Bachir v. Suburban Employee Services, LLC et al
Filing
26
OPINION AND ORDER granting 21 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by District Judge Robert H. Cleland. (WBar)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
ADAM BACHIR,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 17-13323
SUBURBAN COLLECTION IMPORTED
CARS, LLC, d/b/a SUBURBAN ACURA,
Defendant.
/
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff Adam Bachir filed this action against his former employer Defendant
Suburban Collection Imported Cars after he was terminated for excessive absenteeism.
Plaintiff alleges that his absences were covered by the Family Medical Leave Act
(“FMLA”). Plaintiff asserts that Defendant violated the FMLA by both inferring with his
ability to take FMLA-approved leave and terminating him for taking approved leave.
(Dkt. #84, PageID 87–88.) Plaintiff further alleges that he is disabled under the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and asserts that his termination amounted to
discrimination under the ADA. (Dkt. #84, PageID 89.) Defendant moved for summary
judgment, arguing that Plaintiff’s absences were not covered by the FMLA and that he is
not disabled as a matter of law. (Dkt. # 21, PageID 274, 286.) The motion has been fully
briefed, and the court concludes a hearing is unnecessary. See E.D. Mich. R. 7.1(f)(2).
For the reasons stated below, the court will grant Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment on all counts.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff worked as a salesman for Defendant for over two years before he was
terminated for excessive absenteeism on June 22, 2017. (Dkt. #24, PageID 392.) In
February 2017, Plaintiff noticed a painful mass on this throat, which he feared was
cancerous. (Dkt. #24, PageID 402.) Plaintiff received leave from work from February 7–
28, 2017 to seek treatment for the mass. (Dkt. #24, PageID 392.) Defendant admits that
Plaintiff was authorized to take leave during this time but asserts that the leave was not
covered by the FMLA. (Dkt. #24, PageID 575.) Plaintiff claims that Defendant
specifically authorized him to take FMLA leave during February. (Dkt. #24, PageID 393.)
During his absence in February, Plaintiff visited several doctors. (Dkt. #24,
PageID 402.) Plaintiff first visited an urgent care facility on February 7, 2017. There, he
received a note excusing him from work until February 9, 2017. (Dkt. #24-5, PageID
441.) On February 10, 2017, he visited another doctor and received a note excusing
him from work through February 12, 2017. (Dkt. #24-5, PageID 442.) Neither of these
notes explains the reason for Plaintiff’s visit, the treatment provided during the visit, or
the probable duration of Plaintiff’s condition. Plaintiff continued to seek treatment for the
mass throughout March. (Dkt. #24, PageID 392.) In March, biopsy results revealed the
mass was benign, but Plaintiff believed he had been misdiagnosed. (Dkt. #24, 402–
403.)
Defendant claims that Plaintiff has a history of poor attendance and asserts that
Plaintiff’s attendance became increasingly sporadic after he returned from leave.
Plaintiff’s time logs indicate that he was late to work 22 times between February 28,
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2017 and June 19, 2017. (Dkt. # 21-5.) Plaintiff also missed eight days in June.1
Furthermore, Defendant claims that when Plaintiff returned after missing eight days, he
informed his supervisor that he planned to take vacation the next week. (Dkt. #21,
PageID 268.) The parties’ explanations for these absences vary greatly. Defendant
claims that Plaintiff’s June absences were unexcused and unrelated to the mass for
which Plaintiff sought medical treatment in February. (Dkt. #21, PageID 280.) Defendant
admits that these June absences motivated the decision to terminate Plaintiff. (Dkt. #21,
PageID 280, 284.) Plaintiff claims that all of his June absences were medically excused
and related to the mass on his throat. (Dkt. #24, PageID 404.) According to Plaintiff, he
was authorized to use FMLA leave and then fired for using approved leave. (Dkt. #24,
PageID 406.) He further claims he was disabled under the ADA because he believed
had cancer, shared these fears with his supervisors, and was subsequently terminated.
(Dkt. #24, PageID 406, 419.) These factual disputes, however, do not preclude the entry
of summary judgment for defendants.
II. STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate when there exists no dispute of material fact
and the moving party demonstrates that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the court considers
all evidence, and all reasonable inferences flowing therefrom, in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party. Moran v. Al Basit LLC, 788 F.3d 201, 204 (6th Cir. 2015). The
court may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence presented in
1
Defendant asserts that Plaintiff missed work on June 5, 6, 12, 13,15,16,17, and 21,
2017. (Dkt. # 21, PageID 268.)
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support or opposition to a motion for summary judgment—only the finder of fact can
make such determinations. Laster v. City of Kalamazoo, 746 F.3d 714, 726 (6th Cir.
2014).
The movant has the initial burden of showing—pointing out—the absence of a
genuine dispute as to any material fact; i.e., “an absence of evidence to support the
nonmoving party’s case.” See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 325 (1986).
The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to put forth enough evidence to raise a
genuine issue of material fact for trial. Laster, 746 F.3d at 726 (citing Celotex Corp., 477
U.S. at 324). A genuine issue exists “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248; Williams v.
AT&T Mobility Servs. LLC, 847 F.3d 384, 391 (6th Cir. 2017). Not all factual disputes
are material. A fact is “material” for purposes of summary judgment when proof of that
fact would establish or refute an essential element of the claim “and would affect the
application of the governing law to the rights of the parties.” Rachells v. Cingular
Wireless Employee Servs., LLC, 732 F.3d 652, 660 (6th Cir. 2013). A “mere ‘scintilla’ of
evidence” supporting the nonmoving party’s position will not defeat a properly-supported
motion for summary judgment. Tingle v. Arbors at Hilliard, 692 F.3d 523, 529 (6th Cir.
2012) (quoting Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 251).
III. DISCUSSION
A. FMLA Claims
The FMLA entitles employees to take leave for “serious health condition[s]” and
prohibits employers from using the taking of FMLA leave as a negative factor in
deciding employment benefits. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2612, 2614. There are two distinct
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theories of recovery under the FMLA: 1) the “entitlement” or “interference” theory arising
from 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1) and 2) the “retaliation” or “discrimination” theory arising
from 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2). See Morris v. Family Dollar Stores of Ohio, Inc., 320 F.
App'x 330, 334 (6th Cir. 2009). In this case, Plaintiff brings claim under both theories of
recovery. The McDonnell burden-shifting framework, which governs employment
discrimination cases, applies to both theories of recovery under the FMLA. See
Jaszczyszyn v. Advantage Health Physician Network, 504 F. App'x 440, 447 (6th Cir.
2012) (applying the McDonnell burden-shifting framework to both interference and
retaliation FMLA claims)(citing Donald v. Sybra, Inc., 667 F.3d 757 (6th Cir. 2012)).
Under the McDonnell framework, the plaintiff must first prove a prima facie case
of FMLA violation. Skrjanc v. Great Lakes Power Serv. Co., 272 F.3d 309, 315 (6th Cir.
2001) (applying McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)). The
burden then shifts to the defendant to “articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason”
for an adverse employment action. Id. Finally, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to
show that the articulated reason was pretext to mask discrimination. Id.
Count I of the Amended Complaint states an FMLA claim under the retaliation
theory. (Dkt. # 16, PageID 86.) To prove a prima facie claim for retaliation under 29
U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2) of the FMLA, a plaintiff must prove that:
1) he engaged in an activity protected by the [FMLA];
2) this exercise of his protected rights was known to the defendant;
3) defendant thereafter took an employment action adverse to the
plaintiff; and
4) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the
adverse employment action.
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Morris v. Family Dollar Stores of Ohio, Inc., 320 F. App'x 330, 338 (6th Cir. 2009). Count
II states a claim for FMLA interference. The elements of an FMLA interference claim are
similar to the elements of a retaliation claim:
1) [Plaintiff] was an eligible employee;
2) his employer was a covered employer;
3) he was entitled to leave under the FMLA;
4) he gave his employer notice of his intent to take leave; and
5) his employer denied him FMLA benefits or interfered with FMLA rights
to which he was entitled.
