Ronning v. Social Security
Filing
18
OPINION and ORDER Granting Plaintiff Counsel's re 16 MOTION for Attorney Fees . Signed by District Judge Gershwin A. Drain. (TMcg)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
TIMOTHY RONNING,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 18-cv-11021
v.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
GERSHWIN A. DRAIN
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
STEPHANIE DAWKINS DAVIS
Defendant.
/
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF COUNSEL’S MOTION
FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES [#16]
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Timothy Ronning initiated this civil action on March 29, 2019,
seeking review of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration’s
decision to deny his claim for disability benefits. Dkt. No. 1. Subsequently, the
parties agreed to send this case back to the Administration on remand for further
action pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Dkt. No. 13. As a result,
Plaintiff became the prevailing litigant in the proceedings before this Court, and
the parties stipulated that Plaintiff would receive $3,500 in attorney’s fees under
the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. See Dkt. No. 14;
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Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 302 (1993) (holding a party who wins a
sentence-four remand order is a prevailing party).
On remand, the Administrative Law Judge issued a fully favorable decision
on Plaintiff’s disability claims and awarded him compensation for past-due
benefits. Dkt. No. 16-1. But the Social Security Administration withheld twentyfive percent of this award -- $14,675.63 -- to pay for any approved attorney’s fees.
Dkt. No. 16-2, p. 7 (Pg. ID 808). Plaintiff Counsel now petitions the Court to
award attorney’s fees in this amount.
Present before the Court is Plaintiff Counsel’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). Dkt. No. 16. Defendant Commissioner of Social
Security raises no objection to this Motion. Dkt. No. 17. For the reasons set forth
below, the Court will GRANT the Motion [#16].
II. DISCUSSION
Prior to initiating this action, Plaintiff and his attorney executed a
contingency fee agreement that read: “If the claimant is awarded benefits by the
Appeals Council or by a Federal Court, or following an Order of Remand issued by
the Appeals Council or Federal Court, the fee shall be 25% of the total past due
benefits to the Claimant and/or the Claimant’s family.” Dkt. No. 16-3. Counsel
therefore contends that the Court should award him attorney’s fees in the amount
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of $14,675.63, in accordance with the contractual agreement and 42 U.S.C. §
406(b).
Title 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) provides:
Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant under this
subchapter who was represented before the court by an attorney, the court
may determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such
representation, not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due
benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment, and
the Commissioner of Social Security may, notwithstanding the provisions of
section 405(i) of this title, but subject to subsection (d) of this section, certify
the amount of such fee for payment to such attorney out of, and not in
addition to the amount of such past-due benefits. In case of any such
judgment, no other fee may be payable or certified for payment for such
representation except as provided in this paragraph.
42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). The Supreme Court has instructed that “§ 406(b) does
not displace contingent-fee agreements as the primary means by which fees are set
for successfully representing Social Security benefits claimants in court. Rather, §
406(b) calls for court review of such arrangements as an independent check, to
assure that they yield reasonable results in particular cases.”
Gisbrecht v.
Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 807 (2002). There is a rebuttable presumption that an
attorney should receive their full contingency fee under a contract unless “1) the
attorney engaged in improper conduct or was ineffective, or 2) the attorney would
enjoy an undeserved windfall due to the client’s large back pay award or the
attorney’s relatively minimal effort.” Hayes v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs.,
923 F.2d 418, 419 (6th Cir. 1990).
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Here, the Court finds that Counsel is entitled to his full compensation under
the contingency fee agreement. Counsel accepted this case with no guarantee of
being paid for his representation; yet, advocated vigorously and successfully for
his client’s disability rights from the administrative level to the federal courts, and
back again. In the proceedings before this Court, Counsel expended twenty hours
reviewing the administrative record, researching case law, and drafting a Motion
for Summary Judgment. These efforts ultimately led to the case being remanded to
the Social Security Administration and Plaintiff receiving past-due disability
benefits. See Bergen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 454 F.3d 1273, 1277 (11th Cir. 2006)
(“We find that 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) authorizes an award of attorney’s fees where the
district court remands the case to the Commissioner of Social Security for further
proceedings, and the Commissioner on remand awards the claimant past-due
benefits.”).
Accordingly, the Court finds that Counsel’s representation was
effective and that granting him an award of $14,675.63 would not lead to an
undeserved windfall.
In short, the Court will Grant Plaintiff Counsel’s Motion for Attorney’s
Fees. However, the Court will direct Counsel to return to Plaintiff the $3,500 he
received in attorney’s fees under the EAJA. See Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796
(“Congress harmonized fees payable by the Government under EAJA with fees
payable under § 406(b) out of the claimant’s past-due Social Security Benefits in
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this manner: Fee awards may be made under both prescriptions, but the claimant’s
attorney must refund to the claimant the amount of the smaller fee.”) (internal
quotations and citations omitted).
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the Court will GRANT Plaintiff Counsel’s
Motion for Attorney’s Fees [#16].
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:
July 15, 2019
s/Gershwin A. Drain
HON. GERSHWIN A. DRAIN
United States District Court Judge
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed to the attorneys
of record on this date, July 15, 2019, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
s/Teresa McGovern
Case Manager
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