El v. City of Livonia et al
Filing
48
AMENDED OPINION and ORDER Granting Defendants' Motions to Dismiss [13, 19, 23, 28, 31, 42] and Denying Defendant's Motion for Sanctions 20 . Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (LSau)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
KAAMALA RENIA EL,
Plaintiff,
CASE NO. 17-13190
HON. DENISE PAGE HOOD
v.
CITY OF LIVONIA, et al.,
Defendants.
_________________________________________/
AMENDED OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’
MOTIONS TO DISMISS [#13; #19; #23; #28; #31; #42], AND DENYING
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS [#20]1
I.
BACKGROUND
A. Procedural Background
On September 28, 2017, Plaintiff Kaamala Renia El (“El”) brought this
action against Defendants the City of Livonia, Michigan (“Livonia”), Livonia
Chief
of
Police
Curtis
Caid
(“Caid”),
Sergeant
Michael
Mockeridge
(“Mockeridge”), Sergeant Ronny Warra (“Warra”), Officer Jordan Dottor
(“Dottor”), Officer Daniel Tar (“Tar”), Officer Michael Reilly (“Reilly”), Officer
Michael Arakelian (“Arakelian”), Officer Dean Langley (“Langley”), and Officer
Dennis Burklow (“Burklow”) (collectively, “Defendants”). (Doc # 1) El alleges
1
Amends the Order on page 17 to “DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.”
1
Defendants violated her rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Michigan law.
El’s Complaint includes eleven counts:
(1) Illegal Search and Seizure pursuant to § 1983 (Count I);
(2) False Arrest and False Imprisonment under state common law (Count II);
(3) Federal Monell claims for Failure to Train or Supervise (Count III);
(4) Malicious Prosecution under state common law (Count IV);
(5) Assault and Battery under state common law (Count V);
(6) Malicious Prosecution pursuant to § 1983 (Count VI);
(7) Malicious Prosecution under state common law (Count VII);
(8) Ethnic Intimidation under state statutory law (Count VIII);
(9) Assault and Battery under state common law (Count IX);
(10) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress under state law common (Count
X);
(11) Lack of Government Immunity from Litigation under state law (Count XI).
(Doc # 1) El seeks monetary damages for the alleged violations.
Defendant Livonia filed a Motion to Dismiss (Doc # 13), which was
followed by Caid’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc # 19), Dottor and Reilly’s Motion to
Dismiss (Doc # 23), and Defendant Livonia’s Motion for Sanctions. (Doc # 20)
El filed a Response to Defendant Livonia’s Motion to Dismiss. (Doc # 33) El also
filed an alleged Response to Livonia’s Motion for Sanctions (Doc # 32), however,
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the document filed is nearly identical to her Response to Livonia’s Motion to
Dismiss. Livonia filed Replies to both Responses. (Doc # 35; 36) Defendants
Caid, Dottor, and Reilly joined in Livonia’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc # 13). A
hearing on the Motions (Doc # 13; 19; 20; 23) was held on January 31, 2018.
This matter is before the Court on Defendants Burklow and Langley’s
Motion to Dismiss (Doc # 28), Defendant Mockeridge’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc #
31), and Defendants Arakelian, Tar, and Warra’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc # 42).
Defendants Burklow, Langley, Mockeridge, Arakelian, Tar, and Warra join in
Livonia’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc # 13). No response to the present Motions has
been filed.
Livonia argues that El’s Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Livonia asserts
that ten of El’s eleven claims are time-barred by the applicable statute of
limitations. (Doc # 13, Pg. 4) Livonia also argues that the remaining claim is
barred as a matter of law. (Id.) In her Response to Livonia’s Motion to Dismiss,
El argues that her claims should be tolled under Michigan law because she was
legally insane when the injuries occurred. El has not provided any arguments
opposing Livonia’s Motion for Sanctions.
For the reasons that follow, Defendants’ respective Motions to Dismiss are
GRANTED. In addition, the Court DENIES Livonia’s Motion for Sanctions.