Morris, 320 F. App'x at 336. Under each theory of recovery, the plaintiff must establish
that he suffered a serious medical condition to survive summary judgment. Id. at 338
(granting summary judgment for defendant on plaintiff’s interference and retaliation
claims because the court determined that medical condition at issue—an outpatient
needle biopsy—was not a serious health condition).
1. Serious Health Condition
A “serious health condition” is defined as “an illness, injury, impairment, or
physical or mental condition that involves . . . inpatient care . . . or . . . continuing
treatment by a health care provider.” 29 U.S.C. § 2611.11. A serious health condition
involving “continuing treatment” is one resulting in “a period of incapacity of more than
three consecutive days and any subsequent treatment . . . relating to the same
condition.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.115.a. Incapacity is defined as the “inability to work, attend
school or perform other regular daily activities.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.113.b. The FMLA does
not cover “routine, commonplace illnesses of short duration.” Beaver v. RGIS Inventory
Specialists, Inc., 144 F. App'x 452, 456 (6th Cir. 2005). For example, the FMLA does
not cover illnesses for which the treatment “includes the taking of over-the-counter
medications such as aspirin, antihistamines, or salves; or bed-rest, drinking fluids,
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exercise, and other similar activities that can be initiated without a visit to a health care
provider.” 73 Fed. Reg. 67,934, 68,079 (Nov. 17, 2008) (codified at 29 C.F.R. Pt. 825).
The court determines whether a health condition is “serious” and, therefore, covered by
the FMLA. See Morris, 320 F. App'x at 337.
The parties dispute whether Plaintiff experienced a “serious health condition.”
Plaintiff alleges that the mass on his throat, for which he initially sought treatment in
February, qualified as a serious health condition. (Dkt. # 24, PageID 401–402.) Plaintiff
further suggests that the treatment he received throughout May and June was a
continuation of the treatment he initially received in February. (Dkt. #24, PageID 403–
405.) Defendant asserts that Plaintiff did not experience a serious health condition in
February because he was not incapacitated for more than three consecutive days. (Dkt.
#21, PageID 276.) Defendant further asserts that Plaintiff’s June absences were not a
continuation of his earlier medical treatment and did not independently qualify as
serious health conditions. (Dkt. #21, PageID 278.) The court need not resolve this
dispute. Taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the evidence does not
demonstrate that he suffered a serious health condition in either February or June as a
matter of law.
Plaintiff was not hospitalized when he sought treatment for the mass on his throat
in February. The medical documentation Plaintiff submits indicate that he visited
medical providers twice during his first week off work, the first on February 7, 2017, and
the second on February 10, 2017. Plaintiff does not provide any actual records from
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either visit.2 Instead, he submits standard form excuses. The first, dated February 7,
2017, excuses Plaintiff from work until February 9, 2017. (Dkt. #24-5, PageID 441.) The
second, dated February 10, 2017, states that Plaintiff should “not return to work” until
February 13, 2017. (Dkt. #24-5, PageID 441.) Plaintiff asserts that he saw the same
doctor on both occasions.3 (Dkt. #24, PageID 412.) Assuming Plaintiff’s version of the
facts as true, “the fact that plaintiff was off work for more than three consecutive days
does not, in itself, imply a serious health condition.” Booth v. Roadway Exp., Inc., No. C1-03-660, 2005 WL 1705064, at *9 (S.D. Oh. July 21, 2005) (citing Bradley v. Mary
Rutan Hospital Assoc., 322 F.Supp.2d 926, 942 (S.D. Oh. 2004)).
Neither note gives any indication of the reasons for Plaintiff’s visits, the treatment
he received, or the physical limitations, if any, imposed by his medical providers. In
Lackey v. Jackson Cty., the Sixth Circuit held that the plaintiff’s “ambiguous” doctors’
notes—which did not state that plaintiff was incapacitated or explain the reasons for
plaintiff’s absence from work—were insufficient to prove that plaintiff suffered a serious
health condition. See Lackey v. Jackson Cty., 104 F. App'x 483, 489 (6th Cir. 2004).
