Sumner v. SSA

Filing 17

OPINION and ORDER Adopting 14 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION, Denying 10 Motion for Summary Judgment and Granting 13 MOTION for Summary Judgment - Signed by District Judge Nancy G. Edmunds. (LBar)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
RACHEL CHRISTY SUMNER,
Plaintiff,

No. 17-13242

v.

Honorable Nancy G. Edmunds

COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
________________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER ACCEPTING AND ADOPTINGTHE MAGISTRATE
JUDGE’S JANUARY 2, 2019 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [14]
I.

Background
Plaintiff filed this action seeking review of the Commissioner of Social Security’s

decision denying her application for supplemental security income. The Court referred
the matter to the Magistrate Judge, who recommends denying Plaintiff’s motion for
summary judgment, granting Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, and affirming
the Commissioner’s decision. (Dkt. 14.) Plaintiff filed two objections to the Magistrate
Judge’s report and recommendation on January 16, 2019, and the Commissioner filed a
response to Plaintiff’s objections on January 30, 2019. (Dkts. 15, 16.) Having
conducted a de novo review of the parts of the Magistrate Judge’s report to which
specific objections have been filed, the Court OVERRULES Plaintiff’s objections and
ACCEPTS and ADOPTS the report and recommendation. As a result, the Court
DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 10); GRANTS Defendant’s

1 

motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 13); and AFFIRMS the decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
II.

Standard of Review
A. De Novo Review of Objections
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(3), “[t]he district judge must

determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s disposition that has been properly
objected to. The district judge may accept, reject, or modify the recommended
disposition; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with
instructions.” See also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
B. Substantial Evidence Standard
“This court must affirm the Commissioner’s conclusions absent a determination
that the Commissioner has failed to apply the correct legal standards or has made
findings of fact unsupported by substantial evidence in the record.” Walters v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 528 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). Substantial
evidence is “‘more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance; it is such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.’” Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007)
(quoting Cutlip v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994)).
If the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, it must be
affirmed, even if the reviewing court would decide the matter differently, see Kinsella v.
Schweiker, 708 F.2d 1058, 1059 (6th Cir. 1983), and even if substantial evidence also
supports another conclusion, Her v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 203 F.3d 388, 389-90 (6th
Cir. 1999). “The substantial evidence standard presupposes that there is a ‘zone of
2 

choice’ within which the [Commissioner] may proceed without interference from the
courts.” Felisky v. Bowen, 35 F.3d 1027, 1035 (6th Cir. 1994) (quoting Mullen v.
Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986)).
III.

Analysis
Plaintiff makes two objections to the Magistrate Judge’s report and

recommendation. First, Plaintiff argues the Magistrate Judge erred when he found that
the administrative law judge’s (“ALJ”) decision was supported by substantial evidence.
Second, Plaintiff argues the Magistrate Judge erred when he found that the ALJ had
properly accounted for Plaintiff’s mental health limitations within her residual functional
capacity (“RFC”).
The Court first notes that Plaintiff is primarily rehashing arguments she previously
raised in her motion for summary judgment.
This Court is not obligated to address objections made in this form because
the objections fail to identify the specific errors in the magistrate judge’s
proposed recommendations, and such objections undermine the purpose
of the Federal Magistrate’s Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636, which serves to reduce
duplicative work and conserve judicial resources.
Owens v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:12-CV-47, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44411, at *8
(W.D. Mich. Mar. 28, 2013) (citations omitted). Nonetheless, the Court has reviewed
the parts of the Magistrate Judge’s report to which specific objections have been filed.
The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge.
A. Whether the ALJ’s Decision was Supported by Substantial
Evidence
Plaintiff’s rather cursory arguments regarding whether the ALJ’s decision was
supported by substantial evidence suggest the ALJ substituted her own medical
3 

