Ramsey v. Social Security

Filing 52

ORDER Denying 51 Joint Motion for Relief under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b) - Signed by District Judge Nancy G. Edmunds. (LBar)

Case 2:17-cv-13713-NGE-CI ECF No. 52, PageID.1362 Filed 03/09/22 Page 1 of 5

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
JOYCE ANN RAMSEY,
Plaintiff,

No. 17-13713

v.

Honorable Nancy G. Edmunds

COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
________________________________________/
ORDER DENYING JOINT MOTION FOR RELIEF UNDER
FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 60(b) [51]
On November 10, 2021, the Court entered an opinion and order denying Plaintiff’s
motion for attorney fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C.
§ 2412(d)(1)(A). (ECF No. 46.) Plaintiff appealed that order to the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals, (ECF No. 47), but her appeal was dismissed on a joint motion for dismissal
brought by the parties, (ECF No. 49). The parties now jointly move this Court for relief
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) to enable them to effectuate the settlement
reached on appeal. (ECF No. 51.) For the reasons below, the Court DENIES this
request.
I.

Background
On November 15, 2017, Plaintiff filed this action seeking judicial review of the

Commissioner of Social Security’s decision denying her application for supplemental
security income. (ECF No. 1.) Among other arguments, Plaintiff raised the issue of
whether the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) who presided over her hearing was not
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constitutionally appointed under Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018). (ECF No. 17.)
Defendant responded by arguing that Plaintiff’s Appointments Clause challenge was
forfeited because it was not presented to the agency in the administrative process. (ECF
No. 18-2.) This Court ultimately agreed with Defendant’s forfeiture argument and affirmed
the Commissioner’s decision. (ECF No. 27.) But the Sixth Circuit and the Supreme Court
later disagreed, holding that a social security claimant may raise an Appointments Clause
challenge for the first time in court. See Ramsey v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 973 F.3d 537,
540 (6th Cir. 2020); Carr v. Saul, 141 S. Ct. 1352, 1362 (2021).
Subsequent to those decisions and remand of this case to the Social Security
Administration for a new hearing before an ALJ other than the ALJ who presided over
Plaintiff’s original hearing, Plaintiff moved this Court for an award of $51,159.35 in
attorney fees under the EAJA. (ECF Nos. 39, 41.) Defendant opposed the motion. (ECF
Nos. 40-1, 45.) The Court found that even though the Supreme Court held in favor of
Plaintiff’s position on the issue of forfeiture of an Appointments Clause challenge,
because Defendant’s position was substantially justified, Plaintiff is not entitled to attorney
fees under the EAJA. See Ramsey v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 17-13713, 2021 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 217256, at *7-9 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 10, 2021). Plaintiff then appealed, but after
the parties reached a settlement, the appeal was dismissed on the basis of that
settlement. (6th Cir. Case No. 22- 1003, Doc Nos. 12, 13.) The parties now ask the Court
to enter an order vacating its previous order and awarding Plaintiff $2,000.00 in attorney
fees and $505.00 in costs under the EAJA to effectuate the settlement.1 (ECF No. 51.)

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The Court notes that it routinely approves stipulations with regard to an award of
attorney fees under the EAJA in cases where a social security claimant has won a remand
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II.

Analysis
The parties move for relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5) and

60(b)(6). Rule 60(b)(5) sets forth that a court may relieve a party from a final judgment
or order if “the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on an
earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no
longer equitable,” and Rule 60(b)(6) allows a court to relieve a party from a final judgment
for “any other reason that justifies relief.”
Rule 60(b)(5), however, is typically reserved for injunctions, declaratory
judgments, or consent decrees. See Kalamazoo River Study Grp. v. Rockwell Int’l Corp.,
355 F.3d 574, 587 (6th Cir. 2004). And while Rule 60(b)(6) allows a court to relieve a
party from a final judgment for a reason not addressed in Rule 60(b)(1)-(5), it applies “only
in exceptional or extraordinary circumstances.” See Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. Trs. of the
UMWA Combined Benefit Fund, 249 F.3d 519, 524 (6th Cir. 2001) (noting courts should
apply Rule 60(b)(6) relief “only in unusual and extreme situations where principles of
equity mandate relief”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The United
States Supreme Court has provided insight into the circumstances under which a court
may vacate a judgment due to a settlement in another context. In United States Bancorp
Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 29 (1994), the Supreme Court held that
mootness due to a settlement does not justify vacatur of a lower court’s judgment by an

to the agency. But here the parties did not come to an agreement until after the Court
found the government’s position substantially justified—a finding that precludes an award
under the language of the statute. See § 2412(d)(1)(A). Thus, under the current
procedural posture of this case, the only way the Court can award fees under the EAJA
is if it vacates its previous order.
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appellate court unless “exceptional circumstances” counsel in favor of such. In so doing,
the Supreme Court emphasized the value of final judgments, noting that “[j]udicial
precedents are presumptively correct and valuable to the legal community as a whole.
They are not merely the property of private litigants and should stand unless a court
concludes that the public interest would be served by a vacatur.” Id. at 26 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). The Supreme Court also noted that the availability
of vacatur after settlement on appeal may deter settlement at an earlier stage, because
“[s]ome litigants, at least, may think it is worthwhile to roll the dice rather than settle in the
district court, or in the court of appeals, if, but only if, an unfavorable outcome can by
washed away by a settlement-related vacatur. And the judicial economies achieved by
settlement at the district-court level are ordinarily much more extensive than those
achieved by settlement on appeal.” Id. at 27-28. District courts have found the Supreme
Court’s reasoning in Bancorp Mortgage relevant when considering a Rule 60(b) motion
triggered by a settlement on appeal that is conditioned on vacating an earlier judgment.
See, e.g., McLaughlin v. G2 Eng’g & Mgmt., No. 3:15-CV-537-TAV-DCP, 2020 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 34426, at *1, 9 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 28, 2020) (denying such a motion after finding the
parties “fail[ed] to present any circumstances distinguishing th[e] case from other
settlements reached on appeal or to explain why allowing the judgment to stand would
be inequitable”).
The parties do not point to any exceptional or extraordinary circumstances that
would justify relief here. Instead, they merely assert that applying the Court’s previous
order is no longer equitable due to the change in circumstances resulting from the
settlement reached while the matter was on appeal and the dismissal of the appeal. But
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the Court finds that the parties’ interest in effectuating the settlement is outweighed by
“the public interest in final judgments and the prudent use of judicial resources.” See id.
at *10. Defendant chose to contest Plaintiff’s request for attorney fees under the EAJA
and the parties thoroughly briefed the issue of whether Defendant’s position was
substantially justified. The Court ruled in favor of Defendant, addressing an issue on
which district courts have come to differing conclusions. See Ramsey, 2021 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 217256, at *8-9. And other courts have since cited to the Court’s opinion and
order. In sum, the Court finds the balance of equities here weighs against vacating its
previous order.
III.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the parties’ joint Rule 60(b) motion is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
s/Nancy G. Edmunds
Nancy G. Edmunds
United States District Judge

Dated: March 9, 2022
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record
on March 9, 2022, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
s/Lisa Bartlett
Case Manager

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