Zarza v. University of Michigan, Board of Regents

Filing 54

OPINION AND ORDER Granting 44 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by District Judge Robert H. Cleland. (LWag)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______________________________________________________________________
KAREN ZARZA,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 18-13862

BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN,
Defendant.
________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff Karen Zarza 1 brings this action under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701, et seq., against Defendant, Board of Regents of the
University of Michigan, following Defendant terminating the employment of one of
Plaintiff’s subordinates at the University of Michigan. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant
discriminated against her fellow employee based on the employee’s disability. (ECF No.
48, PageID.966.) The crux of Plaintiff’s allegations is that Defendant—Plaintiff’s former
employer—fired Plaintiff in retaliation for her attempts to advocate for the disabled
employee. (Id.)
Before the court is Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, which seeks the
entry of judgment against Plaintiff on her only remaining claim, Count I, for retaliation
under the Rehabilitation Act. (ECF No. 44.) Plaintiff filed a response (ECF No. 48), and

Plaintiff unexpectedly passed away on August 8, 2021. The court substituted her
son Joshua Zarza as a party in interest. (ECF No. 50.)

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Defendant submitted a reply. (ECF No. 51.) The motion has been thoroughly briefed,
and the court concludes that a hearing is not necessary. See E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(f)(2).
For the reasons stated below, the court will grant Defendant’s motion and enter
judgment against Plaintiff.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff began working for Defendant in 2003. (ECF No. 48, PageID.969.) She
worked as a supervisor in Defendant’s Custodial and Grounds Department from 2005
until her termination in November 2017. (Id.) At least one fellow supervisor, Ken
Sawicki, described her as a “competent,” “tough,” and “effective” supervisor who was
mostly fair in her role. (ECF No. 48-10, PageID.1122.) Supervisors such as Plaintiff
attended various trainings regarding federal anti-discrimination laws. (ECF No. 48-5,
PageID.1049-50.)
On approximately August 26, 2015, Defendant terminated one of Plaintiff’s
subordinate employees, Robert Taylor. Nearly two years later on May 8, 2017, Taylor
filed a pro se disability discrimination complaint against Defendant in federal court,
alleging in relevant part that (1) he sustained injuries on the job that rendered him
unable to work; (2) Defendant both “refused” and “failed to offer any reasonable
accommodation within his current role or any other vacant role in the organization for
which [he] was qualified,” despite his requests for accommodations; and (3) ultimately
was terminated from his employment due to his disability. (ECF No. 48-4, PageID.10291037.) Plaintiff, three days after Taylor filed his lawsuit, requested to meet with
Defendant’s Facilities and Operations (“F&O”) Director John Lawter. (ECF No. 48-11,
PageID.1125.) Lawter agreed, and on May 11, 2017, Lawter met with Plaintiff and fellow

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Supervisors Vershawn Miller and Ken Sawicki. (ECF No. 48, PageID.969-70.) Most of
the conversation initially revolved around Taylor, including whether he was properly
accommodated. (ECF No. 48-12, PageID.1145.) Lawter, in his deposition, specifically
noted that Plaintiff and the others “were claiming that [Collette] Donner said she
accommodated him but we didn’t.” (Id.) The four individuals further discussed how
Taylor “was suing U of M” and how the supervisors were “concerned about their
positions” due to any potential vindictiveness from Collette Donner, Defendant’s
Custodial and Grounds Service Department Area Manager who was alleged to be one
of the individuals who did not accommodate Taylor’s disability restrictions. (Id.; ECF No.
48, PageID.970.) According to Plaintiff, she also informed Lawter that if she were called
as a witness to testify for Taylor—something she believed was a possibility at the time—
she “intended to tell the truth” and “would not perjure [her]self.” (ECF No. 48-6,
PageID.1072.) Miller recalls Lawter’s face turning “beet red” at this time, although Miller
apparently speculated as to the reason why. (ECF No. 44-12, PageID.897-98.) Sawicki
recalls the tone of the meeting be uncomfortable because it was “very accusatory,” such
that Lawter felt “surprised and defensive.”2 (ECF No. 44-13, PageID.903.)
On May 16, 2017, Custodial and Grounds Business Manager Kristen Brancheau
sent an email to human resources employee Sabrina Garrett-Owens to discuss the May
11 meeting. (ECF No. 48-15, PageID.1158.) Brancheau stated, in relevant part:

Plaintiff would four months later write a letter to Defendant’s human resources
department stating that, at this meeting, Lawter warned of “collusion” and informed her
that Defendant would “provide [her] the information [she] will use” if she testified in one
of Taylor’s lawsuits. (ECF No. 48-34, PageID.1289.) The letter would also recall Plaintiff
discussing a pending “Federal Lawsuit against the University” in which she had “been
named as a witness.” (Id.)
2

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It is my understanding that Karen might testify for Robert Taylor in his
court case, basically stating that [Donner] was out to get him, we didn't
accommodate his restrictions, etc.
She also made claims . . . that [Donner] is vindictive and out to get her
and [Miller]. She alleges she changes their incident reports, etc.
So now I get to provide detail on all of this. You know what a nightmare
case Robert’s was, ugh. When the evidence shows that Karen is not
accurate, can we finally discipline her for this?
(ECF No. 48-15, PageID.1158.) Garrett-Owens replied, “Wow! If the evidence clearly
shows that Karen is wrong, then I think [Lawter] can do more than fire her.” (Id.) The
following day, on May 17, 2017, Lawter informed Plaintiff that there was “no evidence to
support her claims on [Donner].” (ECF No. 48-12, PageID.1146.)
On June 22, 2017, Defendant circulated a litigation hold letter that instructed its
addressees, including Plaintiff, to “preserve all information related to the claims of
Robert Taylor” due to the filing “of a lawsuit brought by Mr. Taylor against the University,
arising out of his employment with the University.” (ECF No. 48-20, PageID.1223.) Six
days later, Plaintiff met with Brancheau and F&O Associate Director of HR Leti
Rastigue. (ECF No. 48-21, PageID.1227.) At the meeting, according to Brancheau’s
notes, they apparently discussed Taylor’s state workers’ compensation proceeding and
the fact that Plaintiff believed Defendant “received appropriate medical documentation”
but that Donner “would not accept medical documentation.” (Id.)
Just over two months later, on September 5, 2017, a supervisor in the Custodial
and Grounds Department, Scott Price, contacted Donner to discuss complaints about
Plaintiff. (ECF No. 44-3, PageID.829.) Price wanted to discuss Plaintiff’s treatment of
Price and other employees. (Id.) Although he did not recall witnessing anything spurring
him to immediately complain, Price stated there was a “last straw” and “cumulation of

