Arms v. Lapeer County Medical Care Facility et al
Filing
13
ORDER granting 9 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by District Judge Terrence G. Berg. (AChu)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
LYNDA ARMS,
Plaintiff,
2:18-cv-11808
Hon. Terrence G. Berg
v.
LAPEER COUNTY MEDICAL
CARE FACILITY, GARY
EASTON, individually, TONY
ROESKE, individually,
ANGELA OSENTOSKI,
individually, and LINDA
RALSTON, individually,
Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS
Plaintiff Lynda Arms served as the office manager and human
resources officer for the Lapeer County Medical Care Facility
(“LCMCF”) for 28 years. LCMCF is a county-owned skilled nursing
facility. Arms is now suing LCMCF and several of her co-workers
for claims arising from her allegation that they falsely accused her
of embezzling funds from the nursing facility. Plaintiff Arms claims
that these accusations resulted in her termination and subsequent
criminal prosecution by the Lapeer County Sheriff’s Department
and Prosecuting Attorney. She filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
alleging violations of her rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments,1 and First Amendment. Additionally, she asserts
state law claims for malicious prosecution under Mich. Comp. Laws
§ 600.2907 and Michigan common law, and violation of the ElliotLarsen Civil Rights Act, Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.2202.
BACKGROUND
In addition to suing her long-time employer LCMCF, Plaintiff
asserts claims against the following of her former co-workers: Gary
Easton (Plaintiff’s manager), Tony Roeske (also Plaintiff’s
manager), Angela Osentoski (employee), and Linda Ralston
(employee). ECF No. 5 PageID.31–32. As a human resources officer
and office manager at LCMCF, Plaintiff explains she was
responsible for “mak[ing] sure that all of her work was accessible to
others, as a contingency plan, so that nobody was without the
necessary records.” Id. PageID.33. She does not specify what kinds
The Court treats Plaintiff’s claim for malicious prosecution in violation of the
“Fourth and/or Fourteenth Amendment” as one for violation of her Fourth
Amendment rights only. The Sixth Circuit has expressly stated that the right
to be free from malicious prosecution “must be asserted according to the Fourth
Amendment” in a § 1983 action. Johnson v. Ward, 43 F. App’x 779, 782 (6th
Cir. 2002) (quoting Spurlock v. Satterfield, 167 F.3d 995, 1006 n.19 (6th Cir.
2002)).
1
2
of records she was entrusted to maintain. As part of her
“contingency plan,” Plaintiff avers she gave “emergency access to
her files” to certain other LCMCF employees, including Joyce
Leroski, and Defendants Roeske, and Ralston. Id. Plaintiff provides
no specific facts about the nature of this arrangement, such as how
she gave them access, or what kind of files—digital or paper, official
or personal—they were, or to what subject matters they pertained.
But Plaintiff claims that at no point did any LCMCF employee
express concern about the fact that she shared such “access.” Id.
In 2015, LCMCF’s accountant (whether an outside or Countyemployed accountant is unknown, as the Complaint simply refers
to this person as a “CPA”) asked for Plaintiff’s help conducting an
internal audit. See id. In response, Plaintiff claims that she
“locat[ed] and obtain[ed] documentation regarding Defendant
Easton’s account that had previously received approximately [a]
$75,000 influx due to accounting papers he had prepared and/or
filed.” Id. It is difficult to understand precisely what Plaintiff means
by this allegation because no explanation is provided as to what
“documentation” Plaintiff found to show this happened, what an
3
“influx” is, what kind of “account” Easton had at LCMCF, how such
an “influx” could be caused by “accounting papers [Easton] had
prepared and/or filed”, what such “accounting papers” were, why
they were “prepared” or where they were to be “filed.”
Nevertheless, Plaintiff contends, LCMCF’s Board discussed
“making” Easton, her manager, “pay back the [$60,000 in]2 monies
improperly given to him” but ultimately took no action on the
matter. Id. Plaintiff further contends that no criminal charges were
filed against Defendant Easton in connection with that incident. Id.
After Plaintiff helped LCMCF’s auditor gather documentation
related to Defendant Easton’s account, Plaintiff alleges his behavior
toward her changed, and that he became “cold towards her,” and
started “excluding her, not talking to her, [and] becoming upset
towards her.” Id. Further, she claims Defendant Easton began
“demanding that [Plaintiff] train Defendant Osentoski to replace
her.” Id.
Plaintiff at first alleges that Defendant Easton’s account received a $75,000
influx but elsewhere in her Amended Complaint states, “[u]pon information
and belief, the amount of money that Defendant Easton misallocated exceeded
$60,000.” ECF No.5 PageID.33. It is unclear from the pleadings exactly how
much of the $75,000 influx in Defendant Easton’s account was improperly
allocated.
