Spranger v. Macomb, County of
Filing
18
OPINION AND ORDER granting 4 defendant's Motion to Dismiss (finding as moot 11 plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment) Signed by District Judge George Caram Steeh. (MBea)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
KAREN A. SPRANGER,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 18-cv-10005
HON. GEORGE CARAM STEEH
vs.
COUNTY OF MACOMB,
Defendant.
__________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS (DOC. 4)
Plaintiff Karen Spranger alleges that defendant Macomb County is
conspiring against her to impede her ability to perform her role as Macomb
County Clerk. Count I alleges a conspiracy to interfere with Spranger’s civil
rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). Count II, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983, alleges a violation of Spranger’s rights under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This matter is presently before the
Court on Macomb County’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (Doc. 4). Oral argument was held on
February 27, 2018. For the reasons stated below, defendant Macomb
County’s motion is GRANTED.
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I. Background
Spranger, a Republican, was elected in November 2016. She was
sworn in as Macomb County Clerk and Register of Deeds on January 1,
2017. Spranger’s controversial tenure included numerous scandals,
employee grievances, and decreased efficiency in the day to day
performance of the Macomb County Clerk’s office. These events led both
parties to file lawsuits in Macomb County Circuit Court. All Macomb County
Circuit Judges recused themselves from these civil actions, which were
thereafter assigned to St. Clair County Judge Daniel Kelly. Judge Kelly
issued multiple orders in three lawsuits involving Spranger. This lawsuit
arises out of Spranger’s disagreement with Judge Kelly’s orders. Spranger
requests that the Court void Judge Kelly’s orders and dissolve the cases
against her. She asks this Court to enter the following orders:
A. An Order of the Court to dissolve the mandamus
action and injunctive relief filed by the SIXTEENTH
CIRCUIT COURT, COUNTY TREASURER, and
COUNTY SHERIFF as Ordered in Case number
2017-004508-AW;
B. An Order of the Court to dissolve the temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction filed by
CANGEMI’s labor organization AFSCME 411;
C. An Order of the Court to dissolve the quo
warranto counter claim in Case number 2017002261-CZ and then to allow the original case filed
by SPRANGER to be heard by the Court;
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D. An Order of the Court to require SCHAPKA,
DELDIN, BATHANTI, CANGEMI, BIERNAT, COOK,
and COLTHORP to cease and desist in their civil
conspiracy of interference with the Offices of Clerk /
Register of Deeds;
E. An Order of the Court for all employees
terminated by the mandamus order of the
Circuit Court to be reinstated to their employment
position – including any back pay lost due to the
civil conspiracy;
F. A Protective Order to allow SPRANGER to seek
addition[al] redress with the Court if any of the
County actors of MACOMB COUNTY interfere with
the Order of the Court; and
G. An Order of the Court granting such other relief
Plaintiff is found to be entitled to.
(Doc. 1 at PageID 14-15) (emphasis in original). Macomb County filed a
motion to dismiss on January 8, 2018. (Doc. 4). Spranger filed a response,
(Doc. 7), to which Macomb County replied, (Doc. 8). Oral argument was
scheduled for February 27, 2018. (Doc. 6). On February 27, 2018, three
hours before oral argument, Spranger filed a motion for summary
judgment. (Doc. 11). The Court set a briefing schedule and informed the
parties that it would read these briefs before ruling on Macomb County’s
motion to dismiss. Macomb County filed a response. (Doc. 13). On April 3,
2018, Spranger filed a document that appears to be a reply. (Doc. 16). On
March 27, 2018, while the Court was waiting for Spranger’s reply brief,
Judge Kelly ruled that Spranger did not reside at the Warren address she
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listed on her application to run for Macomb County clerk. Based upon his
finding that Spranger made a false claim of residency, Judge Kelly
concluded that Spranger was not eligible to hold office and ordered her
removal.
II. Legal Standard
A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)
“A Rule 12(b)(1) motion addresses whether the Court has authority or
competence to hear a case.” Gilbert v. Ferry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 606, 611
(E.D. Mich. 2003). Motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
fall into two general categories: facial attacks and factual attacks.” United
States v. Ritchie, 15 F.3d 592, 598 (6th Cir. 1994). “A facial attack is a
challenge to the sufficiency of the pleading itself. On such a motion, the
court must take the material allegations of the petition as true and
construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Id.
(emphasis in original). “A factual attack, on the other hand, is not a
challenge to the sufficiency of the pleading's allegations, but a challenge to
the factual existence of subject matter jurisdiction. On such a motion, no
presumptive truthfulness applies to the factual allegations” and “the court is
free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power
to hear the case.” Id. (emphasis in original).
