Eason v. Whitmer et al

Filing 12

OPINION AND ORDER denying #2 Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Signed by District Judge Robert H. Cleland. (LWag)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______________________________________________________________________
DONALD EASON,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 20-12252
GRETCHEN WHITMER,
JONATHAN BRATER, and
JOCELYN BENSON,
Defendants.
________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Donald Eason is campaigning as an independent candidate for the
United States House of Representatives in Michigan’s 13th congressional district. On
August 19, 2020, he filed a two-count complaint alleging violations of his First and
Fourteenth Amendment rights as a candidate and a registered voter based on the
impact of certain Michigan ballot access laws in combination with the effects of
executive orders issued by Defendant Governor Whitmer in response to the COVID-19
pandemic. That same day, he also filed a motion for a temporary restraining order or, in
the alternative, a motion for preliminary injunction. Plaintiff argues that certain
exceptions to the challenged ballot access provisions related to signature requirements
and registration deadlines, which have allegedly been afforded to major-party
candidates, have been unconstitutionally denied to independent candidates like him.

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After denying Plaintiff’s request for a temporary restraining order, the court
ordered Defendants to respond to Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction. The court
has reviewed the complaint, motion, response, and accompanying exhibits and
concludes that a hearing is not necessary. E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(h). For the reasons
explained in this order, the court will deny Plaintiff’s motion.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Michigan’s Executive Orders and Ballot Access Provisions
To qualify for placement on the ballot for the November 3, 2020, general election
as an independent candidate, Plaintiff was required to submit a qualifying petition to the
Michigan Secretary of State by July 16, 2020, with at least 3,000 signatures of
registered voters in his district. Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 168.544f, 168.590c. Plaintiff
admits that he failed to comply with these ballot access provisions and that he obtained
only 2,000 signatures. (ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) He contends that executive orders
issued by Governor Whitmer in response to the COVID-19 pandemic made compliance
with these ballot access provisions impossible.
In a recent nearly identical case in this court raising a constitutional challenge to
Michigan’s signature requirement and filing deadlines related to ballot initiatives, the
court succinctly summarized the relevant executive orders issued in response to the
COVID-19 pandemic:
On March 10, 2020, Governor Whitmer declared a state of emergency and
invoked emergency powers in Executive Order No. 2020-4 in response to
the global pandemic caused by the novel coronavirus, COVID-19. See EO
No. 2020- 4. Beginning three days later, the Governor signed a series of
Executive Orders capping public gatherings and closing bars, restaurants,
and other places of public accommodation. See EO Nos. 2020-5, 2020-9,
2020-21.

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On March 23rd, Governor Whitmer issued Executed Order 2020-21, which
ordered all persons not performing essential or critical infrastructure jobs
to stay in their place of residence, except in limited circumstances. EO No.
2020-21. This order became known as the “Stay-Home Order.” The StayHome Order was extended on multiple occasions. See, e.g., EO Nos.
2020-42, 2020-59. Subsequent Executive Orders—namely, 2020-92,
2020-96, 2020-110, and 2020-115—began implementing a regional
approach to the reopening of the State, which included a gradual
relaxation of certain restrictions and measures. The Stay Home Order
ultimately ended on May 31, 2020. . . . See EO No. 2020-110. Moreover,
as relevant here, Executive Orders 2020-70, 2020-77, 2020-92, 2020-96,
and 2020-110 were all interpreted to permit outdoor, expressive First
Amendment activities. See FAQ’s for EOs 70, 77, 92, 96, and 110.
Beginning July 1, 2020, due to worsening pandemic conditions, the
Governor issued a series of Executive Orders reverting back to certain
measures, such as prohibiting indoor service in bars, implementing a
mask mandate, and limiting public gatherings. See EO Nos. 2020-143, EO
No. 2020-147, 2020-160. The Governor has not issued any Executive
Orders specifically addressing the holding of the November general
election.
Detroit Unity Fund, et al., v. Whitmer et al., No. 20-12016 (E.D. Mich. Aug.17, 2020)
(Davis, J.) aff’d No. 20-1817, 2020 WL 5230726 (6th Cir. Sept. 2, 2020).
Throughout his motion, Plaintiff refers to, but fails to identify with any particularity,
certain “accommodations” to Michigan’s ballot access laws which he claims were
afforded to major party candidates but denied independent candidates like himself.
Attached to his motion as Exhibit D is an explanatory letter dated April 21, 2020, written
by the Michigan Secretary of State in response to a preliminary injunction issued by the
district court in Esshaki, et al. v. Whitmer, et al., No. 20-10831, 2020 WL 1910154 (Apr.
20, 2020) (Berg. J.), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 813 Fed. Appx. 170 (May 5, 2020).
(ECF No. 2-4, PageID.70-74.) The terms of this injunction appear to be the
“accommodations” to which Plaintiff alludes.