2
4
A few months later, Plaintiff alleges there was a payroll
deduction error in her account that resulted in her being paid an
extra $314. Id. PageID.34. She claims that because multiple
employees had access to her files, someone else could have made
the change that resulted in her receiving the additional $314. Id.
According to the Amended Complaint, she notified Defendants of
the payroll error and they agreed to remedy it by deducting $314
from her paycheck. Id. Plaintiff avers she indeed repaid
approximately $300 to LCMCF but that Defendants nonetheless
accused her of making the accounting error on purpose, framed it
as
embezzlement,
and
subsequently
terminated
Plaintiff’s
employment. Id. PageID.34–35. While Plaintiff describes these
embezzlement allegations as “false and baseless,” ECF No. 5
PageID.35, she was nonetheless later criminally charged with
embezzlement—and acquitted at trial. Id.
The Amended Complaint alleges that the Defendants,
LCMCF and its employees, “had no probable cause” to believe
Plaintiff misappropriated funds but that they nevertheless
“charged” her with the crime of embezzlement. Id. PageID.34–35.
5
The Lapeer County Sheriff and the Prosecuting Attorney make
arrest and prosecution decisions, however, not the County’s nursing
facility or its employees.
Plaintiff filed this civil rights suit on June 6, 2018 and entered
her Amended Complaint on June 27, 2018. ECF Nos. 1 & 5.
Defendants moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint for failure to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted. ECF No. 9
PageID.355. The Court agrees that Plaintiff has not pled facts that
would entitle her to relief on her claims for violation of the Fourth
and First Amendment, asserted under § 1983, or for state law
malicious prosecution or violation of the Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights
Act.
DISCUSSION
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits
dismissal of a lawsuit where the defendant establishes the
plaintiff’s “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”
Consideration of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is confined
to the pleadings. Jones v. City of Cincinnati, 521 F.3d 555, 562 (6th
Cir. 2008). Because Defendants styled their motion as one seeking
6
dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court
declines to consider documents outside the pleadings and thereby
to convert Defendants’ motion to one for summary judgment. See
ECF No. 9 (attaching multiple exhibits in support of Defendants’
motion to dismiss); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d) (“If, on a motion
under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside the pleadings are
presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be
treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.”). The Court
does not necessarily agree with Defendants’ assertion that the
exhibits they attached to their motion to dismiss were incorporated
by reference into the Complaint and therefore does not consider
them part of the pleadings. Besides, dismissal of Plaintiff’s
Complaint for failure to state a claim is plainly appropriate based
on the insufficiency of her factual allegations.
In evaluating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), courts
“must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, accept all well-pled factual allegations as true and
determine whether the plaintiff undoubtedly can prove no set of
facts consistent with their allegations that would entitle them to
7
relief.” League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d
523, 527 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Kottmyer v. Maas, 436 F.3d 684, 688
(6th Cir. 2006)). Though this standard is liberal, it requires a
plaintiff to provide “more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” in support
of her grounds for entitlement to relief. Albrecht v. Treon, 617 F.3d
890, 893 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 554, 555 (2007)). Under Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the plaintiff must
also plead “factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted). A plaintiff falls
short if she pleads facts “merely consistent with a defendant’s
liability” or if the alleged facts do not “permit the court to infer more
than the mere possibility of misconduct.” Albrecht, 617 F.3d at 893
(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–679).
A. Fourth Amendment Claims
Plaintiff first claims that Defendants violated her Fourth
Amendment rights because their alleged misconduct in “charg[ing]”
her with “the crime of ‘embezzlement’” “constituted and/or
8
effectuated an unreasonable prosecutorial seizure.” ECF No. 5
PageID.35, 37. “As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’
false and fraudulent criminal charge(s),” Plaintiff contends she was
“legally seized and caused and/or forced to stand trial.” Id.
PageID.35. Plaintiff’s claim for malicious prosecution in violation of
the Fourth Amendment, asserted through § 1983, must be
dismissed for failure to state claim.
Malicious prosecution of an individual violates the Fourth
Amendment,
which
“encompasses
wrongful
investigation,
prosecution, conviction, and incarceration.” Sykes v. Anderson, 625
F.3d 294, 308 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Barnes v. Wright, 449 F.3d
709, 715–16 (6th Cir. 2006)). But to succeed on a malicious
prosecution claim under § 1983 when that claim is premised on a
Fourth Amendment violation, Plaintiff first must plausibly allege
that the Defendants “ma[d]e, influence[d], or participate[d] in the
decision to prosecute” her. Sykes, 625 F.3d at 308 (quoting Fox v.
