G.D. & R.D. obo G.D. v. Utica Community Schools
Filing
26
ORDER Denying 12 , 22 Motions to Dismiss; Granting 14 Motion to Set Aside - Signed by District Judge Nancy G. Edmunds. (LBar)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
G.D. & R.D. obo G.D.,
Plaintiffs,
Case No. 20-12864
v.
Honorable Nancy G. Edmunds
UTICA COMMUNITY SCHOOLS,
Defendant.
___________________________________/
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE CLERK’S ENTRY OF
DEFAULT [14] AND DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTIONS TO DISMISS [12][22]
The matter is before the Court on Defendant’s motion to set aside the Clerk’s
entry of default in this matter (ECF No. 14) and Defendant’s motions to dismiss (ECF
Nos. 12, 22). Plaintiffs do not oppose the Court setting aside the Clerk’s entry of
default (ECF No. 19) but oppose dismissal of this case (ECF No. 18). The Court finds
that the decision process would not be significantly aided by oral argument.
Therefore, pursuant to Eastern District of Michigan Local Rule 7.1(f)(2), Defendant’s
motions will be decided on the briefs and without oral argument. For the reasons set
forth below, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to set aside the Clerk’s entry of
default and DENIES Defendant’s motions to dismiss.
I.
Background
On October 13, 2020, Plaintiffs, the parents of G.D., initiated a miscellaneous
action against Defendant, Utica Community Schools, and filed “Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Attorney’s Fees and Costs.” (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiffs assert they are prevailing party in
1
an administrative action under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”)
and seek an order of $134,420.00 in attorney’s fees and costs.1 (Id.) On October 22,
2020, the Court entered an order transferring the motion from the miscellaneous
docket to the civil docket and ordering Plaintiffs to pay the full civil filling fee within ten
days of that order. (ECF No. 2.) In a subsequent order, the Court clarified that this
case will proceed as an ordinary civil action and that Plaintiffs must both pay the full
filing fee and effectuate service on Defendant. (ECF No. 5.) The Court further noted
that the ordinary time limits set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the
Local Rules for the Eastern District of Michigan will apply.
Plaintiffs later paid the full filing fee. And on January 12, 2021, Plaintiffs
requested the issuance of summons. On February 16, 2021, Plaintiffs filed proof of
service indicating that Defendant had been served on January 21, 2021. (ECF No. 7.)
And the next day, on February 17, 2021, upon Plaintiffs’ request, a Clerk’s entry of
default was entered against Defendant. (ECF No. 11.) That same day, Defendant
moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ motion for attorney’s fees and costs. (ECF No. 12.)
Defendant argues that because Plaintiffs filed a motion, rather than a complaint, both
subject matter and personal jurisdiction is lacking, service of process was insufficient,
and this case should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
1
Defendant later filed its own action stemming from the same underlying
administrative action. (See Case No. 20-13255, ECF No. 1.) Defendant appeals the
administrative law judge’s decision and also seeks its own award of attorney’s fees
and costs. That case was originally assigned to the Honorable Paul D. Borman but
reassigned to the Honorable Nancy G. Edmunds as a companion case to the present
matter. (Id., ECF No. 3.)
2
granted. Defendant also notes it was served after the 90-day time period during which
service should be accomplished. Defendant also moves to set aside the Clerk’s entry
of default. (ECF No. 14.)
In response to Defendant’s motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs filed an “amended
complaint” on March 10, 2021. (ECF No. 17.) Plaintiffs assert that this amended
complaint renders Defendant’s motion to dismiss moot. (ECF No. 18.) Plaintiffs
further argue that the motion they had initially filed is the “functional equivalent” of a
complaint and Defendant’s motion should therefore be denied. (Id.) Plaintiffs do not
oppose Defendant’s motion to set aside the Clerk’s entry of default. (ECF No. 19.)
Defendant filed replies in support of both of its motions. (ECF Nos. 20, 21.)
Defendant also moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ amended complaint, arguing that Plaintiffs
cannot amend a complaint they never filed. (ECF No. 22.) Defendant further argues
that the statute of limitations had expired by the time Plaintiffs filed their amended
complaint.2 (Id.) Plaintiffs oppose Defendant’s motion to dismiss the amended
complaint. (ECF No. 25.)
II.
Defendant’s Motion to Set Aside Clerk’s Entry of Default
Defendant acknowledges that it did not file a timely answer but asks the Court
to set aside the Clerk’s entry of default in this case. Plaintiffs do not oppose this
request.
2
Defendant also moved for an extension of time to file an answer to the
amended complaint. (ECF No. 24.) The Court granted that motion in a text-only
order, allowing Defendant to file its answer to the amended complaint within fourteen
days of the Court’s ruling on Defendant’s motion to dismiss.
