Perry v. Cavalry SPV I, LLC

Filing 26

OPINION AND ORDER Granting 18 Motion for Judgment. Signed by District Judge Sean F. Cox. (JMcC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
Amanda Perry et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.

Case No. 18-10311

Cavalry SPV I, LLC et al.,

Sean F. Cox
United States District Court Judge

Defendant.
______________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
Five plaintiffs have sued Defendant Cavalry SPV I, LLC and its servicing arm, alleging
that state-court debt-collection suits filed by Cavalry against them were false and deceptive, in
violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and the Regulation of Michigan Collection
Practices Act. Defendants have moved for judgment on the pleadings.
For the reasons below, the Court shall grant Defendants’ motion. As to Plaintiff Amanda
Perry, her claims are barred by the one-year statute of limitations. And as for the remaining
Plaintiffs, although their complaint contends that the debt-collection suits were the product of
falsehoods and misrepresentations, they have not offered any well-pleaded factual allegations,
instead of conclusory allegations and legal conclusions, that would allow the Court to reasonably
infer that Defendants violated the FDCPA.
BACKGROUND
This is the second of two nearly identical lawsuits filed by Plaintiffs’ attorneys against
Cavalry SPV I, LLC and its servicing arm, Cavalry Portfolio Services, LLC. See Gordon et al.

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v. Cavalry SPV LLC et al., Docket No. 18-10148. The suit here is on behalf of five
Plaintiffs–Amanda Perry, Kathleen Waluzak, Cynthia Dillard, Sean P. Dolehanty, and Sarah R.
Pearsall. Amended Complaint, ¶ 12. Like the first lawsuit, Plaintiffs generally allege that
Defendants are engaged in the filing of false collection lawsuits for false amounts against
Michigan debtors. Id. at ¶ 2.
More specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Cavalry purchases the collection rights to debts in
bulk portfolios. Id. at ¶ 36. When it does so, it receives a computerized summary of the debts
included in the portfolios, although the purchase agreements for those portfolios disavow
responsibility for the accuracy of the included data. Id. at ¶¶ 36, 39. Plaintiffs allege that this
information that Cavalry receives is insufficient to establish the validity of the debts Plaintiffs
purportedly owe, the calculation of the claimed balance, or that they, as the consumers, even owe
the debt. Id. at ¶ 41. Nor does the information establish an intent to pursue the litigation through
to trial with the proper evidentiary paperwork. Id.
After purchasing the debts, Cavalry provides Michigan attorneys with the sales
documents it has obtained so that the attorneys can sue to collect on the debts. Id at ¶ 36. But the
full and complete purchase/sale agreements from the debt-portfolio purchases are never attached
to the resulting lawsuits. Id. at ¶ 39. Nor do the suits include proof of the exact amount owed or
that Cavalry is the owner of the sued-upon debt. Id. at ¶ 42. In fact, the suits are merely
“computer template” collection suits that lack meaningful attorney review by the attorneys that
sign them. Id. In some instances, Cavalry also uses false affidavits of claims and seeks default
judgments without having admissible prima facie evidence to substantiate its claims at trial. Id.
at ¶ 43. Indeed, Plaintiffs allege that Cavalry’s only intent in filing these suits is to obtain a