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information over time” to the point of feeling “an obligation” to discuss his feelings with
Donner. (Id.) Defendant intimates that this meeting was the “origin” of the investigation
into Plaintiff’s conduct that ultimately led to her termination; Defendant contends that the
termination of Plaintiff’s employment had “nothing whatsoever to do with Robert Taylor,”
to which Garrett-Owens would later testify in her deposition. (ECF No. 44, PageID.756;
ECF No. 48-8, PageID.1103-04.)
On September 6, 2017, Price met with Lawter, to whom Donner reported. (ECF
No. 44-5, PageID.846; ECF No. 44-4, PageID.840.) Price explained that Plaintiff
“verbally berated him” and is otherwise “negative” or “toxic” in the workplace, had been
previously warned about gossip by human resources, and shows favoritism to particular
employees. (ECF No. 44-5, PageID.846.) Lawter, the next day, e-mailed Rastigue to
advise her that Lawter’s department would be investigating complaints concerning
Plaintiff and that both Brancheau and Donner would be participating. (ECF No. 44-6,
PageID.849.) Having learned details of the investigation, Lawter placed Plaintiff on
administrative leave at some point between this date and September 11, although
Plaintiff was not informed until September 13. (ECF No. 44, PageID.760; ECF No. 48,
PageID.982.)
Brancheau personally interviewed custodians, and Price played a role in
gathering employees who were interested in being interviewed. (ECF No. 44-3,
PageID.832.) Price noted in his deposition that he gathered employees who, he had
heard, struggled with Plaintiff’s conduct in the past, and those encompassed both
employees who worked for Karen and “people from [Price’s] shop too.” (ECF No. 44-3,
PageID.832-33.) Brancheau took handwritten notes of the interviews and created a

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twelve-page, typed report regarding her investigation. (ECF No. 44-8; ECF No. 48-19.)
As noted by Brancheau in her report, the employees were consistent in “their
complaints that [Plaintiff] is a very mean, unprofessional, unpleasant person to work
for.” (ECF No. 48-19, PageID.1210.) Many employees discussed their fear of Plaintiff’s
retaliation. (Id., PageID.1214, 1219-20; ECF No. 44-8, PageID.856.)
Brancheau sent the final report to Lawter and Rastigue just past midnight on
September 13, 2017, and later that the same day, Rastigue met with Plaintiff. (ECF No.
48, PageID.983; ECF No. 44, PageID.760.) Plaintiff denied all of the complaints made
against her. (ECF No. 44-9, PageID.876-78.) On the same day, Plaintiff sent Laurita
Thomas of Defendant’s Human Resources Department and Pamela Heatlie of
Defendant’s Office for Institutional Equity an e-mail, claiming that she was being subject
to intimidation, retaliation, threatening behavior, and misconduct. (ECF No. 48-34.)
Plaintiff’s e-mail recalled her May 11 discussion with Lawter pertaining to, inter alia,
Taylor’s “Pending Federal Lawsuit” against Defendant and her being named as a
witness; her e-mail also communicated her feelings that, in May, her “concerns fell on
deaf ears” and that she knew her “continued employment would be brief.” 3 (Id.,
PageID.1289.) She sent a nearly identical e-mail to Masson. (ECF No. 48-14.)

Plaintiff, in this e-mail, also mentions a “Lawsuit brought forward by the
Department of Justice on behalf of” two former employees. (ECF No. 48-34,
PageID.1289.) Plaintiff seemingly refers to a previous consent decree in which
Defendant stipulated that, going forward, it would transfer disabled employees who
could no longer perform the essential functions of their job “to a vacant position that is
equivalent in terms of pay, status, or other relevant factors (e.g., benefits, geographical
location) if the employee is qualified or the position.” (ECF No. 48-2, PageID.1009.) In
the words of David Masson, Defendant’s Senior Associate General Counsel in its Office
of General Counsel, the consent decree centered around Defendant’s obligations as it
pertained to “the transfer of disabled employees to open jobs.” (ECF No. 48-3,
PageID.1023.)
3

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On September 19, 2017, Garrett-Owens sent an email to Rastigue and Lawter to
discuss the “best approach to ending [Plaintiff’s] employment with the department,”
remarking that due to multiple issues over recent years, she “no longer demonstrates
the qualities we need represented by our supervisors.” (ECF No. 44-10, PageID.881;
ECF No. 44-4, PageID.837.) Garrett-Owens discussed the possibility of offering a
settlement agreement, noting “[Plaintiff’s] years of service and lack of documented
discipline.” (ECF No. 44-10, PageID.881.) In the event Plaintiff rejected the settlement
offer, Rastigue suggested that Defendant convene a Disciplinary Review Conference
(“DRC”) to seek her discharge for unsatisfactory performance. (Id.) In his deposition,
Lawter explained that generally, Defendant attempts to merely demote an employee if
somebody could be discharged, but that they “couldn’t find anything” for Plaintiff
because the “charges that were laid against her would not be appropriate for even a
custodian.” (ECF No. 44-4, PageID.837.)
Rastigue met with Plaintiff on September 21 to explain that the investigation
would likely lead to a DRC unless Plaintiff chose to sign a settlement agreement;
Plaintiff had twenty-one days to make this decision, and Plaintiff later declined
Defendant’s settlement offer. (ECF No. ECF No. 48, PageID.988-89; ECF No. 44,
PageID.761-62.) Thus, Defendant held a DRC on November 10, 2017. (ECF No. 48,
PageID.989; ECF No. 44, PageID.761, 767.) The DRC committee was made up of
Garrett-Owens, Rastigue, and Donner. (ECF No. 44, PageID.767.) Although Brancheau
was not present for the DRC (ECF No. 44, PageID.767), Brancheau had a conversation
with Donner to provide her own input on Plaintiff’s situation, and Brancheau
recommended removing Plaintiff from her role at the DRC. (ECF No. 48-18,

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PageID.1183-84.) The committee of Garrett-Owens, Rastigue, and Donner conducted
the DRC, and Plaintiff denied any express or implied allegations of impropriety. (ECF
No. 44-20, PageID.945; ECF No. 44-22, PageID.953.)
On November 15, 2017, Defendant terminated Plaintiff’s employment. (ECF No.
44-22, PageID.953.) The termination letter indicates that, at the DRC, she was charged
with “[u]nsatisfactory work performance, specifically creating a hostile work environment
of fear, intimidation, and harassment of your staff and colleagues.” (Id.) The letter
explained that Plaintiff had an opportunity to respond and that she had given “three
names of employees to talk to on [her] behalf which [she] said would provide
information to attest to [her] ability as a supervisor,” although two could not be reached
and one only worked for her for a short period of time. (Id.) According to the letter,
Plaintiff’s account of the facts was “very different and lacked credibility from the other
staff members’ statements including those from management personnel.” (Id.)
II. STANDARD
To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, a movant must show “there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). First, the moving party bears the initial burden of
presenting evidence that “demonstrate[s] the absence of a genuine issue of material
fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Not all factual disputes are
material. A fact is “material” for purposes of summary judgment when proof of that fact
would establish or refute an essential element of the claim “and would affect the
application of the governing law to the rights of the parties.” Rachells v. Cingular
Wireless Employee Servs., LLC, 732 F.3d 652, 660 (6th Cir. 2013). There is no

