4, 2016) (quoting Depweg v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 14-11705,
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2015 WL 5014361, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 24, 2015) (citing Howard v. Secretary
of Health & Human Services, 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991)).
III.

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff initially lists seven numbered objections to the R&R in his
Objections. (Pl.’s Objs. at pp. 2-3, PgID 794-95.) Plaintiff’s brief, however, does
not specifically address those seven objections, but instead contains three broader
arguments:
I.

Defendant’s Counsel’s statement was improperly excluded from
consideration as parol evidence when it did not vary the terms of
the contract and was never presented in an effort to vary the terms
of the contract.

II.

Defendant’s Counsel’s statement was improperly excluded from
consideration as hearsay when it was never offered for the truth
of the matter asserted and was made by a party opponent.

III.

Filing the Motion to Enforce was not unreasonable under the
circumstances.

(Pl.’s Obj. at pp. 9-17, PgID 801-09.) Arguments I and II appear to encompass the
numbered Objections 3-7, and Argument III covers Objections 1 and 2.
A.

Plaintiff’s First Two Arguments (Objection Nos. 3-7) are DENIED

Plaintiff’s first two arguments – that the Court improperly excluded
Defendant’s counsel’s alleged statement as parol evidence or hearsay in denying
Plaintiff’s Motion to Enforce – constitute objections to the Court’s prior September
25, 2019 R&R and Order denying Plaintiff’s Motion to Enforce Settlement
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Agreement or in the Alternative to Set Aside Settlement (ECF Nos. 37 and 38), and
not the present R&R recommending granting Defendant’s motion for sanctions and
attorneys’ fees. Those objections are untimely and waived.
The September 25, 2019 R&R informed the parties that “objections … must
be filed within fourteen (14) days of service of a copy” of the R&R and that “[f]ailure
to file specific objections constitutes a waiver of any further right of appeal.” (ECF
No. 37 at p. 11, PgID 781, citing Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Howard v.
Secretary of HHS, 932 F.2d 505 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d
947 (6th 1981).) When a party fails to object to a magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation, he waives further review of his claims by the district court and the
circuit court on appeal “[a]s long as [he] was properly informed of the consequences
of failing to object[.]” Miller v. Currie, 50 F.3d 373, 380 (6th Cir. 1995). Plaintiff
did not file any objections to the September 25, 2019 R&R, and on November 13,
2019, this Court entered an Order (1) adopting the R&R and (2) denying Plaintiff’s
Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement or in the Alternative to Set-Aside
Settlement. (ECF No. 38.) Plaintiff has waived review of this decision.
Further, this ruling became the law of the case. “Under the law-of-the-case
doctrine, rulings made at one point in the litigation should continue to govern in
subsequent stages of that litigation.” Niemi v. NHK Spring Co., 543 F.3d 294, 308

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(6th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). Therefore, in this case, the Court has already
ruled:
 The Settlement Agreement is clear on its face and states that the Settlement
Amount will be subject to a RRB lien;
 The Agreement’s integration clause precluded Plaintiff from asserting parol
evidence (Mr. Paxton’s alleged statement that there was no RRB lien) as a
basis for rescission; and
 Plaintiff’s argument that the Agreement was infected by mutual mistake is
rejected and “Plaintiff was decidedly not justified in relying on defense
counsel’s alleged hearsay statement, even if we assume that Mr. Paxton
actually made the comment” because:
o The Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act, 45 U.S.C. § 362(o)
explicitly entitled the RRB to reimbursement and a lien on any
settlement;
o Plaintiff had three months to consider the Agreement, discussed it with
his attorney, exchanged several drafts, and signed the Agreement
certifying that he “has carefully read [the Agreement], that he
understands its contents, that his attorney has explained all of its
contents and ramifications to him, and that he has executed it of his own
free will, act, and deed without coercion and with knowledge of the
nature and consequences thereof;
o Plaintiff did not allege he informed his attorney about defense counsel’s
alleged remark before signing the Agreement; and
o “Plaintiff’s request to ‘enforce’ the Agreement by requiring the
Defendant to reimburse the RRB finds no support in the law or the
language of the Agreement.”
(ECF No. 37 at pp. 7-11, PgID 777-81.) Plaintiff has waived his right to object to
these rulings, and accordingly Plaintiff’s first two arguments (and Objection Nos. 37) are DENIED.
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B.

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Plaintiff’s Third Argument (Objection Nos. 1 and 2) is DENIED