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A. Factual Background
On August 2, 2013, Plaintiff El, a Native American woman of mixed
African decent, was traveling in her car headed southbound on Middlebelt Road in
Livonia, Michigan. El passed a Livonia Police Department Squad Car, which
started to follow her. The police car was driven by Sergeant Mockeridge. El led
Mockeridge into a parking lot, where she was subsequently pulled over by
Mockeridge. Mockeridge informed El that she was pulled over because of a
defective brake tail light on her car. Mockeridge also told El the trunk of the car
was open. (Doc # 1, Pg. 5) Mockeridge identified himself, and asked El to
provide her license and registration. El refused to comply. Then Mockeridge
asked El to step out of her vehicle. El refused to comply. El remained in her car
until backup for Mockeridge arrived. The additional officers surrounded El’s car,
and demanded that El and her passenger exit the car.
When El refused,
Mockeridge informed her that she was under arrest.
El remained in her vehicle. Once her identity was matched to information
obtained from the Law Enforcement Information Network (“LEIN”), the officers
discovered that El operated the vehicle despite having several license suspensions.
One of the officers used a device to unlock the front door on the passenger side of
El’s car, and forcibly removed the passenger from the car. Then the officers
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forcibly removed El from the car. El was subsequently handcuffed, frisked for
weapons, and placed in a police vehicle. She was transported to Livonia’s St.
Mary Hospital for examination and treatment. Then she was taken to a Livonia
jail, and later transferred to the Wayne County jail.
El was arraigned and
prosecuted for resisting and obstructing an officer, and operating a motor vehicle
while license suspended or revoked. (Doc # 13, Pg. 3)
The stop and arrest occurred on August 2, 2013. El alleges that she was
never arraigned, but eventually posted bail in the amount of $500.00. (Doc # 12)
A preliminary exam was held on August 22, 2013. On October 15, 2014, the case
went to trial in the Wayne County Circuit Court. A jury found El not guilty of
resisting and obstructing an officer, but found her guilty of driving with license
suspended or revoked. (Id.) El filed her eleven count Complaint on September 28,
2017.
I.
ANALYSIS
A. Motions to Dismiss
1. Rule 12(b)(6)
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for a motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6). This type of motion tests the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff’s
complaint. Davey v. Tomlinson, 627 F. Supp. 1458, 1463 (E.D. Mich. 1986).
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When reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must “construe
the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept its allegations as
true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Directv Inc. v.
Treesh, 487 F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir. 2007). A court, however, need not accept as
true legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences.” Id. (quoting Gregory v.
Shelby Cnty., 220 F.3d 443, 446 (6th Cir. 2000)).
“[L]egal conclusions
masquerading as factual allegations will not suffice.” Edison v. State of Tenn.
Dep’t of Children’s Servs., 510 F.3d 631, 634 (6th Cir. 2007).
As the Supreme Court has explained, “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the
‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions,
and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . .
.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted);
see LULAC v. Bresdesen, 500 F.3d 523, 527 (6th Cir. 2007). To survive dismissal,
the plaintiff must offer sufficient factual allegations to make the asserted claim
plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009). “A claim has
facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
2. Statute of Limitations
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Livonia asserts that ten of El’s eleven claims are time-barred. El argues that
her claims should be tolled because she was legally insane when the injuries
occurred.
The appropriate statute of limitations to apply in all § 1983 actions is the
general personal injury limitations statute of the state where the injury giving rise
to the action occurred. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276-80 (1985). The Sixth
Circuit has held that Michigan’s three-year statute of limitations for personal injury
actions applies to § 1983 claims arising in the state. Rapp v. Putman, 644 F. App’x
621, 626 (6th Cir. 2016); see also M.C.L. 600.5805(10). Michigan Compiled
Laws § 600.5805 establishes the statute of limitations for injuries to persons or
property arising in Michigan.
As a preliminary matter, El’s insanity argument lacks merit.