DeSoto, 489 F.3d 227, 327 (6th Cir. 2007) (additional citations
omitted)). Second, because a § 1983 claim is premised on violation
of a constitutional right, Plaintiff must allege facts showing that
9
Defendants lacked probable cause for the criminal prosecution.
Sykes, 625 F.3d at 308 (citing Fox v. DeSoto, 489 F.3d 227, 237 (6th
Cir. 2007)) (additional citation omitted). And third, Plaintiff must
plausibly claim that “as a consequence of a legal proceeding,” she
suffered a “deprivation of liberty” separate from the initial seizure.
Sykes, 625 F.3d at 308–09. Finally, the alleged facts must
demonstrate that the criminal proceeding was resolved in favor of
the plaintiff. Id. at 309 (citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 484
(1994)). Plaintiff has pled his fourth element but has failed to
adequately plead the other required elements of a claim for
malicious prosecution under § 1983 and the Fourth Amendment.
Critically, to adequately plead that the Defendants “ma[d]e,
influence[d], or participate[d] in the decision to prosecute” her,
Sykes, 625 F.3d at 308, Plaintiff must allege that Defendants
participated in the decision to prosecute “in a way that aid[ed] in
the decision, as opposed to passively or neutrally participating.”
Miller v. Maddox, 866 F.3d 386, 390 (6th Cir. 2017) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted). In Miller for example,
a police officer was found to have participated or influenced the
10
decision
to
prosecute
the
plaintiffs
when
he
“made
misrepresentations and omissions in his application for an arrest
warrant and investigative report, which were relied on by the
prosecutors in proceeding against the plaintiffs.” Id. (citing Sykes,
625 F.3d at 314–17). In contrast, the Sixth Circuit held that where
a police officer filled out a police report and forwarded it to the
prosecutor’s office, he could not be held liable for malicious
prosecution under the Fourth Amendment for simply providing
such information. See Skousen v. Brighton High Sch., 305 F.3d 520,
529 (6th Cir. 2002).
Here, fatally to Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim for violation of her
Fourth Amendment rights, she fails to allege facts that would
permit a jury to infer Defendants made, influenced, or participated
in the prosecution decision. She does not specifically allege that any
of the Defendants interacted in any way with the Lapeer County
Sheriff or the Prosecuting Attorney’s Office, or even that they
communicated with either of these offices regarding Plaintiff’s
alleged criminal conduct. Moreover, under Skousen, simply
reporting potentially suspicious activity in Plaintiff’s account to the
11
Sheriff’s Office does not suffice to meet the first prong of a claim for
malicious prosecution. 305 F.3d at 529. This deficiency by itself
dooms Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution under the
Fourth Amendment. But Plaintiff has also failed to plead that there
was a lack of probable cause for her criminal prosecution3, or that
she suffered a deprivation of liberty as a consequence of that
prosecution other than her initial arrest. The Court concludes
Plaintiff would not be entitled to relief “under any set of facts that
could be provided consistent with the allegations” of her Fourth
Amendment claim. Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ. of Tipp City
Exempted Village Sch. Dist., 428 F.3d 223, 228 (6th Cir. 2005)
(citation omitted). For these reasons, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim
alleging violation of the Fourth Amendment must be dismissed for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
3
While the Amended Complaint claims in conclusory terms that the criminal charges were
“false and baseless,” ECF No. 5 Page ID.35, 38, the facts pled in the Amended Complaint
support, rather than deny, the account that Plaintiff received an overpayment of $314.
Whether such an insignificant sum should be considered sufficient to justify bringing an
embezzlement charge or not, the facts as alleged are more consistent with the existence of
probable cause than contrary to it.
12
B. Malicious Prosecution Under Michigan Law
Plaintiff’s state-law claim for malicious prosecution falls short
of the pleading standard for similar reasons. Under Michigan law,
the tort of malicious prosecution includes largely the same elements
as under federal law. Zavatson v. City of Warren, Mich., 714 F.
App’x 512, 524 (6th Cir. 2017). But there is an additional
requirement under state law “that the action was undertaken with
malice or a purpose in instituting the criminal claim other than
bringing the offender to justice.” Id. (quoting Matthews v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 572 N.W.2d 603, 610 (Mich. 1998)).