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default via false allegations. Id. at ¶ 41.
Cavalry filed debt-collection suits against each of the five plaintiffs. Amended
Complaint, Ex. 1. The complaints against Dolehanty, Waluzak, and Dillard were nearly
identical, differing only in the dates, listed account numbers, and the amounts owed. Id. They
stated in relevant part:
7. That on or about [date], the account at issue was transferred, sold and/or
assigned from Citibank, N.A. to Plaintiff. (See attached bill of sale.)
8. That on or about [date], Defendant entered into a contract with Plaintiff’s
assignor, Citibank, N.A., for goods sold and delivered and/or services rendered on
open account, Account Number(s): [account number]
9. That a copy of the contract is attached or, alternatively, the contract is in the
possession of Defendant pursuant to MCR 2.113(F)(1)(b) (see attached Exhibits).
10. That the contract was entered into for valid consideration and lawful and
proper purposes and is legally enforceable in all respects.
11. That Plaintiff has performed all of its obligations and fulfilled all of its
conditions precedent under the terms of the contract.
12. That Defendant has received periodic billing statements from Plaintiff’s
assignor to which Defendant has made payment(s) toward and/or not objected to.
13. That Defendant has, without excuse, defaulted upon and materially breached
the contract.
14. That as a result of Defendant’s breach, Plaintiff has suffered damages in the
sum of [amount] (see attached Exhibits).
Id. The complaints all requested judgment in the amount of the debt owed. Id.
Each of these three complaints were accompanied by a bill of sale and assignment,
identical across the complaints except for the listed dates, that stated:
THIS BILL OF SALE AND ASSIGNMENT dated [date], is by Citibank,
N.A., a national banking association organized under the laws of the United
States, located at 701 East 60th Street North, Sioux Falls, SD 57117 (the “Bank”)
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to Cavalry SPV I, LLC, organized under the laws of the State of Delaware, with
its headquarters/principal place of business at 500 Summit Lake Drive, Suite 400,
Valhalla, NY 10595 (“Buyer”).
For value received and subject to the terms and conditions of the Purchase
and Sale Agreement dated [date], between Buyer and the Bank (the
“Agreement”), the Bank does hereby transfer, sell, assign, convey, grant, bargain,
set over and deliver to Buyer, and to Buyer’s successors and assigns, the
Accounts described in Exhibit 1 and the final electronic file.

Id. These bills were signed by a Citibank official. Id. And, at least for Dolehanty, the bill was
accompanied by an exhibit describing the accounts assigned (bulk-debt portfolios) and
documentation from Citibank listing the account information and debt-amount due for the
specific account at issue. Id.
As to Perry, Cavalry filed a similar complaint, which stated in relevant part:
Count I - Breach of Contract
3. Defendant(s) entered into a credit card agreement (“contract”) with
Plaintiff or Plaintiff’s assignor for a credit card bearing account number [number].
4. Plaintiff’s assignor, issued the subject credit card and extended credit to
Defendant(s) in accordance with the card member agreement sent to
Defendant(s).
5. Defendant(s) accepted the terms and conditions of the card member
agreement by using the account to purchase goods and services and/or to take
cash advances and/or to make balance transfers, and under the terms and
conditions of the card member agreement, was thereby contractually obligated to
make timely monthly payments.
6. Plaintiff or Plaintiff’s assignor fully complied with the terms and
conditions of the card member agreement.
7. Defendant(s) defaulted under the terms and conditions of the card
member agreement by failing to pay the monthly payments when due.
8. Per the default provision(s) of the card member agreement, the entire
account balance is now due, and although Plaintiff has requested payment of the
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balance, Defendant has failed to pay it.
Count II - Account Stated
9. For this count Plaintiff incorporates by reference all assertions of fact
contained in paragraphs one though eight and further states:
10. Defendant(s) received and accepted monthly billing statements from
both Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s assignor and did not object to their accuracy, nor has
Defendant(s) raised a legally recognized objection in this matter.
11. The account has become stated between the parties and, consequently,
Defendant(s) is now justly indebted to Plaintiff for the account balance.
Id. This complaint requested judgment in the amount of the debt owed, plus interest, costs, and a
statutory attorney fee. Id.
The complaint against Perry was accompanied by an affidavit of claim, sworn to by an
agent of Cavalry. Id. The affidavit stated that Perry had opened an account with Bank of
America in December 2007, the account had become delinquent, there was an outstanding
balance of $4,076.39, and that Cavalry had purchased the account. Id. But Plaintiffs allege that
this could not have been true; Perry was only 16-years-old in December 2007 and thus could not
have signed for the debt. Amended Complaint, ¶ 11.
Finally, the complaint against Pearsall, which stated in relevant part:
7. That Plaintiff, through its assignor, and Defendant have consented to a
sum as the credit balance due from one another on the account.
8. That Defendant has received periodic billing statements from Plaintiff’s
assignor to which Defendant has made payment(s) towards and/or not objected to.
9. That Defendant’s payments and/or failure to successfully question the
state of the account within a reasonable amount of time constitutes an admission
of correctness.
10. That Defendant has been given all set-offs, credits and/or allowances
on the account and is indebted to Plaintiff in the amount of $8,117.49 (see
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attached Exhibits).
11. That a statement of the account and an affidavit verifying the account
are attached to this Complaint and incorporated by reference (see attached
Exhibits).
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays that Judgment be entered in its favor and
against Defendant in the amount of $8,117.49.
Plaintiffs allege that the debt-collection lawsuits are all the same, have the same or
similar paperwork attached, and all lack any proof that Cavalry owns the specific debt being
sued upon. Id. at ¶ 47. They are computer generated, created by non-attorney employees, and
lack any meaningful or substantive review by the attorney who signs off on the complaints. Id at
¶ 51. The suits lack proper supporting attached credit card agreements listing the actual specific
debts and lack any properly authenticated copies of the relevant bill of sale, credit cardholder
agreement, or other document evidencing and authorizing the amount sought. Id. at ¶¶ 48, 50.
Instead, Cavalry creates false general sale and debt assignments and creates the false impression
that they have the right to collect and sue on the debts. Id. at ¶ 48. Absent the false allegations
and missing paperwork, however, there is no proof that Cavalry has the right to sue Plaintiffs for
the credit card debts. Id. at ¶ 54. This includes the absence of any evidence showing the specific
assignment of the specific debts from the original creditor to Cavalry. Id. at ¶ 57. Indeed, there
was no valid assignment for the debts sued upon here. Id. at ¶ 55.
In light of the above, Plaintiffs have filed suit against Defendants, alleging a litany of
violations of the FDCPA, including:
•

