Darling v. Social Security

Filing 22

OPINION & ORDER (1) Overruling Plaintiff's Objections (Dkt. 20 ), (2) Accepting the Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge (Dkt. 19 ), (3) Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 16 ), and (4) Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 18 ). Signed by District Judge Mark A. Goldsmith. (Sandusky, K)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

SHAWN MARIE DARLING,
Plaintiff,

Civil Action No. 18-10479
HON. MARK A. GOLDSMITH

vs.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.
_______________________________/

OPINION & ORDER
(1) OVERRULING PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS (Dkt. 20), (2) ACCEPTING THE
RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE (Dkt. 19), (3) DENYING
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Dkt. 16), AND (4) GRANTING
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Dkt. 18)
In this social security case, Plaintiff Shawn Marie Darling appeals from the final
determination of the Commissioner of Social Security that she is not disabled and, therefore, not
entitled to disability benefits. The matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Stephanie Dawkins
Davis for a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”). The parties filed cross-motions for summary
judgment (Dkts. 16, 18), and Magistrate Judge Davis issued an R&R recommending that the Court
grant the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment and deny Darling’s motion for summary
judgment (Dkt. 19).

Darling filed objections to the R&R (Dkt. 20); the Commissioner

subsequently filed a response (Dkt. 21).
For the reasons that follow, the Court overrules Darling’s objections and accepts the
recommendation contained in the magistrate judge’s R&R. The Commissioner’s motion is granted
and Darling’s motion is denied. The final decision of the Commissioner is affirmed.
I.

LEGAL STANDARD

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The Court reviews de novo those portions of the R&R to which a specific objection has
been made. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this
Court’s “review is limited to determining whether the Commissioner’s decision ‘is supported by
substantial evidence and was made pursuant to proper legal standards.’” Ealy v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 594 F.3d 504, 512 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234,
241 (6th Cir. 2007)). “Substantial evidence is ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Lindsley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 560 F.3d 601, 604
(6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). In determining whether
substantial evidence exists, the Court may “look to any evidence in the record, regardless of
whether it has been cited by the [Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)].” Heston v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 245 F.3d 528, 535 (6th Cir. 2001). “[T]he claimant bears the burden of producing sufficient
evidence to show the existence of a disability.” Watters v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 530 F.
App’x 419, 425 (6th Cir. 2013).
II. ANALYSIS
Subsequent to the administrative proceeding before the ALJ, Darling submitted the
opinions of limited license psychologist John Longacre and vocational counselor Martha
Ryckman. R&R at 10. The ALJ admitted the evidence into the record and stated that she “fully
considered” the evidence in her opinion, but never discussed the evidence anywhere else in the
opinion. Admin. Record (“A.R.”) at 18 (Dkt. 9-2). Darling argued in her motion for summary
judgment that the ALJ should have accounted for the professional opinions in her decision. The
magistrate judge disagreed and explained that ALJs are not required to discuss every piece of
evidence in the record, and because the opinions are not “acceptable medical sources,” they are
not entitled to any deference. R&R at 12. Additionally, the magistrate judge found that even if

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the ALJ was required to discuss the opinions, it was harmless error because the opinions are
consistent with the ALJ’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) determination. Id.
Darling offers two objections: (i) the magistrate judge erred by failing to find the ALJ’s
decision deficient where she failed to articulate her consideration of the Longacre and Ryckman
opinions; and (ii) the magistrate judge erred by finding that the failure to properly consider the
Longacre and Ryckman opinions were harmless error. See Obj. at 2, 6.
A. Objection One
Darling argues that merely saying that the evidence was fully considered was improper
under the Social Security regulations and Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 06-03p. Objs. at 2-3.
The Commissioner argues that although the ALJ must “consider” evidence from other sources, the
ALJ was not required to “discuss” the evidence in her opinion. Resp. at 1-2. The Commissioner
has the better part of the argument.
The Social Security Administration weighs medical evidence, which can come from two
sources – “acceptable medical sources” and “other sources” that are not “acceptable medical
sources.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513 (2013). There are five defined “acceptable medical sources”:
licensed (1) doctors, (2) psychologists, (3) optometrists, and (4) podiatrists, and (5) qualified
speech-language pathologists. Id. at § 1513(a)(1)-(5). In addition, the ALJ may also review
evidence from “other sources to show the severity” of a claimant’s impairments, such as additional
medical sources of “nurse-practitioners, physicians’ assistants, naturopaths, chiropractors,
audiologists, and therapists.” Id. at § 1513(d)(1). There is no dispute that Longacre and Ryckman
fall in the “other sources” category. Objs. at 4.

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Social Security Ruling 06-03p, 2006 WL 2329939, (Soc. Sec. Admin. Aug. 9, 2006),1
further clarifies the interplay between “acceptable medical sources” and “other” or “additional
medical sources.” “While the ruling notes that information from ‘other sources’ cannot establish
the existence of a medically determinable impairment, the information ‘may provide insight into
the severity of the impairment(s) and how it affects the individual’s ability to function.’” Cruse v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 502 F.3d 532, 541 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Soc. Sec. Rul. 06-03p, 2006 WL
2329939, at *3). Indeed, the agency recognizes that other sources of medical evidence can carry
considerable, even determinative, weight. For example, “depending on the particular facts in a
case, and after applying the factors for weighing opinion evidence, an opinion from a medical
source who is not an ‘acceptable medical source’ may outweigh the opinion of an ‘acceptable
medical source,’ including the medical opinion of a treating source.” SSR 06-03p, 2006 WL
2329939, at *5.
However, it is well settled that ALJ’s are not required to discuss every piece of evidence
in the administrative record. Kornecky v. CSS, 167 F. App’x 496, 508 (6th Cir. 2006). Indeed,
SSR 06-03p explains that “there is a distinction between what an adjudicator must consider and
what the adjudicator must explain in the disability determination or decision.” SSR 06-03P, 2006
WL 2329939, at *6 (emphasis added). “[T]he adjudicator generally should explain the weight
given to opinions from these ‘other sources,’ or otherwise ensure that the discussion of the
evidence in the determination or decision allows a claimant or subsequent reviewer to follow the
adjudicator’s reasoning, when such opinions may have an effect on the outcome of the case.” Id.
(emphasis added).

Social Security Ruling 06-03p was rescinded as to claims filed on or after March 27, 2017.
Darling’s applications were filed in April 2014 (A.R. 230-236, 237-244).

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The ALJ stated that she “fully considered” the Longacre and Ryckman opinions. Although
it may be best practice to explain the weight given to these types of sources, Social Security
regulations and SSR 06-03p do not require anything beyond consideration. Therefore, the
magistrate judge did not err by finding there is no reversible error in the ALJ’s treatment of the
Longacre and Ryckman opinions. Accordingly, Darling’s first objection is overruled.
B. Objection Two
The Court’s finding that ALJ did not err with respect to the treatment of the Longacre and
Ryckman opinions obviates the need to address Darling’s second objection, that the magistrate
judge erroneously found any error by the ALJ to be harmless. Accordingly, Darling’s second
objection is overruled.
III. CONCLUSION
For the above-stated reasons, the Court OVERRULES Darling’s objections (Dkt. 20) and
accepts the recommendation contained in the magistrate judge’s R&R (Dkt. 19). Darling’s motion
for summary judgment (Dkt. 16) is DENIED and the Commissioner’s motion for summary
judgment (Dkt. 18) is GRANTED. The final decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 14, 2019
Detroit, Michigan

s/Mark A. Goldsmith
MARK A. GOLDSMITH
United States District Judge

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