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B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
A court confronted with a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) must construe the complaint in favor of the
plaintiff, accept the allegations of the complaint as true, and determine
whether the plaintiff's factual allegations present plausible claims. Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554-56 (2007). “[N]aked
assertions devoid of further factual enhancement” and “unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s]” are insufficient to “state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009). The complaint need not contain “detailed” factual allegations,
but its “factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above
the speculative level on the assumption that all of the allegations in the
complaint are true.” Ass'n of Cleveland Fire Fighters v. City of Cleveland,
502 F.3d 545, 548 (6th Cir. 2007).
III. Analysis
A. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
Macomb County asserts that the Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction in this case because Spranger’s claims are barred by the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Macomb County’s argument focuses on
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Spranger’s requested relief, seeking an order from this Court dissolving
pending state court cases and multiple orders filed in those cases.
In Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), the plaintiff filed
suit in federal district court requesting that a state trial court judgment,
which was affirmed by the state supreme court, be declared null and void.
Id. at 414. The plaintiff alleged that the state court judgment violated the
Contract Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses. Id. at 414-15. The Supreme Court affirmed the district
court’s order dismissing the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Id. at 415-16. The Court “found that the plaintiff’s complaint was in fact
requesting the district court to exercise appellate review of the state court’s
judgment.” McCormick v. Braverman, 451 F.3d 382, 389 (6th Cir. 2006)
(citing Rooker, 263 U.S. at 415-16). “The Court noted that the district
court’s jurisdiction was strictly original, and that only the Supreme Court
could exercise appellate jurisdiction over state court decisions.” Id. (citing
Rooker, 263 U.S. at 416).
The Supreme Court “reiterated the holding that a [federal] district
court could not exercise appellate review of a state court decision” in
District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
McCormick, 451 at 389. Following Feldman, lower courts interpreted the
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doctrine in ways that extended it far beyond the contours of Rooker and
Feldman. See Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S.
280, 283 (2005). The Supreme Court explained that the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine “is confined to cases of the kind from which the doctrine acquired
its name: cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries
caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court
proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of
those judgments.” Id. at 284.
In applying Exxon, the Sixth Circuit analyzed how courts should
“differentiate between a claim that attacks a state court judgment, which is
within the scope of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and an independent
claim, over which a district court may assert jurisdiction.” McCormick, 451
F.3d at 393. The court concluded that the proper inquiry “is the source of
the injury the plaintiff alleges in the federal complaint.” Id. “If the source of
the injury is the state court decision, then the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
would prevent the district court from asserting jurisdiction. If there is some
other source of injury, such as a third party’s actions, then the plaintiff
asserts an independent claim.” Id. “A court cannot determine the source of
the injury ‘without reference to [the plaintiff’s] request for relief.’” Berry v.
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Schmitt, 688 F.3d 290, 300 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Evans v. Cordray, 424
F. App’x 537, 538 (6th Cir. 2011)).
The Court cannot conclude that all of Spranger’s injuries are caused
solely by state court decisions. Two paragraphs of Spranger’s complaint
certainly support a finding that she is seeking to overturn state court
rulings. She pleads that:
34) The 16th Circuit Court, County Treasurer, and
County Sheriff filed a writ of mandamus in order to
restore four union employees back to their jobs.
This action essentially strips SPRANGER of any
hiring authority, discipline, or termination of
employees.
...
36) The collective legal actions by MACOMB
COUNTY and the county actors have eroded the
Management Rights of SPRANGER. The court
orders are a concentrated effort by MACOMB
COUNTY to systematically take over her Offices.
(Doc. 1 at PageID 11). Similarly, Spranger’s request for relief illustrates an
attempt to have the state decisions overturned. Cf. Berry, 688 F.3d at 300.
She seeks relief from these decisions, asking for
A. An Order of the Court to dissolve the mandamus
action and injunctive relief filed by the SIXTEENTH
CIRCUIT COURT, COUNTY TREASURER, and
COUNTY SHERIFF as Ordered in Case number
2017-004508-AW;
B. An Order of the Court to dissolve the temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction filed by
CANGEMI’s labor organization AFSCME 411;
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C. An Order of the Court to dissolve the quo
warranto counter claim in Case number 2017002261-CZ and then to allow the original case filed
by SPRANGER to be heard by the Court;
D. An Order of the Court to require SCHAPKA,
DELDIN, BATHANTI, CANGEMI, BIERNAT, COOK,
and COLTHORP to cease and desist in their civil
conspiracy of interference with the Offices of Clerk /
Register of Deeds;
E. An Order of the Court for all employees
terminated by the mandamus order of the
Circuit Court to be reinstated to their employment
position – including any back pay lost due to the
civil conspiracy;
F. A Protective Order to allow SPRANGER to seek
addition[al] redress with the Court if any of the
County actors of MACOMB COUNTY interfere with
the Order of the Court; and
G. An Order of the Court granting such other relief
Plaintiff is found to be entitled to.
