Green v. Rocket Mortgage, LLC

Filing 13

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (ECF No. 10 ). Signed by District Judge Susan K. DeClercq. (KBro)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
SHAVONNE GREEN,
Plaintiff,
v.
ROCKET MORTGAGE LLC,

Case No. 2:23-cv-11005
Honorable Susan K. DeClercq
United States District Judge

Defendant.
________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT (ECF No. 10)
Beginning in 2012, Plaintiff Shavonne Green worked for Defendant Rocket
Mortgage at its office in Detroit, Michigan. But in March 2020, the COVID-19
pandemic arrived. In response to the pandemic, Rocket—like many corporate
workplaces—required its employees to work from home to reduce the spread of the
virus. By 2021, the threat of the virus had significantly decreased, and Rocket
required its employees to return to the office. But Green sought an accommodation
from Rocket’s return-to-office mandate, asserting that she had developed
“pandemic-related stress,” which caused her to feel depressed and anxious.
At first, Rocket granted Green some accommodations, but it required Green
to submit updated medical forms documenting the necessity and parameters of her
requested accommodations moving forward. Rocket and Green corresponded for

months, and still Green did not provide the required information to Rocket. So, in
2022, Rocket fired Green.
Green now has sued Rocket, alleging that by making her return to work in
person, it failed to accommodate her disability and discriminated against her under
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). But because the undisputed evidence
shows that Green abandoned the interactive process in seeking her accommodation,
summary judgment is appropriate, and the complaint will be dismissed.
I. BACKGROUND
In 2012, Green began working for Rocket Mortgage as a document analyst,
eventually rising to an executive document specialist position. See ECF Nos. 10-2 at
PageID.83, 85-86, 88; 10-6 at PageID.127; 11-2 at PageID.229–230. Each position
Green held with Rocket required her to work full-time from Rocket’s office, Monday
through Friday, although there was a brief period in 2018 during which Green was
allowed to work from home. See ECF Nos. 10-2 at PageID.83–84, 86–89, 90–91;
10-7 at PageID.131–32.
Starting in March 2020, Rocket Mortgage required employees to work
remotely because of the COVID-19 pandemic, and that remote work mandate
continued through most of 2021. ECF No. 10-2 at PageID.98. But in the Fall of 2021,
Rocket began calling its employees back into the office, requiring at least two inperson days per week. ECF Nos. 10 at PageID.56; 11 at PageID.209.
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Around the time that Rocket required employees to return to the office, Green
began seeking accommodations for her physical and mental impairments, which
included anxiety, depression, chronic back pain, and sciatica pain. See ECF No. 113 at PageID.239.
A. August–October 2021 (First Request1)
On August 19, 2021, Green submitted an accommodation request, which
sought to reduce the number of hours she worked per day.2 She reached out to
Miriam Ankouni, a Rocket Mortgage human resources specialist, with a note from
her physician, Dr. Samar Chamas, which stated that Green should limit her work
hours to five hours per day, from 7:00 AM to 12:00 PM. ECF No. 10-8 at
PageID.135. The note made no reference to remote work.3 Id. Further, the note did
not explain the reason for the accommodation. Id. Nevertheless, Ankouni responded
later that day, authorizing a temporary reduction to five hours per day until midSeptember, clarifying that Rocket would “request updated documentation” if

The designations of “first,” “second,” and “third” requests are merely used to
chronologically identify the sets of documents Green provided to Rocket. For all
other purposes, this Court views these to be sub-parts of one ongoing interactive
process regarding a single accommodation request for remote work.
2
Although Green initially sought a reduced hours accommodation, her suit is solely
focused on the failure to accommodate her later request to work remotely. ECF No.
11 at PageID.207; see also Part III, infra.
3
In her later-discovered visit notes, Dr. Chamas also stated that Green would be
required to return to the office in September, but that Green did not want to return
because she “does not want to get vaccinated.” ECF No. 10-9 at PageID.137.
1

