Griswold v. Trinity Health-Michigan et al

Filing 109

OPINION and ORDER Granting in Part and Denying in Part The Livingston County Defendants' 53 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by District Judge Robert J. White. (TVil)

Case 2:22-cv-10980-RJW-PTM ECF No. 109, PageID.4798 Filed 03/10/25 Page 1 of 47

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

TIMOTHY GRISWOLD, as Personal
Representative of the Estate of JOHN
E. GRISWOLD,
Case No. 22-cv-10980
Plaintiff,
Honorable Robert J. White
v.
TRINITY HEALTH-MICHIGAN, et
al.,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
THE LIVINGSTON COUNTY DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
I.

Introduction
Timothy Griswold commenced this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 wrongful death action

on behalf of his brother, John Griswold’s estate. The amended complaint alleges
that Sheriff Michael J. Murphy, Sergeant Terry Davis, and several jail services
deputies exhibited deliberate indifference to John Griswold’s serious medical
condition while he was incarcerated at the Livingston County jail. The Estate also
asserts that Livingston County failed to train its jail services deputies to
appropriately handle inmate medical emergencies.

The Court will refer to

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Livingston County and the individual deputies as the “Livingston County
Defendants” collectively.
Before the Court is the Livingston County Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment. (ECF No. 53). The Estate responded. (ECF No. 77). The Livingston
County Defendants filed a reply. (ECF No. 80). They also submitted a supplemental
brief. (ECF No. 96). The Court held a hearing on the motion on January 10, 2025.
(ECF No. 104). For the following reasons, the motion is granted in part and denied
in part.
II.

Background
A.

Factual History

Just before 2:00 p.m. on October 14, 2018, Brighton, Michigan police officers
were dispatched to Griswold’s address to investigate a report from his family that he
was assaulting them. (ECF 53-2, PageID.845). Officers found Griswold in the
kitchen and they told him he was under arrest. Family members informed the
officers that Griswold “took about 10 pills” from the “large amount” sitting on the
kitchen counter. (Id.). He did not know what they were for. (Id.). With Griswold in
custody, one of the officers radioed for emergency medical assistance. Paramedics
arrived and “determined that [the pills on the counter] were medication for ulcers.”
(Id.).

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A dashboard camera depicts the officers escorting Griswold to a patrol
vehicle, placing him inside, and driving him to the Livingston County Jail. (ECF No.
53-3, Counter 6:50-7:51, 20:53-42:36). During the trip, Griswold struggled to keep
his head upright, he slurred his speech, and he paused for periods of time between
answering the officers’ questions about the pills he ingested. (Id., Counter 08:5423:00). When the officers transferred him to another vehicle, he informed them he
could “hardly walk.” (Id., Counter 23:29).
The officers assisted Griswold with exiting the vehicle and walked him to the
jail’s intake unit around 2:50 P.M. (Id., Counter 43:16-45:44; ECF No. 53-4, Counter
00:48-3:00; ECF No. 53-5, Counter 0:00-0:18; ECF No. 53-7, PageID.853). The
jail nurse checked Griswold’s vitals as he slouched in a chair. (ECF No. 53-5,
Counter 4:08-8:35). She observed that Griswold was “pouring sweat,” had “pin
point pupils” and that he was “not answering medical questions about health needs.”
(ECF No. 53-7, PageID.853-54). She advised the officers that Griswold “needed to
be transported to the emergency room for clearance.” (Id., PageID.854). The officers
lifted Griswold from under his arms, walked him back to the patrol vehicle, and
assisted him back inside. (ECF No. 53-5, Counter 8:36-9:19; ECF No. 53-3, Counter
45:56-46:50; ECF No. 53-6, Counter 0:00-1:01). They transported him to St. Joseph
Mercy Livingston Hospital. (ECF No. 53-3, Counter 47:07-51:02; ECF No. 77-4).

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At the hospital, Griswold denied feeling any pain, he “follow[ed] commands,”
spoke “in full sentences,” and he did not appear in distress. (ECF No. 77-4,
PageID.3293). Doctors observed that Griswold “may be limited due to probable
intoxication or mental status.” (Id.). He could not stay awake long enough to provide
a urine sample. (ECF No. 53-32, PageID.1172). Although a CT scan of his face
revealed a nasal fracture and his heart rate had decreased, medical evaluation notes
indicate that doctors “discharge[d] [him] to police with instructions.” (Id.,
PageID.3295). The hospital’s discharge papers contained a bold-lettered warning
that “[s]ignificant changes or worsening in your condition may require more
immediate attention.” (ECF No. 53-11, PageID.873). It also cautioned Griswold to
“seek immediate medical care” in the event he experienced “recurrent vomiting.”1
(Id., PageID.876).
Officers returned Griswold to the Livingston County Jail around 5:55 P.M.
(ECF No. 53-8, Counter 0:01). An officer assisted him out of the patrol vehicle and
he walked tentatively on his own power. (Id., Counter 3:57-4:20).

Griswold

stumbled briefly when entering the intake unit. (ECF No. 53-9, Counter 0:28-30).

The “recurrent vomiting” warning appeared in the section of the discharge papers
related to the nasal fracture. (ECF No. 53-11, PageID.876). But none of the jail
services deputies reviewed the discharge papers anyway. (ECF No. 53-28,
PageID.1112, Tr. 29:2-12; ECF No. 77-9, PageID.3409, Tr. 26:25-27:3; ECF No. 7710, PageID.3485, Tr. 159:14-16; ECF No. 77-12, PageID.3594, Tr. 51:20-23; ECF
No. 77-13, PageID.3622, Tr. 54:17-56:3; ECF No. 77-14, PageID.3638, Tr. 9:2010:13).
1

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He swayed slightly back-and-forth. (Id., Counter 0:41-2:23). He leaned his body on
the entrance wall to support himself. (Id., ECF No. 77-10, PageID.3469, Tr. 96:214).
Griswold appeared not to respond to two directives from Deputy Travis
Linden to face the intake wall and place his hands above his head so the deputy could
search him. (ECF No. 53-9, Counter 2:20-3:03; ECF No. 77-10, PageID.3469, Tr.
96:7-10). Deputy Linden pulled him by the arm and placed him next to the wall.
(ECF No. 53-9, Counter 3:06-13; ECF No. 77-10, PageID.3469, Tr. 96:11-14). He
searched Griswold, handcuffed him, and walked him to an intake cell for observation
alongside Deputy Sutfin.2 (ECF No. 53-9, Counter 3:14-4:59; ECF 53-13, Counter
4:17-54, 6:37-7:08). The two deputies attempted to change Griswold into a suicide
vest at Sergeant Davis’s instruction. (ECF 53-13, Counter 4:43-54; ECF No. 77-10,
PageID.3470, Tr. 97:16-22). They instead left him in his civilian clothes because he
was unable to change. (ECF 53-13, Counter 6:37-7:08; ECF No. 77-10,
PageID.3470, Tr. 97:16-22).
At 6:06 P.M., Deputies Linden and Sutfin placed Griswold on the floor of an
intake cell with his hands cuffed behind back. (ECF No. 53-22, Counter 0:01-24;
ECF No. 53-13, Counter 6:54-7:03). He spent the next 13 and a half hours laying

Deputy Sutfin’s first name does not appear in the record. (ECF No. 77-9,
PageID.3412, Tr. 40:11-14).
2

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on the floor of that cell. (ECF Nos. 53-22, 53-23, 53-24). Aside from the cell
inspections that individual deputies performed throughout the night of October 14
and into the morning of October 15 (which the Court will address in more detail
below), four subsequent events are worth noting because of their importance.
Event One – 7:00 P.M. Deputies Linden and Partrick Turchi entered the intake
cell to remove Griswold’s handcuffs. (ECF No. 53-22, Counter 54:41-57:41). Video
footage shows them both placing their hands under each of his arms and standing
him upright. Griswold stumbled as the deputies picked him up off the floor. He lost
his balance, swayed noticeably, and remained hunched over at the waist as Deputy
Linden unlocked the handcuffs. Griswold kept his hands behind his back for some
time, not seeming to recognize that Deputy Linden had already removed the
handcuffs. The deputies assisted him back into a seated position on the cell floor
since he did not appear capable of sitting down on his own. Even then, Griswold
had difficulty sitting up straight without swaying backwards or slouching forwards.
Nor could he lift his head off his chest as Deputy Linden attempted to converse with
him. (Id., Counter 56:22-57:37).
Event Two – 7:59 P.M. Griswold placed his hands to his mouth as he lay on
the floor, turned his head left, and projectile vomited green-colored emesis onto his
shirt, pants, arms, and the cell floor adjacent to him. (ECF No. 53-22, Counter
1:53:20-53; ECF No. 77-16, PageID.3681).