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In Esshaki, Sixth Circuit upheld a portion of the preliminary injunction issued by
the district court which enjoined the enforcement of Michigan’s signature requirement
and April 21, 2020 deadline for candidates attempting to gain access to the August 4,
2020, primary election ballot. Esshaki, 813 F. App’x at 171. That injunction—and the
letter setting guidelines issued by the Michigan Secretary of State in response—was
limited to candidates subject to the April 21 filing deadline. Esshaki, 2020 WL 1910154,
at *12. Plaintiff, who was not required to submit his qualifying petition until July 16,
appears to argue that the Esshaki injunction requires Defendants to extend his
submission deadline and allow him to solicit voter signatures electronically.
B. Plaintiff’s Campaign Efforts
Plaintiff admits that he failed to comply with Michigan’s signature requirement or
July 16 deadline to submit his qualifying petition. He asserts that he obtained 2,000
signatures. (ECF No. 1, PageID.3.)
Plaintiff submits scant information regarding his signature collection efforts. He
does not submit his qualifying petition, and it is not clear when or how Plaintiff began his
campaign or signature collection effects; Plaintiff simply alleges that he “hired campaign
staff and has been diligently campaigning.” (ECF No. 1, PageID.6.) He further claims to
have spent $8,000 in signature collection efforts. (ECF No. 2-1, PageID.37.) He gives
no details about the timeframe of his signature collection efforts or his collection
methods but generally asserts that he postponed his collection efforts in response to
Governor Whitmer’s emergency executive orders. (ECF No. 2-1, PageID.37.)
Importantly, Plaintiff offers no description of what signature collection efforts, if
any, he undertook during the 45 days between the expiration of the Stay-at-Home order

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on June 1, 2020 and the July 16, 2020 submission deadline. The only information he
provides about his campaign activities during this time is that on June 16, 2020, his staff
emailed Wayne County Election Commission “requesting a link so that he could obtain
electronic petition signatures.” (ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) Apparently, he did not receive a
response until August 4, 2020, when the Wayne County Election Commission informed
his campaign staff that the July 16, 2020 deadline would be strictly enforced. (ECF No.
2-1, PageID.38.)
Plaintiff did not file his complaint and motion until August 19, 2020. He does not
explain why he waited 34 days after the deadline to file this action. On August 21, 2020,
the court denied his request for TRO and set deadlines for briefing of his request for
preliminary injunction. (ECF No. 6.)
III. STANDARD
“A preliminary injunction is an ‘extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.’”
Adams & Boyle, P.C. v. Slatery, 956 F.3d 913, 923 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Winter v.
NRDC, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). In order to justify this extraordinary remedy, the
moving party bears the burden of proving: “(1) that they are likely to succeed on the
merits of their claim, (2) that they are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of
preliminary relief, (3) that the balance of equities tips in their favor, and (4) that an
injunction is in the public interest.” Id. (citing Winter v. NRDC, Inc., 555 U.S. at 20).
Determining whether to grant a preliminary injunction requires the court to “balance the
competing claims of injury and must consider the effect on each party of the granting or
withholding of the requested relief.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 24 (quoting Amoco Prod. Co. v.
Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987)).

