Diehl v. Advanced Correctional Health Care et al
Filing
4
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING Plaintiff's Request for a Temporary Restraining Order, Directing the Clerk to Serve Plaintiff's Pending Motion of Defendants and Directing Defendants to file a response to the Request for A Preliminary Injunction 1 Complaint filed by David Daniel Diehl. Signed by District Judge Robert H. Cleland. (LWag)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
____________________________________________________________
DAVID DANIEL DIEHL,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 20-11127
ADVANCED CORRECTIONAL HEALTH
CARE, and MICHAEL MURPHY,
Defendants.
___________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR A TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER, DIRECTING THE CLERK TO SERVE PLAINTIFF'S
PENDING MOTION ON DEFENDANTS, AND DIRECTING DEFENDANTS TO FILE A
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
I. INTRODUCTION
This matter came before the court on a pro se "Emergency Motion for Preliminary
Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order." (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff David Daniel Diehl
is confined at the Livingston County Jail in Howell, Michigan. He states that he is
illiterate and that someone assisted him in filing his motion. (Id., PageID.2.)
Defendants are Advanced Correctional Health Care and Livingston County Sheriff
Michael Murphy.
Plaintiff did not file a complaint, but in his emergency motion he alleges that
needs surgery for a hernia that may have previously ruptured. (Id., PageID.1-2.)
Plaintiff also alleges that, on approximately March 10, 2020, a jail doctor and hospital
employee informed him that he needs, and will be scheduled for, surgery. (Id.)
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According to Plaintiff, nothing has been done, and he has been told that, if the hernia
"splits the wrong way," poison can enter his body and make him sick or worse. (Id.)
Plaintiff further alleges that, due to Defendants’ negligence in delaying or ignoring
his medical condition, he is at risk of future harm. (Id., PageID.2.) He seeks immediate
medical attention, including a surgical procedure to fix his medical problem, and any
other relief deemed proper and just. (Id.)
II. DISCUSSION
The court begins its discussion by noting that injunctive relief is "an extraordinary
remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to
such relief." Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008)
(citing Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam)); see also
Overstreet v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cty. Gov't, 305 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2002)
(stating that preliminary injunctive relief "is an extraordinary remedy which should be
granted only if the movant carries his or her burden of proving that the circumstances
clearly demand it"). When determining whether a temporary restraining order (“TRO”)
should be granted, the Court considers the following four factors:
(1) whether the movant has a strong likelihood of success on the merits, (2)
whether the movant would suffer irreparable injury absent a stay, (3)
whether granting the stay would cause substantial harm to others, and (4)
whether the public interest would be served by granting the stay.
Northeast Ohio Coalition for Homeless & Serv. Employees Int'l Union, Local 1199 v.
Blackwell, 467 F.3d 999, 1009 (6th Cir. 2006).
"Although no one factor is controlling, a
finding that there is simply no likelihood of success on the merits is usually fatal.”
Gonzales v. Nat’l Bd. of Med. Examiners, 225 F.3d 620, 625 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing
Michigan State AFL–CIO v. Miller, 103 F.3d 1240, 1249 (6th Cir. 1997)).
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A. Success on the Merits
Plaintiff's allegations implicate the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution. The Eighth Amendment prohibits ''cruel and unusual
punishments.'' U.S. Const. amend. VIII. Although the Amendment applies only after a
formal adjudication of guilt, Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671 n.40 (1977), ''[d]ue
process requires that a pretrial detainee not be punished.'' Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.
520, 535 n.16 (1979). Thus, whether Plaintiff is a convicted prisoner or a pretrial
detainee, he has a right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment:
The Eighth Amendment provides an inmate the right to be free from cruel
and unusual punishment. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment provides the same protections to pretrial detainees.
Richmond v. Huq, 885 F.3d 928, 937 (6th Cir. 2018) (citing Richko v. Wayne Cty., 819
F.3d 907, 915 (6th Cir. 2016)); see also Winkler v. Madison Cty., 893 F.3d 877, 890
(6th Cir. 2018) (stating that, when a claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical
needs ''is asserted on behalf of a pretrial detainee, the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment is the proper starting point'') (quoting Phillips v. Roane Cty., 534
F.3d 531, 539 (6th Cir. 2008)). To prevail on a claim that Defendants violated Plaintiff’s
constitutional right to medical care, Plaintiff must prove (1) that the alleged deprivation
was sufficiently serious, and (2) that Defendants had a sufficiently culpable state of
mind. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Winkler, 893 F.3d at 890-91.
In conditions of confinement cases, ''that state of mind is one of 'deliberate
indifference' to inmate health or safety.'' Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. ''[D]eliberate
indifference entails something more than mere negligence.'' Id. at 835. As explained in
Rhinehart v. Scutt, 894 F.3d 721 (6th Cir. 2018), ''[t]he plaintiff must show both that the
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alleged wrongdoing was objectively harmful enough to establish a constitutional
violation and that the official acted with a culpable enough state of mind, rising above
gross negligence.'' Id. at 737.