Additionally, “the prosecutor’s exercise of his or her independent
discretion in initiating and maintaining a prosecution is a complete
defense to an action for malicious prosecution” against private
defendants under Michigan law. Zavatson, 714 F. App’x at 525
(quoting Matthews, 572 N.W.2d at 613); see Matthews, 572 N.W.2d
at 613 (“As the chief law enforcement officer of the county, a
prosecutor
has
independent
authority
to
initiate
criminal
prosecutions.”) (citing Mich. Comp. Laws § 764.1) (additional
citation omitted). This complete defense can be overcome only if the
13
person who furnished information to the prosecutor knowingly
provided false information, and the prosecutor acted on that false
information. Zavatson, 714 F. App’x at 525. Here, Plaintiff does not
allege that any false information was presented to the prosecutor
by the Defendants, or that it was relied upon in bringing charges.
Plaintiff has not adequately pled a claim for malicious
prosecution under Michigan law because she has not specifically
alleged whether or how Defendants were involved in influencing
the decision to prosecute her. Further, under Michigan law the
prosecutor’s independent discretion in prosecuting a case is a
complete defense to a claim for malicious prosecution. Plaintiff has
not alleged facts that would permit her to overcome this defense
because she does not present facts indicating that any of the
Defendants knowingly provided false information to the Lapeer
County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office, or that the actions of that
office were informed by such false information. For these reasons,
and others, Plaintiff’s claim for malicious prosecution under
Michigan law will be dismissed.
14
C. First Amendment
Plaintiff’s third claim is that Defendants interfered with her
First Amendment rights by retaliating against her for engaging in
protected speech “when she raised and/or disclosed matters of
‘public concern,’ including, but not limited to, misuse and/or theft of
taxpayers’ monies.” ECF No. 5 PageID.39. A plaintiff alleging
violation of her First Amendment rights under § 1983 must plead
factual allegations sufficient to establish that: “(1) the plaintiff
engaged in constitutionally protected conduct; (2) an adverse action
was taken against the plaintiff that would deter a person of
ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that conduct; and
(3) the adverse action was motivated at least in part by the
plaintiff’s protected conduct.” Handy-Clay v. City of Memphis,
Tenn., 695 F.3d 531, 539 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Fritz v. Charter
Tp. of Comstock, 592 F.3d 718, 723 (6th Cir. 2010)). Plaintiff’s First
Amendment claim cannot survive Defendants’ motion to dismiss
because she has not supported it with the necessary factual
allegations.
15
Under certain circumstances, the First Amendment protects
a public employee’s right to speak as a citizen on matters of public
concern. When a public employee speaks as an employee on matters
of personal interest, however, “a federal court is not the appropriate
forum in which to review the wisdom of a personnel decision taken
by a public agency allegedly in reaction to the employee’s behavior.”
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983). The Supreme Court, in
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006), established a three-part
test to determine whether a public employee’s speech is
constitutionally-protected. Plaintiff must show: “(1) that her speech
was made as a private citizen, rather than pursuant to her official
duties; (2) that her speech involved a matter of public concern; and
(3) that her interest as a citizen in speaking on the matter
outweighed the state’s interest, as an employer, in ‘promoting the
efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.’”
Handy-Clay, 695 F.3d at 540 (quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 417–18).
Plaintiff has not made any specific factual allegations that
would permit the Court to evaluate her claim under the complex
framework of First Amendment jurisprudence. The Amended
16
Complaint provides only legal conclusions, urging, without
elaboration, that Plaintiff “was engaged in protected activity,” that
her speech about alleged misuse of taxpayer money was a matter of
“public concern,” and that Defendants retaliated against her in
such a way that would “chill an ordinarily firm victim . . . from
raising the aforesaid matters of public concern.” ECF No. 5
PageID.56–57. Reviewing the required elements, first, Plaintiff
does not identify speech she made as a private citizen rather than
pursuant to her official duties. Instead, the Amended Complaint
describes her speech regarding the alleged misallocation of funds
by Defendant Easton as taking place in the course of Plaintiff’s
official duties. The second element, that the speech pertains to a
matter of public concern, would appear to be met—although the
allegations are so spare it is not entirely clear whether this is so.
Finally, Plaintiff alleges no facts addressing whether her interest
as a citizen in speaking on the matter outweighed the state’s
interest, as an employer, in “promoting the efficiency of the public
services it performs through its employees.’” Garcetti, 547 U.S. at
417–18. While Plaintiff need not provide overly detailed factual
17
allegations at this phase, providing mere “labels and conclusions,
and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” will
not suffice to survive a motion to dismiss. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim for violation of her First Amendment rights
must be dismissed because she has not provided the Court with any
specific facts that would permit the Court to draw the reasonable
inference that Defendants are liable for violating her First
Amendment rights.
D. Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act Violations
Finally, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ actions violated
Michigan’s Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act (“ELCRA”), Mich. Comp.
