Little Caesar Enterprises, Inc. et al v. Miramar Quick Service Restaurant Corporation et al

Filing 51

ORDER GRANTING 33 Plaintiffs' MOTION for Preliminary Injunction, DENYING 41 Defendants' MOTION for Preliminary Injunction. Signed by District Judge Terrence G. Berg. (AChu)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
2:18-cv-10767

LITTLE CAESAR
ENTERPRISES, INC., et al.,

HON. TERRENCE G. BERG
Plaintiffs,
v.
MIRAMAR QUICK SERVICE
RESTAURANT CORPORATION
et al.,
Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING
PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION,
DENYING DEFENDANTS’
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION

In this breach of contract and trademark infringement case, the
pizza restaurant company Little Caesars Enterprises, Inc. and LC
Trademarks, Inc., which owns the Little Caesars trademark, are suing
operators of several franchise stores for repeatedly violating the
franchise agreement that governs the parties’ relationship and mutual
obligations. The Plaintiffs have moved the Court to enter a preliminary
injunction prohibiting the franchisees from operating in violation of the
franchise agreements, while the franchisees on their part ask the Court
to enjoin Little Caesars from canceling the franchises. The Plaintiffs’
position is the stronger, so preliminary injunctive relief will be granted
in their favor and denied to the franchisees.

BACKGROUND
The “Little Caesars” trademark, service mark, trade name, and
related marks are owned by Plaintiff LC Trademarks, Inc. ECF No. 32
PageID.321–22. LC Trademarks licenses these marks to Plaintiff Little
Caesar Enterprises, Inc., which in turn licenses them to franchisees
throughout the United States. ECF No. 32 PageID.322. Little Caesars
franchisees are permitted to use the Little Caesars marks and to operate
under the Little Caesars System, “which involves the production,
merchandizing, and sale of pizza, chicken wings, and related products
utilizing special equipment, equipment layouts, interior and exterior
accessories, identification schemes, products, management programs,
standards, specifications, proprietary marks, and information.” ECF No.
32 PageID.321.
Khalid Drihmi and Abdel Drihmi are brothers who purchased four
Little Caesars franchises in Connecticut and Massachusetts. They own
the franchises through two companies, Miramar Quick Service
Restaurant

Corporation,

and

Silon

Corporation.

ECF

No.

32

PageID.322–23. The relationship between Little Caesar Enterprises and
Defendants was governed by detailed franchise agreements signed by the
parties and personally guaranteed by the Drihmis. ECF No. 33-4
PageID.452–54. The agreements provided that “Franchisee shall operate
the Restaurant in strict conformity with such methods, standards,
procedures, and specifications as Little Caesar may from time to time
2

prescribe.” ECF No. 33-4 PageID.441. The franchisees were further
required to “maintain the Restaurant premises and adjacent public areas
in a clean, orderly, and excellent condition and in excellent appearance
to the public.” ECF No. 33-4 PageID.412. Little Caesar Enterprises
retained authority under the franchise agreements to conduct
inspections of the franchise premises “when and as frequently as it deems
appropriate, without notice to Franchisee.” ECF No. 33-4 PageID.410,
412.
The agreements also mandated that Defendants purchase all
products, ingredients, equipment, and supplies used or sold in their
restaurants “solely from Little Caesar’s affiliate Blue Line Foodservice
Distribution (“Blue Line”), or from such other entity as Little Caesar
designates in writing.” ECF No. 33-4 PageID.412. The agreements
specified that Defendants were to pay Blue Line directly for all supplies
“in accordance with Blue Line’s then-current payment terms and
conditions.” ECF No. 33-4 PageID.412. If a franchisee failed to make any
payment required under the agreement in full, “Little Caesar and Blue
Line reserve[d] the right, among other remedies, to (a) suspend or refuse
shipment to Franchisee of additional Blue Line products until such
payment has been made in full, and/or (b) require payment for any or all
future shipments of Blue Line products to be made on a cash-on-delivery
(COD) basis.” ECF No. 33-4 PageID.412.

