Randle v. Lewis et al

Filing 31

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 25 MOTION for Summary Judgment - Signed by District Judge Mark A. Goldsmith. (CCie)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
KAMRYN RANDLE,
Case No. 23-cv-11370
Plaintiff,
v.

HON. MARK A. GOLDSMITH

LADEL LEWIS et al.,
Defendants.
__________________________/
OPINION & ORDER
GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Dkt. 25)
Plaintiff Kamryn Randle brought this case against five members of the Flint City
Council, the Flint City Attorney, and a Flint police officer, based on events arising at a Flint City
Council meeting in June 2023. She alleges First Amendment claims as well as state-law claims
for negligence, violation of the Michigan Open Meetings Act, and assault.
Before the Court is Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 25).1 For the
reasons stated below, the Court grants the motion.
I.

BACKGROUND

Randle, a resident of Flint, Michigan, attended a Flint City Council meeting held on June
5, 2023. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 19–20 (Dkt. 22). She began videorecording the meeting as part of her
role as support staff for Councilman Eric Mays and his attorneys. Id. ¶ 20. The City Council has
uploaded its own recording of the June 5, 2023 meeting to its YouTube channel. Am. Compl. ¶
Because oral argument will not aid the Court’s decisional process, the motion will be decided
based on the parties’ briefing. See E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(f)(2); Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b). In addition to
the motion, the briefing includes Randle’s response (Dkt. 29) and Defendants’ reply (Dkt. 30).
1

While this motion was filed and labeled as a motion to dismiss, as the Court stated in its
September 11, 2023 Order, it will treat Defendants’ motion as a motion for summary judgment,
as the motion relies on matters outside of the pleadings. See 9/11/23 Order (Dkt. 24).
1

24

(citing

060523-Flint

City

Council-Budget

Adoption,

available

at

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OmRCFtoOMlA).
During the meeting, Defendant Eva Worthing, a member of the City Council, requested
that Randle turn off the light on her camera, as Worthing was sensitive to the light. Am. Compl.
¶¶ 24–25; Meeting Tr. at PageID.596–597 (Dkt. 25-4). According to Randle, the light at issue
was an operational light, indicating that the camera was turned on and recording. Am. Compl. ¶
27. She did not know how to turn it off and so did not do so. Id. ¶ 28. As described in the
amended complaint—and as is apparent from the meeting transcript—members of the City
Council engaged in a heated argument regarding whether Randle should be required to turn off
the camera light. Id. ¶¶ 24–80; Meeting Transcript at PageID.596–598, PageID.601–618. A
member of Lento Law Group, P.C., a firm hired by Councilman Mays, also engaged in the
dispute, as did Defendants Kim (the Flint City Attorney) and Metcalfe (a Flint police officer).
Am. Compl. ¶¶ 32, 41–42.
Eventually, Defendant Ladel Lewis, chair of the City Council, directed Randle to turn off
her camera light or be removed from the meeting. Id. ¶ 38; Meeting Tr. at PageID.612–613.
The Council voted to support that direction by a 5-3 majority vote. Meeting Tr. at PageID.616–
617.

Immediately thereafter, the meeting was adjourned by a 5-2 majority vote.

Id. at

PageID.616–618.
While the parties agree that Randle was able to record for more than three hours of the
meeting, Am. Compl. ¶ 37; Mot. at 16, they disagree over whether Randle was able to record the
full meeting. Randle argues that she was not permitted to record the end of the meeting. See
Resp. at 17–18. Defendants disagree. See Mot. at 10.
The record is not entirely clear on the subject. Before the vote to require Randle to turn
the light off or leave the meeting, Councilman Murphy stated that Randle had “turned the light
off” but that she was “still able to record,” so it is possible she had turned her camera off at that
2

point. Am. Compl. ¶ 63; Meeting Tr. at PageID.608. But by the time of the vote, her camera
may have been back on. The transcript also shows that the meeting was adjourned immediately
after the vote to require Randle to stop recording. Meeting Tr. at PageID.617–618. If she turned
her camera off after the vote requiring her to do so, the only portion of the meeting she would
have missed would have been the vote to adjourn. And according to video footage cited by
Defendants, Randle’s camera light was still on after the meeting was adjourned. Mot. at 42
(citing Metcalfe Body Cam Video at 13:20–15:00) (Dkt. 19-3).
The Court need not decide the factual question of whether Randle was actually prevented
from videorecording any portion of the meeting, as the Court finds that the fact is not material to
the outcome of her federal claims.
II.