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requirement that the moving party “support its motion with [evidence] negating the
opponent’s claim.” Id. (emphasis removed); see also Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau v. Petrol.
Specialties, Inc., 69 F.3d 98, 102 (6th Cir. 1995).
Second, “the nonmoving party must come forward with ‘specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (emphasis removed) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). This
requires more than a “mere existence of a scintilla of evidence” or “‘[t]he mere
possibility’ of a factual dispute.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252
(1986); Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 582 (6th Cir. 1992) (quoting Gregg v.
Allen-Bradley Co., 801 F.2d 859, 863 (6th Cir. 1986)).
For a court to deny summary judgment, “the evidence [must be] such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at
248. “The essential question is whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement
to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail
as a matter of law.” Troche v. Crabtree, 814 F.3d 795, 798 (6th Cir. 2016) (internal
quotations omitted). All reasonable inferences from the underlying facts must be drawn
“in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” United States v. Diebold,
Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962); Moran v. Al Basit LLC, 788 F.3d 201, 204 (6th Cir.
2015).
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff maintains that Defendant’s adverse employment action against her,
following her advocacy for Taylor, constituted retaliation in violation of the Rehabilitation
Act. (See ECF No. 48, PageID.992-99.) Plaintiff’s claim is rooted in indirect evidence;

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thus, the court will analyze the Plaintiff’s claim under the familiar McDonnell Douglas
burden-shifting paradigm. See A.C. ex rel. J.C. v. Shelby Cty. Bd. of Educ., 711 F.3d
687, 697 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973)). “On a motion for summary judgment, a district court considers whether there is
sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute at each stage of the McDonnell Douglas
inquiry.” Kirilenko-Ison v. Bd. of Educ. of Danville Indep. Sch., 974 F.3d 652, 661 (6th
Cir. 2020) (quoting Cline v. Catholic Diocese of Toledo, 206 F.3d 651, 661 (6th Cir.
2000)). For the reasons explained below, Plaintiff ultimately fails to meet her burden at
the summary judgment stage.
Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, Plaintiff must first demonstrate a prima
facie case of retaliation under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act by showing that (1)
she engaged in protected activity under Section 504, (2) Defendant knew of the
protected activity, (3) Defendant took adverse employment action against Plaintiff, and
(4) there was a causal connection between the adverse action and Plaintiff’s protected
activity. Id. (citing Shelby Cty., 711 F.3d at 697). In a retaliation case, this burden “is not
onerous, but one easily met.” Id. (quoting Shelby Cty., 711 F.3d at 697). Once “this low
hurdle” is cleared, Gribcheck v. Runyon, 245 F.3d 547, 551 (6th Cir. 2001), the burden
of production then shifts to the defendant to show that there was a “legitimate, nondiscriminatory basis” for the adverse employment action. See Kirilenko-Ison, 974 F.3d
at 661. Once the defendant does so, the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to show,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant’s proffered reasons “were not
its true reasons,” but instead were a pretext for retaliation. Id. (quoting Shelby Cty., 711
F.3d at 697).

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A. Prima Facie Case of Retaliation
Defendant avers that it is entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff has
failed to make out a prima facie case of retaliation. Specifically, Defendant contends
that Plaintiff (1) was not engaged in protected activity for purposes of Section 504 (ECF
No. 44, PageID.772-75) and (2) cannot establish the requisite causal connection for a
case of retaliation. 4 (Id., PageID.777.) The court disagrees.
First, Plaintiff has proffered sufficient evidence to establish a genuine dispute as
to whether she engaged in protected activity. Section 504 incorporates the Americans
with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) provisions prohibiting retaliation. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(d).
The ADA proscribes retaliation against an individual “because such individual has [1]
opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this chapter or because such individual
[2] made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation,
proceeding, or hearing under this chapter.” See 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a); see also 29
C.F.R. § 33.13 (stating that no employer may “discharge, intimidate, retaliate, threaten,
coerce or otherwise discriminate against any person” for seeking to enforce Section
504). Thus, the Rehabilitation Act and ADA protect individuals who either (1) oppose
unlawful conduct or (2) participate in a proceeding under the disability discrimination
laws, and since the Acts have a similar scope and aim, “[retaliation] cases construing
either Act are generally applicable to both.”5 Shelby Cty., 711 F.3d at 697.

The parties do not appear to dispute whether Defendant had knowledge of any
protected activity (assuming Plaintiff can establish the protected activity element) and
that Defendant took adverse employment action against Plaintiff.

4

Given their similar language, courts also look to cases assessing Title VII’s antiretaliation provisions insofar as the opposition or participation clause are at issue. See
Zainulabeddin v. Univ. of S. Fla. Bd. of Trustees, 749 F. App’x 776, 782 (11th Cir. 2018)

5

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The crux of Defendant’s argument is that Section 504 prohibits retaliation against
any individual because of his or her opposing practices made unlawful by Section 504
or otherwise seeking to enforce rights under Section 504. (ECF No. 44, PageID.772.) In
other words, Defendant maintains that, to establish a retaliation claim, the alleged
“protected activity by plaintiff needs to relate to Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.”
(Id., PageID.773.) According to Defendant, Plaintiff’s alleged “protected activity” is the
May 11 meeting to “let Lawter know that [Plaintiff] believed she would be a witness on
behalf of Robert Taylor at Taylor’s worker’s compensation proceeding and that she
intended to tell the truth and would not perjure herself. Plaintiff claims that is where it all
began.” (Id., PageID.773-74 (emphasis in original).) In short, Defendant contends
Plaintiff cannot establish that she engaged in protected activity because Plaintiff claims
merely that she “was retaliated against for announcing the prospect that she might be a
witness for Robert Taylor at Taylor’s worker’s compensation proceeding,” and such an
activity is “not protected activity for purposes of Section 504.” (Id., PageID.774.)
Under Section 504, “protected activity” is not as narrow in scope as Defendant
argues. Defendant would have the court impose a requirement that, to establish
“protected activity,” Plaintiff must have specifically informed Defendant that she has
testified in support of Taylor in a disability discrimination action. (ECF No.44,
PageID.775 (“Even if Zarza was nevertheless under some mistaken impression that she
might at some point become a witness in connection with Taylor’s federal court case, it
would not amount yet to the type of protected testifying or participation in a proceeding

