Steele v. Warren
Filing
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OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY Signed by District Judge Gershwin A. Drain. (Bankston, T)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
PATRICIA STEELE,
Case Number: 2:11-CV-12064
Petitioner,
HONORABLE GERSHWIN A. DRAIN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
v.
MILLICENT WARREN,
Respondent.
/
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
AND DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Petitioner Patricia Steele filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28
U.S.C. § 2254. Steele is a state prisoner in the custody of the Michigan Department of
Corrections pursuant to convictions for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated
causing death, Mich. Comp. Laws § 257.625(4)(a), operating a motor vehicle while
intoxicated causing serious impairment of a body function, Mich. Comp. Laws §
257.625(5), operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, second offense, Mich. Comp.
Laws § 257.625(9)(b), and transporting an open container of alcohol, Mich. Comp. Laws
§ 257.624a. She argues that her convictions were obtained in violation of her
constitutional rights because the police and the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by:
(i) failing to conduct a proper investigation; (ii) failing to endorse a res gestae witness
and concealing the existence of that witness; (iii) fabricating evidence to obtain an arrest
warrant; (iv) coercing a witness to falsify evidence; and (v) eliciting perjured testimony.
Respondent argues that the claims are procedurally defaulted and meritless.
The Court denies the petition.
I. Background and Procedural History
Steele’s convictions arise from a collision between her vehicle and another car on
December 12, 2007, in Grand Traverse County. The collision killed the passenger in
the other car, Gerald Frost, and seriously injured the driver, Elaine Frost. At trial, the
defense conceded that Steele was driving while intoxicated and that her vehicle struck
Frost’s vehicle. The defense argued, however, that a third car caused the accident by
striking Steele’s vehicle and causing her to strike Frost’s vehicle.
Steele was found guilty by a jury in Grand Traverse County Circuit Court of
operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (OWI) causing death, OWI causing serious
impairment of a body function, OWI, second offense, and transporting an open
container of alcohol. On May 16, 2008, the trial court sentenced Steele to 7 to 15 years’
imprisonment for the OWI causing death conviction, 3 years, 4 months to 5 years’
imprisonment for the OWI causing serious injury conviction, 1 year imprisonment for the
OWI, second offense conviction, and 3 months’ imprisonment for the transporting an
open container conviction.
Steele filed an appeal of right in the Michigan Court of Appeals. She raised
these claims (the first through counsel and the second in a pro se brief):
I.
The trial court abused its discretion denying Ms. Steel’s motion for a
continuance to have her expert evaluate the scene after the snow melted,
which deprived her of her constitutional right to present a defense and was
not harmless where multiple prosecution witnesses had the benefit of
being present immediately after the accident and where the people’s
witnesses were the exclusive collectors of evidence that was presented at
trial.
II.
The police and the prosecution abused their office and authority
throughout the investigation and at trial by not following up the accident
with proper investigation, by not endorsing a res gestae witness, by
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omitting the existence of a res gestae witness and her exculpatory
evidence, by suppressing a witness statement, by recording an interview
with a neutral witness without her knowledge, by inciting and coercing a
witness to falsify evidence and by putting a witness on the stand that they
knew would commit perjury. Ms. Steele was deprived of her right to a fair
trial as well as her Fourth and Fifth Constitutional rights.
The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Steele’s convictions. People v. Steele,
No. 285641, 2010 WL 99032 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 12, 2010). Steele filed an application
for leave to appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court. The Michigan Supreme Court
denied leave to appeal. People v. Steele, 486 Mich. 1046 (June 28, 2010).
Steele then filed the pending habeas petition. She raises only the claim raised in
her pro per brief in state court. Respondent has filed an answer in opposition.
II. Standard
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) provides:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect
to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings
unless the adjudication of the claim –
(1)
resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2)
resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State
court proceedings.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
“A state court’s decision is ‘contrary to’ . . . clearly established law if it ‘applies a
rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court cases]’ or if it
‘confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the
Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [this] precedent.’”
