Midgyett v. Jackson

Filing 15

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS. Signed by District Judge David M. Lawson. (SPin)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
GREGORY MIDGYETT,
Petitioner,

Case Number 17-13846
Honorable David M. Lawson

v.
SHANE JACKSON,
Respondent.
_________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
A dispute over a parking space on a Detroit residential street led to the shooting death of
Ronnie Davis. The shooter, petitioner Gregory Midgyett, alleged at trial that he acted in selfdefense. The jury convicted him of second-degree murder and firearms offenses. Midgyett
challenges those convictions in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254,
in which he alleges that he was denied the right to present a defense when the trial court refused
to allow him to offer evidence that Davis was a local drug dealer. He also contends that his trial
lawyer did not perform up to constitutional standards. Because neither claim has merit, the Court
will deny the petition.
I.
Ronnie Davis and Gregory Midgyett lived on opposite sides of Seyburn Street in Detroit.
The houses in the neighborhood did not have driveways. Residents “took different places” on the
street and “just said that was their parking spot.”
On July 21, 2013, Davis returned from the store and waited in his car for his usual parking
spot to open up. Midgyett’s father’s vehicle was parked in front of Midgyett’s house. Midgyett’s
truck was also parked on the street. Anthony Hines was inside his parked vehicle when he noticed

Midgyett walk to his truck. Midgyett then walked down to Hines’ car to speak with him,
commenting that he was worried that someone had done something to his truck, because the dome
light was on and the door was ajar. Midgyett referred to Davis’s house and told Hines that he
“hope[d] those people in that house right there didn’t bother [his] truck.”
While the two men were talking, Hines noticed Davis’s car backing up toward them.
Midgyett walked over to the passenger window of the car. Hines heard Midgyett say, “What the
“F” you want?” Hines testified that Midgyett pulled out a pistol; Davis responded, “that’s all you
got[?]” Hines then heard a pop and saw a flash, at which point Hines drove off. Davis drove in
the same direction, hit Hines’ vehicle, causing Hines to spin around and collide with multiple
parked cars, including Midgyett’s truck. After the shooting and the accident, Hines got out of his
car. Hines testified that Midgyett worked for 10 minutes under the hood of his truck, went into
his house, came back out, and with the help of another car, towed his truck away and left the area.
Keith Richardson also was at the scene that night waiting for Davis to park his car. After
Davis backed up his car, Richardson heard a loud crash, noticed another car “spinning out,” and
then saw Davis driving past him at a fast speed, before crashing. Richardson jumped out of his
car, saw that Davis was unconscious with blood on his chest, and called 911. Richardson did not
see a weapon near Davis and testified that he did not know Davis to carry a weapon.
The police found a .22 caliber casing inside of Davis’ car, but no other firearm evidence
was recovered.
Midgyett testified at trial and admitted to shooting Davis, but he insisted that he did so in
self-defense. Midgyett came out of his house to check on his truck, saw Hines in his car down the
street, and walked toward him. While talking with Hines, Midgyett noticed a blue car (Davis’s)
backing up towards them. Midgyett testified that the person in the car “started talking all crazy,
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like you know, man, move your truck.” Midgyett told Davis he did not have to move. The two
men began arguing. Midgyett testified that Davis pointed a weapon at the petitioner. Midgyett
testified that he “was afraid of being shot.” He pulled out his .22 caliber handgun and shot the
man. Midgyett testified he felt that his life was threatened by Davis. About 30 minutes later,
Midgyett’s friend arrived to tow his truck. Midgyett then left the scene.
Midgyett was arrested over a year later. During the intervening period, Midgyett said that
he “snuck over [to his house] occasionally” to see his father, but never returned to live there. He
“didn’t want [his] daddy’s house to be shot up, because that neighborhood is very rough over
there.”
The jury rejected Midgyett’s self-defense argument and convicted him of second-degree
murder, possession of a firearm by a felon, carrying a concealed weapon, and possession of a
firearm during the commission of a felony, second offense. His convictions were affirmed on
appeal. People v. Midgyett, No. 326323, 2016 WL 3749414 (Mich. Ct. App. July 12, 2016); lv.
den. 500 Mich. 926, 888 N.W.2d 93 (2017) (table).
He filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus raising the following grounds:
I.

Petitioner was denied his federal constitutional right to present a defense
when the trial court abused its discretion in excluding relevant evidence of
Mr. Davis’ reputation for violence.

II.

Petitioner’s federal constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel
was violated where trial counsel failed to move for jury instructions on the
lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter.

III.

Petitioner was denied his constitutionally effective trial counsel rights when
counsel failed to subpoena for trial a witness that petitioner explicitly
demanded.

Pet. at 6-7, ECF No. 1, PageID.6-7.

