Glenn v. Kraszewski et al

Filing 22

OPINION AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part 14 Motion to dismiss.Signed by District Judge Linda V. Parker. (DPer)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
WILLIE J. GLEN, III,
Plaintiff,
v.
AARON KRASZEWSKI and
CITY OF DETROIT,

Case No. 24-cv-10665
Honorable Linda V. Parker

Defendants.
__________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
Plaintiff Willie J. Glenn, III has filed this pro se lawsuit against Defendants
alleging violations of his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants are City
of Detroit Police Officer Aaron Kraszewski and the City of Detroit. The matter is
presently before the Court on Defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 14.) The motion is fully briefed.
(ECF Nos. 17-20.)
I.

Standard of Review
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. RMI

Titanium Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 78 F.3d 1125, 1134 (6th Cir. 1996).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a “short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” To

survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint need not contain “detailed factual
allegations,” but it must contain more than “labels and conclusions” or “a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action . . ..” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A complaint does not “suffice if it tenders
‘naked assertions’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
As the Supreme Court provided in Iqbal and Twombly, “[t]o survive a
motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The
plausibility standard “does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading
stage; it simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that
discovery will reveal evidence of illegal [conduct].” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
In deciding whether the plaintiff has set forth a “plausible” claim, the court
must accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true. Erickson v. Pardus,
551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Pro se filings must be construed liberally. Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). Nevertheless, a plaintiff may not simply
assert bare legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 668.
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Therefore, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 668 (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Ordinarily, the court may not consider matters outside the pleadings when
deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Weiner v. Klais & Co., Inc., 108 F.3d
86, 88 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing Hammond v. Baldwin, 866 F.2d 172, 175 (6th Cir.
1989)). A court that considers such matters must first convert the motion to
dismiss to one for summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P 12(d). However,
“[w]hen a court is presented with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, it may consider the
[c]omplaint and any exhibits attached thereto, public records, items appearing in
the record of the case and exhibits attached to [the] defendant’s motion to dismiss,
so long as they are referred to in the [c]omplaint and are central to the claims
contained therein.” Bassett v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 528 F.3d 426, 430
(6th Cir. 2008). The court may take judicial notice only “of facts which are not
subject to reasonable dispute.” Jones v. Cincinnati, 521 F.3d 555, 562 (6th Cir.
2008) (quoting Passa v. City of Columbus, 123 F. App’x 694, 697 (6th Cir. 2005)).

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II.

Factual and Procedural Background1
Mr. Glenn resides in a home in Detroit, Michigan. In June 2020, he began

complaining to Officer Kraszewski about a neighbor’s operation of a “chop/auto
shop” out of the neighbor’s garage. Mr. Glenn reported that the condition posed a
danger, as there was a gas tank, explosions, chemical fumes, asbestos brake dust,
and metal to metal hammering. Mr. Glenn claims that, instead of shutting down
the neighbor’s business, Officer Kraszewski told Mr. Glenn to clean up his yard
and threatened to write him tickets. 2
In response, Mr. Glenn started to clean his backyard. However, the neighbor
had “messed up a guy’s car,” and “the guy came back and shot at his house 3
times[.]” Mr. Glenn, who was removing trash from the backyard at the time, had
to dive to the ground to avoid being shot.
On March 14, 2022, Mr. Glenn filed a complaint with the City’s Office of
the Chief Investigator (“OCI”) complaining that Officer Kraszewski was not doing

The facts are derived from Mr. Glenn’s Complaint (ECF No. 1), except where
alternative citations are provided.
2
Mr. Glenn also states in his briefs that he called Officer Kraszewski “a lot over
the year” to complain about the neighbor’s business and that the officer did nothing
and then began threatening Mr. Glenn with tickets. (See, e.g., ECF No. 16 at
PageID. 115.)
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his job. 3 Two days later, Officer Kraszewski issued $500 worth of blight tickets to
Mr. Glenn. According to the City of Detroit’s Department of Administrative
Hearing’s online public database, Officer Kraszewski issued blights tickets to Mr.
Glenn on March 16, 2022, for the following violations: “defective driveway(s),
parking space(s), walkway(s), areas of traverse dwellings or buildings,” “excessive
weeds or plant growth one- or two-family dwelling or commercial building,”
“rodent harborage one- or two-family dwelling or commercial building,” “failure
to maintain accessory structure(s) one-or two-family dwelling or commercial
building.” (ECF No. 14-1 at PageID. 71-86.)
Mr. Glenn filed a lawsuit against his neighbor and received a court order to
shut down the chop/auto shop being operated out of his garage. Mr. Glenn then
filed another complaint with the OCI, claiming that Officer Kraszewski told the
neighbor it was okay to continue running this business from his garage.

