Reid v. Shoudy et al
Filing
45
OPINION AND ORDER OVERRULING 34 Objections to Magistrate Judge's Order. Signed by District Judge Sean F. Cox. (EVra)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
CHARLES REID,
Case No. 23-cv-11358
Plaintiff,
v.
Hon. Sean F. Cox
United States District Court Judge
OFFICER TRISTAN SHOUDY ET AL.,
Defendants.
___________________________________/
OPINION & ORDER
OVERRULING DEFENDANTS’ OBJECTIONS TO MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S ORDER
GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL (ECF No. 34)
The defendants in this civil action object to a magistrate judge’s rulings on the plaintiff’s
motion to compel discovery. But those rulings were not clearly erroneous, so the defendants’
objections are overruled.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Charles Reid alleges that a police officer, Tristan Shoudy, punched him in the
face on November 9, 2022, while Officers Brandon Pomranke, Nate Tomlinson, and Kyle
Whitten stood by and watched. Reid now seeks damages from those officers (together,
“Officers”) and their employer, the City of Port Huron, Michigan (“City”), under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 for violating his constitutional right to be free from excessive force. Discovery in this
action began in October 2023.
Reid served Defendants with requests to produce documents and interrogatories. As
relevant here, Reid asked Defendants to produce: (1) any so-called “Garrity statements” by the
Officers; (2) any internal-investigation records stemming from the Officers’ encounter with him
on November 9, 2022; (3) the Officers’ and their supervisors’ “discipline file[s]”; and (4) the
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Officers’ and their supervisors’ “personnel file[s].” (ECF No. 22-2, PageID.120). Reid also
asked Defendants to explain any physical contact that the Officers had with him on November 9,
2022, and whether the Officers submitted a warrant for his arrest (Interrogatory #2). Defendants
objected to these discovery requests, and Reid moved to compel. The Court referred Reid’s
motion to Magistrate Judge Curtis Ivy under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), and Magistrate Judge Ivy
addressed Defendants’ objections in an order dated November 6, 2024:
The Officers’ Garrity Statements. Reid’s second request for production asks
Defendants to “identify and provide all Garrity statements authored, generated or provided by
any of the [Officers] or any other officer which concern or relate to the events alleged in [the]
Complaint.” (ECF No. 22-4, PageID.152). The parties agree that a “Garrity statement” is a
statement made by a police officer to the officer’s employer as a condition of continued
employment, which Garrity v. New Jersey held is protected by the privilege against selfincrimination. 385 U.S. 493 (1967). Defendants objected that the Officers’ Garrity statements
were protected by Garrity, but Magistrate Judge Ivy recognized that the privilege against selfincrimination does not apply in civil cases.
Internal Investigation Records. Reid’s ninth request for production asks Defendants to
“identify and provide all statements, whether written or oral, which concern or relate to any of
the events alleged in the Complaint and/or the November 9, 2022, encounter with Plaintiff.”
(ECF No. 22-4, PageID.156–57). And Reid’s twelfth request for production asks Defendants to
“identify and provide all Internal Affairs (IA) investigations, reports, recommendations and/or
findings related to events alleged in the Complaint and/or the November 9, 2022, encounter with
Plaintiff.” (Id. at 157). The parties refer to these documents as “internal investigation” records.
Defendants objected that any information in these records was protected by the deliberative-
2
process privilege, and Magistrate Judge Ivy observed that the deliberative-process privilege does
not apply to purely factual material.1
The Officers’ and Their Supervisors’ Discipline Files. Reid’s fourteenth request for
production asks Defendants to “identify and provide all admonitions, reprimands, suspensions,
terminations, and any other discipline received by, or imposed on, any individual for their role or
part in the November 9, 2022, encounter with Plaintiff.” (Id. at 158). Reid’s twenty-second
request for production asks Defendants to “identify and produce all documents and
communications which describe any and all disciplinary action, if any, imposed or taken against
any of the individually named officers and/or other officers (i.e., supervisors) related to the
November 9, 2022, encounter with Plaintiff.” (Id. at 162). And Reid’s first request for
production seeks the Officers’ and their supervisors’ “discipline file[s].” (Id. at 151). Thus,
Reid sought information about any discipline that the Officers and their supervisors received in
connection with their interaction with him on November 9, 2022, and information about
discipline that the Officers and their supervisors received on other occasions.2
Defendants objected that the discipline files, like the internal-investigation documents,
were shielded by the deliberative-process privilege. Magistrate Judge Ivy disagreed with this
1
Reid’s first request for production sought the “Chief’s file, and/or investigatory file,
Internal Affairs (IA) file, and/or Force Investigation Unit (FIU) file” for the Officers and their
supervisors. (ECF No. 22-4, PageID.151). This request is arguably broader than Reid’s ninth and
twelfth requests insofar as it is not limited to documents concerning the Officers’ interaction with
him on November 9, 2022. But Magistrate Judge Ivy only addressed Reid’s request for “any
internal affairs documents about the incident.” (ECF No. 26, PageID.223 (emphasis added)).