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The warden filed an answer to the petition raising the defense of procedural default. The
“procedural default” argument is a reference to the rule that the petitioner did not preserve properly
some of his claims in state court, and the state court’s ruling on that basis is an adequate and
independent ground for the denial of relief. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991). The
Court finds it unnecessary to address the procedural question. It is not a jurisdictional bar to review
of the merits, Howard v. Bouchard, 405 F.3d 459, 476 (6th Cir. 2005), and “federal courts are not
required to address a procedural-default issue before deciding against the petitioner on the merits,”
Hudson v. Jones, 351 F.3d 212, 215 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518,
525 (1997)). The procedural defense will not affect the outcome of this case, and it is more
efficient to proceed directly to the merits.
II.
Certain provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA),
Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (Apr. 24, 1996), which govern this case, “circumscribe[d]”
the standard of review federal courts must apply when considering an application for a writ of
habeas corpus raising constitutional claims, including claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520 (2003). A federal court may grant relief only if the state
court’s adjudication “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States,” or if the adjudication “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2).
“Clearly established Federal law for purposes of § 2254(d)(1) includes only the holdings,
as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court’s decisions.” White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415, 419
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(2014) (quotation marks and citations omitted). “As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from
a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented
in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and
comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington
v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011). The distinction between mere error and an objectively
unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent creates a substantially higher threshold for
obtaining relief than de novo review. Mere error by the state court will not justify issuance of the
writ; rather, the state court’s application of federal law “must have been objectively unreasonable.”
Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 520-21 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 409 (2000) (quotation
marks omitted)). The AEDPA imposes a highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court
rulings and demands that state-court decisions be “given the benefit of the doubt.” Renico v. Lett,
559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010).
A.
At trial, Midgyett attempted to testify that he had heard from someone that Davis was
“gonna be selling drugs” at the house where he was staying. The trial judge sustained the
prosecutor’s objection to the testimony on the ground that the evidence was irrelevant. The judge
also prevented Midgyett from answering a question regarding whether he had seen “any particular
or unusual activity at [Davis’] house.” The judge agreed that this evidence also was irrelevant.
Midgyett now argues that exclusion of that evidence denied him the right to present a defense.
The Michigan Court of Appeals rejected this issue on direct appeal. It acknowledged that
under Michigan law, a defendant in a homicide prosecution may offer evidence of the victim’s
character trait of aggression to prove that the victim was the first aggressor. People v. Midgyett,
No. 326323, 2016 WL 3749414, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. July 12, 2016) (citing Mich. R. Evid.
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404(a)(2). The court held, however, that Midgyett’s testimony about Davis’s drug dealing did not
tend to show that character trait and therefore was not relevant to self-defense. The court also
determined that the evidence of Davis being involved in the drug trade was offered to explain why
Midgyett did not return to the neighborhood very much after the shooting, which likewise was not
relevant to the defense of self-defense. Ibid. The court also determined that the evidence would
not have made a difference anyway even if it had been received. Id. at *3.
A person accused of a crime has a constitutional right to present witnesses to establish
a defense. This right is a fundamental element of the due process of law. Washington v. Texas,
388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967); see also Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) (“whether rooted
directly in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, or in the Compulsory Process
or Confrontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment, the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants
‘a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense’”) (citations omitted). However, an
accused in a criminal case does not have an unfettered right to offer evidence that is incompetent,
privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under the standard rules of evidence. Montana v. Egelhoff,
518 U.S. 37, 42 (1996).

Rulings that exclude evidence from criminal trials do not violate

the right to present a defense unless they are “‘arbitrary’ or ‘disproportionate to the purposes they
are designed to serve.’” United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998) (quoting Rock v.
Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 56 (1987)). Moreover, under the standard of review for habeas cases as
enunciated in section 2254(d)(1), it is not enough for a habeas petitioner to show that the state trial
court’s decision to exclude potentially helpful defense evidence was erroneous or incorrect.
Instead, a habeas petitioner must show that the state trial court’s decision to exclude
the evidence was “an objectively unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court
precedent.” See Rockwell v. Yukins, 341 F. 3d at 511-12.
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The state courts’ rulings that the evidence was inadmissible reasonably applied state
evidence rules. A colorable argument could be made, perhaps, that individuals involved in the
drug trade carry firearms, and therefore it was more likely that Davis did so at the time of the
shooting. But Midgyett never made that argument, either in the state courts or here. And even if
he had, the state court’s rejection of the evidence with such a minimal connection to the defense
theory certainly would be a debatable point subject to “fairminded disagreement.” Harrington,
562 U.S. at 103. Federal courts will not disturb a state court’s exclusion of evidence on the ground
of relevancy “unless the relevance and probative value of such evidence is so apparent and great
that excluding the evidence denies the petitioner the due process of law.” Jones v. Smith, 244 F.
Supp. 2d 801, 814 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (citations omitted). That is not the case here. The exclusion
of the evidence “was [not] so prejudicial as to deprive the defendant of a fundamentally fair trial.”
Ibid.
B.
Midgyett also argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because his
lawyer did not ask the court to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of voluntary
manslaughter, and because his lawyer did not subpoena a witness that might have been able to
shed light on whether Davis was armed.
The Michigan Court of Appeals viewed the first argument as a criticism of trial counsel’s
decision to go all in on the defense of self-defense, which the court found to be a “legitimate allor-nothing trial strategy.” Midgyett, 2016 WL 3749414, at *6. It rejected the second argument
because Midgyett failed to develop it by identifying the witness or making a record on what she
might have actually said. Ibid.

