Rycraw v. Shaver

Filing 10

OPINION and ORDER Denying 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Declining to Issue a Certificate of Appealability, Granting Leave to Appeal in Forma Pauperis. Signed by District Judge Gershwin A. Drain. (TMcg)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
STEVEN J. RYCRAW,
Petitioner,

Case No. 21-cv-10294

v.

U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
GERSHWIN A. DRAIN

DAVE SHAVER,
Respondent.                           
______________________________/    

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS, DECLINING TO ISSUE A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY,
AND GRANTING LEAVE TO APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS [#1]
I. INTRODUCTION
Petitioner Steven J. Rycraw, a state inmate in the custody of the Michigan
Department of Corrections, filed a pro se habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. §
2254. ECF No. 1. The petition challenges Mr. Rycraw’s plea-based conviction for
first-degree criminal sexual conduct on grounds that: (1) the trial court abused its
discretion when it denied his motion to withdraw his no-contest plea, and (2) his
trial attorney failed to advise him what his sentence would be. Id. at PageID.5–7.
Respondent Dave Shaver argues that the Court should deny the petition
because Mr. Rycraw’s claims are not cognizable under habeas review, that they
lack merit, and the state appellate court’s rejection of the claims was not
unreasonable. ECF No. 7, PageID.125. Mr. Rycraw replies that he had a viable
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argument for withdrawing his plea and that his attorney was ineffective for failing
to advise him that the sentencing cap of seven years was a cap on the minimum
sentence, not the maximum sentence. ECF No. 9, PageID.385–386. Mr. Rycraw
also requests an evidentiary hearing to ascertain whether trial counsel was, in fact,
as ineffective as Mr. Rycraw claims he was. Id. at PageID.387.
Having reviewed the pleadings and record, the Court agrees with
Respondent that Mr. Rycraw’s claims do not entitle him to the writ of habeas
corpus. Accordingly, the Court will DENY the petition.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Following a preliminary examination in Calhoun County, Michigan, Mr.
Rycraw was charged on two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. See
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.520b(1)(f). The charges arose from an incident in 2016,
when Petitioner allegedly struck his former girlfriend on the nose with a cell
phone, punched her ears with his fists, and then demanded that the girlfriend
engage in oral and vaginal sex with him. The woman’s eardrum was ruptured
during the incident, and she testified at the preliminary examination that she
complied with Mr. Rycraw’s demands for sex to stop him from beating her. ECF
No. 8-2, PageID.171–181.

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On June 17, 2019, Mr. Rycraw pleaded no-contest in Calhoun County
Circuit Court to one count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. In return, the
prosecutor dismissed the other count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct and
agreed to a sentence cap of seven years in prison. ECF No. 8-4, PageID.235–236;
ECF No. 8-1, PageID.159; ECF No. 8-7, PageID.315.
Mr. Rycraw subsequently acquired new counsel and moved to withdraw his
no-contest plea on the basis that he thought the seven-year cap referred to the
maximum sentence, not the minimum sentence. He maintained his innocence and
asked the trial court to allow him to withdraw his plea and go to trial. ECF 8-6,
PageID.251–253.

The trial court denied the motion and then sentenced Mr.

Rycraw to prison for seven to twenty-five years with credit for ninety-five days
already served. Id. at PageID.273.
Mr. Rycraw filed a delayed application for leave to appeal in the Michigan
Court of Appeals. He claimed that the trial court abused its discretion when it
denied his request to withdraw his plea and that his plea was not voluntary because
he did not understand the plea agreement and because trial counsel was ineffective.
See ECF No. 8-7, PageID.279–280. The Michigan Court of Appeals denied leave

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to appeal “for lack of merit in the grounds presented.” See People v. Rycraw, No.
352646, 2020 Mich. App. LEXIS 1944, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 12, 2020).1
Petitioner next applied for leave to appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court.
He raised the same two claims that he presented to the Michigan Court of Appeals.
ECF No. 8-8, PageID.357–364. He also raised three new claims, which alleged
that the prosecutor withheld information about another man’s DNA, he was not
arraigned in circuit court on a second charge of first-degree criminal sexual
conduct, and he did not sign a plea agreement. Id. at PageID.365–367. On
November 4, 2020, the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal because
the court was not persuaded to review the questions presented to it. See People v.
Rycraw, 506 Mich. 950 (2020). Finally, on January 28, 2021, Mr. Rycraw filed his
habeas corpus petition. ECF No. 1.