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Event Three – 7:09 A.M. Griswold started convulsing. His legs and arms
began twitching. (ECF No. 53-24, Counter 3:09:13-10:13). Video depicts his
breathing becoming more labored as his abdomen distended with each breath. (Id.).
His breathing then slowed and appeared to stop altogether at 7:17 A.M. (Id., Counter
3:10:13-16:54).
Event Four – 7:42 A.M. Deputies Vincent John and Kurt Heiob entered the
intake cell as Griswold lay motionless on the cell floor. (ECF No. 53-24, Counter
3:41:57-3:44:01). After failing to detect a pulse with the jail nurse’s assistance, they
lifted Griswold by his hands and feet and removed him from the intake cell. (Id.,
Counter 3:43:22-40; ECF No. 23-25, Counter 7:43:25-40). Deputy John performed
CPR. (ECF No. 53-24, Counter 3:43:58-44:01; ECF No. 53-25, Counter 7:43:5844:02).
Livingston County EMS technicians arrived at 7:50 A.M. (ECF No. 77-16,
PageID.3677). They attempted to resuscitate Griswold unsuccessfully. (ECF Id.,
PageID.3680). A physician pronounced him dead at 8:25 A.M. from “sudden cardiac
death.” (Id.; ECF No. 77-17, PageID.3682; ECF No. 77-20, PageID.3863).
Postmortem laboratory work revealed toxic levels of trazodone in Griswold’s blood.3
(ECF No. 77-7, PageID.3312, 3317, Tr. 18:4-7, Tr. 39:23-40:5).

Trazodone is an antidepressant. It works through “increasing the activity of
serotonin in the brain.” https://www.mayoclinic.org/drugs-supplements/trazodoneoral-route/description/drg-20061280 (last visited Mar. 6, 2025).
3

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B.

Procedural History

Griswold’s estate commenced this wrongful death action against, among
others, the Livingston County Defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No.
5). The amended complaint alleges that they exhibited deliberate indifference to
Griswold’s serious medical needs in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Id.,
PageID.36-37, ¶¶ 54-59).

The Livingston County Defendants now move for

summary judgment. (ECF No. 53).
III.

Legal Standards
A moving party is entitled to summary judgment where the “materials in the

record” do not establish the presence of a genuine dispute as to any material fact.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). All the evidence, along with all reasonable inferences, must
be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
The record contains 11 videos of the main incident in question. (See, e.g., ECF
Nos. 53-3, 53-4, 53-5, 53-6, 53-8, 53-9, 53-13, 53-22, 53-23, 53-24, 53-25). The
Court views the facts “in the light depicted by the videotape” and may not adopt a
factual account that is “blatantly contradicted by the record.” Jackson-Gibson v.
Beasley, 118 F.4th 848, 853-54 (6th Cir. 2024) (quotation omitted). The video’s
“gaps or uncertainties” must be construed in the Estate’s favor. Naji v. City of
Dearborn, Michigan, 120 F.4th 520, 523 (6th Cir. 2024) (quotation omitted).

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IV.

Analysis
A.

Qualified Immunity Overview

Section 1983 civil rights plaintiffs must establish that a person acting under
the color of state law deprived them of a guaranteed right under the United States
Constitution or federal law. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1978).
Government officials typically invoke the defense of qualified immunity to shield
themselves from personal liability “for civil damages insofar as their conduct does
not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); see
also Smoak v. Hall, 460 F.3d 768, 777 (6th Cir. 2006). Whether an official should
be entitled to qualified immunity is a legal question for the courts to decide. Elder v.
Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 516 (1994); see also Tucker v. City of Richmond, 388 F.3d
216, 219 (6th Cir. 2004).
Federal courts use a two-pronged test to evaluate whether qualified immunity
is appropriate. The relevant inquiry is (1) “whether, considering the allegations in a
light most favorable to the party injured, a constitutional right has been violated,”
and (2) “whether that right was clearly established.” Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d 484,
494 (6th Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted). While the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden
of showing that the official is not entitled to qualified immunity, Baker v. City of
Hamilton, 471 F.3d 601, 605 (6th Cir. 2006), the defendant has the initial burden of

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showing that his conduct was objectively reasonable under then-existing law.
Tucker, 388 F.3d at 220.
The burden then shifts to the “plaintiff to establish that the defendant’s
conduct violated a right so clearly established that any official in his position would
have clearly understood that he was under an affirmative duty to refrain from such
conduct.” Gardenhire, 205 F.3d at 311; see also Rich v. City of Mayfield Heights,
955 F.2d 1092, 1095 (6th Cir. 1992). The violated right must have been “clearly
established at the time” of the incident. Vanderhoef v. Dixon, 938 F.3d 271, 278 (6th
Cir. 2019). That means courts may “consider only the legal rules existing when the
challenged conduct occurred, not legal rules adopted by later caselaw.” Lawler v.
Hardeman Cnty., 93 F.4th 919, 926 (6th Cir. 2024) (quotation omitted); see also
Kenjoh Outdoor, LLC v. Marchbanks, 23 F.4th 686, 694 (6th Cir. 2022) (requiring
courts to “look to the law at the time the official acted” when ascertaining whether a
right is clearly established).
Summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity is improper when
“there is a factual dispute (i.e., a genuine issue of material fact) involving an issue
on which the question of immunity turns, such that it cannot be determined before
trial whether the defendant did acts that violate clearly established rights.” Poe v.
Haydon, 853 F.2d 418, 425-26 (6th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted).

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B.

Constitutional Violation – Fourteenth Amendment Deliberate
Indifference

Griswold was a pretrial detainee when he passed away because “a court had
yet to try or punish him.” Lawler, 93 F.4th at 926. Pretrial detainees possess a
Fourteenth Amendment right under the United States Constitution not to be
“deprive[d]” of their “life” “without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV,
§ 1. This right, at the very least, mirrors “those afforded convicted prisoners under
the Eighth Amendment.” Lawler, 93 F.4th at 926; see also County of Sacramento v.
Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849-50 (1998).
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the government from inflicting “cruel and
unusual punishments” upon incarcerated individuals. U.S. Const. amend. VIII;
United States v. Campbell, 245 F. App’x 505, 508 (6th Cir. 2007). The amendment
bars prison officials from “unnecessarily and wantonly inflicting pain” on inmates
by acting with “deliberate indifference” to their serious medical needs. Blackmore v.
Kalamazoo County, 390 F.3d 890, 895 (6th Cir. 2004) (quotation omitted).
Deliberate indifference may take the form of delayed medical treatment, Blackmore,
390 F.3d at 899, inadequate treatment, Alspaugh v. McConnell, 643 F.3d 162, 169
(6th Cir. 2011), or the failure to provide any treatment, Rouster v. Cnty. of Saginaw,
749 F.3d 437, 448-449 (6th Cir. 2014).
Under Sixth Circuit precedent:

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A claim of deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment
has both an objective and a subjective component. The objective
component requires the existence of a sufficiently serious
medical need. To satisfy the subjective component, the
defendant must possess a “sufficiently culpable state of mind,”
rising above negligence or even gross negligence and being
“tantamount to intent to punish.” Put another way, “[a] prison
official acts with deliberate indifference if he knows of a
substantial risk to an inmate’s health, yet recklessly disregards
the risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Mere
negligence will not suffice. Consequently, allegations of medical
malpractice or negligent diagnosis and treatment generally fail to
state an Eighth Amendment claim of cruel and unusual
punishment.
Broyles v. Corr. Medical Servs., Inc., 478 F. App’x 971, 975 (6th Cir. 2012) (internal
citations omitted) (footnote added).
Pretrial detainees must demonstrate that jail staff knew of and disregarded an
excessive risk to their health or safety by showing that (1) the officer was aware of
facts from which an inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm
existed, and (2) the officer actually drew the inference. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511
U.S. 825, 837 (1994); Burwell v. City of Lansing, 7 F.4th 456, 466 (6th Cir. 2021).
In plain terms, the officer must recognize the potential for harm to the detainee and
then fail to prevent or avert that harm.4

Under the current standard for assessing a Fourteenth Amendment failure-toprotect claim “officers can face liability even if they did not actually know of a risk
of harm to a pretrial detainee.” Lawler, 93 F.4th at 927. Now, “[p]retrial detainees
need only prove that the officers recklessly disregarded a risk so obvious that they
either knew or should have known of it.” Id. (emphasis in original). Because
4

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1.