“Under
Michigan law, insanity in this context is defined as ‘a condition of mental
derangement such as to prevent the sufferer from comprehending rights he or she is
otherwise bound to know and is not dependent on whether or not the person has
been judicially declared to be insane.’” Britt v. Smith, 9 F. App’x 409, 410 (6th
Cir. 2001) (citing M.C.L. § 600.5851(2)). Michigan courts have found a plaintiff
mentally deranged when she was (1) unable to work with her attorney; (2) unable
to understand or assist her attorney in asserting the cause of action against the
defendant; and (3) unable to address personal and business affairs. Id. The person
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must not be able to “comprehend simple legal procedures.” Id. (citation omitted).
Plaintiff has the burden to prove the action is not time barred. Id.
Michigan Compiled Laws § 600.5851(5) states that a person who is legally
insane at the time a claim arises may commence the action after the disability
ceases. Subsection (1) of the statute provides that such person has an additional
year after the disability is removed to make an entry or commence the action after
the statute of limitations has run. M.C.L. § 600.5851(1). El seeks to prove her
alleged insanity by directing the Court to an affidavit submitted by a boardcertified neuro-psychiatrist, which diagnoses her as mentally disabled before the
events giving rise to this action. (Doc # 32, Pg. 15–16) Doctor Jorge Zuniga,
M.D., stated that El has been under his care for being diagnosed with
schizoaffective disorder and severe and bipolar depression.
El’s tolling argument fails for several reasons. First, El does not claim that
her psychiatric disability has ended. Second, the affidavit provides no information
regarding El’s ability to comprehend her claims or assist her attorney. Third, the
affidavit, dated January 10, 2018, states that El is still receiving treatment and
considered “totally disabled for any type of gainful employment.” (Id.) Finally,
despite her claim of insanity and her inability to work, according to her
psychiatrist, El is able to pursue—with her attorney—the present claims against
Defendants. See Hood v. United States Postal Serv., No. 17-1048, 2017 WL
8
6988055, at *3 (6th Cir. Oct. 11, 2017) (“[G]iven [plaintiff’s] ability to pursue his
claims, tolling under these statutory provisions does not apply”). Tolling does not
apply in this case.
Count I is a Fourth Amendment illegal search and seizure claim under §
1983, and Count III describes the Monell claims resulting from the alleged
violation in Count I. Both claims are subject to Michigan’s three year statute of
limitations. The alleged illegal search and seizure took place on August 2, 2013.
The claims should have been brought no later than August 2, 2016. These claims
are time barred.
Count II alleges false imprisonment and false arrest under Michigan law.
False imprisonment is subject to a two year statute of limitations under M.C.L. §
600.5805(2). Even disregarding that a claim of false imprisonment requires a lack
of probable cause, which was sustained by implication via El’s conviction, the
arrest occurred on August 2, 2013, and the state court trial concluded on October
15, 2014. The false imprisonment claim should have been commenced no later
than October 15, 2016.
In addition, Michigan law establishes that false
imprisonment and false arrest are not separate torts. Peterson Novelties, Inc. v.
City of Berkley, 259 Mich. App. 1, 17 n. 15 (2003). Count II is time barred.
Count IV and Count VII allege claims for malicious prosecution under
Michigan law. Such claims are subject to M.C.L. § 600.5805(5), which establishes
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a two year statute of limitations. Irrespective of whether the Court starts from the
date of the incident, August 2, 2013, or the date of the criminal proceedings,
October 15, 2014, these claims should have been brought no later than October 15,
2016. Counts IV and VII are time barred.
Count V and Count IX allege claims for assault and battery under Michigan
law. Such claims are subject to a two year statute of limitations under M.C.L. §
600.5805(2). The alleged assault and battery occurred on August 2, 2013. These
claims should have brought no later than August 2, 2015. These claims are time
barred.
Count VIII alleges a statutory claim for ethnic intimidation under M.C.L. §
750.147b. The statute does not provide a specific statute of limitations. The
offenses included under M.C.L. § 750.147b could either be subject to the two year
statute of limitations for assault and battery under M.C.L. § 600.5805(2) or the
three year statute of limitations under M.C.L. § 600.5805(10). The events giving
rise to this claim occurred on August 2, 2013. This claim should have been
brought no later than August 2, 2015 or 2016. This claim is time barred. In
addition, irrespective of the statute of limitations. This claim fails because plaintiff
has not stated facts sufficient to establish this claim under Rule 12(b)(6).