ANALYSIS2

The Court first addresses Randle’s claim that Defendants violated her First Amendment
access and freedom of expression rights, and then turns to her 28 U.S.C. § 1985 conspiracy
claim. Because the Court finds that all of Randle’s federal claims must be dismissed, it will
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her state-law claims.
A. First Amendment Freedom of Access Claim
Randle claims that Defendants violated her access rights under the First Amendment.
See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 91–131. The parties do not dispute that Randle had a right to access the
legislative proceedings. Rather, they disagree as to whether that right of access protects Randle’s
ability to videorecord the City Council meeting. Defendants argue that the Court should dismiss
2

In assessing whether a party is entitled to summary judgment, the Court applies the traditional
summary judgment standard as articulated in Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). A court
will grant a motion for summary judgment where “the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(a). If the movant makes an initial showing that there is an absence of evidence to
support the nonmoving party’s case, the nonmovant can survive summary judgment only by
coming forward with evidence showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324–325 (1985).
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this claim because (i) preventing a person from recording a meeting does not violate the First
Amendment right of access where alternative means of access exist and, alternatively, (ii)
Defendant’s actions are permissible under the test established by the Sixth Circuit in S.H.A.R.K.
v. Metro Parks Serving Summit Cnty., 499 F.3d 553 (6th Cir. 2007) for evaluating freedom of
access claims. The Court agrees with Defendants on both grounds and finds no right of access
violation.
The right of access springs from “the common understanding that a major purpose of [the
First] Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs” and “to ensure that
this constitutionally protected ‘discussion of government affairs’ is an informed one.” Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Sup. Ct. for Norfolk Cnty., 457 U.S. 596, 604–605 (1982) (punctuation
modified). It exists where (i) “the place and process has historically been open to the press and
general public” and (ii) “public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the
particular process in question.” Capital Cities Media, Inc. v. Chester, 797 F.2d 1164, 1174 (3rd
Cir. 1986) (punctuation modified).
But the “First Amendment does not require unfettered access to government
information.” Whiteland Woods, L.P. v. Twp. of West Whiteland, 193 F.3d 177, 182 (3rd Cir.
1999)). Courts have held that it “‘does not require states to accommodate every potential method
of recording its proceedings, particularly where the public is granted alternative means of
compiling a comprehensive record.’” Maple Heights News v. Lansky, No. 1:15-cv-53, 2017 WL
951426, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 10, 2017) (quoting Whiteland Woods, 193 F.3d at 183).
Here, Randle was granted both access to the meeting and “alternative means of compiling
a comprehensive record.” Id. Randle does not argue that she was prevented from attending the
meeting, nor does the record bear that out.

She also acknowledges that the City Council

recorded the meeting, a recording she could have watched on the Council’s YouTube channel
after the meeting’s conclusion. Am. Compl. ¶ 24. If she was unable to continue recording on
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her camera without the light, she could have used a different device, such as a smartphone.
Alternatively, she could have recorded audio only, or she could have taken notes. Because
Defendants did not prevent Randle from attending, observing, or recording the proceedings
through other means, they have not violated the First Amendment’s right of access.