3

Defendants were further required to maintain accurate financial
records and accounts, and to provide “weekly reports of Gross Sales,”
“financial statements on a quarterly basis,” and “such other data and
information regarding the operation of the Restaurant as Little Caesar
may require.” ECF No. 33-4 PageID.428. Little Caesar Enterprises
retained the right “at any time to examine and copy, at Little Caesar’s
expense, the books, records, accounts, and business tax returns of the
Franchisee, and the personal tax returns of Franchisee’s owners.” ECF
No. 33-4 PageID.429.
Conditions warranting termination of the franchise agreements
were set forth in plain language. They included the franchisee receiving
three or more notices of default within a year, or demonstrating “willful
or repeated failure . . . to meet any requirements or specifications
established by Little Caesar with respect to product quality, physical
property,

condition

of

equipment

or

materials

used,

products

manufactured, menu, or the use of products, packaging or promotional
materials that have not been specified or approved by Little Caesar.”
ECF No. 33-4 PageID.435. Termination was also justified if a franchisee
“refuses to permit Little Caesar to inspect Franchisee’s Restaurant,
books, records, and other documents” or “fails to cure any default under
this Agreement which materially impairs the goodwill associated with
the Propriety Marks or presents a health or safety hazard to Restaurant
employees or customers.” ECF No. 33-4 PageID.436.
4

Any violations such as these, under the franchise agreement,
warranted termination “without affording Franchisee any opportunity to
cure the default, effective immediately upon receipt of notice by
Franchisee.” ECF No. 33-4 PageID.434. Moreover, upon termination, the
agreement required the franchisee to “immediately cease to operate the
Restaurant” and no longer to “directly or indirectly, represent to the
public or hold itself out as a present or former franchisee of Little
Caesar.” ECF No. 33-4 PageID.437. The franchise agreement also
contemplated liquidated damages for noncompliance, including $250 per
day for each day the franchisee is in default, as well as estimated revenue
and royalty fees Little Caesar Enterprises would forgo because of the
franchisee’s breach. ECF No. 33-4 PageID.438.
In August 2016, after five payments to Blue Line were returned for
insufficient

funds,

Defendants’

Wethersfield,

Connecticut

and

Springfield, Massachusetts franchises were instructed to provide cash on
delivery for product shipments going forward. ECF No. 46 PageID.956.
Later, in January 2018, the Manchester, Connecticut and Hartford,
Connecticut franchises were moved to prepayment terms “after 18
payments across the four stores were returned for insufficient funds over
the prior year and a half.” ECF No. 46 PageID.956. Prepayment required
payment when the food and supplies are ordered from Blue Line, which
was typically two days before delivery. Id.

5

On February 22, 2018, Little Caesar Enterprises sent Defendants
two separate letters with the subject “Notice of Default and Notice of
Franchise Agreement Termination.” ECF Nos. 33-5, 33-6. Those letters
described a long list of critical operational defaults and system standards
defaults observed by Little Caesar Enterprises inspectors at the four
restaurants owned by Defendants in November and December 2017. ECF
Nos. 33-5, 33-6. Little Caesar Enterprises also sent Defendants separate
“Supplemental Notice[s] of Franchise Agreement Termination,” similarly
dated February 22, 2018, which detailed additional defaults by
Defendants. ECF Nos. 33-7, 33-8. Specifically, these supplemental
notices described how Defendants had “fail[ed] to comply with federal tax
laws, as evidenced by a 2016 Notice of Levy from the Internal Revenue
Service related to your franchised restaurants,” and “fail[ed] to provide
to Little Caesar required financial statements related to your franchised
restaurants and . . . to make timely payments to your supplier, Little
Caesar affiliate Blue Line Foodservice Distribution, Inc., for food and
supply deliveries.” ECF No. 33-7 PageID.471; ECF No. 33-8 PageID.476.
These various notices of default and termination referenced previous
notices of default sent by Little Caesar Enterprises to Defendants in May,
August, November, and December 2017. ECF No. 33-5 PageID.458; ECF
No. 33-6 PageID.465; ECF No. 33-7 PageID.471; ECF No. 33-8
PageID.476. Accordingly, Defendants were on notice of the problems
identified by Little Caesar Enterprises.
6

