Bowles v. Macomb Community College et al

Filing 64

OPINION AND ORDER denying 62 Motion for Reconsideration re 60 Order on Motion for Leave to File, filed by Glenn Bowles. Signed by District Judge Robert H. Cleland. (LWag)

Case 3:20-cv-13175-RHC-KGA ECF No. 64, PageID.1392 Filed 05/10/22 Page 1 of 5

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______________________________________________________________________
GLENN BOWLES,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 20-13175

MACOMB COMMUNITY COLLEGE, et al.,
Defendants.
________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Plaintiff Glenn Bowles brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging due
process violations. (ECF No. 12, PageID.270-75.) He also brings a state law libel claim.
(Id., PageID.279) Plaintiff alleges that he was wrongfully accused of inappropriately
touching students and using excessive force while teaching as an adjunct instructor at
the Macomb County Police Academy, administered by Macomb Community College
(“College”).
On April 20, 2022, the court issued an opinion and order denying Plaintiff’s
“Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint.” (ECF No. 60.) The matter was
thoroughly briefed. (ECF Nos. 49, 50, 52, 54, 55, 57, 58.) Now before the court is
Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration of the court’s April 20 order. (ECF No. 62.) After
review, the court finds a hearing unnecessary. E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(f)(1)-(2). For the
reasons stated below, the court will deny the motion.
As an initial matter, Plaintiff cited and applied an outdated standard for motions
for reconsideration. Under Eastern District of Michigan Local Rule 7.1(h)(2), a party may

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move for reconsideration of a non-final order, although they are “disfavored” and may
be brought only upon specific grounds. As of December 1, 2021, it is no longer a
movant’s burden to demonstrate a palpable defect by which the court has been misled,
the correction of which would result in a different disposition. Instead, the movant must
make a three-part showing that: “[t]he court made a mistake, correcting the mistake
changes the outcome of the prior decision, and the mistake was based on the record
and law before the court at the time of its prior decision.” E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(h)(2)(A). But
motions for reconsideration “should not be used liberally to get a second bite at the
apple.” United States v. Lamar, No. 19-CR-20515, 2022 WL 327711, at *1 (E.D. Mich.
Feb. 3, 2022) (Goldsmith, J.). Indeed, motions for reconsideration are not an opportunity
to re-argue a case, present new arguments, or otherwise relitigate issues that the court
previously considered. See United States v. Moore, No. 06-20465, 2022 WL 1251009,
at *1 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 27, 2022) (Edmunds, J.) (citing Nagle Indus., Inc. v. Ford Motor
Co., 175 F.R.D. 251, 255 (E.D. Mich. 1997)); Burn Hookah Bar, Inc. v. City of
Southfield, No. 2:19-CV-11413, 2022 WL 730634, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 10, 2022)
(Murphy, J.).
In its April 20 order, the court held that permitting Plaintiff to amend his complaint
to add a liberty interest would be futile and accordingly denied his motion. (ECF No. 60,
PageID.1379-80.) Much of the opinion focused on whether Plaintiff was ever denied a
name-clearing hearing that comported with due process. (Id., PageID.1371-79.) The
parties mainly disputed whether the College’s proposed name-clearing hearing was
proper in the absence of a “neutral decisionmaker”—which, in Plaintiff’s view, could not
be an individual in any way associated with the College—and whether that

