Taylor v. O'Hair et al

Filing 5

OPINION AND ORDER of Summary Dismissal. Signed by District Judge Terrence G. Berg. (AChu)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
PETER TAYLOR,
Plaintiff,

Civil No. 2:18-CV-10608
Honorable Terrence G. Berg

v.
JOHN D. O’HAIR, ET AL.,
Respondent.
_______________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER OF SUMMARY DISMISSAL
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Peter Taylor’s pro se civil
rights complaint filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff is a state
prisoner confined at the Bellamy Creek Correctional Facility in Ionia,
Michigan. The Court will deny the complaint because it fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted.
I. Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a complaint set
forth “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief,” as well as “a demand for the relief sought.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(a)(2), (3). The purpose of this rule is to “give the defendant fair
notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). While this
notice pleading standard does not require “detailed” factual allegations,
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, it does require more than the bare assertion
of legal conclusions or “an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfullyharmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “A
pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of
the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Id. (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555). “Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked
assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed without prepayment of
the filing fee for this action. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(“PLRA”), the Court is required to sua sponte dismiss an in forma
pauperis complaint before service on a defendant if it determines that
the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who
is immune from such relief. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c); 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B). Similarly, the Court is required to dismiss a complaint
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seeking redress against government entities, officers, and employees
that it finds to be frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). A complaint
is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in law or in fact. Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
To state a federal civil rights claim, a plaintiff must allege that:
(1) he was deprived of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the
federal Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2) the
deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of state law.
Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155-57 (1978). A pro se civil rights
complaint is to be construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
520-21 (1972).
II. Discussion
Plaintiff is incarcerated pursuant to convictions for second-degree
murder, two counts of felonious assault, and possession of a firearm
during the commission of a felony. The complaint names three
defendants: the Wayne County Prosecutor’s Office and two prosecutors,
John D. O’Hair, formerly the elected County Prosecuting Attorney and
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a retired Wayne County Circuit Judge, and James D. Gonzales.
Plaintiff argues that, in connection with his criminal trial, the
prosecutors suppressed material evidence, presented false evidence, and
failed to present a res gestae witness. He seeks monetary damages
between twenty-five and fifty million dollars. Plaintiff’s complaint is
subject to dismissal for several reasons.
First, the complaint is subject to dismissal under Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). Plaintiff argues that material
evidence related to his criminal conviction was withheld. This claim
necessarily challenges the validity of Plaintiff’s criminal conviction. A
claim under § 1983 is an appropriate remedy for a state prisoner
challenging a condition of his imprisonment. See Preiser v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 475, 499 (1973). In Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87, the Supreme
Court established that a state prisoner does not state a cognizable civil
rights claim challenging his imprisonment if a ruling on his claim would
necessarily render his continuing confinement invalid, until and unless
the reason for his continued confinement has been reversed on direct
appeal, called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, or otherwise invalidated.
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Because Plaintiff has not achieved such a favorable termination of his
criminal case, the complaint is barred by Heck.
Second, prosecuting attorneys O’Hair and Gonzales are immune
for suit. The common law principle of absolute immunity for
prosecutors applies to claims filed under § 1983. Imbler v. Pachtman,
424 U.S. 409, 427 (1976). Prosecutors are entitled to absolute
prosecutorial immunity for any conduct relating to “initiating a
prosecution and ... presenting the State’s case.” Id. at 431. In contrast,
when a prosecutor “functions as an administrator” or an investigator
“‘rather than as an officer of the court’ he is entitled only to qualified
immunity.” Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993), citing
Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 n. 33. Plaintiff’s allegations concern conduct
related to presenting the State’s case. Therefore, defendants O’Hair
and Gonzales are immune from suit under § 1983
Finally, a county prosecutor’s office is not an entity or person
subject to suit under § 1983. See Briggs v .Moore, 251 Fed. App’x 77, 79
(3d Cir. 2007); Hancock v. Washtenaw County Prosecutor’s Office, 548 F.
Supp. 1255, 1256 (E.D.Mich.1982).

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III. Order
IT IS ORDERED THAT:
(1) The civil rights complaint is DISMISSED FOR FAILURE
TO STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED.
(2) IT IS CERTIFIED by the Court that any appeal taken by
Plaintiff would not be done in good faith.
SO ORDERED.
s/Terrence G. Berg
TERRENCE G. BERG
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: April 24, 2018
Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that this Order was electronically submitted on
April 24, 2018, using the CM/ECF system, which will send notification
to each party.
s/A. Chubb
Case Manager

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