Defendants had also neglected to report gross sales at their
Manchester franchise and to pay contractually required royalty and
advertising fees on those sales since September 17, 2018. ECF No. 33-2
PageID.393. Likewise, since October 2018 they had not been reporting
sales and paying the requisite fees for the Wethersfield franchise. Id.
PageID.391. Defendants similarly did not report gross sales at their
Springfield franchise or pay royalty and advertising fees on those sales
during at least 38 weeks in 2018 and 2019. Id. They were likewise behind
on reporting gross sales and paying the related fees in connection with
their Hartford franchise. Id. at PageID.393–34. Little Caesars notified
Defendants of these violations of the franchise agreements in a
“Supplemental Notice of Default and Notice of Franchise Agreement
Termination” dated January 9, 2019. ECF No. 33-9 PageID.479; see ECF
No. 33-11 PageID.485–86 (List of Missing Franchise Payments). And
Plaintiffs ground their request for a preliminary injunction in these most
recent, and perhaps most serious violations of the franchise agreements,
which remained uncured as of the date of the May 3, 2019 hearing on this
matter. See ECF No. 45-1 PageID.943. Though Defendants submitted an
opposition to Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, that brief
was late-filed and, most critically, does not dispute the bulk of
Defendants’ specific factual allegations regarding the

franchise

agreement violations outlined in Plaintiffs’ briefing and accompanying
exhibits.

Rather,

Defendants

take
7

the

position

that

Plaintiffs

“themselves created the conditions that resulted in their alleged
violations.” ECF No. 49 PageID.963.
DISCUSSION
“The purpose of a preliminary injunction is merely to preserve the
relative positions of the parties until a trial on the merits can be held.”
Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981). In deciding whether
to grant a preliminary injunction, the Court considers: “(1) whether the
movant has a strong likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether the
movant would suffer irreparable injury absent the injunction; (3)
whether the injunction would cause substantial harm to others; and (4)
whether the public interest would be served by the issuance of an
injunction.” Graveline v. Johnson, 747 F. App’x 408, 412 (6th Cir. 2018)
(quoting Bays v. City of Fairborn, 668 F.3d 814, 818–19 (6th Cir. 2012)).
These four considerations are “factors to be balanced, not prerequisites
that must be met.” Certified Restoration Dry Cleaning Network, L.L.C. v.
Tenke Corp., 511 F.3d 535, 542 (6th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted).
I.

Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction
Plaintiffs seek a preliminary injunction because they believe

Defendants have continued to commit additional defaults under the
franchise agreements since this lawsuit began. They have asked the
Court to enter a preliminary injunction enjoining Defendants from: (1)
continuing to operate their Little Caesars franchises; (2) infringing on LC
Trademarks’ Little Caesar marks and engaging in unfair competition;
8

and (3) violating the post-termination obligations contained in the
franchise agreements, including the covenant against competition.
Because the Court finds Plaintiffs have a substantial likelihood of success
on the merits and would suffer irreparable injury absent the injunction,
and that the public interest would be served by issuance of an injunction,
the Court will grant Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction.
A. Likelihood of success on the merits
A party is not required to prove its entire case at a preliminary
injunction hearing but must demonstrate a strong likelihood of success
on the merits. See Camenisch, 451 U.S. 395. “[I]t is ordinarily sufficient
if the plaintiff has raised questions going to the merits so serious,
substantial, difficult, and doubtful as to make them a fair ground for
litigation and thus for more deliberative investigation.” Six Clinics
Holding Corp., II v. Cafcomp Sys., Inc., 119 F.3d 393, 402 (6th Cir. 1997)
(citation omitted). Plaintiffs have certainly met that threshold here.
Their complaint asserts the following causes of action: (1) breach of
contract; (2) trademark infringement; (3) unfair competition; and (4)
trade dress infringement. The Court finds they are likely to succeed on
the merits of each of these claims.
With respect to their claim for breach of contract, Plaintiffs have
documented numerous instances of Defendants’ defaults under the
franchise agreements. Little Caesar was permitted to terminate the
agreement if Defendants willfully or repeatedly failed to meet
9

operational and maintenance standards, refused to permit Little Caesar
Enterprises to inspect the restaurant, or failed to make any required
payment within 10 days of receiving notice that payment was overdue.
ECF No. 33 PageID.435–36. On multiple occasions, Plaintiffs provided
Defendants with written notice of default, explaining that inspectors had
identified critical operational defaults (which the agreement required be
cured within 24 hours to prevent termination), and other system
standards defaults (to be cured within 30 days to avoid termination).1
More specifically, an inspector found food items were “not properly dated
for expiration,” “[p]ersonal protection equipment was not available [for
employees],” “[p]roper sauce making procedures [were] not followed,” the
sink was “not set up properly and sink broken,” and “[w]ash/sanitize
buckets were not present at the required stations.” ECF No. 33-6
PageID.466; ECF No. 33-5 PageID.459. More significantly, Defendants
admit they have failed on many occasions to report gross weekly sales
and to pay royalty and advertising fees due on those sales. See ECF No.
41-4 (Drihmi Aff.) (“LCE has now created a situation where we have no
choice but [to] default on our regular payments . . . .”). Defendants have
not contested that these and other serious violations of the franchise

The original notices of default are not themselves attached to Plaintiffs’ motion. But
they are referenced in multiple notices of default and franchise agreement
termination included as exhibits to Plaintiffs’ brief.