The Objective Prong

The objective element in a deliberate indifference claim requires a showing
that the pretrial detainee faced a “substantial risk of serious harm” before suffering
an injury. Lawler, 93 F.4th at 928; see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Detainees may
satisfy the objective prong if they have a serious medical need or condition. See
Lawler, 93 F.4th at 928. Objectively serious medical conditions are ones that a
physician has diagnosed “as needing treatment” or ones that are so obviously serious
“that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.”
Mattox v. Edelman, 851 F.3d 583, 598 (6th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted).
Griswold exhibited an “obvious need for medical care.” Blackmore, 390 F.3d
at 900. He stumbled and swayed after returning from the hospital. He could not
stand straight, or on his own power, while Deputy Linden removed his handcuffs.
He vomited profusely over his clothes and face. Over the course of almost 13 hours,
he appeared unable to clean himself, to elevate his head and torso to clear away the
remaining vomit, or to shift the position of his body away from the pool of vomit
collecting on the cell floor. And he did not appear capable of verbalizing a request
for assistance.

Griswold’s incarceration occurred in October 2018, the Court applies the deliberate
indifference test – the legal standard then in place. See id. at 927-28 (holding that
Sixth Circuit “decisions applying Farmer to the claims of pretrial detainees provide
the only clearly established law in 2018.”).
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Taken together, the vomiting along with his significantly diminished motor
and cognitive functioning, could lead a reasonable jury to find that Griswold was
experiencing an objectively serious medical episode. See, e.g., Burwell, 7 F.4th at
465 (holding the objective prong satisfied where the detainee vomited in his cell and
“laid unconscious in that vomit for two hours without any apparent movement.”);
Bowles v. Bourbon Cty., No. 21-5012, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 21292, at *24 (6th Cir.
Jul. 19, 2021) (objective prong met where detainee “suffered from a persistent
migraine-like headache, vomiting, and nausea that ended with intubation and
death”); Preyor v. City of Ferndale, 248 F. App’x 636, 642 (6th Cir. 2007) (objective
component met where detainee vomited more than once, “suffered bouts of
diarrhea,” and “was seen lying on the floor of a cell or in the fish bowl”); Blackmore,
390 F.3d at 899 (“Blackmore vomited – a clear manifestation of internal physical
disorder.”).
2.

The Subjective Prong

Courts “must address the subjective component for each officer individually.”
Burwell, 7 F.4th at 466; see also Garretson v. City of Madison Heights, 407 F.3d 789,
797 (6th Cir. 2005). The plaintiff may resort to “ordinary methods of proof,”
including circumstantial evidence, to show that a jail official subjectively
appreciated the substantial risk of serious harm posed to the detainee. Rouster, 749
F.3d. at 447. An official “may not escape liability if the evidence showed that he

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merely refused to verify underlying facts that he strongly suspected to be true, or
declined to confirm inferences of risk that he strongly suspected to exist.” Comstock
v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 703 (6th Cir. 2001) (quotation omitted). A jury could
even reasonably infer that “a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very
fact that the risk was obvious.” Rouster, 749 F.3d at 447.
Whether an individual defendant subjectively knew that Griswold was
experiencing a serious medical episode depends upon three factors: (1) awareness
that he had vomited, (2) awareness of his previous discharge from the hospital, and
(3) awareness of his diminished motor and cognitive functioning. The following
table charts each individual defendants’ spectrum of knowledge concerning each
factor. A “Yes” designation means that a genuine factual question exists as to
whether the individual defendant knew about a specific factor.
Defendant

Vomit

Hospital Visit

No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

No
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Sheriff Murphy
Deputy Christopher Marquette
Deputy Alicia Famie
Deputy David Loar
Deputy Kurt Heiob
Deputy Vincent John
Deputy Eric VanVleet
Deputy Allison Schulte
Deputy Patrick Turchi
Deputy Travis Linden
Sergeant Terry Davis

15

Diminished
Motor/Cognitive
Function
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes

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The chart illustrates how each individual defendants’ awareness of Griswold’s
serious medical condition varied. As a guiding principle, the extent of their
knowledge about Griswold’s condition directly correlates to the level of their
personal interaction with him.
Viewing the evidence in the Estate’s favor, the record is insufficient to support
a finding of deliberate indifference as to Sheriff Murphy (in his individual capacity)
and Deputies Christopher Marquette, Alicia Famie, and David Loar. There are
genuine factual questions, however, as to whether Sergeant Davis and Deputies Kurt
Heiob, Vincent John, Eric VanVleet, Allison Schulte, Patrick Turchi, and Travis
Linden recognized the substantial risk of serious harm to Griswold and failed to
prevent or avert it.
Sheriff Murphy. There are no material facts showing that Sheriff Murphy was
subjectively aware of and disregarded Griswold’s serious medical condition. Sheriff
Murphy never interacted with Griswold personally. There is no evidence that he
even knew of Griswold’s incarceration at the jail. The Estate does not refute the
Sheriff’s testimony that he first became aware of Griswold’s death “[t]he morning
of his passing.” (ECF No. 77-11, PageID.3521, Tr. 23:9). And the Estate’s counsel
acknowledged at the hearing that Sheriff Murphy’s role in this case is solely
“premised upon his negligent failure to train the staff in policies and procedures.”
(ECF No. 104, PageID.4616, Tr. 85:15-17).

16

Consequently, the deliberate

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indifference claim asserted against Sheriff Murphy in his individual capacity must
be dismissed.
Deputy Christopher Marquette. Deputy Marquette’s involvement in this case
is limited. He passed through the intake unit on his way back to his station at the
housing unit at 2:09 A.M. (ECF No. 53-25, Counter 2:09:42-47; ECF No. 53-18,
PageID.1018, 1020, Tr. 9:12-17, Tr. 13:9-12). He walked in front of Griswold’s cell
for approximately five seconds and “glance[d]” in. (ECF No. 53-25, Counter
2:09:42-47; ECF No. 53-18, PageID.1022, Tr. 15:19). He did not recall seeing any
vomit in the cell. And there is no evidence that he knew about Griswold’s previous
hospital visit or his diminished motor and cognitive functioning. (ECF No. 53-18,
PageID.1021, Tr. 14:1-3). This single event cannot sustain a claim for deliberate
indifference.
Deputy Alicia Famie. Deputy Famie was assigned to the housing unit with
Deputy Marquette on the early morning of October 15. (ECF No. 53-17,
PageID.1004, Tr. 9:14-22). She walked into the intake unit with Deputy Marquette
at 5:05 A.M. to place another detainee in the cell adjacent to Griswold’s. (Id.,
PageID.1005-06, Tr. 10:7-16, 11:4-5; ECF No. 23-25, Counter 5:05:40-5:06:45).
She seemed to notice Griswold lying on the floor and placed her face to the glass
panel of his cell, cupping her left eye with her left hand to shade her perspective
from the glass’s reflection. (Id., Counter 5:05:57). She peered in for approximately

17

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six seconds before returning her attention to the other detainee. (Id., Counter
5:05:54-5:06:00). She then left the intake unit altogether. (Id., Counter 5:06:005:06:45). Deputy Famie did not recollect seeing any vomit in Griswold’s cell and
there is no evidence from which to infer that she knew about his previous hospital
visit or his diminished motor and cognitive functioning. (ECF No. 53-17,
PageID.1007-08, Tr. 12:13-13:3).

As with Deputy Marquette, her passing

observation does not constitute deliberate indifference.
Deputy David Loar.

