McDaniel v. Jackson
Filing
28
OPINION and ORDER Adopting REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 26 in Part, Sustaining Defendant's Objection 27 and Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment in Full 21 . Signed by District Judge Laurie J. Michelson. (EPar)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
CHRISTOPHER MCDANIEL,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 22-11092
Honorable Laurie J. Michelson
Magistrate Judge Patricia T. Morris
STEPHANIE JACKSON,
Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION IN PART [26], SUSTAINING DEFENDANT’S
OBJECTION [27] AND GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FULL [21]
Christopher McDaniel was incarcerated at the Cooper Street Correctional
Facility in Jackson, Michigan.1 (See ECF No. 1, PageID.19.) While incarcerated,
McDaniel began corresponding with an attorney from the Cooley Law School’s
Innocence Project, a legal organization that helps wrongfully convicted individuals
pursue release from prison. (Id. at PageID.5.) McDaniel prepared a letter in response
to a request from the Innocence Project for information regarding his criminal
conviction. (ECF No. 21-3, PageID.143–44; ECF No. 23, PageID.200.) McDaniel says
he attempted to send that letter through the prison’s expedited legal mail system but
was denied by residential unit manager FNU Stewart. (ECF No. 21-3, PageID.143–
45; ECF No. 23, PageID.201.) Although McDaniel addressed his letter to an
McDaniel was granted parole on May 2, 2023. See Michigan Department of
Corrections Offender Tracking Information System (“OTIS”), https://perma.cc/3GM7HLLP.
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“attorney” named “David Williams” at the “Cooley Law School[’s]” Innocence Project,
Stewart claimed that the letter did not qualify as “legal mail” under Michigan
Department of Corrections policy.2 (Id. at PageID.198, 201; see also ECF No. 21-3,
PageID.144.) McDaniel believes this rationale was pretext, explaining that Stewart
likely rejected his letter in retaliation for a grievance he had recently filed against
her. (ECF No. 1, PageID.7; ECF No. 23, PageID.210.)
Rather than send the letter via the alternative regular mail process, McDaniel
kept the letter and filed another grievance against Stewart for refusing to send his
letter as legal mail. (ECF No. 21-3, PageID.145; ECF No. 23, PageID.201.) A few
weeks later he tried to send the letter as legal mail again but was denied by another
residential unit manager, Stephanie Jackson. (ECF No. 21-2, PageID.131). McDaniel
says that Jackson refused to send the letter in retaliation for the grievances he had
filed against Stewart. (ECF No. 21-3, 144, 148, 151–52.) Specifically, he alleges that
Jackson told him she would not send the letter because Stewart told her not to. (Id.)
Jackson denies this and maintains that the letter was addressed only to the “Cooley
As Judge Morris explained in her Report and Recommendation, MDOC
apparently uses two distinct systems for processing outgoing mail: one for regular
correspondence and one for “legal” mail. (ECF No. 23, PageID.201, 203, 205–06.)
MDOC defines legal mail as mail that is “clearly” addressed to “a court, an attorney,
or a party to a lawsuit . . . .” (Id. at PageID.205–06.) Sending letters through the
“expedited legal mail” process, rather than the regular mail process, provides inmates
with two advantages. First, indigent prisoners may borrow funds to either initiate
lawsuits or mail “legal materials” to “a court, an attorney, or a party to a lawsuit due
to pending litigation.” (Id.) And second, mail designated as “legal mail” is delivered
“as soon as possible,” although the policy provides no concrete timeline for this
process. (Id. at PageID.206.) Neither party clarifies how long it takes for legal mail
to be delivered, nor do they explain how long it takes officials to process regular
outgoing mail by comparison.
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Law School,” and that based on her understanding of MDOC policies, she thought the
letter did not qualify as legal mail. (ECF No. 21-2, PageID.131–32.)
Again, McDaniel chose to retain the letter rather than send it out through the
regular mail process. (ECF No. 21-3, PageID.146.) Eventually, after transferring to a
different facility, McDaniel succeeded in sending his letter through the legal mail
process. (Id. at PageID.147.) McDaniel later brought this pro se suit against Jackson
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in both her individual and official capacities, for monetary
damages only. (ECF No. 1, PageID.2, 9.)
All pretrial matters in this case were referred to Magistrate Judge Patricia T.
Morris. (ECF No. 11.) In time, Jackson moved for summary judgment on all claims.