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IV. DISCUSSION
Defendants raise two principal arguments in opposition to Plaintiff’s motion. First,
they argue that his motion should be denied under the equitable doctrine of laches
because Plaintiff failed to timely pursue his claims. Second, Defendants assert that
Plaintiff’s request for preliminary injunction fails on the merits. For the reasons explained
below, the court agrees with Defendants on both points.
A. Laches
Defendants first raise the defense of laches, arguing that Plaintiff’s motion should
be denied because he has essentially slept on his rights. (ECF No. 9, PageID.106.) The
court agrees.
It is a “long-established doctrine” of the courts that “equity aids the vigilant, and
not those who slumber on their rights.” Lucking v. Schram, 117 F.2d 160, 162 (6th Cir.
1941) (quoting Hays v. Port of Seattle, 251 U.S. 233, 239 (1920)). Additionally, “[i]t is
well established that in election-related matters, extreme diligence and promptness are
required.” Mich. Chamber of Commerce v. Land, 725 F. Supp. 665, 681 (W.D. Mich.
2010) (internal citation and quotation omitted). “As a general rule, last-minute
injunctions changing election procedures are strongly disfavored.” Serv. Employees Int’l
Union Local 1 v. Husted, 698 F.3d 341, 345 (6th Cir. 2012); see also Republican Nat’l
Comm. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 140 S.Ct. 1205, 1207 (2020) (“This Court has
repeatedly emphasized that lower federal courts should ordinarily not alter the election
rules on the eve of an election.”). As Judge Davis recently observed, there are several
reasons why such last-minute changes to election procedures are strongly disfavored:
First, “[c]ourt orders affecting elections . . . can themselves result in voter
confusion . . . As an election draws closer, that risk will increase.” Purcell
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v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4-5 (2006); see also William v. Rhodes, 393 U.S.
23, 34-35 (1968) (affirming denial of request for injunction requiring lastminute changes to ballots, given risk of disrupting election process).
Second, “[a]s time passes, the state’s interest in proceeding with the
election increases in importance as resources are committed and
irrevocable decisions are made, and the candidate’s claim to be a serious
candidate who has received a serious injury becomes less credible by his
having slept on his rights.” Kay v. Austin, 621 F.2d 809, 813 (6th Cir.
1980).
Detroit Unity Fund, No. 20-12016, at * 10. These considerations are particularly relevant
in this case where the registration deadline expired over one month before Plaintiff filed
his motion for a preliminary injunction and, even more so, because local clerks may now
begin printing ballots. (ECF No. 9, PageID.104.)
The equitable defenses of laches may bar an action when there is “(1)
unreasonable delay in asserting one’s rights; and (2) a resulting prejudice to the
defending party.” Brown-Graves Co. v. Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas
Pension Fund, 206 F.3d 680, 684 (6th Cir. 2000). Here, both elements are easily met.
Plaintiff offers virtually no explanation for why he filed the instant action 34 days
after the registration deadline. In Detroit Unity Fund, the district court held that laches
barred Plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction filed two hours before the expiration
of the July 28, 2020 deadline for the submission of county ballot initiatives for the
November 3, 2020 election. Detroit Unity Fund et al., No. 20-12016, at *2-3. The Sixth
Circuit upheld this holding. Detroit Unity Fund, et al., No. 20-1817, 2020 WL 5230726.
Plaintiff’s request in the instant case in even more delayed and, consequently, less
persuasive than the injunction requested in Detroit Unity Fund. Not only did Plaintiff file
the instant motion 34 days after the submission deadline, but his failure to provide any
justification for his delayed filing strongly indicates that the delay is not justified. See

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Crookston v. Johnson, 841 F.3d 396, 398 (6th Cir. 2016) (identifying the “first and most
essential” reason to issue a stay of an election-related injunction as plaintiff offering “no
reasonable explanation for waiting so long to file this action.”).
As to the second element of laches, Plaintiff’s significant delay serves to
increase the resulting prejudice to Defendants. See Kay v. Austin, 621 F.2d 809, 813
(6th Cir. 1980) (“As time passes, the state’s interest in proceeding with the election
increases in importance as resources are committed and irrevocable decisions are
made, and the candidate’s claim to be a serious candidate who has received a serious
injury becomes less credible by his having slept on his rights.”). As Plaintiff himself
observes, local clerks may begin printing ballots on September 5, 2020. (ECF No. 2,
PageID.26.) He does not specifically define his requested relief, but presumably, he
seeks to either extend the registration deadline or require Defendants to accept his
untimely qualifying petition. In either case, granting his motion would require alreadyprinted ballots to be reformatted and reprinted which, in turn, would create significant
logistical complications and likely delay additional election deadlines, such as the
mailing of absentee ballots. Last-minute changes to election laws are strongly
disfavored precisely because of these logistical complications. See Serv. Employees
Int’l Union Local 1, 698 F.3d at 345; Republican Nat’l Comm., 140 S.Ct. at 1207. Thus,
the severity of the resulting prejudice to Defendants supports the application of laches.
Though the court may deny the motion based on laches alone, see Chirco v.
Crosswinds Cmtys., Inc., 474 F.3d 227, 232 (6th Cir. 2007), for the reasons explained
below, the court will also deny Plaintiff’s motion on the merits.