Deputy Loar was assigned to the Sheriff Work

Assignment Program on October 15.5 (ECF No. 53-19, PageID.1030, Tr. 10:11-14).
He walked through the intake unit at 6:52 A.M. on his way to the shower room to
“fill a container with water for a[n inmate] work team as [they] left the jail.” (Id.,
PageID.1031, Tr. 11:10-16; ECF No. 23-24, Counter 6:52:03-09). He stopped in the
hallway in front of Griswold’s cell and bent his body forward slightly to look at
Griswold’s position on the floor. (Id., Counter 6:52:03-09). The encounter lasted all
of six seconds. (Id.). Deputy Loar did not remember seeing any vomit in Griswold’s
cell and there is no evidence from which to infer that he knew about Griswold’s
previous hospital visit or his diminished motor and cognitive functioning. (ECF No.

This program appears to be an alternative to incarceration, “that substitutes
community labor, rather than incarceration, for carefully selected offenders.”
https://www.washtenaw.org/1404/Community-Work-Program-CWP (last visited
Mar. 6, 2025).
5

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53-19, PageID.1034, 1037, Tr. 14:20-24, 19:4-6).

No reasonable jury would

conclude that Deputy Loar exhibited deliberate indifference to Griswold’s serious
medical condition.6
Deputy Kurt Heiob. Deputy Heiob performed two cell checks on Griswold –
one at 7:07 A.M. and another at 7:42 A.M. Focusing on the first cell check,7 Deputy
Heiob approached Griswold’s cell with Deputy Eric VanVleet, placed his face close
to the cell glass, and stared into the cell for approximately 13 seconds. (ECF No. 2325, Counter 7:07:09-22). He then turned away to oversee breakfast service to a
group of inmates in another cell, 3 to 5 feet across from Griswold’s. (Id., Counter
7:07:23-7:08:10). A minute later, he walked back towards Griswold’s cell, leaned
on an adjoining wall, and placed his face within inches of the cell glass. (Id., Counter
7:08:10-11). He observed Griswold for 16 seconds before turning to his left and
walking off-camera. (Id., Counter 7:08:11-27). Griswold hardly moved. (ECF No.
23-24, Counter 3:07:06-3:08:27).
Deputy Heiob testified that he did not recall seeing vomit on Griswold or on
the floor of his cell. (ECF No. 53-28, PageID.1107-08, 1110, Tr. 17:21-18:1, 27:20-

Deputy Loar passed through the intake unit again at 7:15 A.M. (ECF No. 23-25,
Counter 7:15:29-38). This time he glanced at Griswold’s cell for two seconds. (Id.,
Counter 7:15:29-30).
6

Recounting the events surrounding the 7:42 A.M. cell check would be duplicative.
The Court already summarized what transpired in the “Factual History” section to
this opinion and order.
7

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22). And there is no evidence from which to infer that he knew about Griswold’s
previous hospital visit or his diminished motor and cognitive functioning. (Id.,
PageID.1111, Tr. 28:4-8, 16-20).
Nonetheless, a reasonable jury could infer that Deputy Heiob did in fact see
vomit as Griswold lay still on the floor. Video footage from Griswold’s cell shows
him not moving while sprawled out on the floor next to a puddle of vomit. (ECF No.
23-24, Counter 3:07:06-3:08:27). The Livingston County EMS technician who
responded to the scene found Griswold with a “fully obstructed” airway and noted
that he had “copious amounts of emesis in his mouth and nose/nostrils.” (ECF No.
77-16, PageID.3678). The technician described Griswold with “thick green colored
vomit around his mouth and coming out of his nostrils.” (Id., PageID.3681). The
technician had to suction his airway clear before attempting to resuscitate him. (Id.,
PageID.3678). And a Sheriff’s Office supplemental investigation report found that
Griswold had “vomited possibly twice,” that “there was also vomit present during
resuscitation efforts,” and that postmortem photographs depicted “brown and yellow
vomit discharge coming from [an] intubation tube.” (ECF No. 77-20, PageID.3864).
Viewing this evidence in the Estate’s favor, there is a genuine factual question
as to whether Deputy Heiob was deliberately indifferent to Griswold’s serious
medical condition.

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Deputy Vincent John. Deputy John performed three cell checks on Griswold
– 6:04 A.M., 7:08 A.M., and 7:42 A.M.8 At the 6:04 A.M. cell check, Deputy John
approached Griswold’s cell with Deputy VanVleet. (ECF No. 23-25, Counter
6:04:31). He stopped within inches of the cell glass door. (Id., Counter 6:04:35). He
peered in at Griswold lying motionless on the floor for approximately 8 seconds
before walking off-camera. (Id., Counter 6:04:35-43). During the 7:08 A.M. cell
check, Deputy John walked to the cell glass door, looked at Griswold lying still in
the same position, and continued to examine Griswold as he walked along the cell
glass panels until he exited the intake hallway. The entire cell check last about 10
seconds. (Id., Counter 7:08:15-25).
Deputy John testified that he did not recall seeing vomit on Griswold or on
the cell floor. (ECF No. 77-15, PageID.3667, Tr. 28:3-15). And there is no evidence
from which to infer that he knew about Griswold’s diminished motor and cognitive
functioning. He did know about Griswold’s previous hospital visit. Deputy John
testified that he “knew that [Griswold] obtained clearance from the hospital to be in
the jail facility” and that the hospital clearance “was mentioned sometime during the
passing throughout the morning.” (Id., PageID.3666, Tr. 22:6-14).
This awareness of Griswold’s prior hospital visit, coupled with the video
footage of Griswold lying still on the cell floor in a puddle of vomit (ECF No. 23-

8

See footnote 7.
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24, Counter 2:04:28-2:04:44, 3:08:14-3:08:23), together with the documentary
evidence indicating the apparent presence of vomit in Griswold’s mouth and nose
(ECF No. 77-16, PageID.3678, 3681; ECF No. 77-20, PageID.3864), are sufficient
to raise a genuine factual question as to whether Deputy John recognized the
potential harm to Griswold and failed to prevent or avert it.
Deputy Eric VanVleet. Deputy VanVleet performed two cell checks on
Griswold – one at 6:04 A.M. and another at 7:07 A.M. (ECF No. 103, PageID.4530;
ECF No. 107, PageID.4775). At the 6:04 A.M. cell check, Deputy VanVleet walked
with Deputy John to within inches of Griswold’s cell glass. (ECF No. 23-25, Counter
6:04:15-28). He stared at Griswold lying still on the floor for approximately 15
seconds before walking off-camera. (Id., Counter 6:04:28-43). During the 7:07 A.M.
cell check, Deputy VanVleet again walked within inches of Griswold’s cell glass.
(Id., Counter 7:07:04-08). He looked at Griswold lying still on the floor for
approximately 18 seconds. (Id., Counter 7:07:09-27). In that time, he tapped the cell
glass. (Id., Counter 7:07:21-22). Griswold moved his leg slightly in response. (ECF
No. 23-24, Counter 3:07:07-28).
Deputy VanVleet testified that he did not recall seeing vomit on Griswold or
the floor of his cell. (ECF No. 77-14, PageID.3639, 3647, Tr. 13:1-5, 46:21-47:11).
He also disclaimed that he ever received information about Griswold’s prior hospital
visit. (Id., PageID.3649, Tr. 53:4-7). A reasonable jury could conclude otherwise.

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Deputy VanVleet acknowledged that video footage from Griswold’s cell
clearly depicted him lying in vomit and that the vomit should have been “readily
apparent” during the 6:04 A.M. cell check. (Id., PageID.3644, Tr. 34:6-14). The
documentary evidence – indicating a pronounced amount of vomit in Griswold’s
mouth and nose – confirms this observation. (ECF No. 77-16, PageID.3678, 3681;
ECF No. 77-20, PageID.3864). What is more, Deputy John – Deputy VanVleet’s
morning shift partner – testified that he was aware of Griswold’s hospital clearance
because “[i]t was mentioned sometime during the passing throughout the morning.”
(ECF No. 77-15, PageID.3666, Tr. 22:13-14). A reasonable jury could reject Deputy
VanVleet’s testimony on this score; inferring that shift partners, working side-byside, and charged with supervising the same inmates, most likely received the same
access to this critical piece of information.
Whether Deputy VanVleet perceived that Griswold was experiencing
diminished motor and cognitive functioning raises another factual question. Deputy
VanVleet testified (and informed investigators) that he smacked Griswold’s cell
glass at the 6:04 A.M. cell check and that Griswold “opened his eyes and looked at
me.” (ECF No. 77-14, PageID.3643, Tr. 31:19-25, Tr. 32:15-19). But when he
smacked Griswold’s cell glass a second time, at the 7:07 A.M. cell check, he
provided divergent accounts concerning whether Griswold opened his eyes to the
resulting the sound. He told investigators that Griswold did open his eyes. (ECF No.