(ECF No. 21.) Judge Morris issued a Report and Recommendation that the Court
should grant Jackson’s motion in part. (ECF No. 26, Page.229.) Specifically, Judge
Morris construed McDaniel’s complaint as raising four distinct claims under 42
U.S.C. § 1983: (1) First Amendment retaliation; (2) denial of access to the courts; (3)
denial of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel; and (4) First Amendment mailinterference. (ECF No. 26, PageID.244–253.) She recommended dismissing the
retaliation, access to the courts, and Sixth Amendment claims, but allowing the mailinterference
claim
to
proceed.
(Id.)
Jackson
objected
to
Judge
Morris’
recommendation that the mail-interference claim be allowed to proceed. (ECF No.
27.) McDaniel did not file any objections, nor did he respond to Jackson’s objection.
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For the reasons explained below, the Court will ADOPT IN PART Judge
Morris’ Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 26) and GRANT Jackson’s motion for
summary judgment (ECF No. 21) on all claims.
When a party objects to a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, a
district judge reviews the issues raised by the objections de novo; there is no
obligation to review un-objected to issues. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); Thomas v. Arn,
474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985); Garrison v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, No. 10-13990, 2012
WL 1278044, at *8 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 16, 2012). “The district court need not provide de
novo review where the objections are frivolous, conclusory or general. The parties
have the duty to pinpoint those portions of the magistrate’s report that the district
court must specially consider.” Mira v. Marshall, 806 F.2d 636, 637 (6th Cir. 1986)
(cleaned up). Objections should be “specific in order to focus the busy district court’s
attention on only those issues that were dispositive and contentious.” Howard v. Sec’y
of Health & Hum. Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991).
As mentioned above, Judge Morris recommended dismissing McDaniel’s First
Amendment retaliation, access to the courts, and Sixth Amendment claims, but
allowing the mail-interference claim to proceed. (ECF No. 26, PageID.244–253.)
At the conclusion of her Report and Recommendation, Judge Morris notified
the parties that they were required to file any objections within fourteen days of
service, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2) and Eastern District of
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Michigan Local Rule 72.1(d), and that only the specific objections to the report and
recommendation are preserved for appeal; all other objections are waived. (Id. at
PageID.255.) Jackson raised three objections to Judge Morris’ recommendation
pertaining to McDaniel’s First Amendment mail-interference claim. (See ECF No.
27.) But McDaniel did not file any objections to Judge Morris’ recommendation—and
the time to do so has long since passed.
The Court finds that McDaniel’s failure to object is a procedural default,
waiving review by this Court of Judge Morris’ findings on the dismissal of his
retaliation, access to the courts, and Sixth Amendment claims. It is well established
in the Sixth Circuit that “a party shall file objections with the district court or else
waive right to appeal.” United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947, 949–50 (6th Cir. 1981).
As the Supreme Court explained in Thomas v. Arn, the Sixth Circuit’s waiver-ofappellate-review rule rests on the assumption that the parties’ failure to object to a
magistrate judge’s report and recommendation is a procedural default “waiving
review even at the district court level.” 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985); see also Garrison v.
Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, No. 10-13990, 2012 WL 1278044, at *8 (E.D. Mich. Apr.
16, 2012) (“The Court is not obligated to review the portions of the report to which no
objection was made.” (citing Thomas, 474 U.S. at 149–52)). The Supreme Court
further held that this rule does not violate either the Federal Magistrates Act or the
Federal Constitution. Thomas, 474 U.S. at 155. And “’[a]lthough exceptional
circumstances may warrant departure from this forfeiture rule in the interests of
justice, no such circumstances are present in this case.” White v. AJM Packaging
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Corp., No. 23-1618, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 5824, at *4 (6th Cir. March 11, 2024)
(citing Thomas, 474 U.S. at 155; Keeling v. Warden, Lebanon Corr. Inst., 673 F.3d
452, 458 (6th Cir. 2012)).
Accordingly, the Court ADOPTS Judge Morris’ recommendation and
DISMISSES McDaniel’s First Amendment retaliation, denial of access to the courts,
and Sixth Amendment claims.
That leaves McDaniel’s mail-interference claim, and Jackson’s objections to
Judge Morris’ recommendation that it proceed. Jackson raises three objections—two
are procedural in nature and one is substantive.
The Court begins with McDaniel’s substantive objection—that Judge Morris
erred in finding McDaniel plausibly alleged a First Amendment mail-interference
claim. (ECF No. 27, PageID.262.)