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“decisionmaker” could be required to overturn the College’s decision to terminate
Plaintiff. (Id., PageID.1372-74 (“[T]he parties’ sole disagreement is whether the offered
name-clearing hearing comported with due process . . . Plaintiff’s major gripe with the
name-clearing hearing was that there was no ‘neutral decisionmaker.’”).)
Assuming Plaintiff brings his motion based on some alleged “mistake” under Rule
7.1(h)(2)(A), Plaintiff advances the same arguments that the court previously
considered and rejected. He contends that “if the employee succeeds in clearing his
name, the employer must reinstate the employee, and reserves the right not to continue
his employment in the future if it has other reasons not to do so. Otherwise, there would
be absolutely no point in requiring that the employer afford the terminated employee a
name clearing hearing.” (ECF No. 62, PageID.1385 (emphasis in original).) He explains
that, to ensure an employee’s reinstatement, the decisionmaker must be “neutral” and
have the ability to review and reverse an employer’s termination decision. (Id.) Plaintiff
relies on language in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 565, 573 n.12 (1972), which
stated, “[o]nce a person has cleared his name at a hearing, his employer, of course,
may remain free to deny him future employment for other reasons.” Yet, as Plaintiff
seems to acknowledge, he is repeating precisely the same arguments that the court
considered in the parties’ briefing of Plaintiff’s motion, particularly in Plaintiff’s “Motion to
Allow Correction of Erroneous Statement in Response” (ECF No. 59). (See ECF No. 62,
PageID.1385.) The court expressly addressed these contentions. For example, the
court explained, in part:
Plaintiff questions, “[w]hat use is a name clearing hearing if [the College]
can simply rubber stamp its termination decision?” (ECF No. 58,
PageID.1349.) Thus, Plaintiff’s position stems from a belief that a proper
name-clearing hearing should be adjudicative in nature and culminate in

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his reinstatement to his position as an instructor at the College.10 But “[t]he
point of a name-clearing hearing is not to argue over the reasons for
termination. Rather, the point is to give the employee the opportunity to
argue, ‘You made a statement about me that is ruining my reputation, and
that statement is not true.’” Jennings v. Cty. of Monroe, 630 F. App’x 547,
556 (6th Cir. 2015) (comparing the difference between the requirements of
a Loudermill hearing and a name-clearing hearing). Even though “it is
certainly possible a public employer may reconsider its decision following
such a hearing, the Constitution does not require reconsideration.” O’Brien
v. City of Saginaw, No. 10-12700-BC, 2011 WL 3799649, at *4 (E.D. Mich.
Aug. 26, 2011) (Ludington, J.) (quoting Awrey v. Gilbertson, No. 10–
14242–BC, 2011 WL 2312175, at *4 (E.D. Mich. June 9, 2011)).
(ECF No. 60, PageID.1374-75.) In footnote 10, the court elaborated:
Plaintiff apparently relies on language in Roth, stating that “[o]nce a
person has cleared his name at a hearing, his employer, of course, may
remain free to deny him future employment for other reasons.” (ECF No.
59, PageID.1354-55 (quoting Roth, 408 U.S. at 573 n.12.) But this does
not mean there must be a “neutral decisionmaker”—as defined by
Plaintiff—moderating the name-clearing hearing, particularly where even
the Court in Roth contemplated that the “opportunity to refute the
charge[s]” would be held “before University officials.” Id. at 573 (emphasis
added). Thus, even if it were true that an employer was “obligated to
rehire the terminated employee” following a name-clearing hearing,
Plaintiff points to no case law requiring the moderator to be completely
unaffiliated with the College.
(Id., PageID.1374 n.10.)
In short, Plaintiff used his motion for reconsideration as an attempt to relitigate
issues and arguments that the court has previously considered. He has failed to point to
a mistake in the court’s opinion that affects the outcome of the prior decision. 1 Rather, it
is clear Plaintiff merely disagrees with the court’s holding. Accordingly,

Even if the court accepted Plaintiff’s position, he does not explain how “correcting
the mistake changes the outcome of the prior decision” as required by Rule 7.1(h)(2)(A),
especially in light of the court’s analysis—spanning over two pages—addressing how
“even without the offered name-clearing hearing, . . . Plaintiff was already afforded the
process due to him.” (ECF No. 60, PageID.1377-79.)

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IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s “Motion for Reconsideration” (ECF No. 62) is
DENIED.
s/Robert H. Cleland
ROBERT H. CLELAND
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Dated: May 10, 2022
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed to counsel of record
on this date, May 10, 2022, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
s/Lisa Wagner
Case Manager and Deputy Clerk
[phone]

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