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Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 15-16 (2003) (per curiam) (quoting Williams v. Taylor,
529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000)). “[T]he ‘unreasonable application’ prong of the statute
permits a federal habeas court to ‘grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct
governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court but unreasonably applies that
principle to the facts’ of petitioner’s case.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520 (2003)
(quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 413). However, “[i]n order for a federal court find a state
court’s application of [Supreme Court] precedent ‘unreasonable,’ the state court’s
decision must have been more than incorrect or erroneous. The state court’s
application must have been ‘objectively unreasonable.’” Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 520-21
(citations omitted); see also Williams, 529 U.S. at 409. “A state court’s determination
that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists
could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” Harrington v. Richter,
562 U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 770, 789 (2011), (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S.
652, 664 (2004). “Section 2254(d) reflects the view that habeas corpus is a guard
against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, not a substitute for
ordinary error correction through appeal. . . . As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus
from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim
being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error
well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded
disagreement.” Id. at 786-87 (internal quotation omitted).
Section 2254(d)(1) limits a federal habeas court’s review to a determination of
whether the state court’s decision comports with clearly established federal law as
determined by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision. See
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Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. Section 2254(d) “does not require citation of [Supreme
Court] cases – indeed, it does not even require awareness of [Supreme Court] cases,
so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts
them.” Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). “[W]hile the principles of “clearly
established law” are to be determined solely by resort to Supreme Court rulings, the
decisions of lower federal courts may be instructive in assessing the reasonableness of
a state court’s resolution of an issue.” Stewart v. Erwin, 503 F.3d 488, 493 (6th Cir.
2007), citing Williams v. Bowersox, 340 F.3d 667, 671 (8th Cir. 2003); Dickens v. Jones,
203 F. Supp. 2d 354, 359 (E.D. Mich. 2002).
Lastly, a federal habeas court must presume the correctness of state court
factual determinations. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). A petitioner may rebut this
presumption only with clear and convincing evidence. Warren v. Smith, 161 F.3d 358,
360-61 (6th Cir. 1998).
III. Discussion
A. Sufficiency of Police Investigation
Steele argues that her right to due process and a fair trial were violated because
the police and prosecutor failed to sufficiently investigate the case. She alleges that
police made little effort to investigate eyewitness statements regarding the possibility
that a third vehicle was involved in the accident.
Respondent argues that this claim is procedurally defaulted. “[F]ederal courts
are not required to address a procedural-default issue before deciding against the
petitioner on the merits.” Hudson v. Jones, 351 F.3d 212, 215 (6th Cir. 2003), citing
Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 525 (1997). “Judicial economy might counsel
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giving the [other] question priority, for example, if it were easily resolvable against the
habeas petitioner, whereas the procedural-bar issue involved complicated issues of
state law.” Lambrix, 520 U.S. at 525. In this case, the Court finds that the interests of
judicial economy are best served by addressing the merits of this claim. The Court
makes the same finding with respect all of the claims Respondent argues are
procedurally defaulted and reaches the merits of all Petitioner’s claims.
The Michigan Court of Appeals, although finding the claim not properly
preserved, nevertheless addressed the merits. The state court held that Petitioner’s
due process rights were not violated by the investigation. The state court reasoned that
the record showed the police instigated the possibility of a third vehicle and simply
found none. Additionally, the state court found the question of a third vehicle was
explored at trial. Steele, 2010 WL 99032 at *2.
On habeas review, a court may grant relief for an inadequate investigation “only
when the petitioner can show a deprivation of due process tantamount to a suppression
of relevant evidence.” Owens v. Foltz, 797 F.2d 294, 296 (6th Cir. 1986). Where the
alleged inadequate investigation is at issue in the trial, the jury may consider the quality
and thoroughness of the investigation in making a reasonable doubt determination. Id.
The Due Process Clause requires that the State disclose to criminal defendants
“evidence that is either material to the guilt of the defendant or relevant to the
punishment to be imposed.” California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984).
Further, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence violates due process of law if a
criminal defendant can show that the police acted in bad faith. Arizona v. Youngblood,
488 U.S. 51, 56-58 (1988). However, neither Trombetta nor Youngblood impose a duty
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to collect evidence. See Miller v. Vasquez, 868 F.2d 1116, 1119 (9th Cir. 1988) (“Since,
in the absence of bad faith, the police’s failure to preserve evidence that is only
potentially exculpatory does not violate due process, then a fortiori neither does the
good faith failure to collect such evidence violate due process.”).