See

Whiteland Woods, 193 F.3d at 184 (finding no First Amendment right of access violation where
video recording was prohibited during planning commission meetings but where plaintiff “was
allowed to attend all the meetings . . . and to compile a full record of the proceedings, whether by
written and stenographic notes or audiotaping”).
Because Randle claims an impingement of her effort to record public proceedings, the
analytical framework set out in S.H.A.R.K. may be applicable—although the end result is the
same. In S.H.A.R.K., the Sixth Circuit upheld a metropolitan park district’s removal of cameras
that an interest group had placed in a park to record planned deer culling, by applying a four-part
test:
First, we ask what rule the government is invoking that prohibits the plaintiffs
from access to information, and whether that rule selectively delimits the audience
. . . . Second, we inquire into the government's stated interest for invoking the
rule. Third, we apply the applicable test to determine whether the government's
stated interest is sufficiently related to the means of accomplishing that interest: if
the rule does not selectively delimit the audience, we uphold the restriction if it is
reasonably related to the government's interest; if the rule does selectively delimit
the audience, a stricter level of scrutiny will apply.
499 F.3d at 560–561 (punctuation modified). The test has been used in other cases involving
restrictions on recording matters of public concern. See McKay v. Federspiel, No. 14-cv-10252,
2014 WL 1400091, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 10, 2014) (upholding a county court’s decision to
prohibit the use of electronic equipment inside a courtroom where the public was able to attend,
observe, and disseminate information learned from courtroom proceedings).
Here, the alleged access restriction by the Council passes the S.H.A.R.K. test. First, the
rule Defendants invoked in this case was the City Council’s rule against disorderly conduct.
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Mot. at 15–16. This rule does not, by its terms, selectively delimit the audience. Nor has Randle
made any genuine showing of selective limitation of an audience.3 Second, the City Council’s
interest in invoking the rule is to maintain order during the meeting. During the hearing,
Defendants noted that the light was disrupting the meeting, as Worthing kept having to leave her
seat. See Meeting Tr. at PageID.609. And third, the City Council’s actions were reasonably
related to the government’s interest—the appropriate test here because the rule does not
selectively delimit. The limitation at issue here—requesting that Randle turn off the light on her
camera, even if it resulted in her having to stop recording—was narrowly tailored to address the
problem the recording device created—the light causing harm to Worthing. The City Council’s
action did not prohibit attendance, note-taking, audio recording, or even video recording,
provided it did not disrupt the meeting.
B. First Amendment Freedom of Expression Claim
Randle also claims a violation of her First Amendment right to freedom of expression.
See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 132–160. She alleges that she intended to disseminate her videorecording
online, but was prevented from doing so when she was made to stop recording the meeting. Id.
¶¶ 139–140. Defendants argue that Randle’s freedom of expression claim fails because: (i) her
freedom of expression claim is wholly derivative of the alleged access restriction; and (ii) her
freedom of expression claim fails on the merits.

Mot. at 23–24.

While Randle’s First

Amendment claim is more appropriately addressed as a freedom of access claim, her freedom of

