Wells v. Ataner Corporation et al

Filing 122

ORDER Granting Defendants' 109 and 110 Motions for Summary Judgment. Signed by District Judge Matthew F. Leitman. (HRya)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
APRIL WELLS,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 21-cv-11032
Hon. Matthew F. Leitman

v.
ATANER CORPORATION, et al.,

Defendants.
__________________________________________________________________/
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (ECF Nos. 109, 110)
Plaintiff April Wells is a former package delivery driver for Defendants
Ataner Corporation and FedEx Ground Package System, Inc. In 2018, Defendants
fired Wells on the ground that Wells committed a violation of their integrity policy
when she misled them about crashing her delivery van into a Tim Horton’s
restaurant. Wells disputes Defendants’ stated basis for her termination. She alleges
that Defendants fired her and subjected her to a hostile work environment because
she is an African American woman and based on her age. She further contends that
Defendants retaliated against her and paid her less than her male, non-African
American counterparts. In this action, she asserts both federal and state claims
against Defendants based upon her allegations. (See Am. Compl., ECF No. 8.)

1

Defendants have now moved for summary judgment on all of Wells’ claims.
(See Motions, ECF Nos. 109, 110.) In response to those motions, Wells has
presented some evidence that her firing may have been unwarranted and perhaps
even unfair. But she has not presented any evidence that it was based upon her
gender, race, or age. Nor has she shown that Defendants unlawfully retaliated
against her, subjected her to a hostile work environment, or paid her less than her
male, non-African American colleagues. Accordingly, for the reasons explained
below, Defendants’ motions are GRANTED.
I
A
Ataner is a shipping company that delivers packages exclusively for FedEx.
(See Dep. of Renata Augustyniak at 5-6, ECF No. 113-2, PageID.5419-5420.)
Ataner is owned by Renata Augustyniak. (See id. at 5, PageID.5419.)
In November 2017, Ataner hired Wells to deliver packages for FedEx. (See
Wells Dep. at 15-16, ECF No. 113-1, PageID.5093-5094.) Wells contends that from
that point forward, she was jointly employed by both Ataner and FedEx, and for
purposes of the pending motions only, FedEx does not dispute that point. (See FedEx
Mot., ECF No. 109, PageID.3800.)
Ataner’s “peak” delivery season ended not long after Wells began work – on
December 24, 2017. (Augustyniak Dep. at 84, ECF No. 113-2, PageID.5513.) At

2

that point, Ataner laid off Wells and all of the other employees it had recently hired
to perform deliveries during its busy season. (See Wells Dep. at 15, 45-46, ECF No.
113-1, PageID.5093, 5123-5124. See also Augustyniak Dep. at 10-11, 54-55, 81-82,
117, ECF No. 113-2, PageID.5125-5126, 5169-5170, 5610-5611, 5546.) Around
that same time, Augustyniak told Wells that Ataner was interested in bringing Wells
back to the company in January of the new year. (See Wells Dep. at 45-46, ECF No.
113-1, PageID.5123-5124.) And that is precisely what Ataner did. In early January
2018, Ataner re-hired Wells to deliver FedEx packages. (See id. at 15-16,
PageID.5093-5094.)
B
On the morning of January 11, 2018, Wells was driving one of Ataner’s
Sprinter oversized vans. (See id. at 43, PageID.5121.) Before beginning work, she
stopped for breakfast at a Tim Horton’s restaurant near her home. (See id. at 46-47,
PageID.5124-5125.) When she arrived at the Tim Horton’s, she began to back her
van into a parking spot adjacent to the restaurant building. (See id. at 57,
PageID.5135.) As she backed in, she “look[ed] out [of her] two side mirrors […] to
make sure that [her] tires [were] not touch[ing] the curb [or] the sidewalk.” (Id. at
57-58, PageID.5135-5136.)

She eventually stopped backing up and pulled

“forward” a bit because she “didn’t want to get too close to the sidewalk.” (Id.)