Plaintiff has not shown that the named defendants were aware of his condition
and that they had a sufficiently culpable state of mind rising above gross negligence.
His conclusory allegations that Defendants delayed or ignored his medical problem,
without any supporting facts, are unlikely to state a plausible claim for relief in a federal
civil rights complaint. Agema v. City of Allegan, 826 F.3d 326, 333 (6th Cir. 2016);
Harrington v. Grayson, 811 F. Supp. 1221, 1227 (E.D. Mich. 1993). (ECF No. 1,
PageID.1-2.) Accordingly, Plaintiff has not shown a strong likelihood of success on the
merits. Although he may be successful in a future complaint, that does not mean he is
entitled to a TRO at this preliminary stage of the proceedings. The first factor weighs
against Plaintiff and in favor of denying a TRO.
B. Irreparable Injury
Plaintiff alleges that he could get sick or worse if his hernia ruptures and
“poison[s]” his body. (ECF No. 1, PageID.1-2.) The rupture of Plaintiff’s hernia would
be an irreparable injury due to the associated health risks and because the injury would
not be fully compensable by money damages. See Overstreet, 305 F.3d at 578 (noting
that "[a] plaintiff's harm from the denial of a preliminary injunction is irreparable if it is not
fully compensable by monetary damages"). Thus, Plaintiff has satisfied the second
factor.
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C. Substantial Harm to Others
The third factor requires a determination of whether substantial harm to others
will occur in the absence of a TRO. Defendants would likely incur significant costs if
the court were to grant a TRO.
Furthermore, granting a TRO could remove from Defendants the deference they
should be afforded in providing the most appropriate medical treatment to the
individuals under their care. Hughes v. Lavender, No. 2:10-CV-674, 2011 WL 1337155,
at *4 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 6, 2011), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:10-CV-674,
2011 WL 2457840 (S.D. Ohio June 16, 2011).
In other words,
[w]here a prison inmate seeks an order enjoining prison officials, this
Court is required to proceed with the utmost care and must recognize the
unique nature of the prison setting. See Kendrick v. Bland, 740 F.2d 432,
438 (6th Cir. 1984). Prison administrators are given broad discretion in
operating their prisons as long as they are pursuing legitimate penological
objectives. This Court is ill-suited to make preliminary decisions based on
disputed medical evidence which would interfere with the operation of the
prison medical system.
Wagle v. Skutt, No. 10-CV-10506, 2011 WL 6019435, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 27, 2011),
report and recommendation adopted, No. 10-10506, 2011 WL 6004241 (E.D. Mich.
Dec. 1, 2011) (Edmunds, J.). Because the same principle applies to jail officials,
Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the third factor.
D. Public Interest
The fourth and final factor is whether the public interest would be served by
granting a TRO. In Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982), the Supreme
Court stated that "[i]n exercising their sound discretion, courts of equity should pay
particular regard for the public consequences in employing the extraordinary remedy of
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injunction." Id. at 312 (citing Railroad Comm'n. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500
(1941)). When an injunction would impair a public interest, even temporarily, "the court
may in the public interest withhold relief until a final determination of the rights of the
parties, though the postponement may be burdensome to the plaintiff." Id. at 312-313
(quoting Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 440 (1944)).
Here, even if Defendants are the proper defendants, Plaintiff’s motion indicates
that he has received some medical attention for his problem. Defendants may have
already scheduled the surgery, or they may have valid reasons for not having scheduled
the surgery.
It would not be in the public’s interest to order an immediate surgical procedure if
surgery has been scheduled, is unnecessary, or can be temporarily delayed. Thus,
Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the fourth factor.
III. CONCLUSION
The first, third, and fourth factors weigh against granting a TRO. Blackwell, 467
F.3d at 1009. Moreover, the court’s finding on the first factor – that there is no likelihood
of success on the merits – is considered fatal under Gonzales, 225 F.3d at 625.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s “Emergency Motion for . . . Temporary Restraining
Order” (ECF No. 1) is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall serve Plaintiff’s motion
(ECF No. 1) and a copy of this order on Defendants at the Livingston County Jail, 140
South Highlander Way, Howell, MI 48843.
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Lastly, IT IS ORDERED that Defendants shall file an answer to Plaintiff’s request
for a preliminary injunction within twenty-one (21) days of the date of this order.
s/Robert H. Cleland
ROBERT H. CLELAND
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
/
Dated: May 15, 2020
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed to counsel of record
on this date, May 15, 2020, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
s/Lisa Wagner
Case Manager and Deputy Clerk
(810) 292-6522
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