(citing Stewart v. Happy Herman’s Cheshire Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d 1278, 1287 (11th Cir.
1997)).
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that Section 504 and the ADA require in order for it to be [protected] activity . . . .”).) But,
as noted above, there is both a participation clause and opposition clause under the
ADA. 6 Thus, while “participation” in a proceeding brought under the disability
discrimination laws may be sufficient to establish protected activity, it is not necessary—
opposition to discriminatory practices is equally protected by Section 504. Indeed, while
vague charges of discrimination are insufficient to demonstrate protected conduct, Land
v. S. States Coop., Inc., 740 F. App’x 845, 850 (6th Cir. 2018), “complaints to
management and less formal protests of discriminatory employment practices”
constitute protected activity under the relevant disability statutes. Robinson v. MGM
Grand Detroit, LLC, 821 F. App’x 522, 532 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Laster v. City of
Kalamazoo, 746 F.3d 714, 730 (6th Cir. 2014)); cf. Sumner v. U.S. Postal Serv., 899
F.2d 203, 209 (2d Cir. 1990) (“[Title VII’s] opposition clause protects as well informal
protests of discriminatory employment practices, including making complaints to
management, writing critical letters to customers, protesting against discrimination by
industry or by society in general, and expressing support of co-workers who have filed
formal charges.”).
Here, as early as May 11, Plaintiff began voicing her opinion that Defendant
mishandled accommodating Taylor. Lawter testified in his deposition that when Plaintiff,
Miller, and Sawicki first spoke to him, most of the conversation revolved around
Taylor—they alleged “that [Donner] said she accommodated him,” but that in reality,

Although Defendant acknowledges the opposition clause, Defendant did not,
either in its initial brief or reply brief, address whether Plaintiff established protected
activity for her opposition to Defendant’s actions. Defendant rests its argument as to this
element on the participation clause, that is, whether Plaintiff had some connection with
or in any manner participated in Taylor’s federal disability discrimination lawsuit.

6

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Defendant did not do so. (ECF No. 48-12, PageID.1145.) Plaintiff, along with Miller and
Sawicki, also demonstrated serious concern that Donner might retaliate against them
for their belief that Donner did not do enough to help Taylor, and a discussion was held
about how Taylor had filed a lawsuit against Defendant. (Id.; ECF No. 44-11,
PageID.890 (“Ms. Donner’s claim that we did everything we could to assist this
employee was inaccurate.”).) Moreover, the May 16 e-mail conversation between
Brancheau and Garrett-Owens—just five days after Plaintiff initially brough her concerns
to Lawter—confirms that Defendant was aware that Plaintiff was advocating for Taylor
and his unaccommodated needs. (ECF No. 48-15.) Brancheau wrote to Garrett-Owens
that Plaintiff believed “[Donner] was out to get [Taylor]” and that “[they] didn’t
accommodate his restrictions.” (Id., PageID.1158.) Plaintiff at least between May and
June brought complaints to her superiors regarding Defendant’s failure to take all
necessary steps to accommodate Taylor, to the point that Lawter commented that
“Taylor’s name seems to just swirl around wherever Karen is.” (ECF No. 48-12,
PageID.1147.) Because “advocating for members of a protected class is a protected
activity for purposes of retaliation claims” under the Rehabilitation Act, the court finds
that Plaintiff has at least proffered enough evidence to raise a genuine dispute as to
whether she engaged in protected activity; a reasonable juror could find that she
advocated for Taylor’s accommodations and opposed Defendant’s treatment of him.
See Kirilenko-Ison, 974 F.3d at 662 (citing Reinhardt v. Albuquerque Pub. Sch. Bd. of
Educ., 595 F.3d 1126, 1132 (10th Cir. 2010)); accord See M.L. v. Williamson Cty. Bd. of
Educ., 772 F. App’x 287, 291 (6th Cir. 2019) (“Advocating for accommodations under
the disability laws is protected activity.”) Thus, although Defendant rests its argument on

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a participation clause analysis, a genuine dispute exists as to whether Plaintiff engaged
in protected activity under the opposition clause. 7
Plaintiff also has the burden of establishing a causal connection between the
adverse employment action and her protected activity. Kirilenko-Ison, 974 F.3d at 664;
Shelby Cty., 711 F.3d at 697. Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot establish this
element of her prima facie case because Plaintiff’s initial protected conduct—her May
11 meeting with Lawter—was completely insulated from the investigation that ultimately
led to any adverse employment action. (ECF No. 44, PageID.776.) Defendant contends
that there is no causal connection between her concerns raised in May and June to her
firing, but instead, her termination was the result of an independent investigation
sparked by Price’s concerns. (Id., PageID.776-77.)
To show causation, a plaintiff is required to “produce sufficient evidence from
which an inference could be drawn that the adverse action would not have been taken”
in the absence of the plaintiff’s protected conduct. Kirilenko-Ison, 974 F.3d at 664
(quoting Weigel v. Baptist Hosp. of E. Tenn., 302 F.3d 367, 381 (6th Cir. 2002)) “This
Circuit has not adopted a uniform approach on whether a causal connection may be
established solely on the basis of temporal proximity.” Krumheuer v. GAB Robins N.
Am., Inc., 484 F. App’x 1, 5-6 (6th Cir. 2012). The Sixth Circuit has concluded in the
past that “temporal proximity alone is sufficient to establish a prima facie case of . . .
retaliation,” but at the same time has found temporal proximity alone to be insufficient to
establish a causal link for purposes of retaliation. See id. (collecting cases discussing

To the extent Plaintiff advances her Section 504 claim under the participation
clause, she will not be able to do so. The court will more fully address this issue below.