The Court now turns to Plaintiff’s third argument (and Objection Nos. 1 and
2), that filing the Motion to Enforce was not unreasonable under the circumstances
and thus Rule 11 sanctions are not warranted. (Pl.’s Obj. at pp. 2, 15-17, PgID 794,
807-09.)
Under Rule 11(b), a party certifies that by presenting a pleading to the court,
the pleading is (1) “not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass,
cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation; (2) the claims
are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending,
modifying or revising existing laws; and (3) the factual contentions have evidentiary
support.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b). Rule 11(c) provides that if ‘the court determines
that Rule 11(b) has been violated, the court may impose an appropriate sanction on
any attorney, law firm, or party that violated the rule or is responsible for the
violation.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c).
“In this circuit, the test for the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions is whether the
individual attorney’s conduct was reasonable under the circumstances.” Michigan
Division-Monument Builders of N. Am. v. Michigan Cemetery Ass’n, 524 F.3d 726,
738-39 (6th Cir 2008) (quoting Mann v. G&G Mfg., Inc., 900 F.2d 953, 958 (6th Cir.
1990)). The test of reasonableness under the circumstances is an objective standard.
Century Prods., Inc. v. Sutter, 837 F.2d 247, 253 (6th Cir. 1988); see also Knestrick
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v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 945 F. Supp. 1080, 1082 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (“The question
is whether a competent attorney … after appropriate investigation would have
reasonably believed the claim was grounded in fact or law.”). This objective standard
is intended to eliminate any “empty-head pure-heart” justification for patently
frivolous arguments. Nieves v. City of Cleveland, 153 F. App’x 349, 353 (6th Cir.
2005).
Rule 11 “stresses the need for some prefiling inquiry into both the facts and
the law to satisfy the affirmative duty imposed by the rule.” Albright v. Upjohn, 788
F.2d 1217, 1221 (6th Cir. 1986). A good-faith belief in the merits of a case is
insufficient to avoid Rule 11 sanctions. Mann, 900 F.2d at 958. Sanctions are
mandatory in the event that the court determines that Rule 11 has been violated, but
the court has “wide discretion” in delineating the extent of the sanctions
imposed. Albright, 788 F.2d at 1222. “The standard for sanctioning parties is the
same as that for counsel: reasonableness under the circumstances per Rule 11, or ‘in
bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons’ under this Court's
inherent sanctioning power.” Adams v. Penn Line Serv., Inc., 620 F. Supp. 2d 835,
840-41 (N.D. Ohio 2009).
After Plaintiff filed the Motion to Enforce, Defendants filed the Rule 11
motion, after complying with that Rule’s safe harbor provisions. (ECF No. 31 at p.

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2, PgID 681.)2 Upon consideration of Defendant’s motion, Plaintiff’s response, and
Defendant’s reply, and after a hearing, Judge Whalen issued his R&R, in which he
found:
This motion for Rule 11 sanctions is based on Defendant’s argument
that Plaintiff’s motion to enforce settlement agreement was frivolous
and unsupported by law. As set forth in my [prior] R&R, Defendant is
right. Plaintiff’s motion flew in the face of long-standing principles of
law, particularly in view of the clear and unambiguous language of the
Agreement regarding the RRB lien, and the statutory requirement that
the Board had a lien on any settlement. As Defendant’s attorney points
out, Plaintiff’s counsel is experienced in railroad cases, and would have
been well aware that the Agreement could not have negated this
statutory requirement. There was no reasonable objective basis for
Plaintiff’s motion.
(ECF No. 39, R&R at p. 6, PgID 790 (emphasis in original).)
In Plaintiff’s Objection, he simply disagrees with the Court’s ruling on his
prior Motion to Enforce, contending that “[j]ust as Mr. Paxton’s statement was not
hearsay it was not improper parol evidence either. Those improper interpretations
of the law underly the decision in the Report and Recommendation that filing the
motion to enforce was not reasonable.” (Pl.’s Obj. at pp. 15-18, PgID 807-10.) He
contends that he asserted “at a minimum, a colorable claim.” (Id.)
Upon review, this Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Whalen’s
recommendation that Rule 11 sanctions against Plaintiff and his attorney are

2

Rule 11(c)(2) sets forth a “safe harbor” provision that requires that a motion for
sanctions not be filed until 21 days after service.
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warranted in this case. The executed Settlement Agreement, entered into by the
parties after months of negotiation and revision with their counsel, is clear on its face
and expressly states that the Settlement Amount will be subject to a RRB lien, which,
by the way, is statutorily required. Plaintiff now contends that he “never sought to
introduce a side agreement … nor did [he] seek to change the terms of the deal,”
(Pl.’s Obj. at p. 17, PgID 809), yet that is exactly what he sought to do in his Motion
to Enforce, asking the Court to rewrite the specific terms of the fully executed
Agreement regarding the RRB lien, contrary to well-settled principles of contract
law that unambiguous contract language must be enforced as written. Moreover,
Judge Whalen found that Plaintiff’s counsel is a seasoned practitioner in railroad
litigation and would have been aware that the lien language was statutorily required
to be included in the Agreement. Plaintiff was simply not justified in relying on an
allegedly overheard stray remark by Defendant’s counsel in light of the Agreement’s
clear and unambiguous language, which Plaintiff certified he “carefully read,” and
under the well-settled principles of contract law, and Plaintiff’s requests to either set
aside the Settlement or to “enforce” the Agreement by ordering Defendant to pay
the approximately $19,000 owing to the RRB are without merit, unsupported by the
law, and there was no reasonable objective basis for Plaintiff’s motion. Accordingly,
the Court agrees that Rule 11 sanctions are warranted against Plaintiff and his
attorney in this case.
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Plaintiff does not object to the amount of the sanction recommended,
$5,000.00, and the Court finds that this amount reasonably compensates Defendant
for the costs incurred as a result of Plaintiff’s unreasonable and meritless motion.
IV.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court:
(1) OVERRULES Plaintiff’s Objections (ECF No. 40);
(2) ADOPTS Magistrate Judge Whalen’s May 31, 2020 Report and
Recommendation (ECF No. 39);
(3) GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for Sanctions and Attorney’s Fees
Pursuant to Rule 11 and Local Rule 83.22 (ECF No. 31); and
(4) SANCTIONS Plaintiff and his attorney pursuant to Rule 11, jointly and
severally, in the amount of $5,000.00, representing Defendant’s reasonable attorney
fees.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: August 14, 2020

s/Paul D. Borman
Paul D. Borman
United States District Judge

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