Woodford v. FCI Milan et al

Filing 26

OPINION AND ORDER Overruling 20 Objection to Magistrate Judge's Order and Affirming 17 Order. Signed by District Judge Susan K. DeClercq. (LVer)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
DARRYL DOMINIC WOODFORD,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 2:23-cv-13284

v.

Honorable Susan K. DeClercq
United States District Judge

FCI MILAN, et al.,
Honorable David R. Grand
United States Magistrate Judge

Defendant.
________________________________/

OPINION AND ORDER OVERRULING OBJECTION TO MAGISTRATE
JUDGE’S ORDER (ECF No. 20) AND AFFIRMING ORDER (ECF No. 17)
Plaintiff Darryl Woodford has filed an objection to the Magistrate Judge’s
order denying his motion to appoint counsel. A hearing is unnecessary. E.D. Mich.
LR 7.1(f)(2). As explained below, Plaintiff’s objection will be overruled because the
Magistrate Judge’s order contains no clear error.
I.
On December 27, 2023, Plaintiff filed his complaint against Defendant FCI
Milan and three individual FCI Milan correctional officers, ECF No. 1, and an
application to proceed without prepaying fees or costs, ECF No. 2, which was
granted, ECF No. 5.
On April 22, 2024, Plaintiff filed a motion seeking the appointment of an
attorney, stating that he is “no match for opposing counsel” and that “without the

legal assistance of professional help, Plaintiff will be faced with a typical hardship.”
ECF No. 16 at PageID.57–58. Magistrate Judge David R. Grand denied Plaintiff’s
motion without prejudice, finding that Plaintiff “has not shown ‘exceptional
circumstances’ meriting the appointment of counsel.” ECF No. 17 at PageID.61.
Magistrate Judge Grand did note, however, that Plaintiff could file a renewed motion
for the appointment of counsel if his case proceeded to trial. Id. at PageID.62.
Plaintiff objects to the order that denied his motion for counsel. ECF No. 20.
II.
The Magistrate Judge’s order resolved a nondispositive pretrial matter. See
Massey v. City of Ferndale, 7 F.3d 506, 508–09 (6th Cir. 1993) (listing dispositive
matters). Therefore, this Court “must consider timely objections and modify or set
aside any part of the order that is clearly erroneous or is contrary to law.” FED. R.
CIV. P. 72(a); accord 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); see also 12 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT
& ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3069 (3d ed. 2022)
(“In sum, it is extremely difficult to justify alteration of the magistrate judge’s
nondispositive actions by the district judge.”). “A finding is ‘clearly erroneous’
when . . . the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. Mabry, 518 F.3d
442, 449 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364,
395 (1948)); see also Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 574
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(1985) (“Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the[] choice
between them cannot be clearly erroneous.”) (citing United States v. Yellow Cab Co.,
338 U.S. 338, 342 (1949) and Inwood Lab’ys, Inc. v. Ives Lab’ys, Inc., 456 U.S. 844
(1982)). A legal conclusion is reviewed de novo and is contrary to law if it “fails to
apply or misapplies relevant statutes, case law, or rules of procedure.” Bisig v. Time
Warner Cable, Inc., 940 F.3d 205, 219 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v.
Winsper, No. 3:08-CV-00631, 2013 WL 5673617, at *1 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 17, 2013)).
“If the district court will affirm the magistrate judge’s order, then it may
simply identify the parts of the record that it reviewed and state that it found no clear
error.” Murphy v. May, No. 1:21-CV-12089, 2023 WL 4964296, at *2 (E.D. Mich.
Aug. 3, 2023) (collecting cases); cf. United States v. Robinson, 366 F. Supp. 2d 498,
505 (E.D. Mich. 2005) (applying the same standard to the adoption of a magistrate
judge’s report and recommendation) (first citing Lardie v. Birkett, 221 F. Supp. 2d
806, 807 (E.D. Mich. 2002); and then citing 12 CHARLES A. WRIGHT

ET AL.,

FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3070.2 (2d ed. 1997)), aff’d, 290 F. App’x
769 (6th Cir. 2008).
III.
Having reviewed Plaintiff’s objection, the relevant orders, and all the related
filings in the record, this Court concludes that the Magistrate Judge’s order, ECF
No. 17, is neither clearly erroneous nor contrary to law.
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Magistrate Judge Grand expressly noted that Plaintiff “has adequately
articulated the basis of his action and appears capable of understanding the issues
and advocating for himself.” ECF No. 17 at PageID.61. Indeed, having reviewed
the papers filed by Plaintiff in this case to date, including his poignant letter
addressed filed on July 10, 2024, this Court agrees that Plaintiff is capable of
expressing himself thoroughly. Magistrate Judge Grand also correctly noted that the
issues in this case are not overly complex and allowed Plaintiff to renew his motion
at a later juncture. Moreover, as noted by Defendants in their response, ECF No. 21,
district courts within the Sixth Circuit have routinely held that issues typical to
prisoner litigation such as limited access to legal materials and limited knowledge
of the law do not present exceptional circumstances requiring the appointment of
counsel. See e.g., Stewart v. United States, 2017 WL 939197, at *1 (W.D. Tenn.
Mar. 7, 2017) (finding appointment of counsel not warranted under similar grounds).
IV.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Objection, ECF No. 20, is
OVERRULED.
Further, it is ORDERED that Magistrate Judge Grand’s Order Denying
Motion to Appoint Counsel, ECF No. 17, is AFFIRMED.
/s/Susan K. DeClercq
SUSAN K. DeCLERCQ
United States District Judge
Dated: August 29, 2024
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