2
A letter that Reid’s counsel sent to counsel for Defendants (ECF No. 22-5) and Reid’s
motion to compel both state that Reid seeks the Officers’ and their supervisors’ entire discipline
files. And Magistrate Judge Ivy discussed Reid’s request for the Officers’ and their supervisors’
“discipline files” without the “about the incident” qualifier that he used to describe Reid’s request
for the internal-investigation records. (ECF No. 26, PageID.223).
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objection for the same reasons that he disagreed with Defendants’ deliberative-process-privilege
objection to producing the internal-affairs documents.
The Officers’ and Their Supervisors’ Personnel Files. Reid’s first request for
production asks Reid to “identify and produce the employee/personnel file[s]” for the Officers
and their supervisors. (Id. at 151). In his motion to compel, Reid argued that these files would
show the training that the Officers and their supervisors received. Defendants objected that the
personnel files only contained irrelevant, private information. Magistrate Judge Ivy determined
that information in the personnel files could help Reid prove that the City had a policy or custom
of violating constitutional rights and that the proper remedy for Defendants’ privacy concerns
was a protective order.
Interrogatory #2. Defendants objected that Interrogatory #2 would not provide any
relevant information that was not contained in police reports and video footage that they had
already provided to Reid. Magistrate Judge Ivy determined that Defendants’ police reports had
little evidentiary value and that their answers to Interrogatory #2 would help the parties’ flesh out
whether they genuinely disputed any material facts.
Magistrate Judge Ivy ultimately granted Reid’s motion to compel in full and awarded
Reid any expenses he had incurred litigating his motion to compel. Defendants now object to
Magistrate Judge Ivy’s rulings on Reid’s motion to compel. Defendants’ objections have been
fully briefed, and the Court overrules them for the following reasons.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A magistrate judge’s ruling on “[a] non-dispositive pretrial motion such as a discovery
motion” is reviewed using “the ‘clearly erroneous’ standard.” Brown v. Wesley’s Quaker Maid,
Inc., 771 F.2d 952, 954 (6th Cir. 1985) (emphasis omitted) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A)).
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ANALYSIS
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit parties to “obtain discovery regarding any
nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the
needs of the case.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). If “a party fails to answer an interrogatory” or
“produce documents,” then “[a] party seeking discovery may move for an order compelling an
answer, designation, production, or inspection.” Id. r. 37(a)(3)(B)(iii), (iv). And “[i]f the motion
is granted,” then a court may require the nonmovant to “pay the movant’s reasonable expenses
incurred in making the motion, including attorney’s fees,” unless an exception applies. Id. r.
37(a)(5)(A). Here, Magistrate Judge Ivy’s resolution of Reid’s motion to compel was not clearly
erroneous.
I.
Reid’s Requests for Production of Documents
Parties may request the production of documents containing information that is
discoverable under Rule 26(b). Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a). An opposing party who wishes to resist
such a request must “state with specificity the grounds for objecting to the request, including the
reasons,” id. r. 34(2)(B), and any untimely objections are waived, see Boles v. Aramark Corr.
Servs., LLC, No. 17-1919, 2018 WL 3854143, at *5 (6th Cir. Mar. 19, 2018). Here, Defendants
objected to Reid’s requests for Garrity statements, internal-investigation records, discipline files,
and personnel files.
A.
The Officers’ Garrity Statements
Defendants argue that Magistrate Judge Ivy’s order to produce the Officers’ Garrity
statements was clearly erroneous for five reasons. First, because Garrity v. New Jersey protects
the statements from disclosure.3 But Garrity would not justify resisting Reid’s request to
3
Defendants buttress their reliance on Garrity with state law, but they waived any reliance
on state law by failing to preserve it in their initial objections to Reid.
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produce the statements unless Garrity instructed that they were not discoverable under Rule
26(b). But Garrity was about the privilege against self-incrimination, and Magistrate Judge Ivy
correctly observed that that privilege doesn’t apply in civil proceedings. See, e.g., Perry v. City
of Pontiac, No. 07-14036, 2012 WL 161973, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 19, 2012).