23

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77-20, PageID.3863). In another statement, he claimed that Griswold never opened
his eyes. (ECF No. 77-14, PageID.3645, Tr. 39:15-23). And at his deposition he
could not recall one way or the other. (Id., PageID.3646, Tr. 43:6-13). A jury could
resolve this discrepancy in the Estate’s favor and reasonably conclude that Deputy
VanVleet should have taken additional measures to assure Griswold’s safety when
he did not respond to the deputy’s efforts to rouse him.9
For all these reasons, whether Deputy VanVleet exhibited deliberate
indifference to Griswold’s serious medical condition presents a genuine question of
material fact.
Deputy Allison Schulte. Deputy Schulte performed approximately 17 cell
checks on Griswold, spanning from 6:35 P.M. on October 14 through 4:56 A.M. on
October 15. (ECF No. 103, PageID.4528-29). Most of them lasted about 3-5
seconds.
Deputy Schulte offered conflicting statements about when she realized
Griswold had vomited. On the one hand, she recalled observing from the intake
control pod video that Griswold had vomited on himself. (ECF No. 77-13,
PageID.3615, Tr. 26:7-27:5). On the other, she testified that she did not know

Deputy VanVleet smacked Griswold’s cell glass on another occasion, while passing
through the intake unit hallway at 7:15 A.M. (ECF No. 23-25, Counter 7:15:20-21;
ECF No. 107, PageID.4777). Griswold continued to lay on the cell floor,
unresponsive. (ECF No. 23-24, Counter 3:15:18-21).
9

24

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Griswold had vomited “[o]n the date in question.” (Id., PageID.3612, Tr. 14:2515:4). She did acknowledge, however, that the vomit was apparent from the intake
control pod video. (Id., PageID.3615, Tr. 27:2-5). And she admitted that she would
have observed Griswold in his cell through that same video feed during her shift.
(Id., PageID.3618, Tr. 38:13-22).10
Although there is no evidence from which to infer that Deputy Schulte knew
about Griswold’s diminished motor and cognitive functioning, she was aware of
Griswold’s previous hospital visit.

Deputy Schulte testified that she “knew

[Griswold] got sent out and went to the hospital” from a “[verbal] passdown of the
prior deputies” and that he required medical clearance before returning to the jail.
(Id., PageID.3613, Tr. 18:19-21; PageID.3611, Tr. 11:23-24).
This awareness of Griswold’s prior hospital visit, coupled with the video
footage of Griswold lying still on the cell floor in a puddle of vomit – which Deputy
Schulte would have observed from the intake control pod, and the documentary
evidence indicating the obvious presence of vomit in Griswold’s mouth and nose
(ECF No. 77-16, PageID.3678, 3681; ECF No. 77-20, PageID.3864), together raise
a genuine factual question as to whether Deputy Schulte was deliberately indifferent
to Griswold’s serious medical condition.

Deputy Linden testified that the vomit was apparent at his 8:27 P.M. cell check –
almost a half hour before Schulte’s 8:55 P.M. cell check. (ECF No. 77-10,
PageID.3472, Tr. 106:4-8; ECF No. 77-13, PageID.3616, Tr. 29:20-22).
10

25

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Deputy Patrick Turchi. Deputy Turchi performed approximately 7 cell checks
on Griswold, from 8:27 P.M. on October 14 through 5:26 A.M. on October 15. (ECF
No. 103, PageID.4528-29; ECF No. 107, PageID.4774). He also assisted Deputy
Linden with removing Griswold’s handcuffs at 7:00 P.M. (ECF No. 53-22, Counter
54:41-57:41).
Deputy Turchi’s most involved cell check occurred at 8:40 P.M. – after
Griswold had already vomited. Deputy Turchi approached Griswold’s cell with
Deputies Linden and Sutfin. (ECF No. 53-13, Counter 2:40:12-20). Deputy Linden
opened the cell door, stood in the doorway, and spoke to Griswold for almost a
minute. (Id., Counter 2:40:20-2:41:19). Deputy Turchi stood next to Deputy Linden
outside the cell, but at the doorway, looking at Griswold through the cell glass during
the conversation. (Id.). Meanwhile, Griswold laid on the floor, arms and legs
crossed, leaning against the cell wall, with noticeable amounts of vomit on his shirt,
his pants, and on the cell floor next to him. (ECF No. 53-22, Counter 2:33:322:34:34).
Deputy Turchi did not recall knowing whether Griswold had vomited by 8:40
P.M., but he did acknowledge that the vomit was apparent from the cell video footage
at that time. (ECF No. 77-9, PageID.3422, Tr. 80:1-19). He also did not recall
smelling vomit emanating from Griswold’s cell even though his sense of smell is
unimpaired. (Id., PageID.3423, 3426, Tr. 81:3-8, Tr. 96:24-97:1). He did know that

26

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Griswold required hospital clearance before returning to the jail. (Id., PageID.3420,
Tr. 71:1-5).
Deputy Turchi saw that Griswold was stumbling and uncoordinated when he
assisted Deputy Linden with removing Griswold’s handcuffs at 7:00 P.M. (Id.,
PageID.3415-16, Tr. 49:18-50:13; Tr. 55:21-56:1). He recalled that Griswold never
opened his eyes or responded verbally throughout that interaction. (Id.,
PageID.3414, Tr. 48:4-17). And Deputy Turchi recognized that Griswold had not
moved from his seated position when he returned to the cell with Deputy Linden at
8:40 P.M. – over an hour and a half later. (Id., PageID.3423, Tr. 81:9-12).
Taken together, the video footage of Deputy Turchi looking at Griswold lying
still on the cell floor, soaked in a puddle of vomit at the 8:40 P.M. cell check, his
proximity to the open cell doorway where he could have smelled the vomit, his
awareness of Griswold’s prior hospital visit, his testimony about Griswold’s lack of
responsiveness and motor coordination, along with the documentary evidence
indicating the apparent presence of vomit in Griswold’s mouth and nose (ECF No.
77-16, PageID.3678, 3681; ECF No. 77-20, PageID.3684), are sufficient to raise a
genuine factual question as to whether Deputy Turchi acted with deliberate
indifference to Griswold’s serious medical needs.
Deputy Travis Linden. Deputy Linden performed approximately 9 cell checks
on Griswold, from 8:27 P.M. on October 14 through 5:18 A.M. on October 15. (ECF

27

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No. 103, PageID.4528-30). He also removed Griswold’s handcuffs at 7:00 P.M. with
Deputy Turchi’s assistance. (ECF No. 53-22, Counter 54:41-57:41).
Deputy Linden’s most noteworthy cell checks occurred at 8:40 P.M. and 3:15
A.M. – again, after Griswold had already vomited. Focusing on the 3:15 A.M. cell
check, Deputy Linden walked to Griswold’s cell, opened the door, and appeared to
talk to him for well over a minute. (ECF No. 53-25, Counter 3:15:50-3:17:09).
Griswold remained on the floor, arms and legs crossed, leaning against the cell wall,
with noticeable amounts of vomit on his shirt, pants, and on the cell floor next to
him – nearly unchanged from his position at the 8:40 P.M. cell check, six and half
hours earlier. (ECF No. 53-22, Counter 3:15:46-3:17:09).
Deputy Linden knew about Griswold’s previous hospital visit. (ECF No. 7710, PageID.3452, Tr. 28:8-11). He admitted that he saw vomit on Griswold at the
8:40 P.M. cell check and that he would have smelled it. (Id., PageID.3472, 3475, Tr.
106:4-8, Tr. 107:17-18, Tr. 118:4-6). He testified that Griswold never talked to him
at the 8:40 P.M. cell check or at any other time.11 (Id., PageID.3476, 3487, Tr.
121:18-122:4, Tr. 165:20-21). And he recalled that Griswold never opened his eyes.
(Id., PageID.3474, Tr. 114:20-22).