Similarly, in Jude v. Hitachi Auto, the court held that plaintiff’s “facially ambiguous
standard form excuse” was insufficient to establish that he suffered a serious medical
condition as a matter of law. Jude v. Hitachi Auto. Sys. Am. Inc., No. 5:15-cv-57-KKC,
2
The only medical record Plaintiff provides from February is a two-page report from a
doctor’s visit on February 24, 2017. (Dkt. #24-6, PageID 450.) This report contains no
certification that Plaintiff suffered a serious medical condition and does not place any
work restrictions on Plaintiff.
3
The court will note that the form excuses are from different medical clinics and appear
to bear the signatures of different physicians. Nevertheless, the court will construe the
evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff and accept the assertion that he was
excused for more than three consecutive days by the same medical provider.
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2016 WL 3976651, at *3 (E.D. Ky. July 22, 2016). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s undetailed
standard form excuses are insufficient as a matter of law to prove that he suffered a
serious health condition.
For Plaintiff’s June abbesses, he submits three more standard form excuses,
none of which contain any information regarding his medical condition or possible work
restrictions. (Dkt. #24-12, PageID 479; Dkt. #24-23, PageID 527; Dkt. #24-24, PageID
529.) Additionally, none of these forms excuse Plaintiff from work for more than three
full consecutive days, which is required for FMLA protection. The medical records
Plaintiff submits for some of his June absences indicate that he experienced only
routine gastrointestinal issues. These records do not indicate that Plaintiff was under
any work or activity restrictions. (Dkt. # 24-9, PageID 465; Dkt. #24-10, PageID 469–
73.) Routine gastrointestinal illnesses are explicitly excluded from FMLA coverage. See
73 C.F.R. §67934, 68079 (2008). This evidence does not independently establish that
Plaintiff suffered a serious health condition in June.
The court need not resolve the factual dispute of whether Plaintiff’s June
absences were a continuation of his treatment in February because Plaintiff’s proffered
evidence does not establish that he suffered a serious health condition on either
occasion. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s prima facie claims for FMLA retaliation and
interference fail as a matter of law, and the court need not further analyze either claim
under the McDonnell burden-shifting framework. See Morris, 320 F. App'x at 338.
(“Because [plaintiff’s] leave was not on account of a serious health condition, he cannot
establish . . . that he engaged in an activity protected by the FMLA.”).
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2. Plaintiff’s Estoppel Argument
Plaintiff’s argument that he be entitled to FMLA leave under a theory of equitable
estoppel fails as a matter of law. The Sixth Circuit recognizes estoppel arguments in the
FMLA context under certain circumstances. Dobrowski v. Jay Dee Contractors, Inc.,
571 F.3d 551, 554 (6th Cir. 2009). To prove an estoppel argument, “a plaintiff must
demonstrate ‘(1) a definite misrepresentation as to a material fact, (2) a reasonable
reliance on the misrepresentation, and (3) a resulting detriment to the party reasonably
relying on the misrepresentation.’” Ritenour v. Tenn. Dep't of Human Servs., 497 F.
App'x 521, 528 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Dobrowski, 571 F.3d at 557). Plaintiff offers one
piece of evidence in support of his estoppel argument—testimony from his own
deposition.4 This testimony fails to satisfy the first two requirements for estoppel. The
relevant portions of Plaintiff’s deposition are as follows:
Q.
So during this February, March time period, did anyone at
Suburban say anything about you taking time off of work?
A.
Yes.
Q.
What was said and by whom?
A.
Sam and Hans basically told me I could take off any time while I
was sick. I wasn’t given anything to sign or documentation for FMLA. I
don’t know. I was just doing what I was told. They said, you can take time
off, what you need. Hans told me about his wife having cancer, and that
4
Plaintiff also contends that the deposition testimony of Essam Khalil, Plaintiff’s direct
supervisor, supports estoppel as does a letter written by Defendant to the EEOC. (Dkt.
