Vincent v. SSA
Filing
17
OPINION and ORDER Adopting 14 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION Denying 13 MOTION for Summary Judgment, and Granting 11 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Signed by District Judge Nancy G. Edmunds. (LBar)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
TAMMY ANN VINCENT,
Plaintiff,
No. 17-13302
v.
Honorable Nancy G. Edmunds
COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
________________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER ACCEPTING AND ADOPTINGTHE MAGISTRATE
JUDGE’S JANUARY 18, 2019 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [14]
I.
Background
Plaintiff filed this action seeking review of the Commissioner of Social Security’s
decision denying her applications for disability insurance and supplemental security
income. The Court referred the matter to the Magistrate Judge, who recommends
denying Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, granting Defendant’s motion for
summary judgment, and affirming the Commissioner’s decision. (Dkt. 14.) Plaintiff filed
two objections to the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation on February 1,
2019, and the Commissioner filed a response to Plaintiff’s objections on February 8,
2019. (Dkts. 15, 16.) Having conducted a de novo review of the parts of the Magistrate
Judge’s report to which specific objections have been filed, the Court OVERRULES
Plaintiff’s objections and ACCEPTS and ADOPTS the report and recommendation. As
a result, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 11); GRANTS
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Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 13); and AFFIRMS the decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
II.
Standard of Review
A. De Novo Review of Objections
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(3), “[t]he district judge must
determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s disposition that has been properly
objected to. The district judge may accept, reject, or modify the recommended
disposition; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with
instructions.” See also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
B. Substantial Evidence Standard
“This court must affirm the Commissioner’s conclusions absent a determination
that the Commissioner has failed to apply the correct legal standards or has made
findings of fact unsupported by substantial evidence in the record.” Walters v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 528 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). Substantial
evidence is “‘more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance; it is such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.’” Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007)
(quoting Cutlip v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994)).
If the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, it must be
affirmed, even if the reviewing court would decide the matter differently, see Kinsella v.
Schweiker, 708 F.2d 1058, 1059 (6th Cir. 1983), and even if substantial evidence also
supports another conclusion, Her v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 203 F.3d 388, 389-90 (6th
Cir. 1999). “The substantial evidence standard presupposes that there is a ‘zone of
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choice’ within which the [Commissioner] may proceed without interference from the
courts.” Felisky v. Bowen, 35 F.3d 1027, 1035 (6th Cir. 1994) (quoting Mullen v.
Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986)).
III.
Analysis
Plaintiff makes two objections to the Magistrate Judge’s report and
recommendation. First, Plaintiff argues the Magistrate Judge erred when he found that
the administrative law judge’s (“ALJ”) decision was supported by substantial evidence.
Second, Plaintiff argues the Magistrate Judge erred when he found that the ALJ
properly evaluated the opinion evidence from Plaintiff’s treating physicians.
The Commissioner’s response does not address Plaintiff’s objections on the
merits, but rather notes that Plaintiff is repeating the same arguments she previously
raised in her motion for summary judgment.
This Court is not obligated to address objections made in this form because
the objections fail to identify the specific errors in the magistrate judge’s
proposed recommendations, and such objections undermine the purpose
of the Federal Magistrate’s Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636, which serves to reduce
duplicative work and conserve judicial resources.
Owens v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:12-CV-47, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44411, at *8
(W.D. Mich. Mar. 28, 2013) (citations omitted). Nonetheless, the Court has reviewed
the parts of the Magistrate Judge’s report to which specific objections have been filed.
The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge.
A. Whether the ALJ’s Decision was Supported by Substantial Evidence
Plaintiff argues her ability to work was overestimated by the ALJ. In support of
this argument, she notes she testified that due to the severe pain and spasms she
experiences on her right side, she is unable to sit for more than fifteen minutes; she is
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unable to engage in physical activity for more than ten to fifteen minutes; she must lie
down for twenty to thirty minutes each time she experiences spasms; and she only
sleeps for four hours at night. The ALJ, however, properly considered this testimony
but, ultimately, found that her statements regarding the intensity, persistence, and
limiting effects of her symptoms were not entirely consistent with the evidence in the
record. (Tr. 16-17.) The ALJ noted, for example, that some of her examination results
were normal and she testified that she was able to care for her three grandchildren.
Moreover, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff only retains the ability to perform
sedentary work, (tr. 15), which is the most restrictive of the job classification categories,
see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567, 416.967. The ALJ also placed the following restrictions on
her residual functional capacity (“RFC”): she must avoid concentrated exposure to
unprotected heights, vibrating tools, moving machinery, extreme temperatures, dusts,
fumes, and gases; she cannot use ladders; she can occasionally climb stairs, balance,
stoop, or crawl; and she must be allowed to change position every 15 minutes. (Tr. 15.)
The last of these restrictions directly addresses Plaintiff’s testimony regarding her
inability to sit for more than fifteen minutes. In sum, the Court agrees with the
Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial
evidence.
B. Whether the ALJ Properly Evaluated the Treating Physicians’
Opinion
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not properly consider the opinion evidence of her
treating physicians, Drs. Wein and Mekasha. More specifically, Plaintiff notes that both
physicians documented her severe pain and the need for her medications to be
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increased and renewed on numerous occasions. Plaintiff also argues that if the opinion
of a treating source is not given controlling weight, the ALJ must apply the factors set
forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527, which the ALJ did not do here.
The Court first notes that the Sixth Circuit has stated that the regulations do not
require an exhaustive factor-by-factor analysis, as long as the ALJ gives “good reasons”
for the weight it gives a treating physician’s opinion. Francis v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
414 F. App’x 802, 804 (6th Cir. 2011) (unpublished). Here, the ALJ properly discussed
the treatment Plaintiff received from both Drs. Wein and Mekasha. (Tr. 15-17.) And in
what the Magistrate Judge described as a “credibility discussion,” (dkt. 14, Pg ID 448),
the ALJ noted that while Dr. Mekasha concluded that Plaintiff was “morbidly obese” and
her seated straight leg raise (“SLR”) was positive on the right, (see tr. 321), an x-ray
study of her lumber spine was normal, (tr. 283), and subsequent examinations indicated
that SLR testing was negative, (see, e.g., tr. 350). See Coldiron v. Comm’r of Soc Sec.,
391 F. App’x 435, 440 (6th Cir. 2010) (“An ALJ may accomplish the goals of [the good
reason requirement] by indirectly attacking the supportability of the treating physician’s
opinion or its consistency with other evidence in the record.”) (unpublished). The ALJ
also noted that he accommodated Plaintiff’s conditions by imposing “significant
restrictions” within her RFC, including the option to change positions every 15 minutes.
(Tr. 17.) In sum, the Court is satisfied that the ALJ properly considered the evidence
from Plaintiff’s treating physicians.
IV.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court OVERRULES Plaintiff’s objections and
ACCEPTS AND ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation. The
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Court therefore DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 11); GRANTS
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 13); and AFFIRMS the decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
SO ORDERED.
s/Nancy G. Edmunds
Nancy G. Edmunds
United States District Judge
Dated: March 25, 2019
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon counsel of
record on March 25, 2019, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
s/Lisa Bartlett
Case Manager
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