Spearman v. Parson et al

Filing 7

OPINION and ORDER of Summary Dismissal - Signed by District Judge Nancy G. Edmunds. (LBar)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
RUFUS LAMAR SAVIN SPEARMAN,

Plaintiff,

Civil Action No. 2:18-CV-10673
HONORABLE NANCY G. EDMUNDS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

v.
MARY PARSON, ET. AL.,

Defendants,
________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER OF SUMMARY DISMISSAL
I. Introduction
Before the Court is Plaintiff Rufus Lamar Savin Spearman’s pro se civil rights
complaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C.§ 1983. Plaintiff is an inmate incarcerated at the
Brooks Correctional Facility in Muskegon Heights, Michigan. For the reasons stated below,
the complaint is SUMMARILY DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE FOR FAILING TO STATE
A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED.
II. Standard of Review
Plaintiff has been allowed to proceed without prepayment of fees. See 28 § U.S.C.
1915(a); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F. 3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997). However, 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) states:
Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been
paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that:
(B) the action or appeal:
(i) is frivolous or malicious;
(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or
(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.
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A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); see also Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992).
A complaint lacks an arguable basis in law or fact if it contains factual allegations that are
“fantastic or delusional” or if it is based on legal theories that are indisputably meritless. See
Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 866 (6th Cir.2000)(citing Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327–28);
See also Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196, 1198–99 (6th Cir.1990). Sua sponte dismissal
is appropriate if the complaint lacks an arguable basis when filed. McGore, 114 F. 3d at
612; Goodell v. Anthony, 157 F. Supp. 2d 796, 799 (E.D. Mich. 2001). A federal court is
permitted to consider any prison grievances and responses to those grievances that are
attached to and incorporated in a pro se prisoner complaint in determining whether or not
the case is subject to summary dismissal under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b) for
failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See e.g. White v. Caruso, 39 F.
App’x. 75, 78 (6th Cir. 2002). Courts are also permitted to review other documents that are
attached to a pro se complaint to determine whether or not a pro se plaintiff states a claim
upon which relief can be granted or whether the complaint should be summarily dismissed.
See e.g. Powell v. Messary, 11 F. App’x. 389, 390 (6th Cir. 2001).
While a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations,” the “[f]actual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the
assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)(footnote and citations omitted).
Stated differently, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, ‘to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
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pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
To establish a prima facie case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a civil rights plaintiff must
establish that: (1) the defendant acted under color of state law; and (2) the offending
conduct deprived the plaintiff of rights secured by federal law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42,
48 (1988). “If a plaintiff fails to make a showing on any essential element of a § 1983 claim,
it must fail.” Redding v. St. Eward, 241 F. 3d 530, 532 (6th Cir. 2001).
III. Complaint
Plaintiff has filed a forty page complaint, along with over one hundred and thirty
pages of exhibits and documents that he wishes to incorporate as part of his complaint.
The gravamen of plaintiff’s complaint is that various prison officials, psychiatrists,
psychologists, or other mental health workers at several prisons have forced him against
his will to enter the Corrections Mental Health Program (CMHP). Plaintiff further claims that
the defendants are forcibly medicating him with anti-psychotic medications, specifically
Haldol. Plaintiff alleges that in forcing him to take these anti-psychotic medications, the
defendants are forcing plaintiff to renounce and abandon his “religiously based
parapsychological beliefs, opinions, and ideas[,]”. (See Dkt. # 1, Pg ID, 13). Plaintiff
indicates several times in his complaint that the defendants are doing this because they
believe he is a danger to himself and to others. Plaintiff claims that the defendants only did
this after he requested medical intervention for back pain. Plaintiff alleges that there was
no basis for the defendants to involuntarily medicate him.
Plaintiff, however, as attached to his complaint numerous exhibits that indicate that
plaintiff was only placed into the CMHP and prescribed medication after hearings were
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conducted before hearing committees for the CMHP. (See Dkt. # 1, Pg ID 98-105, 106-118,
120-28, 132-47). These reports contained physician’s certificates indicating that plaintiff
was interviewed by psychiatrists or other mental health professionals. The reports also
contained a Qualified Mental Health Professional Evaluation (QMHP) which also contained
a history of plaintiff’s mental illnesses. The reports all indicate that plaintiff had a history
of mental illness and had been prescribed psychiatric medications in the past. The reports
indicate that plaintiff had a history of depression and suicide attempts. The reports indicate
that plaintiff did not believe he suffered from any mental illness and refused to voluntarily
take any anti-psychotic medications.