7

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the contradicting standards for causation); Kirilenko-Ison, 974 F.3d at 664 (explaining
that in “some circumstances,” a plaintiff establishes an “an inference of causation . . .
solely from the closeness in time between the point at which an employer learns of an
employee’s protected activity and the point at which it takes an adverse action against
that employee”); Weigel, 302 F.3d at 381 (quoting Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215
F.3d 561, 582 (6th Cir.2000)) (noting that courts have found that a “causal link may be
shown through knowledge combined with closeness in time,” although generally no
single consideration is dispositive). Essentially, in cases where “an adverse employment
action occurs very close in time after an employer learns of a protected activity, such
temporal proximity between the events is significant enough to constitute evidence of a
causal connection for the purposes of satisfying a prima facie case of retaliation. But
where some time elapses between when the employer learns of a protected activity and
the subsequent adverse employment action, the employee must couple temporal
proximity with other evidence of retaliatory conduct to establish causality.” Mickey v.
Zeidler Tool & Die Co., 516 F.3d 516, 525 (6th Cir. 2008); accord Eaves v. Eye Ctrs. of
Tenn., LLC, No. 2:18-CV-00072, 2020 WL 134116, at *6 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 13, 2020)
(discussing the Sixth Circuit’s approach to establishing causation in retaliation claims).
Here, Plaintiff brought concerns to Lawter on May 11 and similar concerns to
Rastigue and Brancheau on June 28. (ECF No. 48-21, PageID.1227; ECF No. 48-12,
PageID.1146.) Plaintiff was placed on administrative leave by Lawter by September 11,
which, following her refusal enter into a settlement agreement, led to her ultimate
termination in November. (ECF No. 44, PageID.760-62; ECF No. 48, PageID.982, 98889.) Thus, within approximately three to four months of her complaints to Defendant

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about its mishandling of Taylor’s accommodations, Plaintiff was subjected to adverse
employment action. In the Sixth Circuit, the causation element has typically been
deemed satisfied “only where the adverse employment action occurred within a matter
of months, or less, of the protected activity.” See, e.g., Dixon v. Gonzalez, 481 F.3d
324, 334 (6th Cir. 2007) (collecting cases standing for the proposition that adverse
action taken in weeks or months is sufficient to show a causal link); Randolph v. Ohio
Dep’t of Youth Servs., 453 F.3d 724, 737 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding, in a Title VII
retaliation case, that a causal connection was established where employee placed was
terminated within six months of protected conduct); Singfield v. Akron Metro. Hous.
Auth., 389 F.3d 555, 563 (6th Cir. 2004) (finding that a lapse of three months was
sufficient to show a causal connection based on temporal proximity in Title VII retaliation
action); Kirilenko-Ison, 974 F.3d at 667 (noting, in a retaliation case under the
Rehabilitation Act, the adverse employment action took place “within a few months” of
advocating for a disabled individual); Bryson v. Regis Corp., 498 F.3d 561, 571 (6th Cir.
2007) (finding temporal proximity of three months to be sufficient to establish causation
in a Family and Medical Leave Act retaliation case).
In addition to the temporal proximity, Plaintiff also presented evidence that her
superiors or other decisionmakers were disgruntled by the fact that she made her
complaints. For example, Miller testified that Lawter’s “face turned beet red” during the
May 11 meeting, something a reasonable juror may find to be indicative of anger or
disdain towards Plaintiff, and Lawter placed Plaintiff on administrative leave. (ECF No.
44, PageID.760; ECF No. 44-12, PageID.897-98.) Similarly, Garrett-Owens and
Brancheau exchanged e-mails on May 16 that could possibly demonstrate either some

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surprise or displeasure with Plaintiff raising her concerns. (ECF No. 48-15,
PageID.1158; ECF No. 48-6, PageID.1072.) The DRC committee, which was ultimately
responsible for her termination, was made up of Rastigue, Garrett-Owens, and Donner,
at least two of whom either had a personal stake in or expressed an arguably negative
reaction to Plaintiff’s complaints. Although the additional evidence of potential retaliatory
motive is not overwhelming, it is at least enough to establish a causal connection when
coupled with the temporal proximity of her placement on administrative leave and her
termination. At this stage, she has produced sufficient evidence from which a
reasonable juror could draw an inference that the adverse action would not have been
taken in the absence of her opposition to Defendant’s actions. Kirilenko-Ison, 974 F.3d
at 664.
Insofar as Plaintiff brings a claim under the participation clause for her testimony
in Taylor’s case, however, Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case due to a
combination of a failure to demonstrate the protected activity and causation elements.
First, Plaintiff has failed to adduce sufficient evidence that, at any time prior to her
dismissal, she had any expectation of participating as a witness in Taylor’s federal
disability proceedings. 8 At her deposition, she indicated that on her May 11 meeting with
Lawter she only discussed her potential participation in Taylor’s workers’ compensation
proceeding:
Q: What was your purpose in asking for the meeting with Mr. Lawter?
A: My purpose was to make John aware that I had been named a witness
in Mr. Taylor's lawsuit against the University of Michigan, that I was going
The court will assume for purposes of this analysis only that if Plaintiff was
indeed named as a witness in Taylor’s federal disability case, such would be sufficient
to constitute protected activity under Section 504.
8

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to testify truthfully in that matter. I was not going to perjure myself. I
expressed concern to him about retaliation and being fired as a result of
that. I asked for his help and protection because I knew that I was going to
be fired.
Q: Let me see if I can take those and sort of break it down a little bit.
When you say that you had been named as a witness, would I be correct
you’re referring to Robert Taylor's workers’ compensation proceeding?
A: Yes.

...

Q: How did you become aware that you were going to be called as a
witness at Robert Taylor's workers' compensation proceeding?
A: Mr. Taylor informed me that he was naming me as a witness.
(ECF No. 44-11, PageID.888.) To be sure, Plaintiff testified that she “brought more than
one concern” to Lawter on May 11, and that there was “more than one thing discussed
during that meeting.” (ECF No. 44-11, PageID.890-91.) But while the record establishes
that during this meeting she engaged in protected activity by protesting Defendant’s
previous actions against Taylor, there is no admissible evidence purporting to show
Taylor either at this point had any expectation of participating in Taylor’s disability action
in some way or that Defendant knew about her intention to do so. 9 In short, although

Insofar as Plaintiff purports to rely on her September 15 and 18 e-mails to human
resources and Masson which harken back to the May 11 discussion about her being
named as a witness in a “Pending Federal Lawsuit,” she cannot do so. First, Plaintiff did
not send these to anybody who played a role in her termination. Second, at this point,
the “wheels of termination had already been put into the motion”—evinced by her
placement onto administrative leave on approximately September 11—so a reasonable
juror could not conclude that Plaintiff’s participation in Taylor’s disability action was a
cause of her termination. Cf. Gipson v. Vought Aircraft Indus., Inc., 387 F. App’x 548,
557 (6th Cir. 2010) (explaining that, in a Family and Medical Leave Act retaliation case,
an employee cannot “insulate himself from a pending dismissal by opportunistically
invoking” statutory protections) (internal quotations omitted). Finally, if anything, her
statements in these e-mails were mere conjecture about her potentially testifying in
Plaintiff’s federal disability proceeding, and such evidence is insufficient to overcome
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on this point. Arendale v. City of Memphis,