3

After Wells finished parking, she “got out of [her] vehicle and [went] inside
the Tim Horton’s.” (Id. at 54, PageID.5132.) Shortly after she entered the restaurant,
at least two employees told her that she had “hit the building” with her van. (Id.)
Wells was surprised because she did not “feel [any] movement” or “feel a bang”
while she was parking. (Id. at 64, PageID.5142.)
Wells then called both the police and Augustyniak. (See id. at 54-55,
PageID.5132-5133.) Wells told police that she was “unsure” whether she had hit
the building, but that the employees said that she did. (See id. at 63-64, PageID.51415142.) She said the same thing to Augustyniak. (See id. at 66, PageID.5144.)
Augustyniak asked Wells to take photographs of her van and the building. (See id.
at 54, 63-64, PageID.5132, 5141-5142.) Wells then did so and sent the photos to
Augustyniak. (See id.) The photos depicted Wells’ van where it came to rest in the
parking spot after Wells completed the parking process by pulling “forward” just a
bit. (See id. at 59, 220, PageID.5137, 5298.) The photos did not show the van in
contact with any portion of the restaurant building. (See id. at 59-63, PageID.51325141.)
After Wells sent the photos to Augustyniak, Wells drove to Ataner’s office
and met with Augustyniak. (See id. at 65, PageID.5143.)

Wells again told

Augustyniak that she was “unsure” if she hit the building. (Id. at 66, PageID.5144.)
During that meeting, Augustyniak said that she had had the chance to review the

4

photographs that Wells had taken, and based on her review of those photos,
Augustyniak did not “think” that Wells had hit the building. (Id.; see also
Augustyniak Dep. at 93, ECF No. 113-2, PageID.5522.) Augustyniak also said that
she would try to obtain “video footage” of the accident if it existed. (Wells Dep. at
66, ECF No. 113-1, PageID.5144.) Wells then “continued” her route and made her
scheduled deliveries for the day. (Id. at 67, PageID.5145.)
Augustyniak changed her mind about the accident when she obtained and
reviewed video surveillance from Tim Horton’s. (See Augustyniak Dep. at 95-96,
ECF No. 113-2, PageID.5524-5525.) In Augustyniak’s opinion, the video clearly
showed Wells hitting the building. (See id. at 100-101, PageID.5529-5530.)
Augustyniak further concluded, based upon her review of the video, that Wells must
have known that she had hit the building and that Wells lied when she claimed that
she was uncertain as to whether she had come into contact with the building. (See
id. at 109, PageID.5538.)
Not long after she viewed the video, Augustyniak spoke with representatives
from FedEx. (See id. at 99, PageID.5528.) FedEx had reviewed the video, police
report, and other evidence regarding the accident, and like Augustyniak, it concluded
that Wells had “hit the building and [was trying to] hide it.” (Id. at 109,
PageID.5538.)

FedEx therefore wanted Wells “disqualified” from delivering

5

packages for them due to her violation of the company’s integrity policy. (Id. at 109110, PageID.5538-5539.)
On January 13, 2018, Augustyniak met with Wells and fired her. (See Wells
Dep. at 67, ECF No. 113-1, PageID.5145.) Augustyniak told Wells that she
(Augustyniak) had obtained and watched the surveillance video from Tim Horton’s,
that the video clearly showed Wells hitting the building, and that Wells was being
fired due to an “integrity” violation. (Id.)

As Augustyniak explained at her

deposition, she concluded that Wells had acted with a lack of integrity in two ways:
(1) by saying that she was unsure if she had hit the building when, based upon the
depiction of the incident on the video, it had to have been obvious to her (Wells) that
she had come into contact with the building and (2) by submitting the photos
depicting the van after it had been pulled forward in the parking spot so as to falsely
“suggest that she didn’t even come into contact with the building.” (Augustyniak
Dep. at 152-153, ECF No. 113-2, PageID.5581-5582.) Augstyniak further explained
that she had to fire Wells based upon these integrity violations because it was
FedEx’s policy that “[i]f someone ha[d] an integrity issue, they [could not] work for
[her] or FedEx” and because FedEx wanted Wells “disqualified” from delivering
packages for them based on her violation of the integrity policy. (Id. at 108-109, 124,
PageID.5537-5538, 5553.)