(a) Using false, deceptive, and misleading representations and means in
connection with the collection lawsuits, violating 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(10)

•

(b) Designing and furnishing the lawsuits against Plaintiffs while knowing that
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the format used would create the false belief in Plaintiffs and the courts that the
suits were supported by legally recognized and non-hearsay documentation,
which was not the case, violating § 1692f(1)
•

(c) Seeking to collect on a debt with no proof, chain of title or transfer,
authorization or card holder agreement, violating § 1692f

•

(d) Designing and furnishing false and hearsay proof and false evidence of a debt
ownership to falsely accuse, threaten, and sue Plaintiffs without the necessary
proof, violating § 1692e(5)

•

(e) Falsely representing that a collection lawsuit and judgment is supported by the
assignment of Citibank debt to Cavalry, violating § 1692e(2)(A)

Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants’ conduct violated a multitude of provisions under
Michigan’s Regulation of Collection Practices Act.
Defendants have moved for judgment on the pleadings (Doc. # 18) and Plaintiffs have
responded (Doc. #21). The Court shall decide this motion on the briefs, the issues having
adequately been presented therein. LR 7.1(f)(2).
STANDARD OF DECISION
A motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) is adjudicated under the same
standard as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Lindsay v. Yates, 498 F.3d 434, 437 n. 5 (6th Cir. 2007).
That rule provides for the dismissal of a case when the complaint fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). The Court must construe the complaint in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept its allegations as true. DirectTV, Inc. v.
Treesh, 487 F3d 471, 476 (6th Cir. 2007). To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must