9

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Plaintiff indicates she had a conversation with Taylor about her potential testimony in
the workers’ compensation proceeding, there is no evidence that a similar conversation
took place regarding her being named as a witness in Taylor’s federal disability action.
In fact, it is not entirely clear that she even knew Taylor’s federal disability lawsuit
existed at the time she made her complaints. Plaintiff cannot maintain a claim under the
disability discrimination laws under these circumstances. See Rorrer v. City of Stow,
743 F.3d 1025, 1046-47 (6th Cir. 2014) (“The ADA is a discrimination statute and does
not protect an employee who participates in arbitration proceedings contesting
employment decisions that do not involve any claims of discrimination.”); Reynolds v.
Am. Nat’l Red Cross, 701 F.3d 143 (4th Cir. 2012) (holding that a retaliation claim under
the ADA failed because “workers’ compensation claim is not something . . . covered by
the ADA.”).
Second, the only evidence of Plaintiff’s intent to participate in Taylor’s federal
disability action—or any knowledge on Defendant’s part of her intention to do so—arose
in December 2018 when she was formally named as a witness, which is far too late.
(See Taylor v. Univ. of Mich., No. 17-11473, ECF No. 40.) At this point, Plaintiff had
already been terminated for over a year. And Plaintiff failed to adduce any evidence, for
example, that she had a conversation with Taylor or his attorney about being named
potentially being named as a witness before this time. Given the chronology of events,

519 F.3d 587, 605 (6th Cir. 2008) (“In order to survive summary judgment, plaintiff
cannot rely on conjecture or conclusory allegations”); Grizzell v. City of Columbus Div.
of Police, 461 F.3d 711, 724 (6th Cir. 2006) (explaining that “mere personal belief,
conjecture and speculation” are insufficient to support an inference for purposes of
summary judgment).
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Plaintiff cannot establish a causal connection between her participation as a witness
and any adverse employment action against her.
In summary, Plaintiff has met her prima facie burden as it pertains to her
opposition to Defendant’s failure to properly accommodate Taylor and her advocacy in
support of him. She has not done so insofar as her participation clause claims are
concerned—it is her burden at this stage to adduce evidence relevant to the
participation clause allegations, and she has failed to do so. Nonetheless, as it relates
to her protected activity under the opposition clause, Plaintiff has met her “easy burden”
of establishing a prima facie case. Kirilenko-Ison, 974 F.3d at 661.
B. Legitimate Basis for Adverse Employment Action
Having cleared her “low hurdle,” the burden of production now shifts from Plaintiff
to Defendant to “articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for its actions.
Gribcheck, 245 F.3d at 551. A defendant is not required to “persuade the court that it
was actually motivated by the proffered reasons”; rather, it is sufficient “to raise a
genuine issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against” a plaintiff by setting forth
evidence showing the reasons for its actions. Provenzano v. LCI Holdings, Inc., 663
F.3d 806, 814-15 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U.S. 248, 254 (1981)). Here, Defendant has easily met its burden. Defendant has
shown that a fellow custodial supervisor, Price, came forth on behalf of himself and
other employees to share concerns regarding Plaintiff. (ECF No. 44, PageID.777.) As
far as the record demonstrates, he did so independently without any influence of those
who may have had some retaliatory motive against Plaintiff. Price’s complaints, in turn,
led to comprehensive witness interviews and a twelve-page investigative report

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summarizing the complaints lodged against Plaintiff. (Id.) This report was considered by
the DRC committee, which ultimately discharged Plaintiff for “[u]nsatisfactory work
performance, specifically creating a hostile work environment of fear, intimidation, and
harassment of your staff and colleagues.” (ECF No. 44-22, PageID.952.) This stated
reason was consistent with Price’s initial complaints. The court finds that there is more
than sufficient evidence in the record to show that Defendant had a neutral, legitimate
reason to place Plaintiff on administrative leave and terminate her.
C. Pretext
“After the defendant articulates its nondiscriminatory reasons for taking the
employment action against the plaintiff, the presumption of discrimination created by the
prima facie case drops out of the analysis.” Gribcheck, 245 F.3d at 552 (citing Wrenn v.
Gould, 808 F.2d 49, 501 (6th Cir. 1987)). It then is a plaintiff’s burden to demonstrate
that “a reasonable jury could find by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant’s stated reasons are pretextual.” Id. In other words, Plaintiff must show that
“the question of pretext is a genuine factual dispute.” Kirilenko-Ison, 974 F.3d at 667
(citing Provenzano, 663 F.3d at 813). Plaintiff can show pretext by demonstrating
Defendant’s reasons for its actions “(1) lack a basis in fact, (2) did not actually motivate
the [adverse action], or (3) were insufficient to motivate the [adverse action].” Shelby
Cty., 711 F.3d at 702 (citing Vincent v. Brewer Co., 514 F.3d 489, 497 (6th Cir. 2007)).
The court finds that, viewing the record as a whole, Plaintiff has not met her burden at
this stage. Defendant’s proffered reasons certainly had a basis in fact, motivated its
decision to place Plaintiff on administrative leave and terminate her, and otherwise were
sufficient to motivate any adverse action against her.

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The investigation, in fact, revealed unsatisfactory work performance and that
Plaintiff created a “hostile work environment of fear, intimidation, and harassment of
[her] staff and colleagues.” (ECF No. 44-22, PageID.952; ECF No. 48-19.) There was
overwhelming evidence that would justify Plaintiff’s termination, all of which was wholly
irrelevant to Plaintiff’s protected conduct. Statements given by Price and at least a
dozen additional employees revealed, among a myriad of other things:
•

“The way Karen treats the temps is terrible. She works them to death and
yells at them all the time. People are so fearful of her that they don’t want to
come forward because they are literally afraid of her.” (ECF No. 48-19,
PageID.1213.)

•

Plaintiff refers to employees “as bastards.” (Id.)

•

After being told by Donner to go home during the work day, Plaintiff “berated
and yelled at [Price] for 2 hours after he was off the clock. [Plaintiff] told him
his communication skills were terrible and that he needed to let her know
when he was going to be off. He pointed out that he was letting her know and
she kept yelling at him. She was trying to tell him what to do like she was his
boss.” (Id.)

•

One employee, Terry Leach, opened his interview by apologizing to
Brancheau “for lying . . . when [Brancheau] did interviews about concerns
with Karen in 2012.” Leach explained that “he was so terrified of retaliation
from [Plaintiff] that he couldn’t tell the truth” at that time. (ECF No. 48-19,
PageID.1214.)