Deputy Linden told investigators that he also observed vomit in Griswold’s cell at
a 12:17 A.M. cell check. (ECF No. 77-10, PageID.3481, Tr. 141:25-142:4).
Griswold did not speak or open his eyes at that time. (Id., Tr. 142:5-7, 24-25).
11

28

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As for the 3:15 A.M. cell check, Deputy Linden acknowledged that Griswold
still did not interact with him, that he was lying in his own vomit, and that he did not
appear “normal.” (Id., PageID.3481, Tr. 144:14-21). When the Estate’s counsel
asked him whether he “could see that [Griswold] had vomited and was lying in his
own pile of vomit and wasn’t moving and wasn’t responding, all that was – was
known to you, wasn’t it?” he responded “Yes.” (Id., PageID.3489, Tr. 175:1-5).
Because Deputy Linden observed that Griswold had vomited, he knew that
Griswold needed hospital clearance before returning to the jail, and he directly
observed Griswold’s unresponsiveness and immobility, there is enough evidence for
a reasonable jury to conclude that he exhibited deliberate indifference to Griswold’s
serious medical condition.
Sergeant Terry Davis. Sergeant Davis performed two cell checks on Griswold
– one at 6:35 P.M. on October 14 and another at 4:30 A.M. on October 15. (ECF No.
103, PageID.4528-29). At the 6:35 P.M. cell check, Sergeant Davis entered
Griswold’s cell and appeared to speak with him for approximately 50 seconds.
Griswold remained seated on the cell floor with his arms behind his back,
handcuffed. His chin rested on his chest. And he did not appear responsive to
Sergeant Davis’s presence. (ECF No. 53-13 Counter 35:19-36:09; ECF No. 53-22,
Counter 28:40-29:24).

29

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During the 4:30 A.M. cell check, Sergeant Davis walked through the intake
hallway, stopped, turned back to Griswold’s cell, and knocked on the glass. He
waited five seconds at the cell door before continuing through the intake unit and
off-camera. (ECF No. 53-25, Counter 4:30:55-4:31:03). Griswold did not appear to
respond. (ECF No. 53-24, Counter 30:55-31:03).
Sergeant Davis testified that he did not recall seeing vomit on Griswold or on
his cell floor at the 4:30 A.M check. (ECF No. 77-12, PageID.3592-94, Tr. 44:1322, Tr. 46:1-2, Tr. 50:4-5). He stated that he would “not necessarily” have entered
Griswold’s cell or called for medical support if he had seen the vomit. (Id.,
PageID.3592-93, Tr. 44:23-45:4). And he admitted that he knew about Griswold’s
previous hospital visit. (Id., PageID.3594, Tr. 51:16-19).
Still, a reasonable jury could find that Sergeant Davis did in fact see the vomit
as Griswold laid still on the floor at the 4:30 A.M. check. Video footage from
Griswold’s cell shows him not moving while sprawled out on the floor next to a
puddle of vomit. (ECF No. 53-24, Counter 30:55-31:03). And the documentary
evidence – indicating “copious amounts” of vomit in Griswold’s mouth and nose –
again confirms this observation. (ECF No. 77-16, PageID.3678, 3681; ECF No. 7720, PageID.3864).
Whether Sergeant Davis perceived that Griswold was experiencing
diminished motor and cognitive functioning raises another factual question. He

30

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attested that Griswold was responsive during the 6:35 A.M. cell check – “[h]e looked
at me through his eyes . . . [h]is eyes moved up when I talked to him.” (ECF No. 7712, PageID.3590, Tr. 33:9, 18-19). Yet Griswold was unresponsive by the time he
conducted the 4:30 A.M. cell check – “he didn’t respond to whatever it is I said or
did.” (Id., PageID.3592, Tr. 41:15-16). This distinct contrast in Griswold’s reactive
demeanor could lead a jury to reasonably conclude that Sergeant Davis perceived
Griswold’s significant motor and cognitive deterioration but failed to take any
affirmative measures to secure Griswold’s welfare.
For all these reasons, whether Sergeant Davis exhibited deliberate
indifference to Griswold’s serious medical condition presents a genuine question of
material fact.
C.

Clearly Established Law – Fourteenth Amendment Deliberate
Indifference

Since there is enough evidence for a jury to reasonably conclude that Sergeant
Davis and Deputies Heiob, John, VanVleet, Schulte, Turchi, and Linden exhibited
deliberate indifference to Griswold’s serious medical condition, the next question is
whether the right they violated was clearly established in October 2018.
The scope of a clearly established right “must be sufficiently clear that a
reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.”
Burwell, 7 F.4th at 476 (quotation omitted). The right is not defined “at a high level
of generality.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011).
31

It must be

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“particularized to the facts of the case.” White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79 (2017)
(quotation omitted). Even still, the case need not “be on all fours in order to form
the basis for the clearly established right.” Hopper v. Plummer, 887 F.3d 744, 755
(6th Cir. 2018) (quotation omitted). The “fact pattern” must only be “similar enough
to have given fair and clear warning to officers about what the law requires.” Id.
(quotation omitted).
“As early as 1972,” the Sixth Circuit has held that “where the circumstances
are clearly sufficient to indicate the need of medical attention for injury or illness,
the denial of such aid constitutes the deprivation of constitutional due process.”
Estate of Carter v. City of Detroit, 408 F.3d 305, 313 (6th Cir. 2005) (quotation
omitted). “[I]n 1992,” the Sixth Circuit reiterated “that a pretrial detainee’s right to
medical treatment for a serious medical need has been established since at least
1987.” Id. And more recently, in Burwell v. City of Lansing, 7 F.4th 456 (6th Cir.
2021), the Sixth Circuit found that a detention officer in a local jail was deliberately
indifferent to the serious medical needs of a pretrial detainee who died in his cell
after “vomit[ing] while unconscious and remained motionless as the vomit pooled
around his head.” Id. at 473. The court of appeals held there, that “it was clearly
established at the time of [the decedent’s] detention” – on April 27, 2015 – “that
declining to render aid to an unconscious detainee lying in a pool of vomit constitutes
a constitutional violation.” Id. at 477.

32

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These same clearly established principles apply here. Placing aside the
marginal factual differences between the circumstances leading to Griswold’s death
and those of the decedent in Burwell, the “fact patterns” are “similar enough” that
Sergeant Davis and Deputies Heiob, John, VanVleet, Schulte, Turchi, and Linden
should have received “fair and clear warning about what the law requires.” Hopper,
887 F.3d at 755. That means they should have all known, by October 14, 2018 (the
date Griswold’s detention commenced), that declining to provide or seek medical
assistance to a significantly impaired detainee, laying prone on his cell floor for up
to 13 hours, in a pool of his own vomit, is a Fourteenth Amendment due process
violation.
The Livingston County Defendants disagree. They seem to argue that Burwell
is materially distinguishable because, unlike in that case, a physician at the hospital
previously cleared Griswold for incarceration. (ECF No. 53, PageID.824-27). And
they assert, correctly, that a “non-medically trained officer does not act with
deliberate indifference to an inmate’s medical needs when he reasonably deferred to
the medical professionals’ opinions.” Greene v. Crawford Cnty., 22 F.4th 593, 608
(6th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up).
But The Livingston County Defendants overlook a countervailing principle.
While “a mistaken, albeit reasonable, belief” that “deference to a provider is
warranted will not rise to the level of deliberate indifference,” “[s]uch deference is

33

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unreasonable in circumstances” where “the medical professional rendered their
opinion prior to changed circumstances.” Grote v. Kenton Cnty., 85 F.4th 397, 412
(6th Cir. 2023).
That’s exactly what occurred in this case. Griswold’s condition continued to
deteriorate after a hospital physician evaluated him and cleared him for incarceration
at the jail. He became more unsteady in his gait, less communicative – to the point
of unresponsive, and was eventually unable to shift his position as he lay on the cell
floor. He also vomited, which is “a clear manifestation of internal physical disorder.”
Blackmore, 390 F.3d at 899. None of these developments should have surprised
Sergeant Davis or Deputies Heiob, John, VanVleet, Schulte, Turchi, and Linden.
Griswold’s hospital discharge papers specifically warned that “[s]ignificant changes
or worsening in your condition may require more immediate attention.” (ECF No.
53-11, PageID.873). And it cautioned Griswold to “seek immediate medical care”
in the event he experienced “recurrent vomiting.” (Id., PageID.876).