III. LEGAL STANDARD
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”)
requires inmates who challenge “a matter ‘adjudicated on the merits in State court’
to show that the relevant state-court ‘decision’ (1) ‘was contrary to, or involved an

1

Judge Douglas B. Shapiro voted to remand the case to the trial court for an
evidentiary hearing to determine whether Mr. Rycraw was properly advised that
the seven-year cap on his sentence meant a cap on the minimum sentence and, if he
was not so advised, to give Mr. Rycraw an opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea.
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unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,’ or (2) ‘was based on
an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding.’” Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1191 (2018) (quoting
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)). The Supreme Court has explained that:
a state court decision is “contrary to [the Supreme Court’s] clearly
established precedent if the state court applies a rule that contradicts
the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases” or “if the state
court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from
a decision of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result
different from [Supreme Court] precedent.”
Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73 (2003) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.
362, 405–06 (2000)).
“Under the ‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court
may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing
legal principle from [the Supreme] Court’s decisions but unreasonably
applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id., at 413,
120 S. Ct. 1495. The “unreasonable application” clause requires the
state court decision to be more than incorrect or erroneous. Id., at
410, 412, 120 S. Ct. 1495. The state court’s application of clearly
established law must be objectively unreasonable. Id., at 409, 120 S.
Ct. 1495.
Id. at 75.
“AEDPA thus imposes a ‘highly deferential standard for evaluating statecourt rulings,’ and ‘demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the
doubt[.]’” Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) (internal and end citations
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omitted). “A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal
habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the
state court’s decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (quoting
Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)).

IV. DISCUSSION
A. Mr. Rycraw’s Motion to Withdraw his Plea
Petitioner alleges first that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his
motion to withdraw his no-contest plea.

Mr. Rycraw asserts that he did not

understand the plea agreement, and because his trial attorney pressured him to
enter a plea, the plea was involuntary and unknowing. ECF No. 1, PageID.5–6.
“A federal court may not issue the writ on the basis of a perceived error of
state law.” Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984); see also Pudelski v. Wilson,
576 F.3d 595, 611 (6th Cir. 2009) (“State law issues are not subject to habeas
review[.]”). “In conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to deciding
whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991). Additionally, a defendant has
no absolute right to withdraw a no-contest plea. Shanks v. Wolfenbarger, 387 F.
Supp. 2d 740, 748 (E.D. Mich. 2005).

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1. Clearly Established Federal Law
The constitutional question is whether Petitioner’s plea was a valid waiver of
his rights. A guilty plea or no-contest plea “is constitutionally valid only to the
extent it is ‘voluntary’ and ‘intelligent.’” Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614,
618 (1998) (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970)). “The
standard was and remains whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent
choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.” North
Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970). That is because a guilty plea, and by
extension a no-contest plea, “constitutes a waiver of three constitutional rights: the
right to a jury trial, the right to confront one’s accusers, and the privilege against
self-incrimination.” Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 28–29 (1992) (citing Boykin v.
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969)).
For a plea to be knowing or intelligent and voluntary, the defendant must
receive notice of the nature of the charges against him, Bousley, 523 U.S. at 618,
he must understand the charges and the constitutional protections that he is
waiving, Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 645 n.13 (1976), and he must be
aware of the direct consequences of his plea, including the value of any
commitments made to him, Brady, 397 U.S. at 755 (quoting Shelton v. United
States, 246 F.2d 571, 572 n.2 (5th Cir. 1957) (en banc)).

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In short, a plea that involves a waiver of constitutional rights must be “done
with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.”
Brady, 397 U.S. at 748. And the voluntariness of a plea “can be determined only
by considering all of the relevant circumstances surrounding it.” Id. at 749.