Incarcerated individuals have a distinct First Amendment interest in both
sending and receiving mail. Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989). But “prison
officials may impose restrictions that are reasonably related to security or other
legitimate penological objectives.” Sillier v. Brooks, 343 F.3d 868, 873 (6th Cir. 2003).
The Sixth Circuit has found a “heightened concern” where the mail is considered
“legal mail.” Id. at 874 (citing Kensu v. Haigh, 87 F.3d 172, 174 (6th Cir. 1996)).
Indeed, courts “afford First Amendment protections for legal mail where it may
impact ‘the prisoner’s legal rights, the attorney-client privilege, or the right of access
to the courts.’” Id.
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“The determination of whether particular kinds of correspondence qualify for
the constitutional protection accorded a prisoner’s ‘legal mail’ is a question of law
properly decided by the court.” Sallier, 343 F.3d at 873 (citing Seal v. Morgan, 229
F.3d 567, 580 (6th Cir. 2000)). On the present record, the Court find’s McDaniel’s
letter was legal mail. For one, the envelope, attached to McDaniel’s complaint and
summary judgment response, was addressed to “Attorney David Williams” at the
“Cooley Law School” Innocence Project. (ECF No. 1, PageID.21; ECF No. 23,
PageID.198.) And the letter was prepared by McDaniel in response to a request for
information concerning his conviction from the Innocence Project. (Id. at PageID.19–
20); see e.g., Caldwell v. Ewing, No. 03-1417, 2006 WL 771213, at *6 (C.D. Ill. Mar.
24, 2006) (finding that “letters [addressed only] to the NAACP and ACLU would not
be considered legal mail since these are referral agencies” but “would be considered
legal mail . . . if they were addressed to a specific attorney.”) McDaniel also provided
the mailing letter and envelope he initially received from the Innocence Project,
which itself had been designated as legal mail by the prison. (ECF No. 1, PageID.19.)
The Sixth Circuit has held that “‘blatant disregard’ for mail handling
regulations concerning legal mail violates constitutional protections,” Merriweather
v. Zamora, 569 F.3d 307, 317 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Lavado v. Keohane, 992 F.2d 601,
609 (6th Cir. 1993)), and that “[t]wo or three pieces of mail opened in an arbitrary or
capricious way suffice to state a claim.” Id. (citing Sallier, 343 F.3d at 879–80;
Lavado, 992 F.2d at 609). This case, however, does not involve any improper review
of McDaniel’s legal mail. Instead, it involves one instance of Jackson refusing to
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designate McDaniel’s letter as legal mail. But “isolated instances of interference with
prisoners’ mail” do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation under the First
Amendment. See Johnson v. Wilkinson, No. 98-3866, 2000 WL 1175519 (6th Cir. Aug.
11, 2000) (“This random and isolated interference with Johnson’s mail did not violate
his constitutional rights.” (citation omitted)); see also Okoro v. Scibana, 63 F. App’x
182, 184 (6th Cir. 2003) (stating that “Okoro was only able to provide one specific
incident where he allegedly did not receive the full contents of a letter from his wife,”
and concluding that “[s]uch a random and isolated incident is insufficient to establish
a constitutional violation” (citation omitted)); cf. Colvin v. Caruso, 605 F.3d 282, 293
(6th Cir. 2010) (citing Johnson for the holding that “isolated interference” with
prisoners’ rights may not rise to the level of a First Amendment violation).
Here, as mentioned, McDaniel complains of only one incident of alleged
interference with his legal mail by Jackson.3 He says that Jackson refused to send
his letter to the Cooley Law School Innocence Project via the prison’s expedited legal
mail process because Stewart told her not to in retaliation for the grievances he
previously filed against Stewart.4 Taking McDaniel’s version of the facts to be true,
and even assuming Jackson’s refusal to send McDaniel’s letter was not an innocent
McDaniel does claim that Stewart initially refused to send his letter as legal
mail. (See ECF No. 21-3, PageID.143–45; ECF No. 23, PageID.201.) But Stewart is
not a defendant in this suit—McDaniel’s complaint pertains only to Jackson’s
conduct.
4 Jackson says that she believed the letter did not qualify as legal mail under
MDOC’s policy. But this is belied by the record. The envelope was specifically
addressed to “Attorney David Williams” at the Cooley Law School Innocence Project.