The reports indicate that plaintiff lacks insight

regarding his mental illnesses and needed to be treated medically. After reviewing these
reports, the mental health committees found that plaintiff suffered from a mental illness that
required a proposed plan of mental health service not to exceed ninety days.
One report indicated that plaintiff was delusional and agitated and believed that
persons were trying to sexually assault him through their thoughts and that there was a
conspiracy against him. Plaintiff also stated that others were using “mental projection” to
engage in “shoot ‘em up bang bang” which he explained as a method to stimulate his anus
or genitals in order to engage in homosexual sex. The report indicates that plaintiff was
suffering from paranoid thoughts that could lead him to be a danger to himself or others.
This first report indicated also that plaintiff had a prior history of being placed on
psychotropic medications. The report concluded that plaintiff likely suffered from a thought
disorder in the schizophrenia spectrum disorders. It also indicated he had a prior history
of depressive episodes and suicide attempts. (Id., Pg ID 99-102).
A second report contained similar findings but also noted that plaintiff claimed that
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his back pain was caused by “astral or mental projections” being used to “fuck him.” It also
indicated that plaintiff attempted suicide three times by hanging or drowning. The report
indicated that plaintiff on his own would most likely discontinue taking his medications. The
report indicated that plaintiff was continuing to suffer from paranoid and somatic delusions.
(Id., Pg ID 111-13).
A third report contains similar findings as the first two but also indicates that plaintiff
has a history of visual hallucinations, i.e. seeing what he referred to as his “elders.” In
response to a question from the psychiatrist, plaintiff denied that it was psychotic for him
to believe that persons could stimulate his genitals from a distance. Plaintiff indicated from
his own “research” that he “used to say that it [the remote sexual assaults] was mental
projection or spells or charms; now I know its metaphysical.” (Id., Pg ID 122). The report
further indicated that plaintiff has a “fixed delusion that someone has inflicted physical pain
upon him through their thoughts.” (Id., Pg ID 123).
Plaintiff appealed the findings of the mental health committees. His appeals were
denied. (Id., Pg ID 107-08, 119, 129, 148-49).
Plaintiff also attached his grievances that he filed and the Michigan Department of
Corrections’ [M.D.O.C.] responses to these grievances. The M.D.O.C. denied these
various grievances because plaintiff had been evaluated by a licensed psychiatrist who
determined that plaintiff was suffering from symptoms that justified medication for mental
illness. (Id., Pg ID 154, 163-64, 173, 176).
Plaintiff seeks monetary damages and injunctive relief.
IV. Discussion
Plaintiff’s action is subject to dismissal for several reasons.
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First, the complaint would be subject to dismissal, because plaintiff has failed to
comply with the pleading requirements of Fed. R.Civ. P. 8. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2) requires
that a claim for relief contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” This rule seeks “to avoid technicalities and to require that the
pleading discharge the function of giving the opposing party fair notice of the nature and
basis or grounds of the claim and a general indication of the type of litigation involved.”
Chase v. Northwest Airlines Corp., 49 F. Supp. 2d 553, 563 (E.D. Mich.1999)(quoting
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 1215). Similarly, Rule 8(e)(1)
requires that “Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct.” Plaintiff’s
complaint is subject to dismissal for failing to comply with the dictates of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8
(a). See Echols v. Voisine, 506 F. Supp. 15, 17-19 (E.D. Mich. 1981), aff’d, 701 F.2d 176
(6th Cir. 1982)(Table); See also Payne v. Secretary of Treas., 73 F. App’x. 836, 837 (6th
Cir. 2003)(affirming sua sponte dismissal of complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2);
“Neither this court nor the district court is required to create Payne’s claim for her.”).
Secondly, a review of the documents and exhibits which plaintiff attached to his
complaint shows that plaintiff is not entitled to relief.
An inmate “possesses a significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted
administration of antipsychotic drugs under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.” Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22 (1990). However, “given the
requirements of the prison environment, the Due Process Clause permits the State to treat
a prison inmate who has a serious mental illness with antipsychotic drugs against his will,
if the inmate is dangerous to himself or others and the treatment is in the inmate’s medical
interest.” Id., at 227.

Although an inmate’s “interest in avoiding the unwarranted
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administration of antipsychotic drugs is not insubstantial.” Id. at 229, the Supreme Court
opined that “[n]otwithstanding the risks that are involved, we conclude that an inmate’s
interests are adequately protected, and perhaps better served, by allowing the decision to
medicate to be made by medical professionals rather than a judge.” Id., p. 231.