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Green’s accommodation “need[ed] to be extended” past then. ECF No. 10-10 at
PageID.143.
When

mid-September

rolled

around,

Green

submitted

another

accommodation request, for the first time adding an ask for remote work.
Specifically, Green asked to “continue to work from home during the time [she is]
on a 5-hour work day restriction.” ECF No. 10-11 at PageID.146. In response,
Ankouni sent Green an ADA packet—a set of forms explaining a disability and
suggesting possible accommodations—and instructed her to have her doctor fill it
out. Id. Ankouni specified that Green’s doctor’s explanations should not be vague,
asking her to “please ensure [her] physician provides details into the why behind the
requests.” Id. (emphasis added)
One week later, Green and her internal medicine doctor, Dr. Prizzy Job,
completed the ADA packet. ECF No. 10-12. The packet included two forms: one to
be filled out by Green and the other by her doctor. Id. On her portion, Green
suggested that she receive accommodations of both reduced work hours and remote
work. Id. at PageID.148. However, Dr. Job recommended only reduced hours for a
temporary period of six months—saying nothing about remote work. Id. at
PageID.152–53. Green submitted the packet to Ankouni on September 20, 2021.
ECF No. 11-6.

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Green and Dr. Job also completed a separate FMLA application packet, again
only recommending a reduction to five hours per day. ECF No. 10-15. On October
4, 2021, Rocket Mortgage approved Green for FMLA intermittent leave for a sixmonth period to allow Green to work shorter days when her conditions flared up and
take time off for physical therapy appointments, consistent with Dr. Job’s
recommendations in the ADA and FMLA packets. ECF Nos. 10-14 at PageID.159;
10-2 at PageID.102; 10-15 at PageID.163–64.
About one week later, Green emailed Ankouni to check in on her ADA
accommodation request, ECF No. 11-8, attaching a new doctor’s note from Dr.
Chamas—not Dr. Job, the physician who filled out the accommodation packets—
which simply stated:
Shavonne Green was seen in my clinic on 8/17/2021. She can only work
from home from 7:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. at this time.
ECF No. 11-7 at PageID.250. In an email the next day, 4 Green asked Ankouni to
clarify what she [Green] was required to do:
Per our conversation yesterday, can you give me in detail[] what exactly
you would like me to have my Doctor explain what you are asking/
need from me and also explain details about the FMLA that wasn’t clear
to you. I want to make sure I have a clear understanding of what you
need from me.

Because Green’s email references a “conversation yesterday,” it is reasonable to
infer that Green and Ankouni spoke—either on the phone or in emails not included
in the exhibits—in response to Green’s email checking in on the status of her ADA
request. See ECF No. 11-8.
4

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ECF No. 11-8 at PageID.252. Three hours later, Ankouni responded, stating that
Rocket could not accommodate the request for a reduced, fully remote workday.
ECF No. 11-9 at PageID.254. The next day, Green responded, noting, “I spoke with
you a couple days ago you asked me for more information regarding my disability
condition and wanted to know ‘Why behind it’ as if the information I given you
about my condition wasn’t enough.” Id. Green then asked for next steps, noting that
she had been trying her best to provide enough information to support her request.
Id.
That same day, Ankouni explained why Rocket denied Green’s requests for
reduced hours and for remote work. ECF No. 11-10 at PageID.256. As to reduced
hours, Ankouni stated that Rocket could not accommodate a shorter workday for six
months, suggesting that Green should consider alternative solutions like taking a
leave of absence or using her approved FMLA leave to end her days earlier when
needed. Id. As to remote work, Ankouni stated that Green had not given Rocket
enough information to justify working from home:
The information that was provided in the accommodation [packet] does
not state any information about working from home, which we
discussed. The only information about working from home was in the
doctors note you provided yesterday that did not state the “why” behind
you needing to work from home. It only stated that you need to work
from home.

