Chassar v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 17

ORDER Adopting 14 Report and Recommendation GRANTING 12 Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Commissioner of Social Security, DENYING 11 Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Randi Michele Chassar Signed by District Judge Paul D. Borman. (DTof)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
RANDI MICHELE CHASSAR,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 17-cv-14114

v.

Paul D. Borman
United States District Judge

COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY,

Anthony P. Patti
United States Magistrate Judge

Defendant.
______________________/
OPINION AND ORDER (1) ADOPTING THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S
FEBRUARY 15, 2019 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION (ECF NO. 14),
(2) OVERRULING PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS (ECF NO. 15)
(3) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT (ECF NO. 11),
(4) GRANTING THE DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT (ECF NO. 12), AND
(5) AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE COMMISSIONER
On February 15, 2019, Magistrate Judge Anthony P. Patti issued a Report and
Recommendation to Deny Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Grant
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, and affirm the findings of the
Commissioner. (ECF No. 14, Report and Recommendation “R&R”.) On February
22, 2019, Plaintiff filed Objections to the Report and Recommendation. (ECF No. 15.)
Defendant filed a Response to Plaintiff’s Objections. (ECF No. 16.) Having
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conducted a de novo review, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), of those parts of the
Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation to which specific objections have
been filed, the Court OVERRULES Plaintiff’s Objections, ADOPTS the Magistrate
Judge’s Report and Recommendation, GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (ECF No. 12), DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF
No. 11), and AFFIRMS the findings of the Commissioner.
I.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed her claim for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) on July 18,

2014, alleging a disability onset date of February 12, 2012 (the date on which Plaintiff
was involved in a parking lot car accident). Plaintiff’s insured status expired on June
30, 2012, the date last insured (“DLI”). The action thus involves a very limited period
of claimed disability, running from February 12, 2012 to June 30, 2012. Plaintiff’s
application was denied by the state disability determination service and she requested
an administrative hearing, which occurred on March 23, 2016 before Administrative
Law Judge (“ALJ”) Patricia S. McKay. (ECF No. 9, Transcript of Administrative
Record (“Tr.”) 37-102.) On September 26, 2016, ALJ McKay issued her decision
finding that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act.
(Tr. 23-36.) On October 24, 2017, the Appeals Council declined to review ALJ
McKay’s decision. (Tr. 1-6.) Plaintiff timely filed her appeal to this Court.
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In her disability report, Plaintiff listed several conditions that she alleged
limited her ability to work: lumbar back injury, bilateral facet arthrosis, right neural
foraminal narrowing, bilateral facet arthrosis with fluid in facet joint, left lateral disc
bulge and left neural foraminal narrowing, chronic, cervicalgia, cephalgia, myositis,
temporomandibular joint disorder, depression. (Tr. 166.) Plaintiff last worked in
2007 and has not worked since due to reasons other than her current medical
conditions. (Tr. 167.) Although Plaintiff reports that she has not worked since 2007,
she reports that her conditions only became severe enough to keep her from working
on February 12, 2012. (Id.)
The ALJ found that Plaintiff has the following medically determinable
impairments through the DLI: history of motor vehicle accident resulting in lumbar,
thoracic, and left shoulder sprain; head injury; and asthma, but concluded that Plaintiff
did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that significantly limited
her ability to perform basic work-related activities through the DLI, and thus did not
have a “severe” impairment at Step 2 of the disability framework and therefore was
not under a disability from the alleged onset date of February 12, 2012 and June 30,
2012. (Tr. 28-29.) The ALJ found the Plaintiff’s statements concerning the intensity,
persistence and limiting effects of her symptoms to be not entirely consistent with the
medical and other evidence in the record. (Tr. 30.) The ALJ found that the “treatment
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record does not support that the claimant’s back and shoulder sprains, head injury, and
asthma caused more than minimal vocational relevant limitations,” and found that the
alleged impairments were not severe as defined in 20 C.F.R. 404.1520(c) and SSRs
85-28 and 96-3p. (Id.)
After proceeding through all of the appropriate administrative appeals, Plaintiff
timely filed her action in this Court on December 20, 2017. This Court referred the
matter to Magistrate Judge Anthony P. Patti who issued his Report and
Recommendation on February 15, 2019 to deny Plaintiff’s motion for summary
judgment and to affirm the decision of the Commissioner. Presently before the Court
are Plaintiff’s Objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation.
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1),