The

Supreme Court further indicated that “[t]hough it cannot be doubted that the decision to
medicate has societal and legal implications, the Constitution does not prohibit the State
from permitting medical personnel to make the decision under fair procedural mechanisms”
without a judicial hearing. Id.
M.D.O.C. Policy Directive (“PD”) 04.06.183 provides, in relevant part, that a prisoner
may be temporarily subjected to involuntary treatment with psychotropic medication where
the following conditions are met: “a psychiatrist's certificate [is] executed which states [that]
the prisoner is mentally ill,” the psychiatrist also concludes that the prisoner “is a present
danger to himself or herself or to others;” “the prisoner refuses treatment;” and the
psychiatrist orders “involuntary administration of psychotropic medication pending the
convening of a Hearing Committee.” Id. at (Q-R).
Before a hearing committee is convened, the inmate must be provided with a copy
of the “Psychiatric Certificate, Psychiatric Report, QMHP11 Report, and a notice of hearing
and rights to the prisoner and, if one has been appointed, to the guardian of the person.”
MDOC PD 04.06.183 at (S). The prisoner shall be assigned a Mental Health Advisor; the
prisoner must not be medicated for twenty-four hours prior to the hearing. Id. at (T). The
hearing committee must consist of “a psychiatrist, a fully licensed psychologist, and another
mental health professional whose licensure or registration requirements include a minimum
of a baccalaureate degree from an accredited college or university, none of whom is, at the
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time of the hearing, involved in the prisoner’s treatment or diagnosis.” Id. at (C). The
hearing committee must consider “the QMHP Report alleging that the prisoner is mentally
ill, the Psychiatric Report, the Psychiatrist’s Certificate, proof that a notice of hearing has
been served, proof that the prisoner has not been medicated within 24 hours and any other
admissible evidence presented at the hearing.” Id. at (W). The prisoner has the right to
attend the hearing, may bring along his or her guardian, and is entitled to the assistance
of his or her mental health advisor. Id. at (X). The prisoner may present evidence, including
witnesses, and may cross-examine witnesses. Id. The hearing committee must then
“determine whether the prisoner is mentally ill and, if so, whether the proposed mental
health services are suitable to the prisoner’s condition. A finding of mental illness must be
confirmed by the psychiatrist on the Hearing Committee to be valid.” Id. at (Y). The
committee must prepare an official record of the hearing, and must present to the prisoner
a report of their findings and orders, along with an appeal form. Id. at (Z-AA). The initial
period of treatment may not exceed ninety days. Id. at (AA).
The prisoner may appeal the hearing committee’s decision to the Director of the
Corrections Mental Health Program with the assistance of their mental health advisor; the
prisoner may then appeal that decision to a state circuit court. Id. at (DD). The policy also
provides for renewal of the medication order. Id. at (EE-FF). The prisoner is also entitled
to a copy of the corrections mental health program guidebook which contains “rights
information,” and is to be offered an “opportunity to consult with staff from the Office of the
Legislative Corrections Ombudsman.” Id. at (GG).
The M.D.O.C.’s policy regarding the involuntary administration of psychotropic drugs
is similar to the Washington state procedure that was upheld as valid in Harper. Id., 494
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U.S. at 233-35. A review of the documents that plaintiff has attached to his complaint
shows that the defendants followed the procedures dictated under M.D.O.C. policy before
he was involuntarily treated with medication. Plaintiff has thus failed to establish a due
process violation.
A review of the various records attached also shows that plaintiff is suffering from
serious mental illness that may make him dangerous to himself or to other persons. There
is no due process violation in the involuntary administration of medicine to an inmate who
suffers from a mental illness. See e.g. Kramer v. Wilkinson, 302 F. App’x. 396, 400 (6th Cir.
2008). Because the various records attached by plaintiff to his complaint clearly show that
he suffers from a serious mental illness, the involuntary administration of medication to
plaintiff does not violate his constitutional rights.
V. ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s civil rights complaint (Dkt. # 1) is
DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE
GRANTED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(e)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(A).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any appeal taken would not be done in good faith.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); see also McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d at 604.
SO ORDERED.
S/ Nancy G. Edmunds___________
HON. NANCY G. EDMUNDS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: March 28, 2018

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I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record
on March 28, 2018, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
s/Lisa Bartlett
Case Manager

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