Count X alleges Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. This claim is
subject to the three year statute of limitations set forth in M.C.L. § 600.5805(10).
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The events giving rise to this claim occurred on August 2, 2013. This claim should
have been brought no later than August 2, 2016. This claim is time barred.
Count XI argues that the individual Defendants are not entitled to
government immunity under Michigan law. El is essentially arguing that the
individual Defendants are grossly negligent. Ignoring El’s failure to allege facts to
support a finding of gross negligence, El’s gross negligence theory hinges on
proving claims that are time barred under Michigan law.
El’s government
immunity argument fails.
3. Remaining § 1983 Malicious Prosecution Claim
Count VI of the Complaint alleges a Fourth Amendment malicious
prosecution claim under § 1983. This claim is subject to the three year statute of
limitations under M.C.L. § 600.5805(10). El alleges that she was prosecuted for a
crime that Defendants knew she did not commit. (Doc # 1, Pg 19) El also alleges
that the individual Defendants “manufactured probable cause,” among other things.
(Id.) The events giving rise to this cause of action ended at the conclusion of El’s
jury trial on October 15, 2014. This claim was brought on September 28, 2017.
This claim is not time barred.
Livonia argues that this claim is barred by the Heck doctrine. The Court
agrees. In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the Supreme Court held that a
plaintiff is barred from bringing a § 1983 claim that would “imply the invalidity”
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of a state conviction or sentence, unless the plaintiff can “demonstrate that the
conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” Id. at 487. El was convicted
of driving while license suspended in state court.
In order to prove a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff must
show that there was a lack of probable cause for the prosecution. “[P]robable
cause to initiate a criminal prosecution exists where facts and circumstances are
sufficient to lead an ordinarily prudent person to believe the accused was guilty of
the crime charged.” Webb v. United States, 789 F.3d 647, 660 (6th Cir. 2015)
(quotations and citation omitted). El’s conviction necessarily implies that probable
cause was sustained at multiple stages of the state court proceedings. Those
proceedings resulted in a final judgment against El. El has not asserted that the
state court conviction was somehow invalid. El has not asserted that the state court
conviction is subject to appeal.
El has not asserted that she challenged the
evidence obtained by the officers during her detainment, which was subsequently
used to convict her, by filing a Motion to Suppress in the state court proceeding.
The Court notes that El did not argue the Heck issue in her Response to Livonia’s
present Motion. Count VI is barred as a matter of law.
All of El’s claims are barred. El has failed to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted. The Court need not address the alternative arguments submitted by
Defendants.
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A. Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions
Defendant Livonia asks the Court to grant the present Motion for Rule 11
Sanctions on El’s attorney for El’s refusal to dismiss this action.2 Livonia cites
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b)(2)-(3), which provides as follows:
By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other
paper—whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating
it—
an attorney or unrepresented party certifies that to the best of
the
person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an
inquiry
reasonable under the circumstances: . . .
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are
warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for
extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for
establishing new law;
support
or
(3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if
specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary
after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation
discovery . . . .
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2)-(3).3
2
Rule 11 provides that a court must not impose a monetary sanction on a represented party. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 11(b)(5).
3
Livonia has shown compliance with Rule 11’s “safe harbor” provision by serving the Motion
for Sanctions more than 21 days prior to filing the motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2); Doc #
20-2.
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Rule 11 “imposes on litigants ‘a continuing duty of candor,’ and a litigant
may be sanctioned ‘for continuing to insist upon a position that is no longer
tenable.’” Rentz v. Dynasty Apparel Indus., Inc., 556 F.3d 389, 395 (6th Cir. 2009)
(quoting Ridder v. City of Springfield, 109 F.3d 288, 293 (6th Cir. 1997)). In the
Sixth Circuit, “the test for the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions is whether the
individual attorney’s conduct was reasonable under the circumstances.” Mann v. G
& G Mfg., Inc., 900 F.2d 953, 958 (6th Cir. 1990). “A district court exercises wide
discretion in determining whether an attorney’s conduct was unreasonable, thereby
justifying an award of sanctions under Rule 11.” Gen. Ret. Sys. of City of Detroit
v. Snyder, 822 F. Supp. 2d 686, 699 (E.D. Mich. 2011).