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B. Preliminary Injunction Factors
To justify the extraordinary remedy of a preliminary injunction, Plaintiff must
prove that: (1) he is likely to succeed on the merits of his claim, (2) he will suffer
irreparable harm, (3) the balance of equities tips in his favor, and (4) an injunction is in
the public interest. Adams & Boyle, P.C., 956 F.3d at 923 (quoting Winter, 555 U.S. at
24). The court concludes that none of these factors weigh in Plaintiff’s favor.
Plaintiff asserts that enforcement of Michigan’s signature requirement and
registration deadlines against the backdrop of executive orders issued in response to
the COVID-19 pandemic violates his rights under the First Amendment and his rights to
equal protection and due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The precise
contours of his claims are less than clear, but he generally asserts that the burden
placed on him is severe and that Defendants have no justification to impose it. (ECF No.
2, PageID.28.) Recent precedent, however, cuts against his position.
Plaintiff has no fundamental right to run for elected office or, as a voter, to vote
for a specific candidate. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 142-43 (1972) (no
“fundamental right to run for elective office.”); Citizens for Legislative Choice v. Miller,
144 F.3d 916, 921 (6th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted) (“A voter has no right to vote for a
specific candidate or even a particular class of candidates.”). It remains true,
nonetheless, that ballot access laws implicate “‘the right of individuals to associate for
the advancement of political beliefs, and the right of qualified voters, regardless of their
political persuasion, to cast their votes effectively.’” Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S.
780, 786-87 (1983) (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30-31 (1968)). These
rights are protected under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