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offer sufficient factual allegations that make the asserted claims plausible on their face. Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Legal conclusions couched as factual
allegations will not suffice. Rondigo, LLC v. Township of Richmond, 641 F.3d 673, 670 (6th Cir.
2011). Rather, “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
ANALYSIS
I. Whether Perry’s Claims are Time-Barred
For the most part, the parties’ arguments here are identical to those considered and ruled
upon by the Court following the defendants’ motions for judgment on the pleadings in Gordon.
See Docket No. 18-10148, Doc. # 27. The cases diverge, however, with respect to Plaintiff
Amanda Perry, as the complaint here alleges certain facts unique to her. Specifically, it alleges
that in August 2013, Defendants sued Perry to collect on credit card debt for an account it said
she opened in December 2007. The twist? Perry alleges that she could not have done so because
she was only 16-years-old at the time. So, Perry contends, Defendants violated the FDCPA by
filing the debt-collection suit against her along with a false affidavit of claim that swore that she
contracted for a debt she did not sign for.
But Perry’s FDCPA claims face a significant–indeed, insurmountable–obstacle: They are
time-barred. Perry’s claims all stem from the allegedly false debt-collection lawsuit filed against
her in 2013. But an FDCPA claim must be brought “within one year from the date on which the
violation occurs.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k. Perry’s lawsuit was not. Filed in January 2018, it comes
well-after the one-year limitations period expired, whether that period is measured from the date

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the lawsuit was filed (8/14/13) or from the date the summons issued (9/16/13). See Ruth v.
Unifund CCR Partners, 604 F.3d 908, 914 (6th Cir. 2010) (declining to address whether the
FDCPA’s one-year clock begins when a suit is filed or when the plaintiff was served).
In response, Perry points to a garnishment issued on Defendants’ behalf in November
2017 as evidence that the FDCPA violations remain ongoing. Her suit, she argues, was timely
filed within one year of the garnishment. This argument invokes the continuing-violation
doctrine; a doctrine that applies when a plaintiff challenges “an unlawful practice that continues
into the limitations period” and is an exception to the general rule that a “limitations clock
begins to run at the time of the act that gives rise to the claim.” Slorp v. Lerner, Sampson &
Rothfuss, 587 F. App’x 249, 257 (6th Cir. 2014). But the Sixth Circuit has held that this doctrine
does not apply in the FDCPA context; an FDCPA claim accrues upon the initiation of a
deceptive, abusive, or otherwise unfair lawsuit because it is a “discrete, immediately actionable
event.” Id. at 258. This case is no different–Perry’s claim accrued when the lawsuit against her
was initiated. Thus, her claims, filed several years after that date, are time-barred and must be
dismissed.
II. FDCPA Claims
This brings the Court to the remaining Plaintiffs’ claims, which Defendants have not
argued are time-barred. As in Gordon, the parties’ arguments revolve around a central dispute:
Whether the complaint alleges that Defendants failed to provide sufficient proof to accompany
their lawsuits (as Defendants contend) or whether it alleges that Defendants lacked sufficient
proof to support their debt-collection claims altogether (as Plaintiffs contend). Compare Harvey
v. Great Seneca Fin. Corp. 453 F.3d 324, 333 (6th Cir. 2006) (“[A] debt may be properly

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pursued in court, even if the debt collector does not yet possess adequate proof of its claim.”)
with 15 U.S.C. § 1692e (prohibiting the use of any “false, deceptive, or misleading
representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.”); § 1692f (“A debt
collector may not use unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.”).
And like Gordon, Plaintiffs’ complaint here alleges both that Defendants failed to accompany
their lawsuits with sufficient proof and that they lacked it altogether.
As to the former, the complaint is replete with allegations addressing the amount of
proof, or rather the lack thereof, that Defendants provided when they filed their debt-collection
suits against Plaintiffs. See, e.g., Amended Complaint, ¶ 47 (“The lawsuits filed by the
Defendants are all the same, have the same or similar paperwork attached and all lack any proof
that CAVALRY owns the specific debt being sued upon.”); id. at ¶ 39 (alleging Defendants
failed to attach full and complete purchase/sale agreements to the lawsuits); id. at ¶ 48 (alleging
Defendants failed to attach credit card agreements to the lawsuits). But these allegations, which
nearly identical to those made in Gordon, cannot support an FDCPA claim since they are
nothing more than a challenge to the sufficiency of the proof accompanying Defendants’ suits
against Plaintiffs. See Harvey, 453 F.3d at 333.
Yet this is not all that Plaintiffs allege. They also allege a garden variety of different
falsities or misrepresentations in the filing of the debt-collection suits. But their various
generalized allegations of falsehoods are not supported by well-pleaded facts to show the same.
The complaint relies on conclusory statements and legal conclusions masquerading as factual
allegations, but lacks any factual content that would allow the Court to reasonably infer liability.
See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. For example, it produces a parade of falsities, alleging that