#24, PageID 414.) In his deposition, Mr. Khalil does not admit that Plaintiff was
authorized to take FMLA leave. To the contrary, Mr. Khalil recalls that Plaintiff requested
FMLA leave but was informed by human resources that “he wasn’t eligible at that time.”
(Dkt. #24-3, PageID 433.) Additionally, the EEOC letter referenced by Plaintiff (Dkt. #242, PageID 427) does not state that Defendant approved FMLA leave—the letter states
that Plaintiff “was given time off for a medical condition,” which Defendant does not
dispute. (Dkt. #25, PageID 577.)
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they were there with me every step of the way. And to take the time off as
I needed, you know, until I got better. And to come in when I could.
...
Q.
You said you weren’t given any paperwork, did you ever ask
anyone for FMLA leave or FMLA paperwork?
A.
Yes, I asked Sam, I said, what do I have to fill out to do all this. He
said, nothing, you’re fine. Me and Hans know about it, you’re
communicating with both of us, you are sending text messages, you are
faxing Dr.’s notes. He goes, it’s all taken care of.
I mean, I have never, ever went on family medical leave in my life. I have
no idea what was supposed to be given to me, you know, for it.
(Dkt. #24, PageID 414; Dkt. #24-8, PageID 460.)
This testimony relates to Plaintiff’s leave in February, which Defendant does not
dispute was authorized, albeit not under the FMLA. (Dkt. # 25, PageID 577.)
Defendant’s position remains that Plaintiff’s absences in June, not February, resulted in
his termination. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, these
statements do not rise to the level of “definite misrepresentation” necessary to satisfy
the first element of estoppel.
Federal circuit precedent informs this determination. In Dobrowski, the Sixth
Circuit concluded that defendant-employer made a “definite misrepresentation”
regarding Plaintiff’s FMLA eligibility because Plaintiff “applied for leave on an FMLA
form and received written notice from his company that his leave was ‘pursuant to the
Family and Medical Leave Act’ and that he was an ‘eligible employee.’” Dobrowski, 571
F.3d at 557 (dismissing plaintiff’s FMLA claim because plaintiff failed to show reliance
on defendant’s definite misrepresentations of his eligibility). In a case factually similar to
the instant case, the Third Circuit held that an employer’s generalized reassurances to
an employee seeking leave did not rise to the level of definite misrepresentation:
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[Plaintiff] also cites [his employer’s] statements from their . . .
meeting prior to his leave as qualifying misrepresentations because
[employer assured [plaintiff] that he should not worry and that his job
would be there upon his return. The District Court properly concluded that
these statements do not satisfy [the definite misrepresentation] element
because they do not address [plaintiff’s] FMLA eligibility. This finding does
not, as [plaintiff] contends, demonstrate that the District Court rendered
credibility determinations prohibited at this stage by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56. Rather, this conclusion shows the District Court engaged in
a straightforward reading of the record.
Palan v. Inovio Pharm., Inc., 653 F. App'x 97, 101 n.8 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal citations
omitted). A straightforward reading of Plaintiff’s deposition testimony, particularly
Plaintiff’s statement that his supervisors “basically told me I could take off any time while
I was sick,” yields no evidence that Defendant affirmatively approved Plaintiff for FMLA
leave. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s estoppel argument fails as a matter of law.
Even if the testimony Plaintiff cites could amount to a definite misrepresentation
of his FMLA eligibility, Plaintiff has offered no evidence that he relied on this
misrepresentation in taking leave in either February or June. Plaintiff simply asserts that
he “relied on the misrepresentation and continued to fax Dr.’s notes” to his supervisors.