In their brief, Defendants provide information related to Mr. Glenn’s OCI
complaint and actions purportedly taken by OCI with respect to the complaint,
citing to exhibits attached to the motion for support. (See ECF No. 14 at PageID.
35.) One of these exhibits is an internal Detroit Police Department memo. (ECF
No. 14-1 at PageID. 91-93.) The second is a print-out from the Detroit Police
Department’s Management Awareness System. (Id. at PageID. 94.) The Court
does not believe that either exhibit is properly offered under Rule 12(b)(6). In any
event, the Court finds the facts for which Defendants offer these exhibits to be
immaterial when deciding whether Mr. Glenn alleges viable claims in his
Complaint.
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Mr. Glenn filed the current action against Officer Kraszewski and the City of
Detroit on March 15, 2024. In his Complaint, he alleges violations of his rights
under the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
III.

Applicable Law & Analysis
A.

First Amendment

Defendants construe Mr. Glenn’s Complaint as alleging two possible First
Amendment claims: (1) that the failure to investigate Mr. Glenn’s OCI complaints
violated his right to petition the government for a redress of grievances; and/or (2)
Officer Kraszewski retaliated against Mr. Glenn for complaining about the
neighbor’s activities and the officer’s failure to shut down those activities.
Liberally reading Mr. Glenn’s pleading, the Court finds this construction to be
accurate.
i.

Right to Petition

The First Amendment protects “the right of the people . . . to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.” U.S. Const. amend. I. Nevertheless, it
“does not guarantee a response to the petition or the right to compel government
officials to act on or adopt a citizen’s views.” Apple v. Glenn, 183 F.3d 477, 479
(6th Cir. 1999); see also Green v. City of Southfield, 759 F. App’x 410, 415 (6th
Cir. 2018) (citing Apple, 183 F.3d at 479) (“Defendants’ failure to investigate [the
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plaintiff]’s citizens’ complaint cannot be the foundation underlying a continuing
violation claim because a citizen cannot compel the government to investigate such
a matter.”). Thus, to the extent Mr. Glenn is claiming a violation of his First
Amendment right to petition the City of Detroit to address his grievances, the
claim is subject to dismissal.
ii.

Retaliation

To state a First Amendment retaliation claim, Mr. Glenn must allege facts
establishing that: (1) he “engaged in protected conduct; (2) an adverse action was
taken against [him] that would deter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing
to engage in that conduct; and (3) there is a causal connection between elements
one and two—that is, the adverse action was motivated at least in part by [Mr.
Glenn’s] protected conduct.” Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378 394 (6th Cir.
1999). Contrary to Defendants’ assertions, Mr. Glenn does plead sufficient facts to
plausibly support these elements and, therefore, plead a retaliation claim.
First, Mr. Glenn engaged in First Amendment conduct when he complained
about his neighbor’s activities to and sought action from Officer Kraszewski, and
when he filed a report with OCI complaining about Officer Kraszewski’s inaction.
See Rudd v. City of N. Shores, 977 F.3d 503, 513 (6th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up)
(explaining that the freedom to petition and the freedom of speech encompasses
the right of “an ordinary citizen to convey the special concerns of the petition’s
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author to the government, and to request action by the government to address those
concerns” and “protects the right of an ordinary citizen to criticize public
officials”). Second, Mr. Glenn alleges that Officer Krasczewski issued him blight
tickets totaling $500 within two days of the filing of his OCI complaint. Such
conduct would deter an ordinary citizen from continuing to complain. See id.
(quoting Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 397) (explaining that “the deterrent effect on
speech ‘need not be great’ to be actionable”). Lastly, the temporal proximity
between Mr. Glenn’s complaint and the tickets is sufficient to allege a causal
connection even if Mr. Glenn lacks additional facts to support his belief that
Officer Krasczewski issued the tickets to be vindictive. See, e.g., Seeger v.
Cincinnati Bell Tel. Co., LLC, 681 F.3d 274, 283-84 (6th Cir. 2012) (collecting
cases); see also Kinney v. McDonough, No. 21-1414, 2022 WL 223633, at *9 (6th
Cir. Jan. 26, 2022) (White, J., concurring) (“Although temporal proximity may
prove to be insufficient at some later stage of the proceedings, [the plaintiff]’s
allegations are sufficient at the pleading stage.”).
Defendants assert that Officer Krasczewski in fact issued Mr. Glenn blight
tickets before his March 14, 2022 OCI complaint. Their assertion is contradicted
by their own exhibit, however. (See ECF No. 14-1 at PageID. 72.) Moreover, Mr.
Glenn alleges otherwise, and this Court must assume the allegations in the
Complaint as true for purposes of deciding Defendants’ motion to dismiss.
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Defendants also argue that Mr. Glenn cannot establish the second element of
his retaliation claim because he filed a second OCI complaint despite being issued
the blight tickets. But the Sixth Circuit has been clear that the question is not
whether the plaintiff was deterred; rather, it is whether “a person of ordinary
firmness” would be. See Bell v. Johnson, 308 F.3d 594, 606 (6th Cir. 2002)
(quoting Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 398).
Defendants also argue that Officer Kraszewski “acted under an objectively
reasonable belief that his actions were lawful” (ECF No. 14 at PageID. 38), and
that Mr. Glenn has failed “to cite ‘clearly established’ law that Officer Kraszewki’s
actions were contrary to” (ECF No. 18 at PageID. 186). Yet, it was clearly
established when Officer Kraszewski issued the blight tickets that retaliation for
petitioning activity is unlawful. See Holzemer v. City of Memphis, 621 F.3d 512,
528 (6th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted) (finding that “a reasonable city official
would have known that the Constitution prohibits retaliation for a citizen’s exercise
of his First Amendment right to Free Speech” and that “case law clearly establishes
that [the official] was on notice that retaliation for any petitioning activity is
unlawful”).
Thus, the Court denies Defendants’ motion to dismiss Mr. Glenn’s First
Amendment retaliation claim against Office Krasczewski.
B.