6

Documentation created at the time of Wells’ firing further reflects that Wells
was fired due to integrity violations. A FedEx “Disqualification Event Form”
completed on January 19, 2018, indicated that Wells was fired for “integrity
breaches” after she “lied about [an] accident.” (Disqualification Event Form, ECF
No. 113-8, PageID.5640.)
II
Wells filed this action against Ataner and FedEx on May 5, 2021. (See
Compl., ECF No. 1.) The operative pleading in this case is Wells’ First Amended
Complaint. (See Am. Compl., ECF No. 8.) In that pleading, Wells brings three sets
of claims against the Defendants: (1) claims against arising out of her firing, (2)
claims related to an alleged hostile work environment, and (3) claims related to the
failure to pay her the same amount as comparable male, non-African American
drivers. The claims are as follows:
 “Harassment & Discrimination on the Basis of Plaintiff’s Sex and Gender
in Violation of Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964” (Count I);
 “Title VII – Gender Based Discrimination – Wage” (Count II);
 Equal Pay Act – Gender Based Wage Discrimination” (Count III);
 “Harassment & Discrimination on the Basis of Race in Violation of Title
VII” (Count IV);
 “Retaliation in Violation of Title VII” (Count V);

7

 “Hostile Work Environment in Violation of Title VII” (Count VI);
 “Discrimination on the Basis of Age in Violation of the Michigan ElliotLarsen Civil Rights Act” (the “ELCRA”) (Count VII);
 “Discrimination on the Basis of Plaintiff’s Sex & Gender in Violation of
the ELCRA” (Count VIII);
 “Discrimination on the Basis of Plaintiff’s Race in Violation of the
ELCRA” (Count IX);
 “Retaliation in Violation of the ELCRA” (Count X); and
 “Hostile Work Environment in Violation of the ELCRA” (Count XI).
Both Defendants filed motions for summary judgment (see FedEx Mot., ECF
No. 109, Ataner Mot., ECF No. 110), and the Court held a hearing on both motions
on September 6, 2024. The Court is now prepared to rule on the motions.
III
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, a movant is entitled to summary
judgment when it “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact.”
SEC v. Sierra Brokerage Servs., Inc., 712 F.3d 312, 326-27 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56). When reviewing the record, “the court must view the evidence
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable
inferences in its favor.” Id. But “the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in
support of the [non-moving party’s] position will be insufficient; there must be
8

evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for [that party].” Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986).

Summary judgment is not

appropriate when “the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require
submission to a jury.” Id. at 251–52.
IV
A
The Court begins with Wells’ claims that the termination of her employment
violated both federal and state anti-discrimination statutes. As noted above, Wells
brings gender and race discrimination claims under both federal law (Title VII) and
state law (the ELCRA) and an age discrimination claim under state law (the
ELCRA). (See Counts I, II, IV, VII, VIII, and IX of the First Amended Complaint).
In order to survive summary judgment on these claims, Wells must present direct
evidence of discrimination or sufficient indirect evidence of discrimination to satisfy
the familiar burden-shifting framework described in McDonnell Douglas, Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973).1 See Redlin v. Grosse Pointe Pub. Sch. Sys.,
921 F.3d 599, 606 (6th Cir. 2019) (applying the McDonnell Douglas framework to
plaintiff’s Title VII and ELCRA claims).

1

All parties agree that the McDonnell Douglas test governs Wells’ federal and state
claims of discrimination. (See FedEx Mot., ECF No. 109, PageID.3812-3813;
Ataner Mot., ECF No. 110-1, PageID.4564-4565; Wells Resp., ECF No. 111,
PageID.5044.)
9

Wells has chosen to rely upon indirect evidence, and the Court must therefore
apply the McDonnell Douglas framework to her claims. Under the first step of that
framework, Wells must make out “a prima facie case of discrimination by a
preponderance of the evidence.” Id. at 613.

In order to do so, she must

“demonstrate” that (1) she “is a member of a protected class,” (2) she “was qualified
for [her] job,” (3) she “suffered an adverse employment decision,” and (4) she was
“treated differently than similarly situated non-protected employees.” Id. at 606–07.
The “burden of establishing a prima facie case is not an onerous one.” Id. at 606. If
Wells satisfies her prima facie case, then “the burden shifts to [Ataner and FedEx]
to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment
action.