This

information could have been useful, except that Sergeant Davis and Deputies Heiob,
John, VanVleet, Schulte, Turchi, and Linden never reviewed the discharge papers
after Griswold returned from the hospital. (ECF No. 53-28, PageID.1112, Tr. 29:212; ECF No. 77-9, PageID.3409, Tr. 26:25-27:3; ECF No. 77-10, PageID.3485, Tr.
159:14-16; ECF No. 77-12, PageID.3594, Tr. 51:20-23; ECF No. 77-13,

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PageID.3622, Tr. 54:17-56:3; ECF No. 77-14, PageID.3638, Tr. 9:20-10:13). That
oversight proved fatal.
The Livingston County Defendants further attempt to distinguish Burwell
based upon the comparative severity of the decedent’s objective symptoms. They
claim that Griswold’s “single episode of vomiting” is not nearly as serious as what
transpired in Burwell. There, video evidence showed the decedent “bent at the waist,
swaying and rocking on the bench inside his cell, grabbing his head and midsection,
dropping his sandwich numerous times, and falling to the floor repeatedly” before
he collapsed to the cell floor and vomited. Burwell, 7 F.4th at 464.
The Livingston County Defendants oversimplify the comparison.

They

ignore how Griswold’s gait became increasingly unsteady, how his cognitive and
motor functioning appeared to diminish substantially over time, how his inability to
communicate became marked, that he could no longer alter his position as he lay
prone on the cell floor, or even extricate himself from a puddle of his own vomit.
These factors are sufficiently analogous to fall within Burwell’s reach.
Because the facts in Burwell largely track the material circumstances of
Griswold’s own death, it may serve as “fair notice” to Sergeant Davis and Deputies
Heiob, John, VanVleet, Schulte, Turchi, and Linden that their “conduct was
unlawful.” Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100, 104 (2018) (citations omitted); see also
Lawler, 93 F.4th at 926.

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D.

Individual Supervisory Liability Against Sheriff Murphy

The Estate next alleges that Sheriff Murphy should be held liable in his
individual supervisory capacity because he failed to train his deputies to follow the
policies (1) requiring an intake reevaluation of a prospective detainee’s health status
when returning to the jail after receiving medical clearance, and (2) mandating that
deputies contact jail medical staff when a detainee appears to be in health-related
distress, even after receiving prior medical clearance. (ECF No. 77, PageID.328384).
Supervisors are not liable under section 1983 for failing to train subordinate
employees unless they “either encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in
some other way directly participated in it.” Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th
Cir. 1999) (quotation omitted). “At a minimum a plaintiff must show that the official
at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the
unconstitutional conduct of the offending officers.” Id. The plaintiff “must point to”
an individual supervisor’s “specific action[s]” to prevail on the claim. Phillips v.
Roane County, 534 F.3d 531, 544 (6th Cir. 2008).
The supervisor must also possess “some contemporaneous knowledge of his
subordinates’ unconstitutional conduct that resulted in a direct injury to the
plaintiff.” Hubble v. Cnty. of Macomb, No. 16-13504, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68465,
at *66-67 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 23, 2019); see also Turner v. City of Taylor, 412 F.3d

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629, 643 (6th Cir. 2005) (dismissing a supervisory liability claim because there was
“no evidence whatsoever that any of the supervisory Defendants either participated
in the beatings or knew about them at any time.”).
Sheriff Murphy never interacted with Griswold personally. There is no
evidence showing that he was even aware of Griswold’s incarceration at the jail.
And the Estate never rebutted Sheriff Murphy’s testimony that he first received
notice of Griswold’s death “[t]he morning of his passing.” (ECF No. 77-11,
PageID.3521, Tr. 23:9). The Estate’s broader accusation that the individual deputies
“were not properly trained [is] more appropriately submitted as evidence to support
a failure-to-train theory against” Livingston County rather than Sheriff Murphy in
his individual capacity. Phillips, 534 F.3d at 544; see also Heyerman v. County of
Calhoun, 680 F.3d 642, 647-48 (6th Cir. 2012); Miller v. Calhoun Cnty., 408 F.3d
803, 817 n.3 (6th Cir. 2005) (treating failure-to-train claims against individual
supervisors as official capacity claims against the municipality where no evidence
existed of their personal involvement in the specific incident of misconduct).
Based on this record, Sheriff Murphy is entitled to summary judgment on the
Estate’s individual supervisory liability claim. See Hubble, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
68465, at *67 (dismissing a supervisory liability claim asserted against a county
sheriff where he “had no actual knowledge” of the decedent or “her condition or her
treatment by jail or medical staff until after her death.”).

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E.

Municipal Liability

The Estate is likewise pursuing a municipal liability claim against Livingston
County under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658
(1978). The Estate’s specific theory of liability is that the County failed to train its
jail services deputies to follow the policies (1) requiring an intake reevaluation of a
prospective detainee’s health status when returning to the jail after receiving medical
clearance, and (2) mandating that they contact jail medical staff when a detainee
appears to be in health-related distress, even after receiving prior medical
clearance.12 (ECF No. 77, PageID.3283; ECF No. 104, PageID.4662-65, Tr. 131:21132:1, Tr. 133:24-134:3).
“A municipality is a ‘person’ under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and so can be held liable
for constitutional injuries for which it is responsible.” Morgan v. Fairfield Cnty., 903
F.3d 553, 565 (6th Cir. 2018). To prevail on a section 1983 claim against a
municipality, the plaintiff must show that a municipal policy or custom violates a
federal right. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91, 694. The Estate may establish municipal
liability through (1) the existence of an illegal official policy or legislative

At the hearing, the Estate’s counsel abandoned its municipal liability theory
predicated upon Sheriff Murphy’s alleged inadequate investigation of Griswold’s
death. (ECF No. 77, PageID.3284; ECF No. 104, PageID.4662-65, Tr.131:21-132:1,
Tr. 133:18-134:3). See Brainard v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 889 F.2d
679, 681 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding that an argument was abandoned when counsel did
not pursue it before an administrative law judge and did not present the argument to
the district court).
12

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enactment, (2) an official with final decision-making authority who ratifies illegal
actions, (3) the existence of a policy of inadequate training or supervision, or (4) the
existence of a custom of tolerance or acquiescence of federal rights violations. See
Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 478 (6th Cir. 2013). A suit against individual
defendants in their official capacities – such as Sheriff Murphy – is “analogous to a
suit against the local entity.” Pineda v. Hamilton County, 977 F.3d 483, 494 (6th Cir.
2020).
“A municipality’s culpability for a deprivation of rights is at its most tenuous
where a claim turns on a failure to train.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61
(2011). There are two ways to demonstrate that a municipality failed to train or
supervise its employees. The first method is where the plaintiff shows a “pattern of
similar constitutional violations by untrained employees” and the County’s
“continued adherence to an approach that it knows or should know has failed to
prevent tortious conduct by employees.” Shadrick v. Hopkins Cnty., 805 F.3d 724,
738-39 (6th Cir. 2015) (cleaned up). These two elements demonstrate “the deliberate
indifference necessary to trigger municipal liability.” Id.
The second method is where the plaintiff points to “a single violation of
federal rights, accompanied by a showing that the County has failed to train its
employees to handle recurring situations presenting an obvious potential for a
constitutional violation.” Id. at 739 (cleaned up). This alternative is open “in a

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narrow range of circumstances where a federal rights violation may be a highly
predictable consequence of a failure to equip employees with specific tools to handle
recurring situations.” Id. at 739 (cleaned up).
Because the Estate did not identify a “pattern of similar constitutional
violations” it must follow the second “mode of proof” by demonstrating that (1) a
single violation occurred, i.e., the deliberate indifference to Griswold’s serious
medical condition, (2) the type of violation is a recurring situation, (3) the type of
violation raises the obvious potential for a constitutional violation. Id.
The basic question in this second class of cases is whether Livingston
County’s “failure to train its employees amounted to deliberate indifference, on
behalf of the County, to the rights of detainees.” Helphenstine v. Lewis Cnty., 60
F.4th 305, 323 (6th Cir. 2023). The Estate must prove three elements: (1) the
County’s “training or supervision was inadequate for the tasks performed; (2) the
inadequacy was the result of the municipality’s deliberate indifference; and (3) the
inadequacy was closely related to or actually caused the injury.” Id. (quotation
omitted); see also Winkler v. Madison Cnty., 893 F.3d 877, 902 (6th Cir. 2018).
The second element – the municipality’s deliberate indifference – requires
proof that “the violation of a clearly established right was a known or obvious
consequence of the lack of training or supervision.” Gambrel v. Knox Cty., 25 F.4th