Second, Defendants protest that Magistrate Judge Ivy never considered public policy
considerations that they discussed. But Defendants waived these challenges by failing to
preserve them in their initial challenges to Reid.
Third, Defendants argue that their Garrity statements do not contain any relevant
information that is not already contained in video footage and police reports that they produced
to Reid.4 But Defendants concede that Garrity statements describe a police officer’s narrative of
some event to his or her supervisor, and it follows that such statements from the Officers could
reveal information about the City’s customs and policies. Thus, the Officers’ Garrity statements
could contain relevant information that is absent from the video footage and police reports.
Fourth, Defendants contend that their production of the Officers’ Garrity statements
would be disproportionate to the needs of this case.5 But Defendants do not explain this
objection beyond their naked assertion that “the burden or expense of compelling the Garrity
Internal Affairs statements outweighs the likely benefit.” (ECF No. 34, PageID.830).
Fifth and last, Defendants argue for the first time that the only documents they possess
that memorialize Garrity statements by the Officers is a “post-incident report” prepared by the
Officers’ supervisors, and that these reports do not qualify as Garrity statements at all. (Id. at
4
Magistrate Judge Ivy did not directly address this objection, but Defendants preserved a
relevancy objection in their initial objections to Reid and response to Reid’s motion to compel.
5
Magistrate Judge Ivy did not directly address this objection, but Defendants preserved it
in their initial objections to Reid and response to Reid’s motion to compel.
6
831). What Defendants believe this assertion adds to the calculus is unclear, given that
Magistrate Judge Ivy properly overruled all their timely objections to producing the Officers’
Garrity statements.6 At this stage, the Court need not address whether such statements exist
unless and until Reid seeks some sanction for Defendants’ failure to comply with Magistrate
Judge Ivy’s order.
B.
Internal-Investigation Records
Defendants argue that Magistrate Judge Ivy’s order to produce the internal-investigation
records was clearly erroneous for three reasons. First, because the deliberative-process privilege
protects those records. “[T]he deliberative process privilege shields from disclosure ‘documents
reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by
which governmental decisions and policies are formulated.’” U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv. v.
Sierra Club, Inc., 592 U.S. 261, 267 (2021) (quoting NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S.
132, 150 (1975)). But “‘purely factual, investigative matters’ that are ‘severable without
compromising the private remainder of the documents’ do not enjoy the protection of the”
privilege. Norwood v. FAA, 993 F.2d 570, 577 (6th Cir. 1993) (quoting EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S.
73, 89, 91 (1973)).
As relevant here, courts have recognized that facts are not severable from protected
decisional information if such facts are “inextricably intertwined with the process by which
policy [was] made or if the manner of selecting or presenting the facts would reveal the
deliberative process.” Dowd v. Calabrese, 101 F.R.D. 427, 430–31 (D.D.C. 1984). Magistrate
Judge Ivy ruled that Defendants must produce any purely factual material in the internal-
6
Defendants do not argue that they have good cause to bring any objections belatedly.
7
investigation records, and Defendants argue that such facts are intertwined with and would reveal
deliberative information.
Magistrate Judge Ivy’s ruling with respect to the internal-investigation records was not
clearly erroneous. The deliberative-process privilege only extends to information that
“compris[es] part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated.”
Hoban v. Sprague, No. 18-cv-12011, 2019 WL 3219709, at *3 (E.D. Mich. July 17, 2019)
(emphasis added) (quoting Dep’t of the Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n, 532
U.S. 1, 8 (2001)). Here, the City’s then-chief of police, Joseph Platzer, testified that he was not
aware of any policy changes that had been implemented because of the Officers’ interaction with
Reid, and Defendants offer no evidence showing otherwise. (ECF No. 36-4, PageID.922). It
follows that the internal-investigation records are not privileged because their creation never led
to any policy change.
Second, Defendants object that the internal-investigation records would not contain any
relevant information.7 But information showing how the City investigated the Officers’
interaction with Reid would be relevant to Reid’s claim against the City.
Third and last, Defendants argue that miscellaneous public-policy concerns excuse their
failure to produce the internal-investigation records. But Defendants waived these objections by
failing to preserve them in their initial objections to Reid.
C.
The Officers’ and Their Supervisors’ Discipline Files
As discussed above, Magistrate Judge Ivy ordered Defendants to produce the Officers’
and their supervisors’ entire discipline files, including information about the Officers’ interaction
with Reid on November 9, 2022, and any other incidents involving the Officers and their
7
Magistrate Judge Ivy did not directly address this objection, but Defendants preserved it
in their initial objections to Reid and response to Reid’s motion to compel.