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Defendants: file “false collection lawsuits for false amounts,” Amended Complaint ¶ 2; seek
“false debt amounts,” id. at ¶ 50; make “false allegations,” id. at ¶¶ 42, 54; take “actions to
falsify debt verifications,” id. at ¶ 58; and design and furnish “false and hearsay proof and false
evidence of a debt ownership.” Id. at ¶ 72d. But despite all these claims of mendacity in the
debt-collection suits, there are no well-pleaded factual allegations that could allow the Court to
infer the same.
Indeed, consider the variety of factual allegations that, if pled, could support Plaintiffs’
claims, including: That they did not have accounts with the particular lender; that the accounts at
issue were fraudulently opened; that they did not incur a debt to the lender; that their debt was
not included in the debts Cavalry purchased in bulk; that the debt-amounts listed were
inaccurate; that Cavalry sought unauthorized interest, fees, or charges; that Cavalry sued the
wrong persons; or that Cavalry’s suit fell outside the applicable statute of limitations. Although
any one of these factual allegations could state a claim under the FDCPA, Plaintiffs did not
include them and have not explained their absence. The complaint’s vague, generalized
allegations of falsehoods are no replacement for well-pleaded factual allegations. With this in
mind, the Court turns to Plaintiffs’ specific claims.1
a. False, Deceptive, and Misleading Representations
First, Plaintiffs generally allege that Defendants violated § 1692e (using false, deceptive,
or misleading representations or means in connection with the collection of any debt) and
§ 1692e(10) (“use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect

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Because Plaintiffs’ claims mirror those raised in Gordon, the Court’s analysis of these
claims mirrors its analysis of the claims in Gordon.
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any debt”). “Whether a debt collector's actions are false, deceptive, or misleading under § 1692e
is based on whether the ‘least sophisticated consumer’ would be misled by defendant's actions.”
Wallace v. Washington Mut. Bank, F.A., 683 F.3d 323, 326 (6th Cir. 2012).
Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged that the least sophisticated consumer would have
been misled by Defendants’ filing of the debt-collection suits. The state-court complaints
alleged that Plaintiffs owed a debt on a specific account and stated the amount owed, allegations
that even the least sophisticated consumer would understand. What’s more, at least some of the
complaints went beyond the bare minimum by including supporting documentation about the
underlying debts. The least sophisticated consumer standard assumes that these complaints and
supporting exhibits were read in their “entirety, carefully, and with some elementary level of
understanding.” Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Lamar, 503 F.3d 504, 510 (6th Cir. 2007).
And read as a whole, these documents did not mislead. See Miller v. Javitch, Block & Rathbone,
561 F.3d 588, 595 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding a complaint did not mislead when read as a whole).
Indeed, Plaintiffs have not denied that they owed a debt or that Cavalry misstated or
misrepresented the amount owed. See id.; Harvey, 453 F.3d at 332 (“Harvey never denied in her
complaint that she owed Seneca a debt, nor did she claim that Seneca and Javitch misstated or
misrepresented the amount that she owed.”). And any conclusory, non-factual allegations as to
various misleading falsehoods in the debt-collection suits do not state a claim.
b. Absence of Legally Recognized and Non-Hearsay Documentation
Next, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated § 1692f(1) by designing and furnishing
the debt-collection suits while knowing that the format they used would mislead Plaintiffs into
believing that the suits were supported by legally recognized and non-hearsay documentation,