3
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(c) provides that “[t]he court may set aside
an entry of default for good cause.” In making the determination of good cause under
Rule 55(c), a court must consider three factors: “1. Whether the plaintiff will be
prejudiced; 2. Whether the defendant has a meritorious defense; and 3. Whether
culpable conduct of the defendant led to the default.” United Coin Meter Co. v.
Seaboard Coastline R.R., 705 F.2d 839, 845 (6th Cir. 1983) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted). Federal courts strongly favor trials on the merits. See
Berthelsen v. Kane, 907 F.2d 617, 620 (6th Cir. 1990).
Here, all of the relevant factors weigh in favor of setting aside the Clerk’s entry
of default. First, there is no evidence of any prejudice to Plaintiff due to the short
delay. Nor does the default appear to be a result of culpable conduct on the part of
Defendant. See Shepard Claims Serv., Inc. v. William Darrah & Assocs., 796 F.2d
190, 194 (6th Cir. 1986) (noting that “[t]o be treated as culpable, the conduct of a
defendant must display either an intent to thwart judicial proceedings or a reckless
disregard for the effect of its conduct on those proceedings”). And Defendant has
articulated several defenses which, if proven, would constitute a complete defense.
See INVST Fin. Group, Inc. v. Chem-Nuclear Sys., Inc., 815 F.2d 391, 398-99 (6th
Cir. 1987). In sum, the Court finds good cause to set aside the Clerk’s entry of default
entered against Defendant.
III.
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
Defendant avers that this case should be dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, lack of personal jurisdiction, insufficient service of process, and failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. All of Defendant’s arguments stem in
4
large part from the same premise—that Plaintiffs improperly filed a “motion,” rather
than a complaint. Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ motion cannot be construed as a
complaint because it does not contain a Rule 7(a) designation, is identified as a
“motion,” and the claims are not listed in numbered paragraphs or limited to a single
set of circumstances as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(b). Plaintiffs
now concede that they incorrectly filed a miscellaneous action, rather than a civil
complaint. However, Plaintiffs argue that their motion was the “functional equivalent”
of a complaint.
Defendant cites to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3 for the unremarkable
proposition that a civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the Court.
Defendant then relies on caselaw to argue that “[b]efore a complaint is filed, no action
has commenced, and the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to grant relief.” See
ECF No. 12, PgID 84 (quoting Clarke v. Brewer, No. 18-11880, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
134256, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 9, 2018) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted)). However, in the cases Defendant cites to, the court noted it did not have
jurisdiction to grant the plaintiff’s motion because there was no underlying claim for
relief. See Clarke, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134256, at *2-3 (no jurisdiction to grant
motion for the appointment of counsel where there was no colorable claim under 42
U.S.C. § 1983); Moss v. Bomber, No. 1:16-CV-870, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4, at *6-7
(W.D. Mich. Jan. 10, 2018) (no jurisdiction to grant motion for declaratory relief
because the Declaratory Judgment Act “is not an independent source of federal
jurisdiction” and the plaintiff abandoned his only potentially viable claims under §
1983); Gardner v. McQueen, No. 2:16-cv-13790, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5085, at *2-5
5
(E.D. Mich. Jan. 13, 2017) (no jurisdiction to grant motion for preliminary injunctive
relief where plaintiff sought to bring a civil rights action under the habeas corpus
statute). By contrast, here, Plaintiffs bring a motion for attorney’s fees under the
IDEA, which “authorize[s] court suits for the recovery of legal fees incurred by parents
who prevailed at the administrative level.” See King v. Floyd Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 228
F.3d 622, 625 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Eggers v. Bullitt Cnty. Sch. Dist., 854 F.2d 892,
898 (6th Cir. 1998)). Because Plaintiffs have set forth a claim for relief over which the
Court has jurisdiction, the irregularities surrounding the initiation of this action are not
jurisdictional.
Although Plaintiffs’ original filing was entitled as a “motion,” it contained the
essential elements of a pleading as set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a).
Thus, the Court finds Plaintiffs’ argument that their motion was the “functional
equivalent” of a complaint persuasive. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e) (“Pleadings must be
construed so as to do justice.”); cf. Beem v. Ferguson, 713 F. App’x 974, 980 (11th
Cir. 2018) (treating motion as “functional equivalent” of complaint because it satisfied
Rule 8 pleading requirements). Moreover, the Court may “excuse technical pleading
irregularities as long as they neither undermine the purpose of notice pleading nor
prejudice the adverse party.” See Phillips v. Girdich, 408 F.3d 124, 128 (2d Cir.