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Id. Finally, Ankouni clarified that Green’s request for reduced hours had been
approved through the end of the month.5 Id. The purpose was to give Green enough
time to work with her doctor to find alternative solutions and to clear up any
confusion about completing the necessary paperwork. Id. When Green replied that
she would reach out to her doctor for a better articulation of why she needed to work
from home, Ankouni responded, “Thank you for the update. I will wait for the
updated information [from] your doctor after you reach out to them.” ECF No. 1111 at PageID.258.
After the first request, Rocket had the following documentation from Green:
1. A note from Dr. Chamas stating that Green should limit her working
hours to five hours per day;
2. ADA and FMLA accommodations packets completed by Dr. Job
recommending a limit on Green’s hours to five hours per day for 6
months (saying nothing about remote work despite Green requesting
it in her portion of the ADA packet);
3. A note from Dr. Chamas stating that Green “can only work from
home” for five hours per day.
ECF Nos. 10-8 at PageID.135; 10-12 at PageID.148, 152–153; 11-7 at PageID.250.
B. October – November 2021 (Second Request)
About two weeks later, at the end of October 2021, Green reached out to
Ankouni again, asking to work remotely and attaching a letter, this time from her

Presumably, Ankouni meant that Green could work a reduced schedule for the rest
of the month without using her approved FMLA time.
5

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therapist. ECF No. 11-13 at PageID.262. The therapist’s letter was slightly more
specific than the letters previously submitted by Dr. Chamas:
It is my medical opinion that Shavonne Green should remain out of the
office and work remotely due to mental health condition. She has the
following diagnosis related to pandemic stress for anxiety and
depression[.]
ECF No. 11-12 at PageID.260. Ankouni was out of the office at the time, so another
human resources associate responded, attaching an accommodation packet for Green
to fill out. ECF No. 11-14 at PageID.264–65. Green replied that she had already
filled out an accommodation packet in September. Id. at PageID.266. The associate,
who had not been involved with the first request, asked Green what happened when
she submitted the packet. Id. Apologizing for sending it again, the associate
explained that she sent over a blank packet because Rocket was not granting work
from home requests based on doctor’s notes. Id. When Green responded, confused,
that she provided a letter because she had been told her packet did not articulate
“why” she needed to work from home, Id. at PageID.267, the associate clarified that
a doctor’s note was just not enough on its own:
The ADA packet that I sent over has very specific questions regarding
the accommodation to help [us] employers do what we can to support
you, that is why we follow that process for any accommodation due to
a medical condition.

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Id. at PageID.268. Green then noted that the accommodation packet she completed
explained her disabilities, but her accommodation was still denied, so she got an
additional letter to further explain her mental disability. Id. at 269.
When Ankouni returned the next week, she asked Green if she was given an
updated accommodations packet for her doctor to complete, reiterating that Rocket
needed “an explanation of how your disability affects your ability to come into the
office.” ECF No. 11-15 at PageID.271. Green never responded—to the email, or to
the request for additional information—and instead returned to work in person. ECF
Nos. 10 at PageID.61; 10-1 at PageID.103; 11 at PageID.213; 11-2 at PageID.233.
After the second request, Rocket had the following documentation from
Green:
1. A note from Dr. Chamas stating that Green should limit her working
hours to five hours per day;
2. ADA and FMLA accommodations packets completed by Dr. Job
recommending a limit on Green’s hours to five hours per day for 6
months (saying nothing about remote work despite Green requesting
it in her portion of the ADA packet);
3. A note from Dr. Chamas stating that Green “can only work from
home” for five hours per day;
4. A letter from October 2021 by her therapist recommending that
Green work remotely due to anxiety and depression.
ECF Nos. 10-8 at PageID.135; 10-12 at PageID.152–53; 11-7 at PageID.250; 11-12
at PageID.260.