2. Application of the Law
At the plea hearing in Mr. Rycraw’s case, the trial court explained the
charges to him and the maximum penalty of life imprisonment for the crimes. ECF
No. 8-4, PageID.234–235. Mr. Rycraw stated that he understood the charges, and
after defense counsel explained the plea agreement to the trial court, Petitioner
stated that was his understanding of the agreement as well. Id. at PageID.235–236.
Mr. Rycraw then stated that, based on his understanding of the agreement, he
wished to enter a plea. Id. at PageID.236.
Continuing, Mr. Rycraw stated that he had reviewed the advice-of-rights
form with his attorney, that he had read and understood his rights, that he had no
questions about his rights, and that he understood by entering a plea, he was giving
up his rights. Id. He also said that he understood he was giving up any future
claim that it was not his choice to enter a plea. Id. at PageID.237. Mr. Rycraw
then pleaded no contest to one count of first-degree criminal conduct. Id. He said
that no one had promised him anything other than the plea agreement and that no
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one was forcing him to enter a plea. Id. Mr. Rycraw claimed to be entering his
plea because it was his choice to do so, id. at 238, and after defense counsel
explained that Petitioner would be subject to lifetime-reporting and the use of a
GPS tether upon his release from prison, Mr. Rycraw stated that he still wished to
have the court accept his plea. Id. at PageID.239–240.
Neither defense counsel, nor the prosecutor, were aware of any promises,
inducements, or threats that had not been placed on the record. Id. at PageID.240.
The trial court opined that Mr. Rycraw’s plea was accurate and that he had made it
freely, understandingly, and voluntarily. Id.
The record, as summarized above, supports the trial court’s conclusion that
Mr. Rycraw’s plea was voluntary and knowing. He was informed of the charges
against him, the maximum penalty for the charges, and the value of the plea
agreement. Mr. Rycraw also acknowledged signing a waiver of his constitutional
rights, and he claimed to understand everything that the trial court had explained to
him. There is no evidence in the record that Mr. Rycraw was coerced into pleading
no-contest. In fact, he claimed that it was his choice to do so.
Furthermore, at the subsequent hearing on Mr. Rycraw’s motion to withdraw
his plea, the trial court provided several reasons for denying the motion. The court
noted that there was no error in the plea proceeding, that Mr. Rycraw was advised
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of the maximum penalty, and that Mr. Rycraw chose to accept the prosecutor’s
plea offer after claiming to understand the plea agreement. The trial court also
stated that there was a possibility Mr. Rycraw would be paroled at the first
opportunity and that there would be prejudice to the prosecution if Petitioner
withdrew his plea because the complainant might not be available. The court
deduced from Mr. Rycraw’s two prior felonies and thirty-one prior misdemeanors
that he understood how sentencing guidelines work. The court concluded that a
withdrawal of the plea was not in the best interest of justice. ECF No. 8-6,
PageID.259–260.
Mr. Rycraw maintains that he did not understand that the seven-year cap on
his sentence was a reference to his minimum sentence. However, “habeas relief
should not be granted by crediting a petitioner’s subjective version of [his or] her
understanding of the plea bargain.” See Hastings v. Yukins, 194 F. Supp. 2d 659,
670 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (citing Nichols v. Perini, 818 F.2d 554, 558–59 (6th Cir.
1987)), see also Bair v. Phillips, 106 F. Supp. 2d 934, 940–41 (E.D. Mich. 2000)).
Moreover, Mr. Rycraw expressed no confusion about the sentence or the plea
agreement at his plea hearing, and he asked the trial court no questions.
The record does not support Mr. Rycraw’s claim that his plea was
unknowing or involuntary. Therefore, the decision of the Michigan Court of

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Appeals—that Petitioner’s claim lacked merit—was objectively reasonable, and
Mr. Rycraw has no right to relief on his first claim.

B. Trial Counsel
Mr. Rycraw’s other claim is that his trial attorney was ineffective because
the attorney failed to inform him what his sentence would be.

ECF No. 1,

PageID.7. Specifically, Mr. Rycraw alleges that his trial attorney failed to explain
to him that the sentencing cap of seven years was a cap on the minimum sentence
that could be imposed, not the maximum sentence. ECF No. 9, PageID.386.

1. Clearly Established Federal Law
Petitioner was entitled to effective assistance of counsel during the plea
negotiations. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 162 (2012). But to prevail on his
claim about his attorney, he must demonstrate “that counsel’s performance was
deficient” and “that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). This test applies plea-based challenges
based on ineffective assistance of counsel. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58
(1985).
In plea cases, the first part of the Strickland test requires showing that
counsel’s advice was not within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in
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criminal cases. Id. at 56–59 (citing Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973), and
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970)).

The second or “prejudice”

component of the test “focuses on whether counsel’s constitutionally ineffective
performance affected the outcome of the plea process.” Id. at 59. The defendant
must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not
have pleaded guilty or no contest and would have insisted on going to trial. Id.

