Smith v. Social Security, Commissioner of

Filing 25

ORDER Overruling 21 Objections, Adopting 20 Report and Recommendation, Denying Plaintiff's 17 Motion for Summary Judgment, and Granting Defendant's 19 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by District Judge Stephen J. Murphy, III. (RLou)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
STACEY S.,
Case No. 2:23-cv-13208

Plaintiff,

HONORABLE STEPHEN J. MURPHY, III

v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.

/

ORDER OVERRULING OBJECTIONS [21],
ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [20],
DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [17] &
GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [19]
The Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denied the
application of Stacey S. for Supplemental Security Income and Disability Insurance
Benefits in a decision issued by an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). ECF 6-1, PgID
34. After the SSA Appeals Council declined to review the ruling, id. at 21, Plaintiff
appealed. ECF 1. The Court referred the matter to Magistrate Judge Anthony P.
Patti, ECF 9, and the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. ECF 17, 19.
The magistrate judge issued a Report and Recommendation (“Report”) suggesting
that the Court deny Plaintiff’s motion and grant the Commissioner’s motion. ECF 20.
Plaintiff filed timely objections to the Report. ECF 21, 23. After examining the record
and considering Plaintiff’s objections de novo, the Court concludes that her objections
lack merit. Accordingly, the Court will adopt the Report’s findings, deny Plaintiff’s

motion for summary judgment, grant the Commissioner’s motion for summary
judgment, and dismiss the complaint.
BACKGROUND
The Report properly detailed the events giving rise to Plaintiff’s action against
the Commissioner. ECF 20, PgID 1736–38. The Court will adopt that portion of the
Report.
LEGAL STANDARD
Civil Rule 72(b) governs the review of a magistrate judge’s report. A district
court’s standard of review depends upon whether a party files objections. The Court
need not review portions of a Report to which no party has objected. Thomas v. Arn,
474 U.S. 140, 153 (1985). De novo review is required, however, if the parties “serve
and file specific written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). In conducting a de novo review, “[t]he district judge may
accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or
return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3).
When reviewing a case under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the Court “must affirm the
Commissioner’s conclusions absent a determination that the Commissioner has failed
to apply the correct legal standards or has made findings of fact unsupported by
substantial evidence in the record.” Longworth v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 402 F.3d
591, 595 (6th Cir. 2005) (quotations omitted). Substantial evidence consists of “more
than a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance” such that a “reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc.

Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007) (quotations omitted). An ALJ may consider the
entire body of evidence without directly addressing each piece in his decision.
Kornecky v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 167 F. App’x 496, 508 (6th Cir. 2006). “Nor must an
ALJ make explicit credibility findings as to each bit of conflicting testimony, so long
as his factual findings as a whole show that he implicitly resolved such conflicts.” Id.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff objected that the ALJ’s determination of her residual functional
capacity (RFC) was not supported by substantial evidence. ECF 21, PgID 1758.
Within that objection, she took issue with several determinations the ALJ made and
the magistrate judge’s approval of those determinations.
Plaintiff objected that the magistrate judge should not have concluded that the
ALJ duly considered “all impairments” in formulating her RFC. ECF 21, PgID 1758.
In particular, she argued that the ALJ failed to properly consider both severe and
non-severe impairments. Id. at 1759. Plaintiff’s objections are inapposite. The
magistrate judge fully analyzed the question, ECF 20, PgID 1748–55, and the Court
discerns no error. The magistrate judge provided a fulsome explanation of how the
ALJ considered both severe and non-severe impairments including Plaintiff’s severe
demyelinating disease and non-severe headaches. Id.; ECF 6-1, PgID 40 (determining
that the headaches were not severe and then stating immediately thereafter that “I
considered all of the claimant’s medically determinable impairments, including those
that are not severe, when assessing the claimant’s residual functional capacity.”).
And instead of identifying a concrete error in the magistrate judge’s analysis, Plaintiff