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In Kishore v. Whitmer, the Sixth Circuit explained the framework governing First
and Fourteenth Amendment challenges to ballot access provisions:
The Anderson-Burdick framework governs First and Fourteenth
Amendment challenges to ballot-access restrictions. See Anderson v.
Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983); Burdick, 504 U.S. at 441, 112 S.Ct.
2059. Within that framework, “the rigorousness of our inquiry into the
propriety of a state election law depends upon the extent to which a
challenged regulation burdens First and Fourteenth Amendment
rights.” Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434, 112 S.Ct. 2059.
When state law imposes “‘severe’ restrictions,” “the regulation must be
‘narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling
importance.’” Id. (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289, 112 S.Ct.
698, 116 L.Ed.2d 711 (1992)). When state law imposes “reasonable,
nondiscriminatory restrictions,” however, the law is subject to rationalbasis review and “the State's important regulatory interests are generally
sufficient to justify” the restrictions. Id. (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788,
103 S.Ct. 1564). When state law imposes an intermediate restriction that
falls somewhere between those two poles, “we weigh the burden imposed
by the State’s regulation against ‘the precise interests put forward by the
State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule, taking into
consideration the extent to which those interests make it necessary to
burden the plaintiff's rights.’” Thompson v. Dewine, 959 F.3d 804, 808 (6th
Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (quoting Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434, 112 S.Ct. 2059).
Kishore v. Whitmer, No. 20-1661, --- F.3d -- , 2020 WL 4932749, at *2 (6th Cir. Aug. 24,
2020) (citing Anderson, 460 U.S. 780; Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 441 (1992)).
Although he does not specifically state his position, Plaintiff appears to suggest
that the Esshaki case stands for the proposition that the ballot access provisions he
challenges impose a severe burden. This position misconstrues the narrow holding of
Esshaki.
In Esshaki, the court held that the burden placed upon the plaintiff was severe
because “Michigan’s Stay-at-Home Order remained in effect through the deadline to
submit ballot-access petitions, effectively excluding all candidates who had not already
satisfied the signature requirements (and predicted a shutdown).” Kishore, 2020 WL
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4932749, at *3 (citing Esshaki, 813 F. App’x at 171). But here, Plaintiff’s submission
deadline was 45 days after the Stay-at-Home order was lifted. Thus, unlike the plaintiff
in Esshaki, Plaintiff had the opportunity to gather signatures before the order went into
effect and after it was lifted. However, Plaintiff fails to describe what signature collection
efforts—if any— he undertook during the 45-day period between the expiration of the
order and his submission deadline. Because Plaintiff had ample opportunity to collect
signatures after the Stay-at-Home order was lifted, “the burden imposed by the Stay-atHome Order is less onerous than the burden in Esshaki.” Kishore, 2020 WL 4932749, at
*3.
In factually similar cases, recent precedent clarifies that ballot access provisions
should be assessed under intermediate scrutiny. Kishore, 2020 WL 4932749, *3
(citation omitted) (“Because Michigan’s ballot-access laws as applied to Kishore and
Santa Cruz impose an intermediate burden, the state need only demonstrate that it has
“legitimate interests to impose the burden that outweigh it.”); Detroit Unity Fund, et al., v.
Whitmer et al., No. 20-1817, --- F. App’x. ---, 2020 WL 5230726, at *1 (6th Cir. Sept. 2,
2020) (“In applying an intermediate level of review and weighing the competing
interests, the district court found that the filing deadline serves an important government
interest in easing the administrative burden on election officials in finalizing and printing
the ballots. . . The district court’s opinion carefully and correctly sets out the law
governing the issues raised.”).
Plaintiff asserts that there are “no” alternative means for him to appear on the
ballot absent injunctive relief, but he offers no details about his collection efforts before
or after the Stay-at-Home order. (ECF No. 2, PageID.29.) While certain social

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distancing protocols remain in effect, these protocols have not made signature
collection “impossible,” as Plaintiff suggests. (ECF No. 2-1, PageID.38.) In fact, the
Sixth Circuit recently observed serval possibilities for signature collection which comply
with social distancing protocols:
There’s no reason that Plaintiffs can’t advertise their initiatives within the
bounds of our current situation, such as through social or traditional media
inviting interested electors to contact them and bring the petitions to the
electors’ homes to sign. Or Plaintiffs could bring their petitions to the
public by speaking with electors and witnessing the signatures from a safe
distance, and sterilizing writing instruments between signatures.
Thompson v. Dewine, 959 F.3d 804, 810 (6th Cir. 2020).
Plaintiff had 45 days to collect signatures after the expiration of the Stay-at-Home
order and before his submission deadline; he apparently decided to forgo such
additional collection efforts. While soliciting signatures in compliance with social
distancing protocols may pose some additional challenges, the resulting burden would
be less than severe. See Detroit Unity Fund, et al., 2020 WL 5230726, at *1.
Comparatively, Defendants’ interest in enforcing established election procedures and
deadlines is significant—particularly because ballot printing may now commence—to
ensure an organized election cycle. See Ohio Democratic Party v. Husted, 834 F.3d
620, 635 (6th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted) (“[E]asing administrative burdens on boards of
elections are undoubtedly important regulatory interests.”). Defendants’ significant
interest in avoiding last-minute changes to election procedures increases each day the
parties move closer to the election. See, 621 F.2d at 813. Plaintiff has not demonstrated
that the less-than-severe burden imposed on him outweighs Defendant’s “legitimate
interest” in enforcing established election procedures. Kishore, 2020 WL 4932749, *3 .
This finding is amplified by the lateness of Plaintiff’s filing.
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Plaintiff provides limited analysis for his equal protection claim. He generally
asserts that he has not received the same “accommodations” as major party
candidates. He fails to specify, though, what accommodations have been granted. (ECF
No 2, PageID.17.) His perfunctory treatment of this issue is reason enough to find that
he is not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of this claim. But to the
extent Plaintiff suggests that the “accommodations” outlined in the Esshaki preliminary
injunction should be extended to him, such argument is misplaced because that
injunction was limited to candidates subject to the April 21st deadline. Esshaki v.
Whitmer, 813 F. App’x at 171. Plaintiff offers no explanation as to why the facts of this
case warrant similar relief; as explained earlier, the most severe restrictions imposed by
the Governor’s executive orders expired well in advance of Plaintiff’s submission
deadline. And to the extent Plaintiff suggests that it is unconstitutional for Defendants to
impose ballot access requirements that are different as between major party candidates
and independent candidates, he has failed to show that the burden of such
differentiated requirements is not outweighed by the state interests advanced,
specifically smooth administration of election procedures and ensuring that candidates
listed on the ballot amass “a significant modicum of support.” Jenness v. Fortson, 403
U.S. 431, 442, (1971); see also American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 783
(1974); Miller v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Elections, 141 F.3d 252, 256 (6th Cir. 1998)
(“[Plaintiff] has failed to present sufficient evidence that the burden imposed by the
state, i.e., an increased signature requirement for independent candidates, is not
justified by legitimate state interests.”).