the Court conducts a de novo review of the portions of the Magistrate Judge’s Report
and Recommendation to which a party has filed “specific written objection” in a
timely manner. Lyons v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 351 F. Supp. 2d 659, 661 (E.D. Mich.
2004). A district court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings
or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Only
those objections that are specific are entitled to a de novo review under the statute.
Mira v. Marshall, 806 F.2d 636, 637 (6th Cir. 1986). “The parties have the duty to
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pinpoint those portions of the magistrate's report that the district court must specially
consider.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). “A general objection, or one that
merely restates the arguments previously presented is not sufficient to alert the court
to alleged errors on the part of the magistrate judge.” Aldrich v. Bock, 327 F. Supp.
2d 743, 747 (E.D. Mich. 2004). “‘[B]are disagreement with the conclusions reached
by the Magistrate Judge, without any effort to identify any specific errors in the
Magistrate Judge’s analysis that, if corrected, might warrant a different outcome, is
tantamount to an outright failure to lodge objections to the R & R.’” Arroyo v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 14-cv-14358, 2016 WL 424939, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 4,
2016) (quoting Depweg v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 14-11705, 2015 WL 5014361,
at *1 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 24, 2015) (citing Howard v. Secretary of Health & Human
Services, 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991)).
In reviewing the findings of the ALJ, the Court is limited to determining
whether those findings are “supported by substantial evidence” and made “pursuant
to proper legal standards.” See Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th
Cir. 2007) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) and Cutlip v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs.,
25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994)). “Substantial evidence is ‘such relevant evidence as
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Kyle v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., 609 F.3d 847, 854 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Lindsley v. Comm’r of Soc.
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Sec., 560 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 2009)); see also McGlothin v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
299 F. App’x 516, 522 (6th Cir. 2008) (recognizing that substantial evidence is “more
than a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance”) (internal quotation marks
omitted). “If the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, [the
court] must defer to that decision, ‘even if there is substantial evidence in the record
that would have supported an opposite conclusion.’” Colvin v. Barnhart, 475 F.3d
727, 730 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Longworth v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 402 F.3d
591, 595 (6th Cir. 2005)).
As to whether proper legal criteria were followed, a decision of the SSA
supported by substantial evidence will not be upheld “where the SSA fails to follow
its own regulations and where that error prejudices a claimant on the merits or
deprives the claimant of a substantial right.” Bowen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 478 F.3d
742, 746 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 546-47
(6th Cir. 2004)).
“This Court does not try the case de novo, nor resolve conflicts in the evidence,
nor decide questions of credibility.” Cutlip, 25 F.3d at 286. “It is of course for the
ALJ, and not the reviewing court, to evaluate the credibility of witnesses, including
that of the claimant.” Rogers, 486 F.3d at 247. See also Cruse v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
502 F.3d 532, 542 (6th Cir. 2007) (noting that the “ALJ’s credibility determinations
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about the claimant are to be given great weight, ‘particularly since the ALJ is charged
with observing the claimant’s demeanor and credibility’”) (quoting Walters v. Comm'r
of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 531 (6th Cir. 1997)).
“Judicial review of the Secretary’s findings must be based on the record as a
whole.” Heston v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 245 F.3d 528, 535 (6th Cir. 2001)).
Therefore, “[b]oth the court of appeals and the district court may look to any evidence
in the record, regardless of whether it has been cited by the [ALJ].” Id. (citing Walker
v. Sec’y of Health and Human Services, 884 F.2d 241, 245 (6th Cir. 1989)). See also
Conley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 13-cv-13072, 2015 WL 404229, at *10 (E.D.
Mich. Jan. 29, 2015) (“The court must examine the administrative record as a whole,
and may look to any evidence in the record, regardless of whether it has been cited by
the ALJ.”).
“[A]n ALJ can consider all the evidence without directly addressing in his
written decision every piece of evidence submitted by a party. Nor must an ALJ make
explicit credibility findings as to each bit of conflicting testimony, so long as his
factual findings as a whole show that he implicitly resolved such conflicts.” Kornecky
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 167 F. App’x 496, 508 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Loral Defense
Systems-Akron v. N.L.R.B., 200 F.3d 436, 453 (6th Cir. 1999)).