largely rephrases her argument from her summary judgment motion. See
Funderburg v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 15-10068, 2016 WL 1104466, at *1 (E.D. Mich.
Mar. 22, 2016) (“In reviewing Plaintiff’s filings in this Court, the Court notes that
Plaintiff’s objections are merely a restatement [of] the arguments he presented in his
summary judgment brief, an approach that is not appropriate or sufficient.”).
Plaintiff’s objection is insufficient.
Plaintiff also objected to the magistrate judge’s approval of the ALJ’s
evaluation of possible manipulative limitations. ECF 21, PgID 1760. But the record
shows that the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s manipulative concerns, and that
substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s determination. The magistrate judge
correctly and fulsomely analyzed the question and noted that other persuasive
medical evidence—namely, state physician Dr. Choi’s opinion—supported the
omission of manipulative limitations from the RFC. ECF 20, PgID 1751; ECF 6-1,
PgID 107 (stating, in Dr. Choi’s opinion, that Plaintiff had “[n]o” manipulative
limitations). Plaintiff’s request, as the magistrate judge observed, was largely a
request for the Court to give her chosen evidence more weight. ECF 20, PgID 1751–
52. That assessment is not the Court’s role when, as here, “substantial evidence”
supported the ALJ’s conclusion. See Ilman v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 693 F.3d 709, 714
(6th Cir. 2012).
Plaintiff also claimed that reliance on Dr. Choi’s “persuasive” opinion did not
excuse the ALJ from citing medical facts, resolving inconsistencies, and providing a
sufficient explanation regarding her “recurring headaches,” “breakthrough seizures,”

and “brain fog.” ECF 21, PgID 1760–61. Plaintiff made no mention of Dr. Choi’s
opinion in her motion and argued for the first time in an objection that the ALJ
improperly relied on Dr. Choi’s opinion to excuse his obligations. See ECF 17. The
Court’s review is generally limited to issues raised before the magistrate judge. Murr
v. United States, 200 F.3d 895, 902 n.1 (6th Cir. 2000)
Nevertheless, the ALJ considered the effect of Plaintiff’s neurological
symptoms and found that she had “moderate limitations” in her abilities to
understand, remember, or apply information and to concentrate, persist, or maintain
pace. ECF 6-1, PgID 42. When discussing Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity, the
ALJ expressly explained that: (1) he took all of Plaintiff’s non-severe impairments—
including headaches—into account, id. at 40; (2) Plaintiff’s most recent neurological
examinations—which were generally unremarkable—undermined her claim of
serious seizures, but that he nonetheless took seizures into account when
determining the RFC, id. at 47 (“The record shows that . . . seizure disorder limit[s]
the claimant’s ability to perform work-related activity.”); and (3) Plaintiff’s “brain fog
and comprehension issues” were belied by the fact that the cited medical evidence
showed that she “exhibited good contact with reality, fair insight, normal motor
activity, an ability to function, and a spontaneous, organized, and logical thought
process.” Id. at 46.
The ALJ explained his thought process as described above and ultimately
concluded that “the claimant’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably
be expected to cause the alleged symptoms; however, the claimant’s statements

concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not
entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record for the
reasons explained in this decision.” ECF 6-1, PgID 44. The magistrate judge did not
err in concluding that the ALJ adequately explained his RFC determination and that
the determination was supported by substantial evidence.
For the reasons above and based on the Court’s de novo review, the Court will
deny Plaintiff’s objections and adopt the report and recommendation.
CONCLUSION
The Court has carefully reviewed the parties’ motions, the Report, and
Plaintiff’s objections. For both the reasons stated here and based on its de novo review
of the analysis in Judge Patti’s order, the Court finds Plaintiff’s objections
unconvincing and agrees with the Report’s recommendation to grant the
Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment and deny Plaintiff’s motion for
summary judgment.
ORDER
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Objections [21] are
OVERRULED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the magistrate judge’s Report and
Recommendation [20] is ADOPTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment
[17] is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Commissioner’s Motion for Summary
Judgment [19] is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this case is DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
This is a final order that closes the case.
SO ORDERED.

s/Stephen J. Murphy, III
STEPHEN J. MURPHY, III
United States District Judge
Dated: March 11, 2025