Should [Ataner and FedEx] do so, [Wells] then must prove by a

preponderance of the evidence that the stated reasons were a pretext for
discrimination.” Id. (citations omitted) (cleaned up).
B
Even though Wells’ burden at the prima facie stage is not a heavy one, she
has not carried it here. More specifically, she has not satisfied the fourth element of
her prima facie case that requires her to identify a similarly situated employee
outside of her protected class who was treated more favorably then she was.
Defendants are therefore entitled to summary judgment on those claims. See Abebe
v. Health and Hospital Corp. of Marion County, 35 F.4th 601, 604 (6th Cir. 2022)

10

(holding that plaintiff failed to satisfy prima facie case where plaintiff failed to
“identif[y] a proper comparator”).
In her response to Defendants’ motions for summary judgment, Wells
identified two comparators outside of her protected class who, she claims, were
treated more favorably than she was, but neither comparator is similarly situated to
Wells. First, Wells said in her responses that she was “aware of at least one
employee (not a member of her protected class) who did not report an accident in
which they were involved, and when . . . Ataner’s management found out, that
employee was not terminated.” (Wells Resp. Br., ECF No. 111, PageID.5045.) At
the hearing on Defendants’ motions, Wells’ counsel explained that that employee
was a Hispanic man named Mario. But when Wells was asked about Mario at her
deposition, Wells acknowledged that she did not know if Mario had failed to report
his accident to Ataner:
Q. Do you know if Mario reported the accident […]
A. I know Mario, the gentleman that took off the overhead
at the bank, he was procrastinating and telling that he did
it. He was debating. So I know he probably didn’t call in
a timely fashion if he was unsure if he should call or not
and report it.
Q. Do you know if he eventually reported the accident?
A. I don’t know. You have to ask Renata.

11

(Wells Dep. at 91, ECF No. 113-1, PageID.5169.) This testimony establishes, at
most, that Mario did not timely report an accident to Ataner; even when construed
in the light most favorable to Wells; it does not show that Mario failed to report
and/or acknowledge an accident. And Wells has not presented any evidence that a
delay in reporting an accident – in contrast to a failure to acknowledge responsibility,
as Wells was accused of – is considered an integrity violation under Defendants’
policies. Moreover, there is undisputed evidence in the record that Ataner did fire
other employees who violated the company’s integrity policy by, among other
things, lying about accidents – as Ataner accused Wells of doing here. (See
Augustyniak Dep. at 29-40, ECF No. 113-2, PageID.5144-5155.) Under all of these
circumstances, the Court concludes that Mario is not similarly situated to Wells. 
Second, Wells says that “multiple former co-workers, who were white, male
and/or younger . . . had multiple accidents in a short period of time, yet were not
terminated.” (Wells Resp. Br., ECF No. 111, PageID.5045. See also Wells Dep. at
91, ECF No. 113-1, PageID.5169.) But Defendants did not fire Wells for having an
accident. Instead, they fired her based upon their perception that she displayed a
lack of integrity in connection with her reporting of the accident. And while
accidents are often an unavoidable part of work as a delivery driver, a lack of
integrity is not. (See, e.g., Dep. of Andria Garrett at 53, 63, ECF No. 109-6,
PageID.4409, 4418, explaining that discipline for “being [involved] in accidents” is

12

“progressive” based on the number of accidents a driver is involved in and whether
the accidents are “preventable,” but “[i]ntegrity breaches” are not subject to
“progressive” discipline because there is “zero tolerance” for “integrity breaches”).
For these reasons, the employees who were not fired after being involved in
accidents were not similarly situated to Wells (who, again, was fired based upon
Defendants’ perception that she acted with a lack of integrity). See Mitchell v. Toledo
Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 583-84 (6th Cir. 1992) (explaining that an employee is
similarly situated to a plaintiff if that employee “engaged in the same conduct
without such differentiating or mitigating circumstances that would distinguish their
conduct or the employer’s treatment of them for it”).
Finally, Wells suggests that even if she cannot satisfy the fourth element of
her prima facie case by identifying a similarly situated comparator, she can make
out her prima facie case of discrimination with other evidence. She says that a factfinder may infer that she was fired based on her age, race, and gender because “all
of Defendants’ Black women employees who drove for Ataner and were over the
age of 40 were terminated at the end of the busy season.” (Wells Resp. Br., ECF No.
111, PageID.4045.) At first blush, that does sound like potentially persuasive
evidence of discrimination. But a closer look shows otherwise. The undisputed
evidence in the record reveals that Ataner laid off all of its seasonal employees at
the end of “peak season,” regardless of their age, race, or gender. (Augustyniak Dep.