•

“Karen treats the temporary employees like dogs. She will take them into her
office to discuss issues with them but is screaming so loud they can hear her
through the closed door. However, much of the time, she yells at people in
front of the entire group.” (ECF No. 48-19, PageID.1215.)

•

“She treats the temps like dirt. [One employee] was a good temp but wasn't
where he was supposed to be so she fired him. She fires the good workers
and keeps the problematic ones.” (Id.)

•

“[Plaintiff] told [Leach] that she wasn’t hiring Jose because he didn’t speak
English and she couldn’t do it.” (Id.)

•

“Karen goes after supervisors who don’t go along with her.” (Id.)

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•

“When Karen is gone, everyone is good but when she is at work the
environment changes and everyone is on edge.” (ECF No. 48-19,
PageID.1216.)

•

“Karen is a really, really mean person. She treats the temp terribly, yelling at
Fanta instead of talking to her. The very first time [Plaintiff] met [Fanta] she
was mean to [Fanta] and told [Fanta] if she didn't have her ID she couldn't
work. When [Plaintiff] tells her to do things, she raises her voice and yells at
her. . . . [Plaintiff] gives her temps poor evaluations, is very mean and yells at
them, doesn’t spend any time coaching or helping them.” (ECF No. 48-19,
PageID.1216.) The same employee noted that “it has been so stressful
working here” under Plaintiff’s supervision. (Id.)

•

“Karen is one hot mess. . . . Karen is very vindictive and likes to tell people
she will ‘drain the blood out of the employees.’ [An employee] has heard her
saying that the supervisors are better than the custodians. Witnessed her
calling [Price] out on sitting with them at a potluck, saying he was one of them
now and needed to start acting like it.” (ECF No. 48-19, PageID.1217.)

•

“Most of her chewing out people is in public even though she says she will
address issues in private.” (ECF No. 48-19, PageID.1218.)

•

“She is not very nice to the temps and gets on a power trip with them. Karen
really doesn’t like Fanta and talks down to her and is mean to her, She makes
Fanta do all of the restrooms.” (Id.)

•

“Karen is mean and berates people. However, people are afraid of her and
won’t speak up against her because of the fear of retaliation.” (Id.)

•

“Karen always looks for the worst in every situation and never has a nice
thing to say about anyone’s work. If you want a good team, you should be
encouraging them not jumping down their throats and being so negative.”
(ECF No. 48-19, PageID.1219.)

•

One employee remarked that he “has worked many places and Karen is not
fit to work here. She is out of it, loopy and he has never dealt with someone
harassing him like she does. He feels like she is always thinking about how
she can mess with them every day,” and he also noted that “[Plaintiff] treats
the temps like shit. They are afraid to say anything about their treatment.”
(ECF No. 48-19, PageID.1220.)

•

“Everyone should be treated equally and Karen does not do this. Her staff are
afraid of her. When he started a lot of people told him she was a horrible
person and they were so glad they didn’t work for her. She treats people
unfairly and messes with their vacation time. She treats the temps terribly and

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one even quit within 3 hours of working for her. She is always yelling at them
and fires most of them. Instead of trying to help them in the confusing, large
buildings she belittles them for not doing the work and fires them eventually. .
. . [I]t was horrible that she told Scott (they could all hear) that he couldn’t eat
with his staff at the holiday party as he wasn't one of them anymore, he was a
supervisor.” (Id.)
•

“[Plaintiff] makes situations worse than they have to be by accusing them of
things.” (Id.)

•

An employee noted that he “doesn’t know why [Plaintiff] doesn’t like him, if it
is because she didn't hire him or because he is black. She makes it hard for
some reason,” particularly because Plaintiff “takes her anger out on
everyone.” (Id., PageID.1220-21.)

Numerous employees expressed their frustration with Plaintiff, and the report is replete
with more specific, corroborated examples of Plaintiff’s mistreatment of employees.
(See ECF No. 48-19.) The report also details, inter alia, several accounts of unfair
favoritism for one or two particular employees and an improper hiring practice involving
a temporary employee named Jose. (ECF No. 48-25, PageID.1248.)
While the timing of her termination appears suspicious at first glance, the record
clearly demonstrates that not a single individual at whom Plaintiff directed any of her
protected conduct was a catalyst sparking any adverse employment action. Rather, a
completely insulated, independent actor with no stake in Plaintiff’s opposition to
Defendant’s treatment of Taylor was the impetus behind the investigation into Plaintiff’s
conduct as a custodial supervisor. 10 (ECF No. 48, PageID.973-74; ECF No. 44-3,
PageID.829; ECF No. 44-5, PageID.846; ECF No. 44-4, PageID.840.) There is no

The manner in which Price brought his complaints demonstrates the severity of
Plaintiff’s actions. Price called Donner to talk in person because the matter was
“extremely serious,” prompting Donner to return campus despite her already having left
work for the day. (ECF No. 44-3, PageID.829.) Price noted he and others “couldn’t take
it anymore” and that he should have brought his concerns to Donner sooner. (Id.) His
conversation with Donner persisted for nearly two hours. (Id., PageID.830.)
10

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evidence to suggest any investigation into Plaintiff’s misconduct would have been
initiated unless these complaints by Price were brought forth—any allegation that the
investigation began as a “sham” is plainly unsupported by the evidence before the court.
And there were several others who shared substantially similar problems with Plaintiff
as a custodial supervisor, none of whom appeared to be influenced by Donner, Lawter,
or any superiors who may have been responsible for Plaintiff’s termination.
Defendant presented these allegations to Plaintiff and gave her the opportunity to
respond. On September 13, 2017, Rastigue and another human resources employee
interviewed Plaintiff regarding the employees’ complaints. (ECF No. 44-9, PageID.876.)
Plaintiff was also given the chance at the DRC to “respond or provide relevant evidence
to refute” the allegations, but of the three names Plaintiff provided to provide testimony
on her account “two couldn't be reached and one stated that he worked for [Plaintiff] for
a short period of time and it was 3 years ago.”11 (ECF No. 44-22, PageID.953.) Plaintiff
denied all allegations against her at the time of her interview and the DRC, and she
continued to deny them in her depositions taken in the present action. But at this stage,
a “blanket denial [of] the employer’s articulated reasons . . . is not enough; a plaintiff
must take the extra step of presenting evidence to show that the reasons given are an
attempt to cover up the employer’s alleged real discriminatory motive.” Irvin v. Airco