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even though that was not the case. Section 1692f(1), however, only prohibits the “collection of
any amount (including any interest, fee, charge, or expense incidental to the principal obligation)
unless such amount is expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by
law.” And Plaintiffs never allege that the amounts sought in the debt-collection suits were not
authorized by the underlying credit agreements or that Cavalry sought interest, fees, charges, or
expenses not authorized by those contracts. Nor do Plaintiffs cite any law prohibiting recovery
of the amounts sought. Their conclusory allegation that the debt-collection suits were not
supported by legally recognized proof is no substitute.
c. Seeking to Collect on Debts with No Proof
Plaintiffs’ third claim contends that Defendants sought to collect on the debts “with no
proof, chain of title or transfer, authorization or card holder agreement to collect any amount,
interest, fee or any charges,” in violation of § 1692f (“A debt collector may not use unfair or
unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.”). On its face, this appears to be a
claim that the debt-collection suits were not accompanied by any proof, which, again, is not
actionable. Harvey, 453 F.3d at 333. But, even if this claim is read more charitably, construed as
a contention that no proof exists, it still fails. Not only have Plaintiffs not pleaded any facts
specific to their § 1692f claim, see Christy v. EOS CCA, 905 F.Supp.2d 648, 656 (E.D. Penn.
2012) (“A complaint will be deemed deficient under [§ 1692f] if it does not identify any
misconduct beyond which plaintiffs assert violate other provisions of the FDCPA.”), but their
argument that no proof exists is met with a familiar reply: It is unsupported by any well-pleaded
factual allegations. Thus, this claim fails.
d. Threatening to Sue Plaintiffs Without the Necessary Proof

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Next, Plaintiffs reiterate their allegation that Defendants designed and furnished “false
and hearsay proof and false evidence of debt ownership.” This time, however, they allege that
Defendants violated § 1692e(5), which prohibits the “threat to take any action that cannot legally
be taken or that is not intended to be taken.”
Lawsuits and court filings can be a threat under the FDCPA. See Currier v. First
Resolution Inv. Corp., 762 F.3d 529, 535 (6th Cir. 2014). But for a lawsuit to violate the
FDCPA, it must be unlawful. See id. (holding that allegations that the defendant filed and
maintained an invalid lien for a month stated a claim under § 1692e(5)); see also Heintz v.
Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 296 (1995) (“[W]e do not see how the fact that a lawsuit turns out
ultimately to be unsuccessful could, by itself, make the bringing of it an ‘action that cannot
legally be taken.’”). And Plaintiffs have not alleged any well-pleaded facts to show how the
suits here were unlawful. Instead, they repeatedly emphasize that Defendants filed them with the
sole intent to obtain default judgments. But this contention is merely speculative and, even if
true, would not run afoul of § 1692e(5). See St. John v. Cach, LLC, 822 F.3d 388, 391 (7th Cir.
2016) (holding § 1692e(5) “does not prohibit debt collectors from filing a collection lawsuit
without intending to go to trial.”). So, this claim fails.
e. Falsely Representing that the Suits were Supported by Assignments
Plaintiffs’ final claim alleges that Defendants falsely represented that the state-court suits
were supported by valid assignments of the debts sued-upon from Citibank to Cavalry, in
violation of § 1692e(2)(A) (prohibiting the false representation of “the character, amount, or
legal status of any debt”). Under Michigan law, “rights can be assigned unless the assignment is
clearly restricted.” Burkhardt v. Bailey, 680 N.W.2d 453, 462 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004). A valid

