Morris v. MDOC et al
Filing
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OPINION and ORDER Dismissing the Michigan Department of Corrections and Dismissing Plaintiff's Claims or Money Damages from Defendant's Whitmer and Washington in the Official Capacities - Signed by District Judge Nancy G. Edmunds. (LBar)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
DALE LESTER MORRIS, 187452,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 21-10404
GRETCHEN WHITMER,1
HEIDI WASHINGTON, and
MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS,
Honorable Nancy G. Edmunds
Defendants.
_______________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER DISMISSING THE MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS AND DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS FOR
MONEY DAMAGES FROM DEFENDANTS WHITMER AND
WASHINGTON IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES
Plaintiff Dale Lester Morris is a state prisoner in the custody of the Michigan
Department of Corrections (“MDOC”) at the Gus Harrison Correctional Facility in
Adrian, Michigan (“ARF”). On February 19, 2021, Plaintiff filed a pro se
amended civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 5.) The
defendants are Michigan Governor Gretchen Whitmer, MDOC, and MDOC’s
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Plaintiff spelled this defendant’s first name as “Grechin” in the caption for his
amended complaint. The Court takes judicial notice that Ms. Whitmer’s first name
is spelled “Gretchen.”
Director, Heidi Washington. Plaintiff seeks monetary and injunctive relief from
the defendants on grounds that living conditions at ARF are deplorable and violate
his right to reasonable safety under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution. For the reasons given below, the Court is dismissing
MDOC from this lawsuit. The Court is also dismissing Plaintiff’s claims for
money damages from defendants Whitmer and Washington in their official
capacities.
I. Introduction
Plaintiff alleges in his complaint that, while incarcerated at ARF, he became
infected two times with the coronavirus known as COVID-19 due to the inhumane
conditions at ARF. He claims that the disease devastated his vital organs and that
he is likely to die from contracting the disease again due to his Moorish American
race and the atrocious housing conditions at ARF. According to Plaintiff, the
housing conditions at ARF include overcrowding, infestation with mice,
inadequate ventilation, dilapidated structures, and predatory inmates. Plaintiff
alleges that the defendants are deliberately indifferent to his need for reasonable
safety and that they have failed to comply with state administrative rules on
housing inmates. He seeks $100 per day for every day that he is forced to live in
housing conditions that amount to cruel and unusual punishment. He also wants
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the Court to order Governor Whitmer to release him from prison due to MDOC’s
alleged failure to keep him safe and healthy.
II. Legal Framework
The Court granted Plaintiff permission to proceed without prepaying the fees
or costs for this action. The Court is required to screen indigent prisoners’
complaints and to dismiss a complaint, or any portion of a complaint, that is
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted, or
seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 572 (6th Cir. 2008).
Although a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations,” the
“[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if
doubtful in fact).” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007)
(footnote and citations omitted). In other words, “a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
Under Twombly and Iqbal, the factual allegations in a complaint are accepted as
true. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, and Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
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draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
A complaint is legally frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in law or in fact.
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The term “frivolous” in the
applicable subsection of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, “embraces not only the inarguable legal
conclusion, but also the fanciful factual allegation.” Id.
This action was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “makes ‘liable’
‘[e]very person’ who ‘under color of’ state law ‘subjects, or causes to be
subjected,’ another person ‘to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution[.]’ ” Pineda v. Hamilton Cty., Ohio, 977
F.3d 483, 489 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting the statute). A plaintiff must prove two
things to prevail in an action under § 1983: “(1) that he or she was deprived of a
right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States; and (2) that the
deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of law.” Robertson v.
Lucas, 753 F.3d 606, 614 (6th Cir. 2014).
III. Discussion
Plaintiff’s claims about MDOC are frivolous in the legal sense and fail to
state a claim because “a State is not a person within the meaning of § 1983.” Will
v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989). Additionally, the
Eleventh Amendment bars suits against a state or one of its agencies or
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departments unless the state has consented to suit. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984). “The state of Michigan . . . has not
consented to being sued in civil rights actions in the federal courts,” Johnson v.
Unknown Dellatifa, 357 F.3d 539, 545 (6th Cir. 2004), and “Congress did not
intend to abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity by passing section
1983,” Thiokol Corp. v. Dep’t of Treasury, 987 F.2d 376, 383 (6th Cir. 1993)
(citing Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979)).
“Eleventh Amendment immunity ‘bars all suits, whether for injunctive,
declaratory or monetary relief, against the state and its departments, by citizens of
another state, foreigners or its own citizens.’ ” McCormick v. Miami Univ., 693
F.3d 654, 661 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Thiokol, 987 F.2d at 381). The State of
Michigan, therefore, is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment.
Plaintiff sues the individual defendants, Gretchen Whitmer and Heidi
Washington, in their personal and official capacities for money damages and
injunctive relief. The Supreme Court explained in Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S.
159 (1985), that
[o]fficial-capacity suits . . . “generally represent only another way of
pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.”
Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690,
n. 55, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 2035, n. 55, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 1978). As long as
the government entity receives notice and an opportunity to respond, an
official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as
a suit against the entity. Brandon [v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471-472, 105
S. Ct. 873, 83 L. Ed. 2d 878 (1985)]. It is not a suit against the official
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personally, for the real party in interest is the entity. Thus, . . . a plaintiff
seeking to recover on a damages judgment in an official-capacity suit
must look to the government entity itself.
Id. at 165-166 (emphasis in original); see also Thiokol, 987 F.2d at 381 (stating
that the Eleventh Amendment “bars suits for monetary relief against state officials
sued in their official capacity”).
Governor Whitmer and Ms. Washington are state officials serving in the
executive branch of the State of Michigan. See www.Michigan.gov. Therefore,
Plaintiff’s claims about Whitmer and Washington in their official capacities for
money damages is comparable to a suit against the State, which is immune from
suit. In addition, state officials acting in their official capacities are not “persons”
under § 1983. Will, 491 U.S. at 71. The Court, therefore, dismisses Plaintiff’s
claim for money damages from Whitmer and Washington in their official
capacities.
The Supreme Court, nevertheless, has held “that state officials, sued in their
individual capacities, are ‘persons’ within the meaning of § 1983.” Hafer v. Melo,
502 U.S. 21, 31 (1991) Moreover, “the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits
for equitable, prospective relief . . . against state officials in their official capacity.”
Diaz v. Michigan Dep't of Corr., 703 F.3d 956, 964 (6th Cir. 2013); see also
Thiokol, 987 F.2d at 381 (stating that the Eleventh Amendment “does not preclude
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actions against state officials sued in their official capacity for prospective
injunctive or declaratory relief”) (citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)).
IV. Conclusion
Plaintiff’s claims about MDOC are frivolous and fail to state a claim for
which relief may be granted. MDOC also is immune from suit. The Court,
therefore, dismisses MDOC from this lawsuit.
Plaintiff’s claim for money damages from defendants Whitmer and
Washington in their official capacities also fails to state a claim for which relief
may be granted. Accordingly, that claim is dismissed. Pursuant to Supreme Court
precedent and case law in this Circuit, however, Plaintiff may proceed with his
claim for injunctive relief from Whitmer and Washington in their official
capacities and his claim for money damages from Whitmer and Washington in
their personal or individual capacities.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: April 9, 2021
s/ Nancy G. Edmunds_______________
NANCY G. EDMUNDS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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