Laws § 37.2202. Section 2 of the ELCRA provides that “[a]n
employer shall not . . . [f]ail or refuse to hire or recruit, discharge,
or otherwise discriminate against an individual with respect to
employment, compensation, or a term, condition, or privilege of
employment, because of religion, race, color, national origin, age,
sex, height, weight, or marital status.” Mich. Comp. Laws
§ 37.2202(1)(a). While Defendants do not specifically address
18
Plaintiff’s ELCRA claims in their motion to dismiss, which appears
to be an oversight, the Court will sua sponte dismiss those claims.
Cases brought under the ELCRA are analyzed under the
same burden-shifting framework used in Title VII cases. Ondricko
v. MGM Grand Detroit, LLC, 689 F.3d 642, 652 (6th Cir. 2012).
Under this framework, a plaintiff first must establish a prima facie
case of sex discrimination by showing that she was: (1) a member
of a protected group; (2) qualified for the job in question; (3) subject
to an adverse employment action; and (4) treated differently than
similarly-situated male employees for the same or similar conduct.
Humenny v. Genex Corp., 390 F.3d 901, 906 (6th Cir. 2004) (citation
omitted). To establish this last element of her prima facie case,
Plaintiff must show that “all relevant aspects” of her employment
situation are “nearly identical” to those of similarly-situated male
employees. Id. To be considered similarly-situated, the male
employee(s) “must have to deal with the same supervisor, have been
subject to the same standards, and engaged in the same conduct
without such differentiating or mitigating circumstances that
would distinguish their conduct or the employer’s treatment of
19
them for it.” Id. (quoting Gray v. Toshiba Am. Consumer Prod., Inc.,
263 F.3d 595, 599 (6th Cir. 2001) (additional citation omitted)).
Plaintiff has not pled a prima facie case of sex discrimination
under the Michigan ELCRA because she has not alleged facts that
would permit this Court to infer that she was treated differently
than similarly-situated male employees for the same or similar
conduct. Plaintiff provides a conclusory allegation that “Defendant
Employer showed favoritism of male employees over female
employees, especially when it comes to disciplines and promotions.”
ECF No. 5 PageID.42. She further avers that she “spoke up and
opposed the special treatment she was receiving, which was similar
in
nature,
but
dissimilar
in
outcome
to
another
male
employee . . . Gary Easton.” Id. PageID.43. By this, Plaintiff
appears to refer to the fact that she was terminated after an
erroneous payroll deduction of $314 was discovered in her account
but that Defendant Easton was not terminated when it was
allegedly discovered that he had misallocated more than $60,000.
Yet Plaintiff has not pled facts establishing that she and Defendant
Easton were similarly-situated. The complaint alleges that unlike
20
Plaintiff, Defendant Easton was a manager at LCMCF and “a
supervisor exercising supervisory power over [Plaintiff].” ECF No.
5 PageID.31. Additionally, from the Amended Complaint it appears
LCMCF’s Board did not infer any wrongdoing from Defendant
Easton’s receipt of an “approximately $75,000 influx due to
accounting papers he had prepared and/or filed,” and took no
further action. Id. PageID.33–34. Additionally, Defendant Easton’s
“influx” of money is not characterized as an erroneous payroll
deduction, while Plaintiff’s receipt of an additional $314 is. Because
Plaintiff has not pled facts that would could make out a prima facie
case of gender discrimination under the ELCRA, that claim must
be dismissed.
E. Qualified Immunity
The Court does not decide whether the individual Defendants
are entitled to qualified immunity. While “qualified immunity is a
threshold question to be resolved at the earliest possible
point . . . that point is usually summary judgment and not
dismissal under Rule 12.” Wesley v. Campbell, 779 F.3d 421, 433–
34 (6th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
21
Vakilian v. Shaw, 335 F.3d 509, 516 (6th Cir. 2003)). The Sixth
Circuit has further cautioned that “it is generally inappropriate for
a district court to grant a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on the basis of
qualified immunity.” Courtright v. City of Battle Creek, 839 F.3d
513, 518 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Wesley, 779 F.3d at 433).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’
Second Corrected Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim
under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (ECF
No. 9). The facts contained in the Amended Complaint are
insufficient to state a claim and demonstrate that any further
amendment would be futile. Plaintiff’s Complaint is therefore
DISMISSED with prejudice.
SO ORDERED.
s/Terrence G. Berg
TERRENCE G. BERG
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: March 25, 2019
22
Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that this Order was electronically submitted
on March 25, 2019, using the CM/ECF system, which will send
notification to each party.
s/Amanda Chubb
Case Manager
23
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?