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III.

ANALYSIS
The Social Security Regulations describe the inquiry at step two in pertinent

part as follows: “You must have a severe impairment. If you do not have any
impairment or combination of impairments which significantly limits your physical
or mental ability to do basic work activities, we will find that you do not have a severe
impairment and are, therefore, not disabled. We will not consider your age, education,
and work experience.” 20 C.F.R. 404.1520(c). Basic work activities include:
(1) Physical functions such as walking, standing, sitting, lifting, pushing,
pulling, reaching, carrying, or handling;
(2) Capacities for seeing, hearing and speaking;
(3) Understanding, carrying out, and remembering simple instructions;
(4) Use of judgment;
(5) Responding appropriately to supervision, co-workers, and usual work
situations; and
(6) Dealing with changes in a routine work setting.
Harley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 485 F. App’x 802, 803 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1521(b), 416.921(b)).
In the Sixth Circuit, “the step two severity regulation codified at 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(c) and 404.1521 has been considered a de minimis hurdle in the disability
determination process.” Higgs v. Bowen, 880 F.2d 860, 862 (6th Cir. 1988). “Under
the prevailing de minimis view, an impairment can be considered not severe only if
it is a slight abnormality that minimally affects work ability regardless of age,
education, and experience.” Id. (citing Farris v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs.,
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773 F.3d 85, 89-90 (6th Cir. 1985)). At stage two, the Plaintiff must “prove that she
suffered from more than slightly or minimally impairing ailments before her DIB
coverage lapsed.” Id. at 863.
A.

Objection No. 1: The Magistrate Judge Correctly Concluded That
The ALJ’s Finding That Chassar Did Not Have Any Severe
Impairments Prior to Her Date Last Insured (DLI) is Supported by
Substantial Evidence

Plaintiff argues that the Magistrate Judge erred in concluding that the ALJ’s
decision that Plaintiff did not meet the de minimis hurdle of the second step in the
disability evaluation process was supported by substantial evidence. The Magistrate
Judge concluded that “Plaintiff fails to point to any record evidence reflecting specific
limitations on her ability to work prior to her DLI,” and concluded that the ALJ’s
determination that Plaintiff’s history of medical impairments prior to the DLI were not
significantly limiting during that period of time was supported by substantial
evidence. (R&R 13, PgID 1022) (emphasis in original). The Court concludes that the
Magistrate Judge did not err in finding that the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff did
not demonstrate any severe impairments prior to her DLI was supported by substantial
evidence.
“[D]isability is determined by the functional limitations imposed by a condition,
not the mere diagnosis of it.” Hill v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 560 F. App’x 547, 551 (6th
Cir. 2014) (citing Higgs v. Bowen, 880 F.2d 860, 863 (6th Cir. 1988)). “It is plaintiff's
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burden to provide evidence showing how her impairment has affected her functioning
during the period of alleged disability.” Turner v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 17-cv12735, 2018 WL 4610875, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 31, 2018) (Davis, MJ), adopted at
2018 WL 4600284 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 25, 2018) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). “‘The mere existence of . . . impairments . . . does not establish that [the
plaintiff] was significantly limited from performing basic work activities for a
continuous period of time.’” Id. (quoting Despins v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 257 F.
App’x 923, 930 (6th Cir. 2007)). The Sixth Circuit has noted that “‘[w]hen doctors’
reports contain no information regarding physical limitations or the intensity,
frequency, and duration of pain associated with a condition, this court has regularly
found substantial evidence to support a finding of no severe impairment.’” Despins,
257 F. App’x at 930 (quoting Long v. Apfel, 1 F. App’x 326, 331 (6th Cir. 2001).
“[S]ince Higgs, the Sixth Circuit has regularly found substantial evidence to support
a finding of no severe impairment if the medical evidence contains no information
regarding physical limitations or the intensity, frequency, and duration of pain
associated with a condition.” Green v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 17-13528, 2019 WL
1102225, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 31, 2019), adopted at 2019 WL 1098919 (E.D. Mich.
March 8, 2019).