Plaintiff complains that her friend and co-worker, Miller, was not interviewed and
would later testify that she had never seen Plaintiff treat employees differently or speak
to them in a demeaning manner; however, as Miller’s deposition reveals, Miller and
Plaintiff “had to supervise different buildings and crews,” and she therefore only
“sometimes” saw Plaintiff interact with her own custodians. (ECF No. 48-9,
PageID.1111.) Miller’s deposition also does nothing to rebut the numerous specific,
individualized accounts of Plaintiff’s misconduct proffered by Defendant’s employees.
11

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Carbide, 837 F.2d 724, 726 (6th Cir. 1987). Nothing in the record suggests that the
allegations leading to Defendant’s adverse employment actions lacked a basis in fact,
did not motivate Defendant, or were insufficient to motivate Defendant. 12 Plaintiff’s
attempts to refute the notion that she ever mistreated any subordinate employees or coworkers presents nothing more than the “mere possibility” of a factual dispute.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
Plaintiff also, to establish pretext, attempts to argue that the initial investigation
into her conduct was either a sham or pretextual because Brancheau—who conducted
the investigation—was biased against Plaintiff. Plaintiff relies on Brancheau’s e-mail
stating, “It is my understanding that Karen might testify for Robert Taylor in his court
case, basically stating that [Donner] was out to get him, we didn’t accommodate his
restrictions, etc.” (ECF No. 48, PageID.971 (emphasis added).) According to Plaintiff,
this statement indicates that Brancheau played a role in the failure to accommodate
Taylor, and therefore, any investigation conducted by Brancheau was improper. But the
use of the word “we” is the only evidence Plaintiff presents to demonstrate Brancheau
having any role in deciding whether to accommodate Taylor. 13 All of Plaintiff’s
complaints between May and June had to do with Donner failing to accommodate

To the extent Plaintiff argues she can demonstrate pretext by pointing to her
strong performance record over the course of her employment, she has proffered only
one performance review from 2012 in support of this proposition. (ECF No. 48-7.) Yet,
even this performance review indicates that she should “work on” enhancing her
“empathetic listening skills when dealing with staff members and others,” which
correlates with the complaints she received five years later. (Id., PageID.1088.)
12

Brancheau’s use of the word “we”—given the absence of any additional evidence
to show Brancheau’s personal involvement—is likely a general reference to the
Custodial and Grounds Department as a whole.

13

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Taylor—in this regard, the record is wanting of any evidence as to Brancheau’s role in
Taylor’s firing.
And significantly, to the extent Plaintiff complains that Brancheau was, because
of her alleged “bias,” improperly “assigned . . . to investigate Plaintiff’s complaints
concerning the fact that Defendant discriminated against Taylor based on his disability,”
the record plainly contradicts any notion that Brancheau was assigned to do so. (ECF
No. 48, PageID.972 (emphasis added).) First, Plaintiff cites a portion of Lawter’s
deposition testimony which does nothing to show Brancheau was assigned to
investigate Plaintiff’s complaints; rather, this portion of the transcript demonstrates that
after Price made complaints to Lawter, Lawter then shared the information with
Brancheau and asked her to investigate Price’s complaints. (ECF No. 48-12,
PageID.1147.) Second, Plaintiff claims that Brancheau “admits” she did not investigate
Plaintiff’s regarding Taylor’s disability discrimination by citing Brancheau’s deposition,
but this is not what Brancheau stated in the portion of the deposition cited by Plaintiff.
Instead, Brancheau testified that she was not “assigned” to investigate Plaintiff’s claims
or interview Plaintiff in the first place, despite what Plaintiff contends:
Q: Okay. And [Plaintiff] makes some allegations of, regarding retaliation. .
. . Were you ever assigned to interview Ms. Zarza regarding her retaliation
complaint?
A: No.
Q: Were you only involved in the investigation that you did with the twelve
pages of notes that we just went through? Is that the only time you
investigated anything regarding Karen Zarza in 2017?
A: Yes.

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(ECF No. 48-18, PageID.1205 (emphasis added).) In short, Brancheau did not have a
“conflict of interest” before investigating Plaintiff’s misconduct, nor did Brancheau ever
shirk any obligation to investigate Plaintiff’s advocacy in support of Taylor. 14
Brancheau’s investigation into Plaintiff’s misconduct was the direct result of a genuine
concern of Price.
Thus, Plaintiff has not produced sufficient evidence to show that there is a
genuine issue for trial as it relates to pretext. A defendant’s proffered reason “cannot . . .
be a pretext for [retaliation] unless it is shown both that the reason was false, and that
[retaliation] was the real reason.” Robinson, 821 F. App’x at 529-30 (alterations in
original) (quoting Seeger v. Cincinnati Bell Telephone Co., 681 F.3d 274, 283, 285 (6th
Cir. 2012)). Plaintiff falls far short of meeting her burden and fails to cast doubt on the
reasons for her termination; no reasonable juror could conclude that Defendant’s
offered reason was pretextual.
IV. CONCLUSION
While Plaintiff met the easy burden of establishing a prima facie case, she has
not proffered sufficient evidence to overcome Defendant’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reasons for placing her on administrative leave and ultimately terminating her. Given the

Similarly, the court rejects Plaintiff’s argument that Garrett-Owens and
Brancheau’s e-mail May 16 e-mail exchange reveals any bias against her. While
Brancheau asked Garrett-Owens if they could discipline Plaintiff for her complaints, she
qualified the question by asking if they could discipline Plaintiff “[w]hen the evidence
shows that Karen is not accurate.” (ECF No. 48-15, PageID.1158 (emphasis added).)
Garrett-Owens did not reveal any bias against Plaintiff in her response, which noted that
Lawter could discipline Plaintiff “[i]f the evidence clearly shows that Karen is wrong.” (Id.
(emphasis added).) A reasonable juror would not believe these two comments by
Brancheau and Garrett-Owens—each of whom expressly stated that they must have
evidence before taking any disciplinary action—demonstrated preconceived ill-will
towards Plaintiff.
14

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substantial evidence that she was unfit in her role due to her “creating a hostile work
environment of fear, intimidation, and harassment of [her] staff and colleagues,” a
charge that has not been sufficiently rebutted, no reasonable jury could return a verdict
for Plaintiff. (ECF No. 44-22, PageID.953) The central question for the court is “whether
the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or
whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law,” and the court
holds that Plaintiff has not met her burden to justify presenting this case to a jury.
Troche, 814 F.3d at 798. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 44)
is GRANTED. A separate judgment will issue.
s/Robert H. Cleland
ROBERT H. CLELAND
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Dated: August 2, 2022
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed to counsel of record
on this date, August 2, 2022, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
s/Lisa Wagner
Case Manager and Deputy Clerk
[phone]

S:\Cleland\Cleland\MAZ\Civil\18-13862.ZARZA.MotionForSummaryJudgment.MAZ.3.docx

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