2. Application of the Law
No one stated at the plea hearing in Mr. Rycraw’s case that the seven-year
sentencing cap applied to Mr. Rycraw’s minimum sentence.

The prosecutor,

however, stated at the subsequent hearing on Mr. Rycraw’s motion to withdraw his
plea that Mr. Rycraw’s trial attorney had spent a lot of time with Petitioner. ECF
No. 8-6, PageID.255. The prosecutor recalled how defense counsel had visited Mr.
Rycraw in jail and then called or sent text messages to the prosecutor after normal
work hours. Id. And on the day of the plea, the prosecutor apparently had to wait
about an hour or an hour and a half while defense counsel talked with Mr. Rycraw
and tried to negotiate a plea agreement with the prosecutor at the bottom of the
sentencing guidelines. Id.
It seems highly unlikely that defense counsel could have spent so much time
with Mr. Rycraw and exerted so much effort to negotiate a plea agreement and yet
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failed to explain the minimum and maximum sentences that his client was facing
with and without a plea agreement. Furthermore, as the trial court pointed out
above, Mr. Rycraw had considerable experience with the criminal legal system and
likely understood how sentencing guidelines worked.
Even if trial counsel’s performance was deficient, Mr. Rycraw failed to
show that the deficient performance prejudiced him. He claims that, but for trial
counsel’s ineffectiveness, he would have gone to trial. But a petitioner cannot
satisfy the Hill v. Lockhart standard for prejudice merely by telling the Court that
he would have gone to trial if he had gotten different advice. Shimel v. Warren,
838 F.3d 685, 698 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Pilla v. United States, 668 F.3d 368, 373
(6th Cir. 2012)). To prevail on his claim, Mr. Rycraw “must convince the court
that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the
circumstances.” Id. (quoting Pilla, 668 F.3d at 373).
Had Mr. Rycraw gone to trial, he would have had to defend himself against
two counts of criminal sexual conduct.

The complainant gave detailed and

persuasive testimony to support the charges at the preliminary examination, and
her testimony was corroborated by DNA evidence that linked Mr. Rycraw to the
crimes. ECF No. 8-6, PageID.253–254. Thus, there is a strong possibility that Mr.
Rycraw would have been convicted of two counts of criminal sexual conduct if he
had gone to trial.
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Mr. Rycraw also risked a greater sentence if he went to trial and was
convicted. His own sentencing attorney stated that Mr. Rycraw was taking a risk
in trying to withdraw his no-contest plea because the sentencing guidelines were
“far above” what the plea agreement called for. Id. at PageID.252–253.
Under similar circumstances, a rational person would not have gone to trial
if the person had been informed that the trial court could impose a minimum
sentence of seven years. Therefore, trial counsel’s performance did not prejudice
Mr. Rycraw, and the state appellate court’s rejection of his claim for lack of merit
was not objectively unreasonable.

Mr. Rycraw has no right to relief on his

ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.
Although Mr. Rycraw requested an evidentiary hearing on his claim about
trial counsel, he is not entitled to a hearing for the same reason that he has not
established prejudice. See Moore v. United States, 676 F. App’x 383, 385–86 (6th
Cir. 2017). Apart from his self-serving, conclusory statement that he would have
gone to trial but for counsel’s ineffectiveness, Mr. Rycraw has not alleged any
facts indicating that he would have gone to trial had he known the seven-year
sentencing cap applied to his minimum sentence. Cf. id. In addition, “review
under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before the state court that
adjudicated the claim on the merits.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181
(2011).
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V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, Mr. Rycraw’s petition for a writ of habeas
corpus [#1] is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court DECLINES to issue a
certificate of appealability because Mr. Rycraw has not made “a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right.”

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).

Additionally, reasonable jurists could not disagree with the Court’s resolution of
Petitioner’s claims, nor conclude that the issues presented to the Court deserve
encouragement to proceed further.

Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327

(2003). If Mr. Rycraw appeals this decision, however, he may proceed in forma
pauperis on appeal without further authorization from this Court, because he was
granted pauper status in this Court, and an appeal could be taken in good faith. 28
U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); FED. R. APP. P. 24(a)(3)(A)

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 11, 2022

/s/ Gershwin A. Drain
GERSHWIN A. DRAIN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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Copies of this Order were served upon attorneys of record on
January 11, 2022, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
/s/ Teresa McGovern
Case Manager

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