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In sum, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the burden imposed on him by
Michigan’s signature requirements and election deadlines, in combination with the
executive orders which remain in effect, is not outweighed by Defendants’ legitimate
interest in avoiding last minute changes to election procedures. Independent of the
court’s determination that the equitable defense of laches applies, the court’s finding
that Plaintiff has not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits is fatal to his
motion. See Gonzales v. Nat’l Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 225 F.3d 620, 625 (6th Cir. 2000).
Nevertheless, the court observes that the remaining factors it must consider before
issuing an injunction (risk of irreparable harm to Plaintiff, balance of equities, and public
interest) weigh against Plaintiff.
First, because the court concludes that Plaintiff does not have a strong likelihood
of success on the merits, he has not shown that he will suffer irreparable harm. The two
remaining factors collapse into a single inquiry because Defendants represent the
Government. See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009). Defendants have a
significant interest in enforcing election-related deadlines. Disrupting these established
deadlines—especially when the deadline expired nearly two months prior—could result
in serious administrative complications and election delays. Furthermore, as the Sixth
Circuit recently observed in Thompson:
Serious and irreparable harm will thus result if [the Sate] cannot conduct
its election in accordance with its lawfully enacted ballot-access
regulations. Comparatively, Plaintiffs have not shown that complying with
a law we find is likely constitutional will harm them. So the balance of the
equities favors Defendants. Finally, giving effect to the will of the people
by enforcing the laws they and their representatives enact serves the
public interest.

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Thompson, 959 F.3d at 812. Accordingly, Plaintiff as not demonstrated that the
extraordinary remedy of a preliminary injunction is justified in this case.
V. CONCLUSION
Like every candidate for public office, Plaintiff was required to comply with certain
Michigan ballot access laws to earn a place on the November ballot. He failed to do so.
The effect of the Governor’s executive orders issued in response to the COVID-19
pandemic certainly had an impact on his ability to collect signatures. Kishore, 2020 WL
4932749, at *4 (“To be sure, obtaining signatures might well be more difficult now than it
would be in normal circumstances.”). However, that impact was not severe as the
orders did not totally prevent Plaintiff from complying with the challenged election
requirements. Plaintiff could have continued his signature collection efforts after the
expiration of the Stay-at-Home order or initiated a prompt challenge to the ballot access
laws in advance of the filing deadline. He has done neither, choosing instead to file the
instant motion as he approaches the eleventh hour, some 34 days after the expiration of
the qualifying petition deadline, while offering virtually no explanation for his delay.
Though the tardiness of his filing is reason alone for denial, the court also concludes
that he has not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of his claims nor that
any of the remaining preliminary injunction factors weigh in his favor. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction (ECF No. 2) is
DENIED.
s/Robert H. Cleland
/
ROBERT H. CLELAND
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: September 9, 2020

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I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed to counsel of record
on this date, September 9, 2020, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
s/Lisa Wagner
/
Case Manager and Deputy Clerk
[phone]
S:\Cleland\Cleland\HEK\Civil\20-12252.EASON.preliminary.injunction.HEK.RHC.1.docx

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