13

at 10-11, 54-55, 81-82, PageID.5125-5126, 5169-5170, 5610-5611.) Moreover, as
Wells acknowledges, Defendants re-hired her in January 2018 almost immediately
after the mass layoff at the end of Defendants’ peak season. The fact that Defendants
quickly re-hired Wells after the layoff effectively negates any inference of
discrimination (at least as to Wells) that could otherwise have arisen from the layoff.
C
While the Court concludes that Wells has not established a prima facie case
of discrimination, the Court recognizes that Wells has raised a number of legitimate
concerns about whether her firing was justified. Indeed, she has persuaded the Court
that Defendants may well have erred when they concluded that she attempted to
mislead them about the accident. For instance, Defendants acted as if Wells stated
or implied that the photos she took depicted her truck at its closest point to the
restaurant building rather than depicting the truck after she pulled forward to
complete her parking process, but there is no evidence in the record that Wells ever
said that or did anything to imply that. Moreover, Wells repeatedly told anyone who
would listen – including Augustyniak and the police – that she was unsure whether
she hit the restaurant building; she did not deny that she had done so. And it makes
sense that she could have been uncertain about the impact. As an Ataner witness
who previously worked at FedEx confirmed, because some of the delivery vans are
so large, their drivers “regularly” have minor accidents in which they do not feel a

14

“jolt” or a “bump.” (Garrett Dep. at 46-47, ECF No. 109-6, PageID.4402-4403.) For
these reasons and others, there is a serious question on this record as to whether, as
Defendants concluded, Wells committed integrity violations when she submitted
photos of her truck after it had been pulled forward and when she reported that she
was unsure as to whether she had hit the restaurant building with her truck. Simply
put, there is a real question as to whether Wells’ termination was warranted.
But what is not open to question is whether Wells’ termination was based on
her race, age, or gender. As explained in detail above, Wells has not presented any
evidence that it was. And since the laws under which Wells brings her claims protect
against employment discrimination – not against unjustified personnel decisions –
Defendants are entered to summary judgment on Wells’ claims challenging her
termination.2
V
A
The Court next turns to Wells’ retaliation claims under Title VII and the
ELCRA. (See Counts V and X of the First Amended Complaint.) These federal and
state claims are reviewed under the same standard. See, e.g., Wasek v. Arrow Energy

2

Because the Court concludes that Wells has not satisfied her burden to establish a
prima facie case of age, race, or gender discrimination, it need not and does not reach
the question of whether Defendants’ proffered reason for firing Wells was
pretextual.
15

Services, Inc., 682 F.3d 463, 482 (6th Cir. 2012) (noting in case where plaintiff
brought a retaliation claim under both Title VII and the ELCRA that “the ELCRA
analysis is identical to the Title VII analysis”). “Title VII retaliation claims may be
proved with direct evidence or by indirect evidence via the McDonnell Douglas
framework.” Redlin, 921 F.3d at 613. “Under the [indirect evidence] approach” that
applies here, a plaintiff “must first establish a prima facie case of retaliation by
demonstrating” the following four elements:
(1) [the plaintiff] engaged in activity protected by Title
VII; (2) [the plaintiff’s] exercise of such protected activity
was known by the defendant; (3) thereafter, the defendant
took an action that was “materially adverse” to the
plaintiff; and (4) a causal connection existed between the
protected activity and the materially adverse action.
Id. (quoting Laster v. City of Kalamazoo, 746 F.3d 714, 729 (6th Cir. 2014)). As
with Wells’ discrimination claims, “[t]he burden of establishing a prima facie case
in a retaliation action is not onerous, but one easily met.” Nguyen v. City of
Cleveland, 229 F.3d 559, 563 (6th Cir. 2000).
If the plaintiff “succeeds in making out the elements of a prima facie case of
retaliation, the burden of production shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate,
non-retaliatory reason for the termination.” Redlin, 921 F.3d at 613 (cleaned up). “If
the employer satisfies its burden of production, the burden shifts back to [p]laintiff
to show that the reason was a pretext for retaliation.” Id. (cleaned up).