1

10

agreement occurred. Plaintiffs have therefore established a likelihood of
success on the merits with respect to their breach of contract claims.
Plaintiffs are also likely to succeed on their trademark
infringement and unfair competition claims. In the trademark context,
establishing a strong likelihood of success on the merits is “often decisive”
in determining that a preliminary injunction is warranted. PGP, LLC v.
TPII, LLC, 734 F. App’x 330, 332 (6th Cir. 2018). This is because “[i]f the
movant is likely to succeed on an infringement claim, irreparable injury
is ordinarily presumed, and the public interest will usually favor
injunctive relief.” Id. (citing Wynn Oil Co. v. Am. Way Serv. Corp., 943
F.2d 595, 608 (6th Cir. 1991) and Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control
Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 532–33 (6th Cir. 2004)). To show that
they are likely to succeed on the merits of their infringement and unfair
competition claims, Plaintiffs need establish only that: (1) they own the
Little Caesars marks; (2) Defendants are using the marks in commerce;
and (3) Defendants’ use of the marks is likely to cause confusion. Hensley
Mfg. v. ProPride, Inc., 579 F.3d 603, 609 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing 15 U.S.C.
§ 1114(1)). See Victory Lane Quick Oil Change, Inc. v. Darwich, 799 F.
Supp.2d 730, 735 (E.D. Mich. 2011) (“Under the Lanham Act . . . we use
the same test to decide whether there has been trademark infringement,
unfair competition, or false designation of origin”). Here, it is undisputed
that Plaintiff LC Trademarks owns the Little Caesars trademark, service
mark, trade name, and related marks, and that it has licensed those
11

marks

to

Plaintiff

Little

Caesar

Enterprises,

Inc.

Defendants

acknowledge they continue to operate their restaurants as Little Caesars
franchises and are thus using Plaintiffs’ marks in commerce. Concerning
the final element of likelihood of confusion, the Sixth Circuit has held
that “proof of continued, unauthorized use of an original trademark by
one whose license to use the trademark has been terminated is sufficient
to establish ‘likelihood of confusion.’” U.S. Structures, Inc. v. J.P.
Structures, Inc., 130 F.3d 1185, 1190 (6th Cir. 1997). Because Defendants
continue to hold their restaurants out as licensed Little Caesars
franchises after termination of the franchise agreements, they are on a
daily basis using Plaintiffs’ marks without permission and thereby
creating a likelihood of confusion. Plaintiffs have established a likelihood
of success on the merits of their trademark and unfair competition
claims, as well as their breach of contract claim.
B. Irreparable injury to Plaintiffs absent the injunction
After considering Plaintiffs’ likelihood of success on the merits of
their underlying claims, the Court must examine whether the Plaintiffs
will suffer irreparable injury without the injunction. Tenke Corp., 511
F.3d at 550. The Sixth Circuit has specifically held that “[i]n trademark
infringement cases, a likelihood of confusion or possible risk to the
requesting

party’s

reputation

satisfies

the

irreparable

injury

requirement.” Lucky’s Detroit, LLC v. Double L, Inc., 533 F. App’x 553,
555 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Wynn Oil Co., 943 F.2d at 608). See Ford Motor
12