Due Process
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The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause provides that “No
State . . . “shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law[.]” U.S. Const. amen. XIV § 1. In his Complaint, Mr. Glenn alleges that
his due process rights were violated as a result of OCI’s failure to process his
complaints within ninety days. In his response brief, Mr. Glenn also asserts that
the operation of a chop/auto shop in his neighbor’s garage has interfered with the
enjoyment of his property.
i.

Interference with Property Right

In his response brief, Mr. Glenn expresses that the operation of a chop/auto
shop in his neighbor’s garage interfered with Mr. Glenn’s enjoyment of his
property, and Defendants are liable because they failed to shut down the neighbor’s
business.
The Due Process Clause protects against state actions which deprive a
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend.
XIV, § 1. However, it does not protect persons against such deprivations caused
by private actors. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S.
189, 195 (1985) (explaining that the purpose of the Due Process Clause is “to
protect the people from the State, not to ensure that the State protect[s] them from
each other.”); Stiles ex rel. D.S. v. Grainger Cnty., 819 F.3d 834, 853 (6th Cir.
2016). There are two exceptions to this rule: (1) when a person is in state custody
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and therefore in a “special relationship” with the State; and (2) when the State
creates or increases the risk of harm to a person—that is, when a “state-created
danger” causes the plaintiff’s injury. 4 Stiles, 819 F.3d at 853. Yet, neither
exception is applicable to the facts alleged here.
As such, Mr. Glenn fails to allege a plausible due process claim based on
Defendants’ failure to shut-down his neighbor’s chop/auto shop.
ii.