16

B
Wells has failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation because she has
not identified any protected activity that she engaged in before Defendants fired her.
During her deposition, Defendants asked Wells why she believed that Defendants
retaliated against her. In response to that question, Wells did not identify any activity
protected under Title VII or the ELCRA that she believed led to her firing:
Q. Do you believe that Ataner in some way retaliated
against you for, for -- in any way?
A. Yes.
Q. And how is that?
A. Terminating me over something that I didn’t say
because I was a black female and because [Augustyniak’s]
boyfriend helped me out.
Q. And those are the reasons why you feel you were
retaliated against?
A. Yes.
(Wells Dep. at 103, ECF No. 113-1, PageID.5181.) In other words, Wells testified
that Defendants retaliated against her when they fired her for (1) making a false
report about the accident at Tim Horton’s and (2) accepting help from Augustyniak’s
boyfriend. None of that conduct is protected under Title VII or the ELCRA. Those
statutes protect “employees from retaliation for having opposed an employer’s
unlawful actions” by, for example, “complain[ing] about unlawful practices to a

17

manager, [a] union, or other employees.” Barrett v. Whirlpool Corp., 556 F.3d 502,
516 (6th Cir. 2009). These statutes do not protect making reports about vehicle
accidents and receiving help from the owner’s significant other. Since Wells has not
identified any protected conduct that led to her firing, her retaliation claims fail.
While Wells did not identify any protected conduct when asked to do so in
her deposition, she did identify such conduct in a declaration submitted along with
her opposition to Defendants’ summary judgment motions. In that sworn statement,
Wells says that (1) she engaged in protected conduct by “ma[king] complaints to
Ataner’s management regarding the different treatment” she experienced as an
African American woman and (2) she “faced backlash and retaliation for bringing
up the fact of the different treatment.” (Wells Decl. at ¶¶ 6-7, ECF No. 113-4,
PageID.5616.)
Wells’ declaration fails to save her retaliation claims because it is contrary to
her deposition testimony in two respects.

The statements in the declaration

identifying the purported protected activity are inconsistent with (1) her deposition
testimony (quoted above) in which she identifies the universe of conduct for which
she was retaliated against and says nothing about complaining about discrimination
and (2) another portion of her deposition testimony in which she conceded that she
had no “evidence” that “Ataner somehow retaliated against [her] for bringing up a
fact that employees were treated differently.” (Wells Dep. at 182, ECF No. 113-1,

18

PageID.5261.) It is well-established that “a party may not create a factual issue by
filing an affidavit, after a motion for summary judgment has been made, which
contradicts [a party’s] earlier deposition testimony.” Reid v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
790 F.2d 453, 460 (6th Cir. 1986). Because the statements in Wells’ declaration
identifying her purported protected conduct are contrary to her deposition testimony,
Wells cannot rely on those statements to defeat Defendants’ summary judgment
motion.
For the reasons explained above, Wells has not identified any competent
evidence that she engaged in protected conduct under Title VII or the ELCRA, and
Defendants are therefore entitled to summary judgment on her retaliation claims.
VI
Next, Wells brings claims of a hostile work environment under both Title VII
and the ELCRA. (See Counts VI and XI of the First Amended Complaint.) In order
to establish a hostile work environment claim
under Title VII or the ELCRA, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that (1) [she] belongs to a protected class; (2)
[she] was subject to unwelcome harassment; (3) the
harassment was based on [a protected category]; (4) the
harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of
employment; and (5) the defendant knew or should have
known about the harassment and failed to take action.
Khalaf v. Ford Motor Co., 973 F.3d 469, 472 (6th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up) (quoting
Phillips v. UAW Int’l, 854 F.3d 323, 327 (6th Cir. 2017)). “When evaluating these

19

claims . . . [courts] look[] at the totality of the alleged harassment to determine
whether it was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of a plaintiff’s
employment and create an abusive working environment.” Id. (cleaned up). The
Sixth Circuit “has established a relatively high bar for what amounts to actionable
discriminatory conduct under a hostile work environment theory.” Id. (quoting
Phillips, 854 F.3d at 328).