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C. April – July 2022 (Third Request)
Four months later, on April 22, 2022, Green again reached out to Ankouni
stating that under her therapist’s recommendation, she “will be working remotely”
starting the next week “because [she is] unable to work in the office due to mental
health condition.” ECF No. 11-16 at PageID.273 (emphasis added). Green attached
a letter from her therapist stating that, in her medical opinion, “Shavonne Green
should remain out of the office and work remotely due to mental health condition.
She has the following diagnosis for anxiety and depression.” ECF No. 11-17 at
PageID.275.
That same day, Ankouni responded that Green needed to submit an updated
accommodation packet and “go through the accommodation process” before Rocket
could proceed with the remote work request. ECF No. 11-18 at PageID.278. Ankouni
emphasized that Green needed to either report in person until a decision was made
on the accommodation or take off the days she was expected in the office. Id. In
response, Green simply wrote, “The accommodation packet you are requesting from
my Doctor, you’ve received.” Id. She then attached the packet from September that
recommended accommodations only until March—which had already come and
gone. Id.; see ECF No. 10-12 at PageID.152. When Ankouni asked whether the
packet was the same packet originally submitted in September or an updated packet,
Green replied, “This is the same packet. You requested an accommodation packet
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from my doctor [ ] which she has already filled out. If you have any questions please
feel free to give her a call.” ECF No. 11-18 at PageID.279.
A few weeks later, Ankouni reached back out to Green, informing her of the
problems with her simply resubmitting the old accommodations packet rather than
providing an updated one:
During our phone call it was stated that I will begin the accommodation
reviewal process with the documents that were sent over to me. If you
remember, I did let you know that there was a chance the documentation
may be declined again due to it being the same documentation that was
provided last year and was declined at that time. . . . I received
confirmation on Friday that we cannot move forward with the current
accommodation packet that was sent over due to the packet being
completed over 6 months ago. . . . For next steps, we will need your
doctor to complete updated documentation. I know you sent over a
doctors note, but a doctors note is not sufficient for an accommodation
process. I will fax over the forms today to your doctor, can you please
confirm for me the fax number and your doctors name?
ECF No. 11-19. Green did not respond. ECF No. 10-21 at PageID.188–89. So, after
a month of hearing nothing from Green, Ankouni wrote to Green, claiming that
Green refused to participate in the interactive process, but that Rocket would give
her one last chance to submit a proper ADA packet by June 29, 2022. Id. Ankouni’s
letter noted that Rocket would “temporarily allow [Green] to work from home . . .
while [she] work[ed] with [her] healthcare provider to provide the updated ADA
packet.” Id. The letter also clarified that the specific information Rocket needed was
“what accommodations were currently needed in order for you to be able to perform
your essential job functions with or without accommodation, the duration of time
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you would need those accommodations, if any, and the extent to which your current
condition limits your ability to perform your essential job functions onsite.” Id.
Six days later, Green responded by emailing Ankouni. ECF No. 10-22 at
PageID.191. In her email, Green claimed that the documents she had already
provided—that is, the September accommodation packet and her doctors’ notes—
were enough. Id. Regarding the request for an updated packet, Green wrote:
[T]he accommodation to work remotely is from my psychotherapist
and not my medical doctor. I did not give consent to my therapist to
explain how my performances are affected working in the office or
home. I have allowed my therapist to only disclose[] my diagnosis. This
is my confidential right as an employee. The only accommodation is
needed is to work remotely.
Id.
One week later, on June 5, 2022, Green reached back out to ask if her request
had been denied. ECF No. 10-23 at PageID.193. Ankouni responded that Green still
had not provided enough information for her request to be considered. Id. The next
day, Green asked again if the request had been approved or denied. ECF No. 10-24
at PageID.195. Ankouni gave the same response, stating, “Again, I have asked you
for this information repeatedly and you have refused to provide on every occasion.”
Id. Green did not respond. ECF No. 10-2 at PageID.108.
After Green’s third request, Rocket had the following:
1. A letter from August 2021 by Dr. Chamas recommending that Green
work 5 hours per day;
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2. ADA and FMLA accommodations packets completed by Dr. Job
recommending a limit on Green’s hours to five hours per day (until
March 2022), with substantive bases for that recommendation;
3. A letter from September 2021 by Dr. Chamas recommending that
Green work 5 hours per day from home;
4. A letter from October 2021 by her therapist recommending that
Green work remotely due to anxiety and depression;
5. A letter from April 2022 by her therapist recommending that Green
work remotely due to anxiety and depression.
ECF Nos. 10-8 at PageID.135; 10-12 at PageID.152–53; 11-7 at PageID.250; 11-12
at PageID.260; 11-17 at PageID.275.
On July 11, 2022, Rocket Mortgage fired Green “due to [her] failure and
refusal to provide requested documentation with respect to [her] request to work
remotely and [her] attendance occurrences.” ECF No. 10-25 at PageID.197.
In April 2023, Green sued, alleging that Rocket failed to accommodate her
disability and discriminated against her under the ADA. ECF No. 1. Rocket moved
for summary judgment. ECF No. 10. In response, Green agreed to voluntarily
dismiss Count II of her complaint, which alleged disability discrimination. ECF No.
11 at PageID.224. As such, only Count I, which alleges failure to accommodate,
remains. ECF No. 1 at PageID.5.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
To prevail on summary judgment, movants must identify record evidence
showing that there is no genuine dispute of material fact and that they are entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986);