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391, 408 (6th Cir. 2022) (quotation omitted); see also Arrington-Bey v. City of
Bedford Heights, 858 F.3d 988, 995 (6th Cir. 2017).
The third element – actual causation between the inadequate training and
Griswold’s death – requires evidence of “but-for (or factual) causation and
proximate causation.” Gambrel, 25 F.4th at 408; see also Powers v. Hamilton Cnty.
Pub. Def. Comm’n, 501 F.3d 592, 608-11 (6th Cir. 2007). With respect to factual
causation, the Estate “cannot hold the municipality liable without proof that proper
training would have prevented” the jail services deputies’ deliberate indifference to
Griswold’s serious medical needs. Gambrel, 25 F.4th at 409; see also Carey v.
Helton, 70 F. App’x 291, 294-95 (6th Cir. 2003) (per curiam). As for proximate
causation, the Estate must show that “a municipality could reasonably foresee that
an employee’s wrongful act would follow from the lack of training.” Gambrel, 25
F.4th at 409; see also Crabbs v. Scott, 800 F. App’x 332, 338 (6th Cir. 2020).
1.

Adequacy of the Training

A municipality’s failure to train its employees on jail policies does not
“necessarily demonstrate[ ] deliberate indifference to . . . constitutional due process
rights.” Porro v. Barnes, 624 F.3d 1322, 1329 (10th Cir. 2010). Inadequate policy
training must violate a constitutional standard and result in a constitutional harm,
which the policies are intended to prevent. See id. (“Policies are often prophylactic,
setting standards of care higher than what the Constitution requires.”). The Estate’s

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assertion that the jail services deputies did not receive adequate training on jail
policies is, in effect, an argument that the County failed to train them to (1) evaluate
detainees for indications of serious medical distress, and (2) recognize those
symptoms of serious medical distress warranting immediate medical intervention.
The evidence (or lack thereof) supports this theory.
None of the deputies testified that they received training on how to identify
whether a detainee is suffering from a form of toxicity, overdose, or some other
severe internal physical disorder. The County produced no training manuals,
protocols, curriculums, completion certificates, training logs, or personnel files
showing that jail services deputies are trained to address these emergent medical
situations. Nor is it apparent that the County ever provided these materials to its jail
policies expert prior to his deposition. (ECF No. 77-18).
Sheriff Murphy did testify that the jail services deputies are trained in CPR.
(ECF No. 77-11, PageID.3528, Tr. 49:3-4). But when asked whether the deputies
are “supposed to know that vomiting may be an indication of medical problem,” he
was unaware of any specific training on that topic. (Id., Tr. 49:5-8) (“I don’t know
what the class is, to be honest with you.”). And he disagreed with the notion that
deputies should be trained to recognize that detainees may be suffering from a
“medical crisis” when they are verbally non-responsive. (Id., PageID.3529, Tr. 54:310).

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A reasonable jury could also infer the County’s failure to train from the
deputies’ own statements. Deputy Linden testified that the County never tested him
on the jail’s policies. (ECF No. 77-10, PageID.3455, Tr. 37:14-15). And some of the
deputies viewed Griswold’s unresponsiveness to verbal prompts as behavioral
obstinance, rather than perceiving his silence as an inability to answer intake
questions and the sign of a worsening severe medical impairment. (ECF No. 77-10,
PageID.3649, Tr. 96:15-21; ECF No. 77-12, PageID.3596, Tr. 57:7-14, 25, Tr. 58:1).
The lack of training evidence, coupled with the individual defendants’
deposition statements, could lead a reasonable jury to conclude that the County
inadequately trained its jail services deputies to “identify or address a medical
emergency” and that any “training program to the extent that it existed, was
insufficient.” Helphenstine, 60 F.4th at 325.
2.

The County’s Deliberate Indifference

“Deliberate indifference is a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a
municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action.”
Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011) (cleaned up). A municipality “could
be liable under § 1983 without proof of a pre-existing pattern of violations” when
the “unconstitutional consequences of failing to train” employees are “patently
obvious.” Id. at 64. Placing jail services deputies in situations where they must
exercise “professional judgment that lies outside their area of expertise may

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demonstrate deliberate indifference.” Helphenstine, 60 F.4th at 325 (citation
omitted).
At the time of Griswold’s death, Livingston County retained either a nurse
practitioner, a registered nurse, or a licensed practical nurse to remain at the jail until
10:00 P.M. daily. (ECF No. 77-11, PageID.3536, Tr. 81:1-13). No other medical
professionals stayed onsite from then until 6:00 A.M. (Id., Tr. 81:14-17). Deputy
Linden testified that, in the absence of an onsite medical provider, jail services
deputies often had to make their own independent assessment of a detainee’s medical
symptoms to determine whether hospitalization, or some other medical intervention,
was warranted. (ECF No. 77-10, PageID.3467, Tr. 85:21-86:4). Other deputies
confirmed this predicament. Yet the record is devoid of any evidence that the County
trained its jail services deputies to (1) evaluate detainees for indications of serious
medical distress, or (2) recognize those symptoms of serious medical distress
warranting immediate medical attention.
The lack of deputy training, as well as the absence of onsite medical providers
for a sizable portion of the night shift, raises sufficient factual questions about
whether the County “effectively” tasked its jail services deputies with making
“determinations about what constituted a medical emergency – a requirement well
outside their area of expertise.” Helphenstine, 60 F.4th at 325. A reasonable jury
could, therefore, find that the “possible unconstitutional consequences” of the

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County’s inadequate training are “patently obvious,” i.e., that critically ill detainees
would not receive essential medical services. Id.; see also Estate of Carter, 408 F.3d
at 313 (noting that “a pretrial detainee’s right to medical treatment for a serious
medical need has been established since at least 1987.”).
3.

Actual Causation

Whatever triggered Griswold’s serious medical episode (whether it stemmed
from a trazodone overdose or some other drug toxicity), a reasonable jury could
decide that the County’s failure to train its jail services deputies is what led to
Griswold’s death. Not only that, a jury may also conclude that Livingston County
“could reasonably foresee” that the jail services deputies’ deliberate indifference to
Griswold’s serious medical needs “would follow from the[ir] lack of training.”
Gambrel, 25 F.4th at 409.
Because there is sufficient evidence to find that the County’s training was
inadequate, that the inadequacy resulted from the County’s deliberate indifference,
and that the inadequacy caused Griswold death, the Estate’s failure-to-train claim
withstands summary judgment.
F.

Official Capacity Claims Against Sheriff Murphy

That leaves the official capacity claims asserted against Sheriff Murphy.
Because any claims asserted against him in his official capacity are duplicative of
the municipal liability claim asserted against Livingston County, the claims asserted

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against Sheriff Murphy in his official capacity must be dismissed. See Doe v.
Claiborne Cty., Tenn. By & Through Claiborne Cty. Bd. of Educ., 103 F.3d 495, 509
(6th Cir. 1996) (“We will also affirm the dismissal of the official capacity claims
against [three municipal officials] because a suit against an official of the state is
treated as a suit against the municipality.”); see also Direct Constr. Servs., LLC v.
City of Detroit, 820 F. App’x 417, 425-26 (6th Cir. 2020) (affirming the district
court’s dismissal of official capacity claims asserted against municipal officials as
duplicative of the claims asserted against the municipality directly). Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that the Livingston County Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment (ECF No. 53) is granted in part and denied in part.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion is granted as to Sheriff Murphy
and Deputies Marquette, Famie, and Loar.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion is denied as to Livingston
County, Sergeant Davis, and Deputies Heiob, John, VanVleet, Schulte, Turchi, and
Linden.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Sheriff Murphy and Deputies Marquette,
Famie, and Loar are dismissed from this case with prejudice.

Dated: March 10, 2025

s/ Robert J. White
Robert J. White
United States District Judge

47