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In support of this objection, Plaintiff directs the Court to two pieces of record
evidence. One is a Clinical Progress Note (the date is illegible although it is
apparently presumed by the parties to have been recorded prior to the DLI – some
time in March or May, 2012) indicating that Plaintiff complained of “memory loss,”
although the Note also states that Plaintiff’s short term memory “appears ok” and
Plaintiff was able to “recount history of events.” (Tr. 849.) The Note also remarks
that Plaintiff reported she had “difficulty with writing.” (Id.) Plaintiff argues that this
Note is evidence not only of diagnoses but of “symptoms” and “findings” to support
these diagnoses. Although nothing in this Note indicates that these impairments
limited Plaintiff’s ability to perform basic work functions in any way, Plaintiff argues
that “it is difficult to imagine how memory loss would not result in more than a slight
impact on the ability to function in a work setting,” and she asserts that from this
evidence “it stands to reason” that Plaintiff’s ability to work must have been affected
in some significant way.
Even assuming that these records are evidence of Plaintiff’s reporting
symptoms and the medical providers making findings and supplying diagnoses,
nothing in this Note indicates the effect that this “memory loss” and “difficulty with
writing” had on Plaintiff’s functioning, specifically on her ability to perform basic
work. See Apfel, 1 F. App’x at 331-32 (finding no severe impairment at step two
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where the medical records “[did] not contain a single statement by a treating physician
indicating that [the claimant’s] health problems result in any specific work-impairing
limitations”). So too here. There is no statement or indication in this Note regarding
the magnitude of Plaintiff’s “memory loss,” nor any indication that this “memory
loss” affected Plaintiff’s ability to perform basic work. In fact Plaintiff reported at
that visit that she was “currently studying” and Plaintiff testified at her administrative
hearing that she did in fact earn her Masters in Psychology in early 2013 through an
online course of study that she was actively pursuing prior to the DLI and throughout
the relevant period. (Tr. 62, PgID 88.) “‘The mere existence of . . . impairments . .
. does not establish that [the plaintiff] was significantly limited from performing basic
work activities for a continuous period of time.’” Turner, 2018 WL 4610875, at *5.
Next Plaintiff directs the Court to a May 17, 2012 treatment note from United
Psychological, in which the medical provider lists a diagnosis of “ADHD” and circles
“impaired” rather “intact” as to Plaintiff’s “attention and/or concentration.” (Tr. 917.)
This same treatment note also indicates that Plaintiff’s affect was “congruent,” her
motor skills, speech, and thought processes were “intact,” her judgment and insight
were “intact - good,” her memory was “grossly intact,” and she was “oriented times
three.” (Id.) Nothing in this treatment note indicates that Plaintiff’s ADHD was more
than a slight or minimal impairment of Plaintiff’s to concentrate – and the record
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evidence of her successful pursuit of a Masters degree during this same period of time
suggests no severe limitations as would preclude basic work as a result of this
diagnosis.
In an effort to demonstrate that this ADHD diagnosis necessarily demonstrated
difficulty with persistence and pace to perform full-time work, Plaintiff cites the
testimony of the vocational expert (“VE”) at the administrative hearing who opined
that, if all of Plaintiff’s testimony was found to be credible, Plaintiff would be unable
to engage in competitive employment due to an inability to maintain persistence and
pace. (Tr. 99.) Plaintiff fails to point out that the VE was responding to the ALJ’s
hypothetical that asked the VE to credit all of Plaintiff’s testimony, which in the end
the ALJ found “not entirely consistent with the medical and other evidence in the
record.” (Tr. 30.) Plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ’s credibility finding.
“Concentration, persistence, and pace, refer to the ‘ability to sustain focused attention
sufficiently long to permit the timely completion of tasks commonly found in work
settings.’” Young v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 925 F.2d 146, 150 (6th Cir.
1990) (quoting 20 C.F.R.Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 12.00(C)(3)). Nothing in this
note suggests that Plaintiff suffered from a severe inability to focus or suggests any
severe limitation on her ability to walk, stand, lift, push, pull, reach, carry, handle, see,
hear, speak, understand and carry out simple instructions, use judgment, respond
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appropriately to others or deal with changes in setting. Indeed the note observes that
Plaintiff is “currently studying,” and other record evidence confirms that Plaintiff was
pursuing her Masters degree in Psychology at this time, which she did complete in
early 2013, all while raising children and maintaining a 4.0 grade point average.
Plaintiff has failed to pinpoint any error in the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion
that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff did not
overcome the de minimis Step 2 severity hurdle. While the records relied upon by
Plaintiff in her objection indicate that Plaintiff complained of certain impairments in
or around May 2012, “there is no objective medical evidence in the record sufficient
to overturn the Commissioner's determination that those impairments did not
significantly limit [her] ability to perform basic work activities prior to [her DLI].”
Despins, 257 F. App’x at 931.
Nor was the ALJ required to specifically identify and discuss these two records
in her decision when her decision made clear that she allowed new evidence to be
submitted and expressly stated that her decision “reflect[ed] all exhibited evidence as
of the date” of her decision. (Tr. 26.) It is well understood that “an ALJ can consider
all the evidence without directly addressing in his written decision every piece of
evidence submitted by a party.” Kornecky, 167 F. App’x at 508.