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FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). If the movant does so, then the burden shifts to the nonmovant
to identify specific facts that create “a genuine issue for trial,” Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986) (citation omitted), which requires more than
a mere “scintilla of evidence,” id. at 251, and more than “metaphysical doubt,”
Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). A genuine
issue of material fact exists where “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. All inferences
must be reasonable, logical, and drawn in the nonmovant’s favor to determine
whether any party must prevail as a matter of law. See id. at 251–52.
III. ANALYSIS
Because Green agreed to voluntarily dismiss her disability discrimination
claim, this Court considers only whether summary judgment is appropriate as to
Green’s reasonable accommodation claim. Further, although Green’s complaint
seems to argue that her failure-to-accommodate claim includes her request for a
reduced work schedule, ECF No. 1 at PageID.5, Green abandoned that argument in
her response to the motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 11 at PageID.207 (“In
particular, [Rocket] illegally failed to provide [Green] with a reasonable
accommodation to work remotely.”). See Bennett v. Hurley Med. Ctr., 86 F.4th 314,
324 (6th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted) (“When a litigant fails to address a claim in
response to a motion for summary judgment, that claim is deemed abandoned or
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forfeited.”). Therefore, this Court considers only whether the failure to grant a
remote work accommodation violated the ADA.
A. Reasonable Accommodation
Under the ADA, employers must make reasonable accommodations to the
known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a
disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a), (b)(5)(A).
The Sixth Circuit has adopted a multi-part test to evaluate reasonableaccommodation claims:
(1) The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that he or she is
disabled. (2) The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that he or she
is “otherwise qualified” for the position despite his or her disability: (a)
without accommodation from the employer; (b) with an alleged
“essential” job requirement eliminated; or (c) with a proposed
reasonable accommodation. (3) The employer will bear the burden of
proving that a challenged job criterion is essential, and therefore a
business necessity, or that a proposed accommodation will impose an
undue hardship upon the employer.
Tchankpa v. Ascena Retail Grp., Inc., 951 F.3d 805, 811–12 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting
Kleiber v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 485 F.3d 862, 869 (6th Cir. 2007)); see also
Fisher v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 951 F.3d 409, 417 (6th Cir. 2020) (noting that failureto-accommodate claims “are analyzed pursuant to the direct test” from Kleiber rather
than the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting approach).
Here, the Parties dispute the reasonableness of Green’s request to work
remotely: Rocket argues that in-person work is essential, and Green disagrees. ECF
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Nos. 10 at PageID.71; 11 at PageID.218. Rocket further argues that Green’s inability
to work onsite and meet her productivity goals kept her from being “otherwise
qualified” under the ADA. ECF No. 10 at PageID.74. But before considering the
reasonableness of the proposed accommodation and Green’s qualifications, there is
a preliminary question to address: did the Parties engage in the required interactive
process to determine Green’s limitations and find a suitable accommodation?
B. Interactive Process
When an employee requests a reasonable accommodation, “it may be
necessary for the [employer] to initiate an informal, interactive process with the
[employee].” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3). Although the ADA’s text does not mention
this interactive process, the Sixth Circuit has held that “the interactive process is
mandatory.” Kleiber, 485 F.3d at 871. As part of the interactive process, an employer
may request documentation supporting the accommodation. Tchankpa, 951 F.3d at
813. That documentation should explain how the employee’s disability impairs their
ability to perform essential job functions, or at least show that the suggested
accommodation relates to their disability. Id. at 814. Documentation in support of a
reasonable accommodation is sufficient if it:
“(1) describes the nature, severity, and duration of the employee’s
impairment, the activity or activities that the impairment limits, and the
extent to which the impairment limits the employee’s ability to perform
the activity or activities; and, (2) substantiates why the requested
reasonable accommodation is needed.”
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U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, Enforcement Guidance on DisabilityRelated Inquiries and Medical Examinations of Employees under the ADA (2000).
Within the interactive process, an employee seeking a remote work accommodation
“must explain what limitations from the disability make it difficult to do the job in
the workplace, and how the job could still be performed from the employee’s home.”
U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, Work at Home/Telework as a Reasonable
Accommodation (2003).
The goal of the interactive process is to understand the specific limitations
caused by the disability and consider possible accommodations to overcome those
limitations. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3). And because both the employer and employee
naturally have access to information that the other does not, both must engage in the
process in good faith. Kleiber, 485 F.3d at 871 (6th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted).
When a party fails to participate in good faith and the interactive process breaks
down, courts should determine the cause of the breakdown and assign responsibility.
Id. (quoting Bultemeyer v. Fort Wayne Cmty. Schs., 100 F.3d 1281, 1285 (7th Cir.
1996). If an employee voluntarily abandons the process—for example, by failing to
communicate or provide adequate information—the employer is not liable for failure
to accommodate. Brumley v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 909 F.3d 834, 840 (6th Cir.
2018).