judgment for that of the physician and did not base her decision on the testimony and
medical evidence in the record.
As a threshold matter, the Court notes that the Sixth Circuit has “rejected the
argument that a residual functional capacity determination cannot be supported by
substantial evidence unless a physician offers an opinion consistent with that of the
ALJ.” Mokbel-Aljahmi v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 732 F. App’x 395, 401 (6th Cir. 2018)
(unpublished). To impose such a requirement “would, in effect, confer upon the
treating source the authority to make the determination or decision about whether an
individual is under a disability, and thus would be an abdication of the Commissioner’s
statutory responsibility to determine whether an individual is disabled.” Rudd v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 531 F. App’x 719, 728 (6th Cir. 2013) (unpublished) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff retains the ability to perform sedentary work,
(tr. 15), which is the most restrictive of the physical exertional levels, see 20 C.F.R. §
416.967. The ALJ also placed the following additional restrictions on Plaintiff’s RFC:
she can only lift and carry 5 pounds; she can have no exposure to extreme
temperatures or hazardous machinery, unprotected heights, or ladders, ropes or
scaffolds; she can only read typical newspaper print but not smaller print; she can
perform simple, routine tasks involving simple 1, 2, 3 instructions and simple workrelated decisions with few work place changes. (Tr. 15.) As the Commissioner points
out in in its response, this conclusion was partially supported by the opinion of the
state agency physician, and in fact, the ALJ’s RFC was more restrictive than that of
the state agency physician. (See Tr. 19.)
4 

The Court finds that the ALJ properly considered the relevant evidence in the
record in assessing Plaintiff’s RFC. As the Magistrate Judge stated, the ALJ noted
that the record showed that Plaintiff’s physical limitations were not as severe as she
alleged. (See Tr. 17.) For example, despite her allegations of severe leg, foot, and
back pain, there was evidence she exercised regularly by walking and riding her bike,
(e.g., tr. 502), her examination results were normal, (e.g., tr. 434-35), and she
admitted not taking pain medication, (e.g., tr. 44). Similarly, with regard to her mental
RFC, the ALJ found that despite her diagnosis of depression, she had reported
improvement with the use of medication, (e.g., tr. 44); she engaged in household
chores, traveling, shopping, paying her bills, and handling her finances, (e.g., tr. 4749, 179); and she could get along with others and maintain attention, (e.g., tr. 180-82).
In sum, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that the ALJ’s
decision was supported by substantial evidence.
B. Whether the ALJ Properly Considered Plaintiff’s Mental Health
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not properly consider Plaintiff’s testimony and
the medical documentation regarding her mental health when assessing her RFC.
The ALJ recognized, however, that Plaintiff’s affective disorder was severe, (tr. 13),
and considered the impact of that mental health impairment on her ability to work, (tr.
17-19). As a result, the ALJ limited Plaintiff to routine tasks involving no more than
simple, short instructions and simple work-related decisions with few work place
changes.
Moreover, as the Magistrate Judge noted, Plaintiff has not provided anything
beyond her own allegations that additional restrictions should be imposed within her
5 

RFC; and, in fact, she does not state what those restrictions should be, but rather
suggests “that the ALJ could have included more restrictive limitations.” See dkt. 14,
Pg ID 862 (citing Berry v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 16-10548, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
181174, at *31 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 8, 2016) (emphasis in original)). In any case, the ALJ
addressed Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the severity of her symptoms, finding them
not credible in light of the evidence in the record. As discussed above, the ALJ noted
that Plaintiff reported her depression improved with the use of medication, she
engaged in a wide range of daily activities, and she could get along with others.
Moreover, the record showed she had intact mood and affect. (See, e.g., tr. 323, 326,
337.) In sum, the ALJ properly considered and assessed the evidence regarding
Plaintiff’s mental health and did not “mischaracterize” Plaintiff’s depression. Plaintiff
has not demonstrated any error in the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation.
IV.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court OVERRULES Plaintiff’s objections and

ACCEPTS AND ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation. The
Court therefore DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 10); GRANTS
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 13); and AFFIRMS the decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
SO ORDERED.
s/Nancy G. Edmunds
Nancy G. Edmunds
United States District Judge
Dated: March 25, 2019
6 

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon counsel of
record on March 25, 2019, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
s/Lisa Bartlett
Case Manager

7