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“The findings of the Commissioner are not subject to reversal merely because
there exists in the record substantial evidence to support a different conclusion.”
Buxton v. Halter, 246 F.3d 388, 389-90 (6th Cir. 2001). “The substantial evidence
standard presupposes that there is a “zone of choice” within which the Secretary may
proceed without interference from the courts. If the [administrative] decision is
supported by substantial evidence, a reviewing court must affirm.” White v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., 572 F.3d 272, 281-82 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Felisky v. Bowen, 35 F.3d
1027, 1035 (6th Cir. 1994)). Plaintiff demonstrates no error in the Magistrate Judge’s
conclusion that ALJ McKay operated within that zone of choice here in concluding
at step two that Plaintiff did not suffer from a severe impairment prior to the DLI.
Plaintiff’s first objection is OVERRULED.
B.

Objection No. 2: The Magistrate Judge Correctly Concluded That
the ALJ’s Decision that Plaintiff Failed to Cite Any Evidence From
After Her DLI That Established a Limitation on Her Ability to Work
Prior to her DLI was Supported by Substantial Evidence

In support of this objection, Plaintiff directs the Court to post-DLI evidence,
specifically an August 1, 2012 report by Julia A. Burnham, D.O. regarding Plaintiff’s
complaint of “headaches and loss of words.” (Tr. 854-56.) Dr. Burnham states that
Plaintiff reported suffering from an increase in headaches since her February 12, 2012
parking-lot car accident when she was hit by a jeep while traveling at low rate of
speed. Plaintiff complained of photophobia, phonophobia, and osmophobia, and an
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increase in agitation when having a headache. Plaintiff was not using any medications
to treat her headaches. Plaintiff also complained of “forgetfulness that has not
progressed or worsened.” (Id. at 855.) Dr. Burnham observed that despite the
headaches and forgetfulness, Plaintiff “maintains a 4.0 average obtaining her masters
in Psychology” and is “a busy mother of 4 children.” (Id.) Dr. Burnham recommends
psychiatry counseling and Botox therapy for Plaintiff’s migraines. (Id.)