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Here, with respect to the interactive process, the Parties do not dispute the
facts. They do not dispute the authenticity of each other’s evidence or suggest that a
jury should decide any questions of credibility. Rather, they disagree on who was
responsible for any breakdown in the process and the sufficiency of the
documentation Green provided.
The undisputed email exchanges, depositions, and doctors’ notes discussed
above show that for months, both parties made concerted good-faith efforts to gather
the necessary information through the interactive process. But that same undisputed
evidence also shows that the interactive process broke down before an
accommodation could be reached. So, this Court must assign blame for the
breakdown. Kleiber, 485 F.3d at 871.
The assignment of blame here requires resolving two questions: (1) when did
the breakdown occur; and (2) who caused the breakdown.
1. First Request
Green argues that Rocket was the first to disengage from the interactive
process. ECF No. 11 at PageID.222. She claims that Ankouni ended the process
when she denied Green’s first remote work request in October 2021, three hours after
Green emailed her to ask what additional information was needed. Id.; 11-9 at
PageID.254. But in context, the subsequent conversations between Green and
Ankouni confirm that the interactive process continued well beyond that point. ECF
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Nos. 11-9 at PageID.254; 11-10 at PageID.256; 11-11 at PageID.258. Ankouni
specifically told Green that Rocket would await further documentation from Green’s
doctor. ECF No. 11-11 at PageID.258. In this way, Rocket continued seeking
additional information from Green, and so there was no breakdown after the first
request.
2. Second Request
Neither Party argues that the other abandoned the process in November 2021,
after Green’s second request. That said, the facts support a conclusion that either (1)
Green abandoned the process by not responding with more information and
returning to work, ECF Nos. 10 at PageID.61; 10-1 at PageID.103; 11 at PageID.213;
11-2 at PageID.233, or (2) she merely paused discussions until resuming them in
April, ECF Nos. 11-17; 11-18. Either way, Rocket was not responsible for a
breakdown in November 2021, so no liability for failure to accommodate attached
at that moment in time.
3. Third Request
In the end, Green was the one to abandon the interactive process. That is
because when Green made her third request in April 2022, she again asked to work
remotely but refused to submit a new accommodation packet from her doctor. ECF
Nos. 11-17; 11-18 at PageID.278. The previous packet—which, again, did not
recommend working from home—expired by its own terms in March 2022. ECF
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No. 10-12 at PageID.152. But Green still insisted on resubmitting it and refused to
complete a new one. ECF Nos. 11-18 at PageID.278; 10-22 at PageID.191. And,
despite Green’s refusals, Rocket was still participating in the interactive process:
Ankouni told her she would review the new request, but that the chances of approval
were low considering: (1) Green had not provided any new information and (2) her
prior request had already been deemed insufficient. ECF No. 11-19 at PageID.281.
Green still refused to complete a new packet. Id.; see also ECF No. 10-21 at
PageID.188–89. Accordingly, Green caused the breakdown at that point.
4. Sufficiency of Documentation
Green argues that Rocket “cannot escape liability” on the theory that she
abandoned the interactive process because (1) “Plaintiff did provide all of the
requested information” and (2) “Plaintiff’s participation in the interactive process
met all of her requirements under the ADA.” ECF No. 11 at PageID.221. Put
differently, Green contends that Rocket had all the information it needed to grant an
accommodation.
The problem with this argument, however, is that Green did not provide
enough information to Rocket to allow consideration of her requested
accommodation. Over a span of more than 10 months with three major periods of
back-and-forth, Green only provided five documents in support of her request for
remote work:
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1. A letter from August 2021 by Dr. Chamas recommending that Green work
5 hours per day;
2. ADA and FMLA accommodations packets completed by Dr. Job in
September 2021 recommending a limit on Green’s hours to five hours per
day (until March 2022) because of her anxiety, depression, chronic pain,
and sciatica, with substantive explanations for that recommendation;
3. A letter from September 2021 by Dr. Chamas recommending that Green
work 5 hours per day from home;
4. A letter from October 2021 by her therapist recommending that Green
work remotely due to her anxiety and depression;
5. A letter from April 2022 by her therapist recommending that Green work
remotely due to her anxiety and depression.
ECF Nos. 10-8 at PageID.135; 10-12 at PageID.152–53; 11-7 at PageID.250; 11-12
at PageID.260; 11-17 at PageID.275.
Of the above documents, only three recommended remote work and only the
last two tied the recommendation to a diagnosis (anxiety and depression). ECF Nos.
11-7 at PageID.250; 11-12 at PageID.260; 11-17 at PageID.275. But even in those
two notes, Green’s therapist never provided an explanation of why Green’s anxiety
and depression hindered her ability to work in person and, relatedly, how working
from home would enable her to perform the essential functions of her position. ECF
Nos. 11-12 at PageID.260; 11-17 at PageID.275. In fact, only one health provider—
Dr. Job—provided any explanation of Green’s impairments and how they affected
her work. ECF No. 10-12. And Dr. Job notably did not suggest Green be allowed to
work remotely, despite Green requesting such an accommodation on her own portion
of her ADA packet. Id.