Co. v. Lloyd Design Corp., 22 F. App'x 464, 469 (6th Cir. 2001) (“[W]here
a plaintiff makes a strong showing of likelihood of confusion, irreparable
harm follows as a matter of course.”). The reasoning is that irreparable
injury stems both from the potential difficulty plaintiff will have in
proving damages, and also from “the impairment of intangible values.”
Darwich, 799 F. Supp. 2d at 736 (citing Wynn Oil, 943 F.2d at 608). The
Sixth Circuit has also acknowledged that “[a] loss of customer goodwill
often amounts to irreparable injury.” Basicomputer Corp. v. Scott, 973
F.2d 507, 511 (6th Cir. 1992).
It is inevitable that Defendants’ operation of their restaurants
using the Little Caesars name and marks will cause confusion. Despite
termination of the franchise agreements, Defendants continue to use the
logo, décor, branding, and many of the food products associated with
Little Caesars restaurants. This will certainly lead consumers to believe
Defendants’ restaurants are authorized Little Caesars franchises, and
could diminish customer goodwill towards the Little Caesars brand
should customers be dissatisfied with their experience at Defendants’
restaurants (which are not being operated in accordance with the Little
Caesars System). For these reasons, Plaintiffs have easily established the
threat of irreparable injury.
C. Substantial harm to others
The third factor for the Court to consider is whether issuing an
injunction would cause substantial harm. Tumblebus Inc. v. Cramer, 399
13

F.3d 754, 769 (6th Cir. 2005). Unfortunately, there is a strong likelihood
that a preliminary injunction will cause Defendants to suffer substantial
financial harm. Defendants assert that they “decided to invest their life
savings and that of their family in this business in the pursuit of the
American dream.” ECF No. 49 PageID.964. Though the Court does not
take this consideration lightly, this harm arises from the Defendants’
conduct in violating the terms of the franchise agreement more than it
does from the issuance of the preliminary injunction. Moreover, even
considering this harm, it is outweighed by the other three factors which
weigh strongly in favor of the injunction.
D. Public interest served by the injunction
The final factor to evaluate in deciding a motion for preliminary
injunction is “whether the public interest would be served by the issuance
of the injunction.” Tumblebus, 399 F.3d at 760. As an initial matter, there
is a generally recognized public interest in holding parties to their
agreements. S. Glazer’s Distrib. of Ohio, LLC v. Great Lakes Brewing Co.,
860 F.3d 844, 853–54 (6th Cir. 2017). As discussed in the context of
Plaintiffs’ likelihood of success on the merits, Plaintiffs have adduced
significant evidence that Defendants have breached, and continue to
breach, the franchise agreements. There is also a public interest in
“preventing consumer confusion and deception in the marketplace and
protecting the trademark holder’s property interest in the mark.”
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Amouri’s Grand Foods, Inc., 453 F.3d 377, 383
14

(6th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). Further, as specifically noted by
another court in his district, “[t]he public interest is especially served by
issuing a preliminary injunction against a former franchisee as a
licensee’s status increases the probability of consumer confusion.” Little
Caesar Enterprises, Inc. v. R-J-L Foods, Inc., 796 F. Supp. 1026, 1036
(E.D. Mich. 1992) (Edmunds, J.) (quoting Church of Scientology Int’l v.
Elmira Mission of the Church of Scientology, 794 F.2d 38, (2d Cir. 1986)).
Because Defendants continue to maintain their restaurants as
unauthorized Little Caesars franchises, there is a substantial likelihood
that consumers who patronize these restaurants will be confused. The
Court therefore finds that the public interest would be served by a
preliminary injunction.
Examined together, these factors weigh strongly in favor of
granting Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. The Court is
particularly convinced by the proof in support of Plaintiffs’ showing of a
substantial likelihood of success on the merits, and the fact that Plaintiffs
will inevitably suffer irreparable injury absent issuance of an injunction.
Though an injunction will cause harm to Defendants, the Court finds that
these previous factors, as well as the public interest, tip the scale in favor
of granting Plaintiffs’ request for an injunction.

15

II.

Defendants’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction
Defendants ask the Court to enjoin Little Caesar Enterprises and

LC Trademarks from enforcing termination of the franchise agreement
based on unproven violations of the agreement and attempting to enforce
any penalty provisions in the agreements. Defendants further request
that the Court enjoin Blue Line from “over-charging or otherwise
manipulating the defendants’ account to create artificially late charges,
and costs,” which Defendants purport gave them no choice but to violate
the franchise agreements. Defendants have not provided facts or law that
would justify entering an injunction prohibiting this behavior.
A. Likelihood of success on the merits
Defendants have conceded that they are in breach of the franchise
agreements but implicitly rely on the argument that they were forced into
breach by the actions of Little Caesar Enterprises, which they urge
“created its own violations of the agreement through illegal conduct,
[and] unfair and deceptive business practices.” ECF No. 41-2 PageID.779.
Defendants’ brief only expressly addresses their likelihood of success on
the merits of their retaliation and discrimination claims, though it notes
in passing that Defendants’ own violations of the franchise agreements
should not be considered substantial enough to warrant termination of
the franchise agreements. Id. at PageID.780. The Court does not find that
Defendants have shown a likelihood of success on the merits of any of
their claims.
16