Notably,

Dr. Burnham’s report contains no statements that would indicate that Plaintiff’s
migraine headaches or her forgetfulness severely limited her ability to walk, sit, stand,
lift, push, pull, reach, carry, handle, see, hear, speak, understand and carry out simple
instructions, use judgment, respond appropriately to supervision or co-workers, or
deal with changes in a routine work setting – either during the period prior to her DLI
or even at the time that she examined the Plaintiff post-DLI. “[D]isability is
determined by the functional limitations imposed by a condition, not the mere
diagnosis of it.” Hill v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 560 F. App’x 547, 551 (6th Cir. 2014).
“It is plaintiff's burden to provide evidence showing how her impairment has affected
her functioning during the period of alleged disability.” Turner, 2018 WL 4610875,
at *5 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). And simply demonstrating that
a condition may have worsened since the DLI does not establish that the Plaintiff was
disabled from performing basic work prior to the DLI. King v. Sec. of Health and
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Human Servs., 896 F.2d 204, 206 (6th Cir. 1990).
Here, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff’s
post-DLI evidence did not reflect limitations on the Plaintiff’s functioning prior to the
DLI . As the record demonstrates, Plaintiff was able to work on and earn a Masters
degree in Psychology, and reportedly to maintain a 4.0 grade point average, prior to
and after the DLI, and physical testing (MRIs, CT scans) done in this post-DLI period
often indicated normal/benign conditions. As discussed supra, substantial evidence
supported the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff did not suffer from a severe limitation
on her ability to perform basic work between February 12, 2012 and June 30, 2012
(her DLI), in part due to the absence of any evidence in the medical records indicating
such an impairment on Plaintiff’s limitations to perform basic work functions. The
post-DLI evidence to which Plaintiff directs the Court suffers from the same
evidentiary shortcoming – nothing in this evidence speaks to or suggests any
limitations on Plaintiff’s ability to perform basic work despite the apparent onset of
the migraine headaches. Despite the absence of medical evidence suggesting any nonminimal degree of the severity of the limitations on Plaintiff’s ability to perform basic
work, Plaintiff argues in her objection that it is “common sense” that Plaintiff’s
migraines both severely limit her ability to perform basic work and affected her
functioning prior to the DLI. But this “common sense” deduction is not a substitute
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for medical opinion evidence – particularly where the medical evidence of record
supports a conclusion otherwise.
The salient point here is that even assuming some correlation between the
symptoms and diagnoses of Plaintiff’s condition prior to and after her DLI, Plaintiff’s
post-DLI evidence does not establish any degree of limitation on Plaintiff’s ability to
perform basic work functions prior to the DLI. “[E]vidence of a claimant’s post-DLI
condition, to the extent it relates back, is relevant only if it is reflective of a claimant’s
limitations prior to the date last insured, rather than merely [her] impairments or
condition prior to that date.” Fucinari v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 12-cv-13308, 2013
WL 2393137, at *6 (E.D. Mich. May 31, 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiff’s post-DLI evidence does not
meet this threshold of relevance.
The ALJ’s decision need not be the only and best conclusion – it need only be
supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s
conclusion that Plaintiff’s medical records, either prior to or after her DLI, do not
suggest anything other than a minimal limitation on Plaintiff’s ability to perform basic
work and the ALJ appropriately considered that Plaintiff’s own level of functioning
during the relevant time period suggests nothing more than a minimal restriction on
Plaintiff’s ability to perform basic work. Plaintiff’s objection does not refer the Court
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to evidence in the record undermining the ALJ’s conclusions or mandating a reversal
of the ALJ’s decision. Rather, Plaintiff urges the Court to speculate about what “must
have been” occurring prior the Plaintiff’s DLI despite the record evidence relied upon
by the ALJ demonstrating what “was” occurring.
Plaintiff demonstrates no error in the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that the
ALJ’s decision that Plaintiff’s post-DLI evidence did not establish a limitation on her
ability to perform basic work prior to her DLI is supported by substantial evidence.
Plaintiff’s second objection is OVERRULED.
IV.

CONCLUSION
The Magistrate Judge correctly concluded that “Plaintiff has failed to

demonstrate that or how the ALJ’s Step 2 finding is not supported by substantial
evidence and has failed to convincingly show that a different outcome was legally or
factually required on this record.” (R&R 17, PgID 1026.) Accordingly, the Court:
1)

OVERRULES Plaintiff’s Objections (ECF No. 15);

2)

ADOPTS Magistrate Judge Patti’s February 15, 2019 Report and
Recommendation (ECF No. 14);

3)

DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 11)
and GRANTS the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(ECF No. 12); and
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4)

AFFIRMS the decision of the Commissioner.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/Paul D. Borman
PAUL D. BORMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: March 18, 2019

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