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Green’s cursory and conflicting documentation—five notes from three
providers referencing different, if any, diagnoses and recommending two different
accommodations—left Rocket with more questions than answers. Thus, no jury
could find that it was unreasonable for Rocket to request more information from
Green before granting a remote work accommodation. See Tchankpa, 951 F.3d 805,
813 (affirming grant of summary judgment for employer when employee’s medical
documentation did not explain why his disability required work from home); see also
Aldini v. Kroger Co. of Mich., 628 F. App’x 347, 351 (6th Cir. 2015); U.S. Equal
Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, Enforcement Guidance on Disability-Related Inquiries
and Medical Examinations of Employees under the ADA (2000); U.S. Equal Emp.
Opportunity Comm’n, Work at Home/Telework as a Reasonable Accommodation
(2003).
And despite Green’s arguments to the contrary, the undisputed evidence
shows that Rocket clearly and repeatedly requested an explanation of why Green’s
disabilities required remote work. ECF Nos. 10-11 at PageID.146 (“please ensure
your physician provides details into the why behind the requests); 11-10 at
PageID.256 (“The only information about working from home was in the doctors
note you provided yesterday that did not state the ‘why’ behind you needing to work
from home.”); 11-15 at PageID.271 (asking for “an explanation of how your
disability affects your ability to come into the office”); 10-21 at PageID.188–89
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(requesting documentation of “the extent to which your current condition limits your
ability to perform your essential job functions onsite”).
By refusing to submit the requested updated accommodation packet, and by
never providing an explanation for why her disability required her to work from
home, Green abandoned the interactive process. Because of Green’s abandonment,
Rocket Mortgage may not be held liable for failing to accommodate her disability.
Brumley, 909 F.3d at 840. Therefore, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment
will be granted and Green’s reasonable-accommodation claim—and thus her
complaint—will be dismissed.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment, ECF No. 10, is GRANTED.
Further, it is ORDERED that the Complaint, ECF No. 1, is DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE.
/s/Susan K. DeClercq
SUSAN K. DeCLERCQ
United States District Judge

Dated: March 7, 2025

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