Failure to Investigate

Mr. Glenn claims a violation of his due process rights because OCI did not
process his complaint(s) within ninety days. As an initial matter, Defendants argue
that Mr. Glenn has misconstrued the time requirements for OCI to investigate his
claim. Defendants assert:
Section 7-808 of the City of Detroit’s Code of Ordinances requires
that within 90 days of the OCI receiving a complaint, the Board of
Police Commissioner “shall sent [sic] written communication
informing the complainant that their complaint has been received.”
To prevail under the “state-created danger” exception, the plaintiff must
satisfy a three-part test. Doe v. Jackson Local Sch. Dist., 954 F.3d 925, 932 (6th
Cir. 2020) (citing Estate of Romain v. City of Grosse Pointe Farms, 935 F.3d 485,
491-92 (6th Cir. 2019)). The first part requires that the official took “an
affirmative act that either creates or increases the risk that the plaintiff will be
exposed to private acts of [harm].” Id. (quoting Schroder v. City of Fort Thomas,
412 F.3d 724, 728 (6th Cir. 2005)). “[O]missions,” such as “failing to enforce the
law,” do not qualify as affirmative acts that increase the risk to the plaintiff. See
Stiles, 891 F.3d at 855. Similarly, “ignoring a dangerous situation is usually not an
affirmative act and . . . usually cannot increase a preexisting danger.” Id. (citing
cases).
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Exhibit E. There is no requirement that complaints be processed
within 90 days.
(ECF No. 14 at PageID. 35 (citing ECF No. 14-1 at PageID. 99.) Yet, Section 7808 expressly states: “The Chief Investigator for the Board [of Police
Commissioners] shall investigate a complaint immediately and file a report of
findings with the Board within sixty (60) days.” 5 (ECF No. 14-1 at PageID. 99
(emphasis added).) Nevertheless, Mr. Glenn’s procedural due process claim fails
for other reasons.
To adequately plead a procedural due process claim under § 1983, Mr.
Glenn must allege facts showing that he had a property interest protected by the
Due Process Clause, that he was deprived of that interest, and the City of Detroit
did not afford him adequate procedural rights prior to that deprivation. See
Cooperrider v. Woods, 127 F.4th 1019, 1042 (6th Cir. 2025) (quoting Hahn v. Star
Bank, 190 F.3d 708, 716 (6th Cir. 1999)). Mr. Glenn is claiming that he was
deprived of a “right” to have his OCI complaint investigated according to the city’s
ordinances, and that by failing to investigate his complaint within the required time
frame, he was deprived of a property right without due process. However, there is
“no protected property interest in the procedure itself.” Richardson v. Twp. of
Whether the Chief Investigator for the Board investigated Mr. Glenn’s OCI
complaint within this 60-day window requires the consideration of facts beyond his
pleading.
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Brady, 218 F.3d 508, 517-18 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing United of Omaha Life Ins. Co.
v. Solomon, 960 F.2d 31, 34 (6th Cir. 1992)); see also Hasanaj v. Detroit Pub.
Schs. Cmty. Dist., 35 F.4th 437, 451-52 (6th Cir. 2022) (“State law procedures that
relate to property rights are not property rights.”). As the Sixth Circuit explained
in Hasanaj: “Property cannot be defined by the procedures provided for its
deprivation any more than can life or liberty.” 35 F.4th at 452 (quoting Cleveland
Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985)); see also id. (quoting Olim
v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 250 (1983)) (“Process is not an end in itself. Its
constitutional purpose is to protect a substantive interest to which the individual
has a legitimate claim of entitlement.”).
For these reasons, Mr. Glenn fails to state a viable procedural due process
claim based on his allegation that city procedures were not followed, and where he
does not otherwise allege the deprivation of a protected right without due process.
See, e.g., Richardson v. Twp. of Brady, 218 F.3d 508, 517-18 (6th Cir. 2000)
(holding that the plaintiff could not state a viable procedural due process claim
based on a claim that the municipality failed to swiftly execute its procedures).
C.

Monell Liability

Defendants argue that Mr. Glenn fails to state a viable claim against the City
of Detroit because he does not allege sufficient facts to establish a violation of his
constitutional rights and, even if he does, has not alleged facts to demonstrate that
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a City of Detroit custom or policy was the moving force behind such a violation.
As discussed above, Mr. Glenn alleges a viable First Amendment retaliation claim.
He does not, however, allege facts to plausibly establish the City of Detroit’s
liability for that violation.
A municipality is not liable simply because it employs a tortfeasor. See,
e.g., Jackson v. City of Cleveland, 925 F.3d 793, 828 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting
D’Ambrosio v. Marino, 747 F.3d 378, 388-89 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Monell v.
Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of the City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)). “Instead, a
plaintiff must show that ‘through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was the
‘moving force’ behind the injury alleged.’” Id. (quoting Alman v. Reed, 703 F.3d
887, 903 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397,
404 (1997)). “A plaintiff does this by showing that the municipality had a ‘policy
or custom’ that caused the violation of his rights.” Id. (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at
694).
The Sixth Circuit has described four methods to establish a municipality’s
policy or custom: “(1) the existence of an illegal official policy or legislative
enactment; (2) that an official with final decision making authority ratified illegal
actions; (3) the existence of a policy of inadequate training or supervision; or (4)
the existence of a custom of tolerance or acquiescence of federal rights violations.”
Jackson, 925 F.3d at 828 (quoting Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 478 (6th Cir.
14

2013)). Mr. Glenn alleges no facts in his Complaint or briefs suggesting that he
can establish a City of Detroit policy or custom through any of these methods.
Therefore, he fails to assert a viable claim against the city.
IV.

Conclusion
For the reasons stated, the Court holds that Mr. Glenn fails to plausibly

allege violations of his due process rights or the City of Detroit’s liability for the
misconduct complained of in his Complaint. He does plausibly allege a First
Amendment retaliation claim against Officer Kraszewski.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 14) is
GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART and the City of Detroit is
terminated as a party to this action.
Date: March 7, 2025

s/LINDA V. PARKER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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