“For example, in the context of alleged racial

discrimination, [the Sixth Circuit] has determined that ‘even offensive and bigoted
conduct is insufficient to constitute a hostile work environment if it is neither
pervasive nor severe enough to satisfy the claim’s requirements.’” Id. (quoting
Phillips, 854 F.3d at 328).
Wells has failed to meet this “high bar” here with respect to her hostile work
environment claims. When asked directly at her deposition, Wells conceded that
she had no “evidence or witnesses to support [her] allegation that [she was] somehow
working in a hostile work environment while she was employed at Ataner.” (Wells
Dep. at 186, ECF No. 113-1, PageID.5264.) That concession is likely fatal to Wells’
hostile work environment claim.
And even if it is not, Wells has failed to identify any evidence of hostility
sufficient to establish that she was subject to a hostile working environment. For
example, Wells says that she “would routinely hear Ms. Augustyniak make
comments related to employees’ ages” and that she would “hear Ms. Augustyniak

20

routinely make comments related to employees’ gender and how that affected their
ability to perform tasks, since they could lift heavier items.” (Wells Decl. at ¶¶ 1, 3,
ECF No. 113-4, PageID.5615.) But these vague descriptions of statements by
Augustyniak are not “severe enough” to constitute a hostile work environment. See
Khalaf, 973 F.3d at 472 (explaining that to constitute a hostile work environment,
harassment must be so “pervasive [as to] alter the conditions of a plaintiff’s
employment”). Defendants are therefore entitled to summary judgment on these
claims.
VII
Finally, the Court turns to Wells’ claim under the Equal Pay Act that she was
paid less than similar male, non-African American drivers at Ataner. (See Count III
of the First Amended Complaint.) The Equal Pay Act “prohibits employers from
paying an employee at a rate less than that paid to an employee of the opposite sex
for performing equal work.” Beck-Wilson v. Principi, 441 F.3d 353, 359 (6th Cir.
2006). The following framework governs a plaintiff’s claim under the Equal Pay
Act:
In order to establish a prima facie case of wage
discrimination under the EPA, plaintiffs must show that an
employer pays different wages to employees of opposite
sexes “for equal work on jobs the performance of which
requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which
are performed under similar working conditions.” Corning
Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195, 94 S. Ct.
2223, 41 L.Ed.2d 1 (1974) (quoting 29 U.S.C. §
21

206(d)(1)). Jobs need not be identical in order to be
considered “equal work” under the EPA. Shultz v.
Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259, 265, & n.10 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905, 90 S. Ct. 1696, 26 L.Ed.2d 64
(1970). Whether a job is substantially equal for purposes
of the EPA is determined on a case-by-case basis and
“resolved by an overall comparison of the work, not its
individual segments.” Odomes v. Nucare, Inc., 653 F.2d
246, 250 (6th Cir. 1981) (orderlies and nurses aides
perform substantially equal work).
Id. at 359–60.
Wells has again failed to establish her prima facie case. At her deposition,
Wells expressly denied that she was bringing any claims that she was paid less than
Ataner’s male, non-African American employees:
Q. Are you claiming that you were paid less than male
employees when you worked for Ataner?
A. No.
Q. Are you claiming that you were paid less than white
employees[?]
A. No.
[….]
Q. Are you making any claim to your knowledge that you
were paid less than […] male or non-African American
employees as part of your lawsuit?
A. No.
(Wells Dep. at 102-103, ECF No. 113-1, PageID.5180-5181.) Moreover, Wells did
not identify any evidence in her response to Defendants’ motions that could establish
22

she was paid less than male, non-African American employees. (See Wells Resp,
ECF No. 112, PageID.5074-5075.) Instead, Wells said that (1) she “directed a
subpoena to Paychex” – Ataner’s payroll processor – requesting information related
to Ataner’s “hiring, termination, and pay rates,” but Paychex “responded that it had
no records” and (2) her counsel was “preparing to file a Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(d)
declaration regarding this issue” that would explain what additional discovery Wells
needed prior to the Court deciding the summary judgment motions. (Id.) But Wells’
counsel never filed a Rule 56(d) affidavit. In sum, because Wells has not provided
any evidence to establish her prima facie case under the Equal Pay Act, and because
she has not properly sought denial of Defendants’ motion under Rule 56(d), her
claim under the Act fails.
VIII
For all of the reasons explained above, Defendants’ motions for summary
judgment (ECF Nos. 109, 110) are GRANTED, and all of Wells’ claims are
DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Matthew F. Leitman
MATTHEW F. LEITMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: September 26, 2024

23

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the parties
and/or counsel of record on September 26, 2024, by electronic means and/or
ordinary mail.
s/Holly A. Ryan
Case Manager
[phone]

24