2005). Here, the relief sought by Plaintiffs in their motion along with the supporting
allegations were clear, and the technical defects did not prejudice Defendant. Thus, it
was well within the Court’s discretion to excuse those defects and transfer the motion
to the civil docket. See Gardner, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5085, at *4 (noting that
“federal district courts possess authority to dismiss an action when a plaintiff fails to
6
comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure” but are “given substantial discretion”
in doing so) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In sum, the Court denies
Defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6).
Defendant next argues that this case should be dismissed for lack of personal
jurisdiction and insufficient service of process due to defective service. Defendant
argues that service was defective for two reasons: 1) Plaintiffs included a copy of their
“motion,” rather than a complaint, with the summons, and 2) Defendant was not
served within 90 days of the filing of the motion.
The Court finds Defendant’s first argument unavailing based on its conclusion,
discussed above, that Plaintiffs’ motion, under the facts and circumstances of this
case, was the functional equivalent of a complaint. Furthermore, at the time of
service, the Court had already transferred the motion to the civil docket and indicated
that this case would proceed as an ordinary civil action. Plaintiffs, however, did not
request a summons until the end of the 90-day period during which service should
have been accomplished and did not serve Defendant until nine days later. Under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m),
[i]f a defendant is not served within 90 days after the complaint is filed, the
court—on motion or on its own after notice to the plaintiff—must dismiss the
action without prejudice against that defendant or order that service be
made within a specified time. But if the plaintiff shows good cause for the
failure, the court must extend the time for service for an appropriate period.
Here, Plaintiffs argue that there was good cause for the failure to timely effect
service because of their attempts at obtaining a waiver of service from Defendant. As
7
a general matter, however, “inadvertence and miscommunication . . . are not enough
to establish good cause.” See Slenzka v. Landstar Ranger, Inc., 204 F.R.D. 322, 324
(E.D. Mich. 2001). But “‘courts have been accorded discretion to enlarge the [90-day]
period even if there is no good cause shown.’” Id. at 325 (quoting Henderson v.
United States, 517 U.S. 654, 662 (1996)). In determining whether to exercise this
discretion, the Court considers whether: (1) a significant extension of time was
required; (2) an extension would prejudice the defendant in some way other than the
inherent prejudice in having to defend the suit; (3) the defendant had actual notice of
the suit; (4) a dismissal without prejudice would substantially prejudice the plaintiff,
i.e., refiling of the lawsuit would be time-barred; and (5) the plaintiff had made any
good faith efforts at effecting proper service of process. Id. at 326.
Here, the first four factors weigh in favor of Plaintiffs. The extension needed is
a mere nine days and Plaintiffs have already served Defendant. And the Court does
not find any prejudice beyond the inherent prejudice in having to defend the suit. And,
in fact, Defendant has placed the merits of the same issues raised by this lawsuit
before the Court by filing a separate lawsuit appealing the same underlying
administrative action. (See Case No. 20-13255.) Moreover, as evidenced by its
motion for clarification and the correspondence between the parties regarding the
possibility of a waiver of service, Defendant had actual notice of the suit. And a
dismissal without prejudice may substantially prejudice Plaintiffs because according to
Defendant, an attempt to refile this lawsuit would be time-barred. (See ECF No. 22,
PgID 206.) Only the fifth factor weighs in favor of Defendant. On balance, the Court
finds that the relevant factors weigh in favor of an exercise of discretion to grant a brief
8
extension of the time for service. Accordingly, the Court denies Defendant’s motion to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2)
and for insufficient service of process under Rule 12(b)(5).
IV.
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint
Defendant moves to dismiss the amended complaint in large part based on the
same argument regarding the irregularities surrounding the initiation of this action the
Court has considered and rejected above. Because the Court has determined that
Plaintiffs’ motion was the functional equivalent of a complaint, the amended complaint
was filed in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. And to the extent
Defendant raises the issue of timeliness, this case was commenced on the date the
motion was filed—October 13, 2020. Thus, it was filed before the relevant statute of
limitations expired.3 Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to dismiss the amended
complaint is denied.
V.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion to set aside the Clerk’s entry of
default [14] is GRANTED and Defendant’s motions to dismiss [12][22] are DENIED.
This case will proceed to an adjudication on the merits.
SO ORDERED.
s/Nancy G. Edmunds
Nancy G. Edmunds
United States District Judge
Dated: April 9, 2021
3
The underlying administrative decision was issued on September 11, 2020.
And the parties agree that the appropriate limitations period is 90 days.
9
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon counsel of
record on April 9, 2021, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
s/Lisa Bartlett
Case Manager
10
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?