Goins v. Campbell

Filing 10

OPINION and ORDER Denying 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Denying 9 Amended Petition, Declining to Issue a Certificate of Appealability, and Denying Petitioner Leave to Appeal in Forma Pauperis. Signed by District Judge Stephen J. Murphy, III. (DPar)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
ROBERT RAY-RILEY GOINS,
Petitioner,

Case No. 2:17-cv-13592

v.

HON. STEPHEN J. MURPHY, III

SHERMAN CAMPBELL,
Respondent,
___________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS,
DENYING THE MOTION TO AMEND THE PETITION [9],
DECLINING TO ISSUE A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY,
AND DENYING PETITIONER LEAVE TO APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS
Robert Ray-Riley Goins is confined in a Michigan state prison after a Kent County
jury convicted him of first- and second-degree criminal sexual conduct. He petitions the
Court for a writ of habeas corpus, but for the reasons below, the Court will deny the
petition.
BACKGROUND
Goins's convictions arose from sexual contact he had with two girls related to him,
ages 12 and 14. People v. Goins, No. 318215, 2015 WL 558176, at * 1 (Mich. Ct. App.
Feb. 10, 2015); see also Wagner v. Smith, 581 F.3d 410, 413 (6th Cir. 2009) (noting that
a federal court reviewing a habeas petition presumes the state court's findings correct).
Michigan's Court of Appeals affirmed Goins's conviction and he did not file an application
for leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court. See ECF 8-21.

Following his appeal, Goins filed a post-conviction motion for relief from judgment
pursuant to M.C.R. 6.508(D), which the trial court initially denied. People v. Goins, No.
12-08569-FH (Kent Cty. Cir. Ct., Oct. 16, 2015). Goins appealed this, too, and the
appellate court remanded the case to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing to determine
whether petitioner had been denied the effective assistance of counsel "when his trial
counsel failed to fully advise him regarding the sentencing consequences of a plea offer."
People v. Goins, No. 330433 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 15, 2016).
The trial judge held the hearing but ultimately denied the motion for relief from
judgment. People v. Goins, No. 12-08569-FH, *2–4 (Kent Cty. Cir. Ct., Apr. 22, 2016).
Goins then sought leave to appeal, but the Michigan appellate courts denied him leave to
do so. People v. Goins, No. 334426 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 3, 2016); lv. den. 501 Mich. 859
(2017).
Goins subsequently filed the instant petition. Initially, he raised only one ground for
relief:
Petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel in violation of the
Sixth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States when his trial
counsel failed to explain the sentencing exposure Petitioner faced if he
accepted the plea offer.
ECF 1, PgID 5; ECF 9, PgID 853. After briefing on the petition was complete, Goins
moved to amend the petition and included the proposed, amended version. The amended
petition would add another claim:
Petitioner was denied the effective assistance of appellate counsel in
violation of the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States
when his appellate counsel failed to raise petitioner's strongest issue:
[i]neffective assistance of trial counsel.
ECF 9, PgID 853. The Court addresses both arguments below.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Goins filed his habeas petition in 2017, so the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) governs. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997).
A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit "precludes federal habeas
relief so long as 'fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's
decision." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v.
Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). Thus "even a strong case for relief does not mean
the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable." Id. (citing Lockyer v. Andrade,
538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003)).
Section 2254(d) requires the Court to determine what arguments or theories
supported or could have supported the state court's decision. The Court must then ask
whether fairminded jurists could possibly disagree "that those arguments or theories are
inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision" of the Supreme Court. Id.
Finally, habeas review is "limited to the record that was before the state court."
Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011). A state court's factual determinations are
presumed correct on federal habeas review, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), but a petitioner may
rebut this presumption with clear and convincing evidence. Warren v. Smith, 161 F.3d
358, 360–61 (6th Cir. 1998).
LEGAL STANDARD
There are two prongs an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, whether focused
on trial counsel or appellate counsel. See Whiting v. Burt, 395 F. 3d 602, 617 (6th Cir.
2005). First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was so deficient that
the attorney was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). The defendant must overcome a
strong presumption that counsel's behavior was within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance. Id. Second, the defendant must show that such performance
prejudiced his or her defense. Id. To demonstrate prejudice, the defendant must establish
that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
Strickland places the burden on the defendant who raises a claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel, and not the state, to show a reasonable probability that the result of the
proceeding would have been different, but for counsel's allegedly deficient performance.
See Wong v. Belmontes, 558 U.S. 15, 27 (2009).
On habeas review, "the question 'is not whether a federal court believes the state
court's determination' under the Strickland standard 'was incorrect but whether that
determination was unreasonable—a substantially higher threshold.'" Knowles v.
Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009) (quoting Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473
(2007)). "The pivotal question is whether the state court's application of the Strickland
standard was unreasonable. This is different from asking whether defense counsel's
performance fell below Strickland's standard." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. at 101. A
"doubly" deferential judicial review therefore applies to a Strickland claim brought by a
habeas petitioner. Id.
DISCUSSION
I.

Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel
Goins claims his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to adequately explain the

various sentencing guidelines ranges when she advised him about the prosecutor's plea

offer. He claims that this deficiency caused him to reject a plea bargain to one count of
second-degree criminal sexual conduct, which led to him being convicted of the higher
offense of first-degree criminal sexual conduct.
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel extends to the plea bargaining process.
Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 163 (2012); Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143-44 (2012).
A criminal defendant during plea negotiations is "entitled to the effective assistance of
competent counsel." Lafler, 566 U.S. at 162 (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S.
759, 771 (1970)). When an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim involves a rejected
plea offer, the defendant must the establish that he was prejudiced by counsel's alleged
deficiency, and that but for the ineffective advice there is a reasonable probability that the
plea offer would have been presented to the court, i.e., that the defendant would have
accepted the plea and the prosecution would not have withdrawn it in light of intervening
circumstances. Id. at 163. The defendant must also show that the court would have
accepted the plea's terms, and that the conviction, or sentence, or both, would have been
less severe than under the judgment and sentence that in fact were imposed. Id. at 164.
There are several reasons to reject Goins's claim, but the first reason is that he
fails to show that his attorney gave him deficient advice. Goins's attorney, Judy Baxter,
testified that she learned the prosecuting attorney planned to pursue the first-degree
charge if the case proceeded beyond the preliminary examination and Baxter discussed
the sentencing guidelines with Goins at that time. On the day of trial, Baxter conveyed the
then-available plea bargain to Goins and gave him a rough estimate of the sentencing
guidelines for the original first-degree criminal sexual conduct charge. According to
Baxter, she may have explained to Goins that under the best case scenario he would

have received a "straddle cell guideline" sentence if he pleaded guilty to second-degree
criminal sexual conduct.1 Baxter testified that she explained to Goins that a plea bargain
to the lesser offense of second-degree criminal sexual conduct would eliminate the
possibility of petitioner receiving a life sentence if convicted of first-degree criminal sexual
conduct. Goins and his wife acknowledged that Baxter advised Goins he might receive a
life sentence if convicted of this charge.
In Jones v. United States, 178 F. 3d 790 (6th Cir. 1999), the Sixth Circuit rejected
a claim that trial counsel had been ineffective in failing to adequately advise his client
about the risks of going to trial as opposed to accepting a plea bargain. The Sixth Circuit
panel reviewed the record and noted that the facts suggested that the attorney adequately
advised the defendants with repect to the plea offer and potential sentence. The facts
also supported the magistrate judge's crediting of the attorney's testimony over the
defendant's. The panel conceded that the attorney "probably could have been more
explicit in his advice" to the defendant, but concluded that the record did "not suggest that
his performance was deficient." Id. at 794.
Here, Baxter adequately advised Goins about the advantages of accepting a plea
to the lesser offense of second-degree criminal sexual conduct versus the risks of going
to trial and being convicted of the offense of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. She
advised Goins that first-degree criminal sexual conduct carries up to life in prison and

1

A straddle cell guideline sentence is one in which the upper limit of the minimum
sentence is more than eighteen months and the lower limit is under twelve months. Under
the straddle cell guideline, a judge has the option of imposing a prison sentence or a
lesser "intermediate sanction." Kittka v. Franks, 539 F. App'x. 668, 671 (6th Cir. 2013)
(citing Mich. Comp. Laws § 769.34(4)(c)).

discussed the sentencing guidelines for first-degree criminal sexual conduct with him.
Perhaps Baxter could have been more explicit on the day of trial concerning the possible
penalties for second-degree criminal sexual conduct, but Goins was adequately advised
about the advantages of accepting a plea to the lesser offense of second-degree criminal
sexual conduct.
Goins also fails to show that he would have unequivocally pleaded guilty to
second-degree criminal sexual conduct. When Goins testified at the evidentiary hearing,
he could not state, categorically, that he would have pleaded guilty to second-degree
criminal sexual conduct if it involved a prison sentence. Although he did testify that he
would have accepted a plea that allowed for probation or county jail time, the proposed
plea agreement did not put those options on the table. And even so, Baxter, the
prosecuting attorney, and Goins's own wife all testified that Goins was adamant about his
innocence and refused to plead guilty—testimony that the trial judge found more credible
than Goins's. In sum, Goins was not prejudiced by counsel's alleged failure to adequately
advise petitioner about the penalties for second-degree criminal sexual conduct because
he failed to show that he would have unequivocally pleaded guilty to this charge if it
involved prison time. Cf. Humphress v. United States, 398 F.3d 855, 859 (6th Cir. 2005).
II.

Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel
In the proposed, amended petition, Goins additionally faults his appellate counsel

for not arguing that his trial counsel provided him with ineffective assistance. Courtappointed counsel does not have a constitutional duty to raise every non-frivolous issue
requested by a defendant. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983). Goins failed to
show that his trial counsel was ineffective and is thus is unable to establish that appellate

counsel was ineffective for failing to raise an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim
on his direct appeal. See, e.g., Fautenberry v. Mitchell, 515 F. 3d 614, 642 (6th Cir. 2008).
The Court will therefore deny the motion to amend the petition because the proposed
amendment would be futile. See Wiedbrauk v. Lavigne, 174 F. App'x. 993, 1000-02 (6th
Cir. 2006).
III.

Certificate of Appealability
The Court concludes that Goins is not entitled to federal habeas relief on the

claims he presented and will therefore dismiss his petition. Should Goins wish to appeal
this decision, he must first secure a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c)(1)(a); Fed. R. App. P. 22(b). A certificate of appealability may issue only if a
habeas petitioner makes "a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28
U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). When a court denies relief on the merits, the substantial showing
threshold is met if the petitioner demonstrates that reasonable jurists would find the
court's assessment of the constitutional claim debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel, 529
U.S. 473, 484-85 (2000). "A petitioner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that . . .
jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to
proceed further." Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003). Having considered the
matter, the court concludes that Goins fails to make a substantial showing of the denial
of a constitutional right as to his habeas claims. For that reason, the Court will deny him
a certificate of appealability and likewise deny him leave to proceed in forma pauperis on
appeal as an appeal could not be taken in good faith. See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a).
ORDER

WHEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus
is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion to amend the petition [9] is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a certificate of appealability is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner is DENIED LEAVE to appeal in forma
pauperis.
SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 18, 2018

s/Stephen J. Murphy, III
STEPHEN J. MURPHY, III
United States District Judge

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the parties
and/or counsel of record on June 18, 2018, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
s/David P. Parker
Case Manager