3

Randle claims that other people in the meeting were recording and were not ejected. Resp. at
17. But Randle supplies no facts showing that those devices created the kind of annoyance that
her device did. The only detail regarding prior cameras recording with lights that can be found
in the record is a councilwoman’s statement during the meeting that television cameras had been
used in the past with “huge” lights. Meeting Tr. at PageID.606. But Randle makes no showing
that a “huge” light creates the kind of annoyance that a smaller, more focused light can produce
when the light beam interferes with the vision of persons present. Thus, Randle has not shown
that the rule’s enforcement was selective.
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expression claim also fails on the merits.
When evaluating a freedom of expression claim, the Court first considers whether the
speech is protected under the First Amendment. If it is, the Court next ascertains whether the
applicable forum is public or nonpublic, before applying the appropriate standard for the forum
to determine whether the probation on speech passes muster under the First Amendment. Parks
v. City of Columbus, 395 F.3d 643, 647 (6th Cir. 2005).
Defendants are correct that courts in this circuit have generally evaluated right to record
cases under the right of access, as opposed to freedom of expression. In S.H.A.R.K., for
example, the Sixth Circuit evaluated the right to videorecord as being protected by the First
Amendment’s right of access guarantee. S.H.A.R.K., 499 F.3d at 559. In McKay, 2014 WL
1400091, the Court rejected the parties’ contention that the right to record raises a constitutional
issue of freedom of expression, citing the S.H.A.R.K. opinion as “clarif[ying] . . . that a member
of the public’s right to record involves the First Amendment right to access information, not
freedom of expression.” Id. at *10.
While Randle’s claim is more appropriately evaluated under the right of access standard,
“there is a growing trend of courts adopting the view that video recording is indeed speech for
First Amendment purposes.” Knight v. Montgomery Cnty., 470 F. Supp. 3d 760, 766 (M.D.
Tenn. 2020) (collecting cases). Therefore, the Court will also consider Randle’s freedom of
expression claim on the merits.
The Sixth Circuit has explained that a City Council meeting is “a ‘designated’ and
‘limited’ public forum: ‘designated’ because the government has intentionally opened it for
public discourse, and ‘limited’ because the State is not required to allow persons to engage in
every type of speech in the forum.” Youkhanna v. City of Sterling Heights, 934 F.3d 508, 519
(6th Cir. 2019) (punctuation modified). When a forum is a designated and limited public forum,
“the government may regulate the time, place and manner of speech so long as the regulation is
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(1) content neutral, (2) narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest and (3) leaves
open ample alternative channels for communication of the information.” Lowery v. Jefferson
Cty. Bd. of Educ., 586 F.3d 427, 432 (6th Cir. 2009) (punctuation modified).
Here, there is no evidence that Defendants’ decision to require Randle to either turn off
her camera light or leave the meeting was not content-neutral, as it was based on the effect the
light was having on Worthing.

The action was also narrowly tailored, despite Randle’s

arguments that the easiest and least restrictive way to accommodate both Worthing’s medical
issue and Randle’s First Amendment rights would have been for Worthing to move. Resp. at 18.
But “the requirement of narrow tailoring is satisfied so long as the regulation promotes a
substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation, and
does not burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government’s
legitimate interests.” Tucker v. City of Fairfield, 398 F.3d 457, 463 (6th Cir. 2005) (punctuation
modified). The narrow tailoring requirement is satisfied here: the rule against disorderly conduct
promotes the City Council’s ability to effectively run its meetings, and its application did not
burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further that interest, as Randle was
permitted to record the meeting by other means. A person recording a council meeting has no
First Amendment right to force public officials to change their seating arrangements.
Finally, Defendants left open ample alternative channels for communication of the
information.

They posted a livestream as well as a recording of the meeting to the City

Council’s YouTube channel. Randle argues that the difference between the video she was
creating and the video available on the City Council YouTube channel is that “the YouTube
video is concentrated on one camera angle.” Resp. at 17. But the test requires only “ample
alternative channels,” not an identical alterative channel. Randle has not persuaded the Court
that being able to disseminate her video, with a different angle, would make a meaningful
difference.
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C. Conspiracy Claim Under § 1985
Randle also claims a conspiracy under 28 U.S.C. § 1985, alleging that Defendants
conspired to deprive her of her First Amendment rights. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 161–169. As
explained above, the Court finds no First Amendment violation. Therefore, there can be no §
1985 conspiracy. See Rodrigues v. Martin Marietta Corp., Master Builders Div., 829 F.2d 39
(6th Cir. 1987) (holding that, where the plaintiff could not establish a violation of any federal
right, he had no basis for a conspiracy claim under § 1985).4
D. State-Law Claims
Because the Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss as to the federal claims, the
Court will use its discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining
state-law claims by dismissing these claims without prejudice. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); United
Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726–727 (1966) (“[I]f the federal claims are
dismissed before trial, . . . the state claims should be dismissed as well.”).
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, the court grants Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment (Dkt. 25).

SO ORDERED.
Dated: September 25, 2024
Detroit, Michigan

s/Mark A. Goldsmith
MARK A. GOLDSMITH
United States District Judge

Because the court finds that Randle cannot establish any violations of federal law, it need not
address Defendants’ arguments that they are entitled to legislative and qualified immunity.
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