Livonia makes two arguments in support of its Motion for Sanctions.
Livonia argues that El’s repeated assertions that there was not probable cause for
her arrest and subsequent conviction reflects a willful misrepresentation or
inadequate inquiry into the facts. Livonia also argues that filing a complaint
containing several causes of action that are clearly time-barred reflects a willful
disregard for the duty to inquire into the law or, alternatively, to file knowingly
actionable claims. El did not respond to these arguments.
The purpose of Rule 11 sanctions is to deter conduct that abuses the legal
process. Merritt v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 613 F.3d 609,
626 (6th Cir. 2010). There is an obligation on attorneys “to conduct a reasonable
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inquiry into the law and facts before signing pleadings, written motions, and other
documents.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 Advisory Committee Notes (1993 Amendments).
“Subdivision (b) does not require a formal amendment to pleadings for which
evidentiary support is not obtained, but rather calls upon a litigant not thereafter to
advocate such claims or defenses.” Id. Rule 11 sanctions are appropriate where
the attorney’s conduct was objectively unreasonable under the circumstances.
Nieves v. City of Cleveland, 153 F. App’x 349, 352 (6th Cir. 2005). The Sixth
Circuit has held that a plaintiff “act[s] frivolously when they continue[] pursuing
this action after Defendants point out[] inadequacy in their motion to dismiss.”
Royal Oak Entm’t, L.L.C. v. City of Royal Oak, 316 F. App’x 482, 487 (6th Cir.
2009).
In the present case, El brought eleven claims against the Defendants, all of
which are barred by the applicable statute of limitations or controlling law. El was
made aware of the deficiencies in her Complaint, and Livonia’s subsequent Motion
for Sanctions (Doc # 20), and has continued in this action. El did not counter
Livonia’s arguments regarding probable cause, nor did she challenge Livonia’s
assertion that the § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution was barred as a matter of
law.
El responded to Livonia’s Motion to Dismiss by arguing that the applicable
statute of limitations should be tolled due to her mental disability. The tolling
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argument was not included in her Complaint. The affidavit submitted in support of
El’s Response (Doc # 32), dated January 10, 2018, evidences a conclusion that her
attorney did not consider the tolling argument until after he became aware of the
present Motion for Sanctions. In addition, the tolling argument lacks merit. The
Court reiterates that ten of the eleven claims in this action were clearly time barred
as presented by the plaintiff. “A reasonable attorney would have researched the
applicable statute-of-limitations period for a[n] action prior to filing a complaint.”
Friedler v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U.S., 86 F. App’x 50, 56 (6th Cir. 2003).
The Court has discretion to impose sanctions for El’s refusal to dismiss this
case after becoming aware that all of the claims in her Complaint are barred.
Livonia’s probable cause argument in support of the present Motion does not
justify the imposition of sanctions because El sought to challenge whether probable
cause existed for the stop, not her arrest. Livonia has not presented facts sufficient
to establish the extent of sanctions that should be granted.
I.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Livonia’s Motion to Dismiss
(Doc # 13) is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Curtis Caid’s Motion to
Dismiss (Doc # 19) is GRANTED.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants Jordan Dottor and Michael
Reilly’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc # 23) is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants Dennis Burklow and Dean
Langley’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc # 28) is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Michael Mockeridge’s
Motion to Dismiss (Doc # 31) is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants Michael Arakelian, Daniel
Tar, and Ronny Warra’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc # 42) is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Livonia’s Motion for
Sanctions (Doc # 20) is DENIED.
S/Denise Page Hood
Denise Page Hood
Chief Judge, United States District Court
Dated: August 28, 2018
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon counsel of
record on August 28, 2018, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
S/LaShawn R. Saulsberry
Case Manager
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