(Dkt. #24, PageID 415.) Plaintiff fails to assert that but for Defendant’s
misrepresentations regarding his FMLA eligibility, he would not have taken leave on
either occasion. Plaintiff’s conclusory elemental recitation is insufficient to satisfy the
second requirement for estoppel and, therefore, insufficient to survive summary
judgment. See Arendale v. City of Memphis, 519 F.3d 587, 605 (6th Cir. 2008) (“In
order to survive summary judgment, Plaintiff cannot rely on conjecture or conclusory
accusations . . . . Conclusory assertions, supported only by Plaintiff's own opinions,
cannot withstand a motion for summary judgment."); Stalbosky v. Belew, 205 F.3d 890,
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895 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that vague and conclusory statement were insufficient to
counter a motion for summary judgment).
B. ADA Claim
The Sixth Circuit succinctly summarized the requirements for ADA discrimination
claims in Latowski v. Northwoods Nursing Ctr.:
The ADA prohibits discrimination “against a qualified individual on the
basis of disability in regard to . . . the hiring, advancement, or discharge of
employees . . . and other terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). A prima facie case of discrimination
under the ADA requires the plaintiff to show that (1) she is disabled, (2)
she is otherwise qualified for the job, with or without reasonable
accommodation, and (3) she was discriminated against because of her
disability. Talley v. Family Dollar Stores of Ohio, Inc., 542 F.3d 1099, 1105
(6th Cir. 2008). A person is “disabled” under the ADA if she has “(A) a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the
major life activities . . . ; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) [is]
regarded as having such an impairment.” § 12102(1). An individual is
“regarded as” disabled if an employer “mistakenly believes that an
employee has a physical impairment that substantially limits one or more
major life activities or . . . mistakenly believes that an actual, nonlimiting
impairment substantially limits one or more of an employee's major life
activities.” Daugherty v. Sajar Plastics, Inc., 544 F.3d 696, 704 (6th Cir.
2008) (quoting Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471, 489, 119 S. Ct.
2139, 144 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1999)). “The regarded-as-disabled prong of the
ADA ‘protects employees who are perfectly able to perform a job, but are
rejected because of the myths, fears and stereotypes associated with
disabilities.’” Id. at 703 (quoting Gruener v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 510 F.3d
661, 664 (6th Cir. 2008)).
Latowski v. Northwoods Nursing Ctr., 549 F. App'x 478, 486–87 (6th Cir. 2013).
Plaintiff asserts that he meets the regarded-as-disabled definition of
disability because he personally believed he had cancer and shared this concern
with his supervisors. (Dkt. #24, PageID 420–21.) This claim is unfounded.
To qualify as a disability under the regarded-as-disabled prong of the
ADA, a condition must last more than six months. 42 U.S.C. 12102(3)(B). Plaintiff
has not alleged, much less produced evidence sufficient to show, that the mass
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on his throat afflicted him for more than six months. Drawing all reasonable
inferences in favor of Plaintiff, his condition lasted from February to June of 2017.
Accordingly, the mass constitutes a transitory condition and is not a disability
under the ADA. Moreover, Plaintiff puts forth no evidence that his supervisors
believed he had cancer, let alone considered him disabled. To the contrary, in
March, Plaintiff informed his supervisors that the mass on his throat was benign.
(Dkt. #21-3, PageID 301; Dkt. #21-13, PageID 380.) Because Plaintiff has offered
no evidence to prove that his condition lasted more than six months, nor to
suggest that his employers considered him disabled at the time of his
termination, Plaintiff’s ADA claim fails as a matter of law.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Summary judgment is appropriate because there is no dispute of material fact
and Plaintiff’s claims fail as a matter of law. Plaintiff’s FMLA claims fail because he has
not established that he suffered a serious health condition. Similarly, Plaintiff’s ADA
claim fails because he has not offered evidence to prove he was disabled within the
statutory meaning of disability. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. #21) is
GRANTED on all counts. A separate judgment will issue.
s/Robert H. Cleland
ROBERT H. CLELAND
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: September 27, 2018
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I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed to counsel of record
on this date, September 27, 2018, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
s/William Barkholz for Lisa Wagner
Case Manager and Deputy Clerk
(810) 292-6522
S:\Cleland\Cleland\JUDGE'S DESK\C1 ORDERS\17-13323.BACHIR.summary.judgment.HEB.2.docx
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