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assignment requires a written instrument that clearly reflects the assignor’s intent to vest in the
assignee a present right to thing assigned. Id. at 463 (“[U]nder Michigan law, a written
instrument, even if poorly drafted, creates an assignment if it clearly reflects the intent of the
assignor to presently transfer ‘the thing’ to the assignee.”). The assignee then “stands in the
position of the assignor, possessing the same rights and being subject to the same defenses.” Id.
at 462.
As to this claim, all Plaintiffs’ offer is an unsupported legal conclusion that no
assignment occurred. But a well-pleaded complaint must rest on factual allegations, not legal
conclusions. See Rondigo, 641 F.3d at 670. What’s more, the documents attached to Plaintiffs’
complaint rebut their argument that no assignment occurred. At least three of the debt-collection
complaints were accompanied by a Bill of Sale and Assignment, signed by a Citibank official,
stating, “the Bank does hereby transfer, sell, assign, convey, grant, bargain, set over and deliver
to Buyer, and to Buyer’s successors and assigns, the Accounts described in Exhibit 1 and the
final electronic file.” This written language clearly and unambiguously manifests Citibank’s
intent to transfer the relevant accounts. Burkhardt, 680 N.W.2d at 464 (“[T]he law presumes
that the parties understand the import of a written contract and had the intention manifested by
its terms.”). That is all that required to show a valid assignment. See id. (“[W]hen the language
of a document is clear and unambiguous, interpretation is limited to the actual words used.”).
None of Plaintiffs’ legal arguments couched as allegations rebut this conclusion. First,
Plaintiffs insinuate that the assignment did not comply with Michigan’s statute of frauds because
no representative from Cavalry signed it. Amended Complaint, ¶ 56. This is incorrect.
Michigan’s statute of frauds only requires the assignment to be signed “by the party to be

15

charged” with the agreement or promise. See Burkhardt, 680 N.W.2d at 463, quoting M.C.L.
§ 566.132(1)(f). Here, that party was the lender assigning the debts (such as Citibank), so no
signature from Cavalry was required.
Second, Plaintiffs contend that the Bill of Sale and Assignment contained “no evidence
showing the specific assignment of the specific debt(s) from the Original Creditor to Cavalry
SPV.” Amended Complaint, ¶ 57. But this is nothing more than an allegation that Cavalry filed
the debt-collection lawsuit with insufficient proof of the assignment, which cannot support an
actionable FDCPA claim. Harvey, 453 F.3d at 333.
To be sure, Plaintiffs are correct that the exhibits attached to the state-court complaints
painted an incomplete picture. Although they show a valid assignment of certain accounts by
Citibank to Cavalry, and show the existence of a debt owed to Citibank by Plaintiffs, the exhibits
do not show that those specific debts were included in the accounts sold and assigned by
Citibank to Cavalry. And the Court does not have any documentation showing that similar
exhibits were actually attached to the complaint against Pearsall. But Cavalry was not required
to attach this information to its state-court complaints, id., and Plaintiffs have not alleged that
their specific debts were not included in the debt-portfolio Cavalry purchased or, for that matter,
any facts tending to show that no valid assignment occurred. Instead, all they offer is the bare
legal conclusion that the assignment was invalid, which is not enough to state a claim.
III. State Law Claims
This leaves only Plaintiffs’ MRCPA claims, which they concede are based on the same
set of facts as their FDCPA claims. The Court shall grant Defendants’ request to dismiss most of
these claims with prejudice, as MRCPA claims that “simply duplicate” the FDCPA claims “need

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not be addressed separately.” Newman v. Trott & Trott, P.C., 889 F.Supp.2d 948, 967 (E.D.
Mich. 2012); see also In re Repository Techs., Inc., 601 F.3d 710, 725 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[W]hen
a state-law claim is clearly without merit, it invades no state interest–on the contrary, it spares
overburdened state courts additional work that they do not want or need–for the federal court to
dismiss the claim on the merits rather than invite a further, and futile, round of litigation in the
state courts.”).
But the Court will not do the same for any MRCPA claims by Amanda Perry. This is
because her FDCPA claims do not fail here on their merits; instead, they are barred by the
applicable statute of limitations. Yet this may not be the case for her state-law claims; indeed,
Defendants do not argue that those claims are barred by any Michigan statute of limitations.
And the specific facts that she alleges–that Defendants attempted to collect on a debt that she did
not sign for–may well constitute violations of the MRCPA. So, having dismissed the federal
claims, the Court shall decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Perry’s state-law
claims and will dismiss those claims without prejudice.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, the Court ORDERS that Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings is GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Sean F. Cox
Sean F. Cox
United States District Judge
Dated: August 16, 2018
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record on
August 16, 2018, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
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s/Jennifer McCoy
Case Manager

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