Amison v. Stiles et al

Filing 5

OPINION AND ORDER of Summary Dismissal. Signed by District Judge Terrence G. Berg. (AChu)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
WILLIAM AMISON,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 2:18-cv-11876
Hon. Terrence G. Berg

v.
BRETT STILES, et. al.,

Defendants.
__________________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER OF SUMMARY DISMISSAL
I. Introduction
The Plaintiff, William Amison, presently confined at the Jackson
County Jail in Jackson, Michigan, has filed a pro se civil rights
complaint. Dkt. 1. For the reasons stated below, the Court will dismiss
the complaint without prejudice.
II. Standard of Review
On June 21, 2018, this Court granted Plaintiff’s Application to
Proceed without Prepaying Fees or Costs pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(a). Dkt 4. Section 1915(e)(2)(B) provides that the court shall
dismiss a case brought by a litigant proceeding in forma pauperis at any
time if the court determines that the action or appeal is, inter alia,
frivolous or malicious. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).

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A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact.
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); see also Denton v.
Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992). Sua sponte dismissal is appropriate
if the complaint lacks an arguable basis when filed. McGore v.
Wrigglesworth, 114 F. 3d 601, 612 (6th Cir. 1997); Goodell v. Anthony,
157 F. Supp. 2d 796, 799 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
III. Analysis
Plaintiff’s complaint indicates that he is a pretrial detainee who has
been charged with criminal offenses related to a heroin overdose death
and first-degree criminal sexual conduct. Dkt. 1. Petitioner’s criminal
case is currently pending in the Jackson Circuit Court.1 Plaintiff claims
that he has been the victim of police and prosecutorial misconduct. See
Dkt. 1. Plaintiff also contends that the police violated his Fourth
Amendment rights in the search and seizure of his vehicle, and that three
civilian witnesses gave false statements and testimony. See id. He asserts
that he has already been tried once, but the jury was unable to reach a
verdict. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages and “to be released from jail,
due to the state not having a case against me.” Dkt. 1, at 8.

1 The

Jackson Circuit Court website, https://www.co.jackson.mi.us/597/CourtRecords, of which this Court is able to take judicial notice, See e.g. Graham v.
Smith, 292 F. Supp. 2d 153, 155, n. 2 (D. Me. 2003), confirms that plaintiff’s still
has an open case in that court. See People v. Amison, No. 16005232-FC-38.
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IV. Discussion
Plaintiff’s complaint is subject to summary dismissal under
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 45 (1971). In Younger, the United States
Supreme Court held that federal courts should not enjoin pending state
criminal proceedings except in a “very unusual circumstance” where an
injunction is necessary to prevent “both great and immediate”
irreparable injury. See id. The cost, anxiety, and inconvenience of a
defendant having to defend against a single criminal prosecution cannot
be considered in itself to constitute irreparable injury. Instead, the
threat to a state criminal defendant’s federally protected rights must be
one that “cannot be eliminated by his defense against a single criminal
prosecution.” Id. at 46. The holding in Younger was based on principles
of equity and upon the “more vital consideration” of the principles of
comity and federalism. Id. at 44. Thus, in cases in which a criminal
defendant is seeking to enjoin ongoing state court proceedings—
whether they be criminal, civil, or administrative—federal courts
should not exercise jurisdiction, but should instead dismiss the case in
its entirety. Kish v. Michigan State Bd. of Law Examiners, 999 F. Supp.
958, 965 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (internal citations omitted).

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A three-factor test applies in determining whether the Younger
abstention doctrine should apply:
1. are there pending or ongoing state judicial proceedings;
2. do these proceedings implicate important state
interests; and
3. is there an adequate opportunity in the state
proceedings to raise constitutional challenges?
See Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457
U.S. 423, 432 (1982); GTE Mobilnet of Ohio v. Johnson, 111 F. 3d 469,
481 (6th Cir. 1997).
Applying the above test, the Court finds that it is appropriate to
abstain from issuing injunctive relief in Plaintiff’s underlying criminal
state court proceeding. Moreover, if Plaintiff were to be convicted, he
would still be required to exhaust his available state court appellate
remedies prior to seeking federal relief. For purposes of Younger, a
state’s trial and appeals process is “treated as a unitary system” and a
party may not obtain federal intervention “by terminating the state
judicial process prematurely” by foregoing state appeals to attack the
trial court’s judgment in federal court. New Orleans Public Service, Inc.
v. Council of the City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 369 (1989). A
necessary prerequisite of the Younger doctrine is that a party [prior to
contesting the judgment of a state judicial tribunal in federal court]
must exhaust his or her state appellate remedies before seeking relief in
the district court. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 608 (1975).
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Considering the first factor, there is an ongoing state judicial
proceeding against Plaintiff. See supra, at n.1. As to the second factor,
as is true of any state criminal case—“there is no question that the
ongoing prosecution implicates important state interests.” Davis v.
Lansing, 851 F. 2d 72, 76 (2nd Cir. 1988); See also Hansel v. Town
Court for Town of Springield, N.Y., 56 F. 3d 391, 393 (2nd Cir. 1995) (“it
is axiomatic that a state’s interest in the administration of criminal
justice within its borders is an important one”). Finally, with respect to
the third factor, during the course of the state prosecution Plaintiff will
have an opportunity to challenge the constitutionality of any pending
criminal charges or any convictions in the state courts. With good
reason, federal courts presume that the state courts provide due process
that adequately protects the interests of a federal plaintiff. See Kelm v.
Hyatt, 44 F. 3d 415, 420 (6th Cir. 1995). Applying this test, the Court
will abstain from granting Plaintiff any injunctive relief related to his
ongoing state criminal case.
The Court recognizes that Plaintiff also requests monetary
damages arising from his arrest and prosecution. The Younger
abstention doctrine also applies to cases where a plaintiff requests
monetary damages. See Carroll v. City of Mount Clemens, 139 F.3d
1072, 1075 (6th Cir.1998) (holding, “[plaintiff’s] present federal action
for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fair Housing Act is a
textbook case for Younger abstention”); Schilling v. White, 58 F.3d 1081,
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1084 (6th Cir. 1995) (“our Circuit has recognized that the relevant
inquiry when considering abstaining under Younger is the nature and
degree of the state’s interest in its judicial proceedings, rather than
whether a party is seeking injunctive relief or monetary damages.”).
V. Conclusion
It is hereby ORDERED that the Plaintiff’s Complaint, Dkt. 1, is
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
SO ORDERED

Dated: June 29, 2018

s/Terrence G. Berg
TERRENCE G. BERG
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that this Order was electronically filed, and the
parties and/or counsel of record were served on June 29, 2018.
s/A. Chubb
Case Manager

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