(Doc. 1 at PageID 14-15) (emphasis in original). See also (Doc. 1 at
PageID 16-17). Spranger reiterates this request in her Motion for Summary
Judgment. (Doc. 11 at PageID 88-89). These aspects of Spranger’s
complaint suggest that her claims fall within the purview of RookerFeldman, but other allegations are less clear. For example, Spranger’s
allegation that Macomb County “hindered [her] ability to appoint and hire
budgeted employees” may be a consequence of the state orders or,
instead, may be founded on some independent interference from the
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alleged Macomb County actors. The Court cannot determine whether
Judge Kelly’s orders1 are the object of Spranger’s complaint based on the
record presently before it. Defendant Macomb County did not submit the
state court records in support of its claims here. As such, the Court cannot
say whether Spranger’s additional allegations were previously presented to
the state court; such that their appearance here merely constitutes a
misguided attempt to appeal a state court order, as precluded by RookerFeldman, or represent independent claims based on injuries from another
source.
Although the record may be insufficient to dismiss Spranger’s
complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, Spranger nevertheless fails
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted as required by Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Count I asserts a claim of conspiracy
under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).
To state a claim under § 1985(3), a plaintiff must
allege: “(1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of
depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or
class of persons of the equal protection of the laws,
or of equal privileges or immunities of the laws; (3)
an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; (4) whereby
a person is either injured in his person or property
1
The Court refers solely to the orders Judge Kelly issued “before the district court proceedings
commenced . . . .” See Exxon, 544 U.S. at 284.
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or deprived of any right or privilege of a citizen of
the United States.”
Vakilian v. Shaw, 335 F.3d 509, 518 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting United Bhd. of
Carpenters and Joiners of Am. v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 828-29 (1983)). The
second element requires a plaintiff to “prove that the conspiracy was
motivated by ‘some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously
discriminatory animus.’” Haverstick Enters., Inc. v. Fin. Fed. Credit, Inc., 32
F.3d 989, 994 (quoting Scott, 463 U.S. at 829). “A class protected by
section 1985(3) must possess the characteristics of a discrete and insular
minority, such as race, national origin, or gender.” Haverstick, 32 F.3d at
994 (citing Hicks v. Resolution Trust Corp., 970 F.2d 378, 382 (7th Cir.
1992)). Spranger’s complaint does not allege any race-based, ethnicanimated, or gender-motivated animus by Macomb County. As such, she
has failed to state a claim for conspiracy under § 1985(3).
Count II pleads a violation of Spranger’s civil rights pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Monell v. Department of Social Services of New York, 436
U.S. 658 (1978) holds that municipalities like defendant Macomb County
“may be held liable for the constitutional violations of their employees only
where the municipality’s policy or custom led to the violation.” Robertson v.
Lucas, 753 F.3d 606, 622 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694-
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95). A plaintiff attempting to demonstrate an illegal policy or custom must
show “(1) the existence of an illegal official policy or legislative enactment;
(2) that an official with final decision making authority ratified illegal actions;
(3) the existence of a policy of inadequate training or supervision; or (4) the
existence of a custom of tolerance or acquiescence of federal rights
violations.” Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 478 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing
Thomas v. City of Chattanooga, 398 F.3d 426, 429 (6th Cir. 2005)).
Spranger does not plead that Macomb County maintained a policy or
custom that caused her injury. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires a
plaintiff’s pleading to “give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and
the grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544 (internal
quotation marks and alterations omitted). Spranger’s complaint, which
merely contains “nebulous assertions of wrongdoing” and “fails to claim that
[her] rights were violated by a policy or custom” of Macomb County “cannot
be said to give [Macomb County] fair notice of this claim.” Robertson, 753
F.3d at 623. This “deficiency is manifest from the face of [Spranger’s]
complaint. . . .” Id. As such, she has failed to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted.
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IV. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, Macomb County’s motion to dismiss is
GRANTED. Counts I and II shall be dismissed. As such, Spranger’s Motion
for Summary Judgment, (Doc. 11), is moot.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: May 2, 2018
s/George Caram Steeh
GEORGE CARAM STEEH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Copies of this Order were served upon attorneys of record on
May 2, 2018, by electronic and/or ordinary mail and also on
Karen A. Spranger, 7520 Hudson, Warren, MI 48091.
s/Barbara Radke
Deputy Clerk
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