Concerning their retaliation claim, Defendants argue that Little
Caesar Enterprises began issuing them notices of violation more
frequently “after the defendants exercised their legal rights not to
consummate a deal LCE supported, and [after] they coincidentally
stop[ped] paying gratuities to LCE agents.” ECF No. 41-1 PageID.783.
But Defendants do not dispute that they were at this point already in
violation of the franchise agreements because of their failure to maintain
required operational standards, to report gross weekly sales, and to pay
related royalties and fees. Because Defendants do not dispute the various
violations of the franchise agreements carefully documented by
Plaintiffs, the Court cannot conclude that the only possible reason
Plaintiffs began issuing violation notices was as retaliation for
Defendants’ lack of cooperation and failure to pay bribes. Applying this
same reasoning, the Court finds Defendants have not established a
likelihood of success on the merits of their claim that discrimination was
the real reason Little Caesar Enterprises notified them of multiple
instances of breach.
B. Irreparable Harm
Addressing the second preliminary injunction factor, the Court
determines that Defendants’ harm is not irreparable because it is fully
compensable by money damages. See Basicomputer Corp., 973 F.2d at
511. The Supreme Court has plainly stated that “[m]ere injuries, however
substantial, in terms of money, time and energy necessarily extended in
17

the absence of a stay, are not enough.” Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61,
90 (1974). The possibility that Defendants could be adequately
compensated at a later date “weighs heavily against a claim of
irreparable harm.” Id. Though they assert their discrimination claims
could not adequately be compensated with money damages, Defendants
have offered no legal support for that position. Moreover, the Sixth
Circuit has previously found that certain discrimination claims can be
adequately remedied with monetary damages. See, e.g., Zazueta v. Ky.
Comm. and Tech. Coll. Sys., 92 F. App’x 298 (6th Cir. 2004) (finding that
employment-discrimination plaintiff’s claims could be compensated with
monetary damages). For example, in Jerome v. Viviano Food Co., Inc.,
489 F.2d 965 (6th Cir. 1974), the Sixth Circuit concluded that a Title VII
plaintiff who claimed that the defendant-employer refused to hire her
because she was a woman was not entitled to a preliminary injunction
because back wages could adequately compensate her alleged damages.
Moreover, in the context of their own argument about irreparable harm,
Defendants declared, “If the court does not intervene and issue an order
enjoining the plaintiff from engaging in further actions against the
defendants, they will be driven out of business with no hope to ever
recover.” ECF No. 41-1 PageID.784. This focus on the longevity of
Defendants’ restaurants suggests even Defendants’ claim that they were
pushed out of business or held to more stringent standards than other
franchisees because of their race or national origin would be compensable
18

by monetary damages, potentially measured by the restaurants’ average
gross profits.
C. Substantial harm to others
For reasons discussed above, the Court finds that Plaintiffs would
suffer substantial reputational harm should Defendants continue to
operate their unauthorized Little Caesars franchises. See infra at 10–13.
D. The public interest
The

Court

disagrees

that

entering

Defendants’

requested

injunction would advance the public interest. As stated previously, there
is an acknowledged public interest in holding parties to their agreements.
Great Lakes Brewing Co., 860 F.3d at 853–54. Additionally, the public
interest is best served by guarding against the operation of unlicensed
franchisees. R-J-L Foods, Inc., 796 F. Supp. At 1036.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction is
hereby GRANTED and Defendants’ motion for preliminary injunction is
DENIED. Within ten (10) days of the date of this Order, Plaintiffs shall
file on the docket a proposed Preliminary Injunction Order with
appropriate terms enjoining Defendants from (1) continuing to operate
their restaurants as Little Caesars franchises; (2) infringing on the Little
Caesar marks owned by LC Trademarks; and (3) violating the posttermination obligations contained in the franchise agreements, including
the covenant against competition. Plaintiffs are directed to also submit
19

the proposed order in Word format via the Proposed Orders function in
CM/ECF. Following the Court’s independent review and subject to its
approval, the Preliminary Injunction Order will be entered and shall
thereupon shall take immediate effect.

SO ORDERED.
Dated: July 16, 2019

s/Terrence G. Berg
TERRENCE G. BERG
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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