(ECF No. 23, PageID.198; ECF No. 1, PageID.21.)
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mistake, the Court finds that this single incident would not rise to the level of a
constitutional violation given the rulings in Johnson and Caruso.
Judge Morris rejected this reasoning in her thorough Report and
Recommendation. (ECF No. 26, PageID.250.) She noted that “[a]lthough the [Caruso]
Court did not explain why it believed ‘random and isolated’ interferences with First
Amendment interests to be lawful, it apparently used that phrase to describe the
standard for accidental First Amendment deprivations.” (Id.) And she explained that
“the line of cases [Caruso] relie[d] on clarify that random and isolated interferences
do not raise constitutional concerns only if they are accidental.” (Id. (citing Smith v.
Maschner, 899 F.2d 940, 944 (10th Cir. 1990).) So, she found that Caruso “does not
apply here because (1) McDaniel raises a genuine dispute as to whether Jackson
mistakenly read his envelope as being addressed simply to the Cooley Law School
and (2) there is no evidence in the record indicating that the slow processing of regular
mail, relative to ‘expedited’ legal mail, is accidental.” (Id.)
Judge Morris’ understanding of Caruso is not unreasonable. Indeed, Caruso
itself did deal with isolated incidents of accidental conduct. See Caruso, 605 F.3d at
293 (finding that prison officials who “mistakenly” served Jewish inmate non-kosher
food did not violate the First Amendment because their transgressions were “isolated”
and noting that there was no “evidence that the isolated mistakes were willful”). But
the Sixth Circuit case Caruso relied on for its holding, which dealt specifically with a
First Amendment mail interference claim, did not make any distinction between
intentional and accidental conduct. See Johnson, 229 F.3d at 1152 (finding that
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“random and isolated interference with Johnson’s mail did not violate his
constitutional rights” where the prison placed Johnson’s mail—a copy of the
Georgetown Law Journal—in the prison vault without notifying him, in violation of
prison rules).
Importantly, the Sixth Circuit recently held that a single incident of mail
tampering did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Smith v. Goostrey, No.
23-1025, 2023 WL 5024659, at *3 (6th Cir. Aug. 4, 2023) (“Smith clarifies on appeal
that his tampering-with-legal-mail claim is limited to the single incident in
September 2021. Such a limited and isolated event does not rise to the level of a
constitutional violation, however.” (citing Caruso, 605 F.3d at 293).) In Goostrey, the
plaintiff alleged that prison officials opened his legal mail outside of his presence on
a single occasion. (Id.) While it was not clear that the defendants in Goostrey acted
willfully, their conduct of opening Goostrey’s mail outside of his presence does not
appear to be accidental or a simple mistake like that at issue in Caruso. Yet the Sixth
Circuit again found this single incident did not rise to the level of a constitutional
violation under the First Amendment. Given the broad language used by the Sixth
Circuit in Goostrey, and the lack of circuit precedent narrowing the application of the
rule from Johnson and Caruso to accidental conduct alone, the Court declines to adopt
that narrow reading of those cases.
One final point. The district court in Goostrey “recognize[d] that legal mail is
entitled to additional protections and that it is possible that under some
circumstances, even one instance of improperly processing legal mail could violate an
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inmate’s constitutional rights. However, . . . the facts alleged by Plaintiff are not such
a circumstance.” Smith v. Goostrey, No. 22-753, 2022 WL 17579095, at *8 (W.D. Mich.
Dec. 12, 2022), aff’d in part, vacated in part, remanded, No. 23-1025, 2023 WL
5024659 (6th Cir. Aug. 4, 2023). Assuming the Sixth Circuit was leaving open the
possibility for such a circumstance to exist, this case is also not it. There is nothing
to suggest that Jackson was unwilling to send McDaniel’s letter by regular mail or
that time was of the essence with this particular correspondence.
Accordingly, because McDaniel’s First Amendment mail-interference claim is
based upon a single and isolated incident of interference with his legal mail—that
claim will be dismissed.
Because the Court agrees with Jackson’s substantive objection and dismisses
the mail-interference claim, it will not address Jackson’s procedural objections.
In sum, the Court ADOPTS Judge Morris’ Report and Recommendation (ECF
No. 26) in part and GRANTS Jackson’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 21)
on all claims. A separate judgment will follow.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 27, 2024
s/Laurie J. Michelson
LAURIE J. MICHELSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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