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The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant
the right to the effective assistance of counsel. An ineffective assistance of counsel claim has two
components. A petitioner must show that counsel’s performance was deficient, and that deficiency
prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). An attorney’s
performance meets the first element when “counsel’s representation [falls] below an objective
standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 688. The petitioner must show “that counsel made errors so
serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth
Amendment.” Id. at 687. “Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential.”
Id. at 689. The Supreme Court has “declined to articulate specific guidelines for appropriate
attorney conduct and instead [has] emphasized that the proper measure of attorney performance
remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.” Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 521
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688) (quotation marks omitted).
An attorney’s deficient performance is prejudicial if “counsel’s errors were so serious as
to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
The petitioner must show “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,
the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694. Unless a defendant demonstrates
both deficient performance and prejudice, “it cannot be said that the conviction resulted from a
breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable.” Id. at 687.
Success on ineffective assistance of counsel claims is relatively rare, because the Strickland
standard is “‘difficult to meet.’” White, 572 U.S. at 419 (quoting Metrish v. Lancaster, 569 U.S.
351, 357-58 (2013)). And under AEDPA, obtaining relief under Strickland is even more difficult
because “[t]he standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both highly deferential and when
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the two apply in tandem, review is doubly so.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 105 (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted). This doubly-deferential standard requires the Court to give “both the
state court and the defense attorney the benefit of the doubt.” Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 15
(2013). “[T]he question is not whether counsel’s actions were reasonable,” but whether “there is
any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.” Richter, 562
U.S. at 105.
The state court of appeals was reluctant to look behind trial counsel’s strategic decision not
to ask for a manslaughter instruction. That holding did not contravene or unreasonably apply
Supreme Court precedent. Trial counsel may have reasonably determined that asking the jury to
compromise on a lesser offense would weaken the defense of self-defense. Moreover, there was
no evidence that would have supported a heat-of-passion manslaughter defense theory, and years
earlier the Michigan Supreme Court had held that the doctrine of imperfect self-defense is not
available as “a freestanding defense that mitigates a murder to manslaughter because it was not
recognized as such under the common law at the time the Legislature codified the crimes of murder
and manslaughter.” People v. Reese, 491 Mich. 127, 150, 815 N.W.2d 85, 98 (2012). In fact, the
court of appeals noted that “[t]he voluntary manslaughter instruction was potentially detrimental
to defendant’s self-defense theory.” Midgyett, 2016 WL 3749414, at *6.
Finally, it is well established that a decision not to request jury instructions on all possible
lesser offenses may well be proper trial strategy. See Tinsley v. Million, 399 F.3d 796, 808 (6th
Cir. 2005). Counsel’s decision to pursue an “all or nothing” defense in the hopes of obtaining a
complete acquittal on the charges was a reasonable defense decision. See Kelly v. Lazaroff, 846
F.3d 819, 830 (6th Cir. 2017). Trial counsel may have decided not to argue inconsistent theories
of defense and to seek an outright acquittal on a self-defense theory, which was a reasonable choice
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that the state courts properly should not second-guess. See Lewis v. Russell, 42 F. App’x 809, 81011 (6th Cir. 2002).
The argument that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to subpoena a witness for trial
was not well developed in the state court, nor is it more developed here. Midgyett presented that
argument to the state court of appeals in a pro se brief that he was allowed to file after his courtappointed appellate counsel filed the formal brief on appeal. Midgyett argues that an unnamed
witness was at the scene and was putting pressure on Davis’s wound. He contends that the witness
could have contradicted Mr. Richardson’s testimony that Davis did not have a gun in his car.
But Midgyett has not told us who this person was, and he has not furnished a statement —
much less an affidavit — detailing what she might have said if called as a witness. Conclusory
allegations of this sort, not backed up with evidence, are not enough to show that defense counsel
failed to perform adequately by not calling the witness. Workman v. Bell, 178 F.3d 759, 771 (6th
Cir. 1998). And without any proof of what the witness would have said at trial, Midgyett is unable
to establish that he was prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to investigate or to call this unnamed
woman as a witness at trial. Clark v. Waller, 490 F.3d 551, 557 (6th Cir. 2007).
Midgyett has not satisfied either component of Strickland for an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim. He is not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus on this claim.
III.
None of the petitioner’s claims presents a basis to issue a writ of habeas corpus under 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d). The state courts’ decisions in this case were not contrary to federal law, an
unreasonable application of federal law, or an unreasonable determination of the facts. The
petitioner has not established that he is presently in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws
of the United States.
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Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED.
s/David M. Lawson
DAVID M. LAWSON
United States District Judge
Dated: June 8, 2021

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