8
supervisors. Here, Defendants only object to Magistrate Judge Ivy’s ruling concerning the
“discipline records regarding this incident.” (ECF No. 34, PageID.831). Thus, Defendants
waive any objection to Magistrate Judge Ivy’s order to produce discipline information regarding
other incidents.
Defendants object to Magistrate Judge Ivy’s order to produce the Officers’ and their
supervisors’ discipline files for the same reasons that they object to Magistrate Judge Ivy’s order
to produce the internal-investigation records. Those objections fail for the reasons discussed
above.
D.
The Officers’ and Their Supervisors’ Personnel Files
Defendants separately address Magistrate Judge Ivy’s order to produce the Officers’
personnel files and his order to produce the Officers’ supervisors’ personnel files. Defendants
argue that Magistrate Judge Ivy’s order to produce the Officers’ personnel files was clearly
erroneous for five reasons. First, Defendants argue that Reid only clearly requested personnel
files for Officer Shoudy but not Officers Pomranke, Tomlinson, and Whitten. But Defendants
waived this objection by failing to preserve it in their response to Reid’s motion to compel.
Second, Defendants object that they already produced the Officers’ “training file[s].”
(ECF No. 34, PageID.839). But again, Defendants waived this objection by failing to raise it in
their initial objections to Reid.
Third, Defendants object that the Officers’ personnel files contain private information.
But the Court agrees with Judge Ivy that a protective order would remedy these concerns.
Fourth, Defendants argue that the Officers’ personnel files don’t contain any relevant
information. But Reid alleges that those files contain training information, and Defendants
carefully avoid denying this allegation. And the Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Ivy that
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information about the training that that Officers received would be relevant to Reid’s municipalliability claim.
Fifth and last, Defendants argue that producing the Officers’ personnel files would not be
“proportional.”8 (ECF No. 34, PageID.839). Because this is the extent of Defendants’
disproportionality objection, it is undeveloped.
Defendants object to Magistrate Judge Ivy’s order to produce the Officers’ supervisors’
personnel files for largely the same reasons that they object to Magistrate Judge Ivy’s order to
produce the Officers’ personnel files, and those objections fail for the same reasons.
*
*
*
The Court shall overrule Defendants’ objections to Magistrate Ivy’s order to produce
documents.
II.
Interrogatory #2
Parties may propound interrogatories to obtain information that is within the scope of
Rule 26(b). Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(a)(2). A party may oppose an interrogatory by serving the
opposing party with a “specific[]” objection, and “[a]ny ground not stated in a timely objection is
waived unless the court, for good cause, excuses the failure.” Id. r. 33(b)(4). Here, Defendants
objected to Interrogatory #2, which asked them to explain any physical contact that the Officers
had with Reid and whether the Officers submitted a warrant request for him.
Defendants object that Magistrate Judge Ivy’s order to answer Interrogatory #2
undermines Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 33(d) and Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8). But
Defendants waived this objection by failing to raise it in their initial objections to Reid. The
Court shall overrule Defendants’ objection to Judge Ivy’s order to answer Interrogatory #2.
8
Magistrate Judge Ivy did not directly address this objection, but Defendants preserved it
in their initial objections to Reid and response to Reid’s motion to compel.
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III.
Sanctions
“If a party fails to make a disclosure required by Rule 26(a), any other party may move to
compel disclosure and for appropriate sanctions,” such as ordering the noncompliant party to
“pay the movant’s reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion [to compel], including
attorney’s fees.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(3)(A), (5)(A). Because Magistrate Judge Ivy properly
granted Reid’s motion to compel, he also properly sanctioned Defendants unless, for example,
their failure to comply was “substantially justified.” Id. r. 37(5)(A)(3). Defendants argue that
their failure to comply with Reid’s discovery requests was “well articulated,” but they do not
explain why Magistrate Judge Ivy’s contrary finding was clearly erroneous. (ECF No. 34,
PageID.849).
The Court shall overrule Defendants’ objection to Magistrate Judge Ivy’s order imposing
sanctions.
CONCLUSION & ORDER
None of Magistrate Judge Ivy’s rulings on Reid’s motion to compel were clearly
erroneous. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ objections to those rulings (ECF
No. 34) are OVERRULED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Sean F. Cox
Sean F. Cox
United States District Judge
Dated: January 27, 2025
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