Steele has not shown any failure to investigate that could be judged tantamount
to a suppression of relevant evidence. Any perceived failures of the police investigation
were adequately explored at trial. The Michigan Court of Appeals’ conclusion that there
was no due process violation was a reasonable one.
B. Res Gestae Witness
Steele next argues that the police and prosecutor committed misconduct in their
handling of witness Julie Gauthier. Gauthier witnessed the accident, gave a statement
to police following the accident, and testified at trial. Steele’s claim regarding Gauthier
is somewhat convoluted, but she appears to argue that she was not advised of the
content of Gauthier’s statements (which she views as exculpatory) prior to the time
scheduled for her preliminary examination. Steele waived her right to a preliminary
examination. She argues that if Gauthier’s statements had been disclosed prior to the
time scheduled for the preliminary examination, she would not have waived her
preliminary examination and that she would not have been bound over for trial because
probable cause would not have been established.
There is no general constitutional right to a preliminary examination before trial.
See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 125 n. 26 (1975); Harris v. Neil, 437 F.2d 63, 64
(6th Cir.1971). A state court’s failure to even hold a preliminary examination does not
present a cognizable habeas claim. See Scott v. Bock, 241 F.Supp.2d 780, 793 (E.D.
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Mich. 2003) (Lawson, J.). Similarly, a claim that the evidence offered at a preliminary
examination was insufficient for a finding of probable cause is not cognizable on habeas
review. See David v. Lavinge, 190 F.Supp.2d 974, 978 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (O’Meara, J.).
Further, it is an “established rule that illegal arrest or detention does not void a
subsequent conviction.” Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 119 (citing Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S.
519 (1952); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886)). Thus, “although a suspect who is
presently detained may challenge the probable cause for that confinement, a conviction
will not be vacated on the ground that the defendant was detained pending trial without
a determination of probable cause.” Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 119. Because Steele is now
incarcerated pursuant to valid convictions, she cannot challenge the preliminary
procedures employed prior to her trial.
Further, Steele has not shown that police or the prosecutor withheld any
exculpatory evidence related to Gauthier’s verbal and written statements to police.
Gauthier testified at trial and defense counsel extensively cross-examined her regarding
the content of those statements. Steele has failed to identify any piece of evidence
related to Gauthier that was not disclosed to her prior to trial. Additionally, her claim
that the police improperly recorded an interview with Gauthier does not implicate
Steele’s constitutional rights. Accordingly, she is not entitled to habeas relief on this
claim
C. Fourth Amendment Claim
Next, Steele alleges that the investigating police officers fabricated evidence
regarding material facts in order to create probable cause to secure an arrest warrant.
The Supreme Court has held that “where the State has provided an opportunity
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for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be
granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an
unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at trial.” Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465, 494-95 (1976). The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals utilizes a two-step analysis to
determine whether a defendant was given a full and fair opportunity to litigate a Fourth
Amendment claim in state court:
First, the court must determine whether the state procedural mechanism,
in the abstract, presents the opportunity to raise a fourth amendment
claim. Second, the court must determine whether presentation of the
claim was in fact frustrated because of a failure of that mechanism.
Machacek v. Hofbauer, 213 F.3d 947, 952 (6th Cir. 2000) (internal quotations omitted).
“Michigan has a procedural mechanism which presents an adequate opportunity
for a criminal defendant to raise a Fourth Amendment claim.” Robinson v. Jackson, 366
F. Supp. 2d 524, 527 (E.D. Mich. 2005). This procedural mechanism is a motion to
suppress, ordinarily filed before trial. See People v. Ferguson, 376 Mich. 90 (Mich.
1965) (describing the availability of a pre-trial motion to suppress). Because Michigan
provides a procedural mechanism for raising a Fourth Amendment claim, Steele may
only demonstrate entitlement to relief if she establishes that presentation of her claim
was frustrated by a failure of that mechanism. This she has not done.
Steele raised this issue on direct appeal. The Michigan Court of Appeals
affirmed Steele’s convictions, and the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal.
Steele was provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of her Fourth Amendment
claim in the Michigan courts. Her disagreement with the state courts’ rulings does not
render the state’s procedural mechanism inadequate. This claim is barred by the rule in
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Stone v. Powell.
D. Knowing Presentation of False Testimony
Finally, in her fourth and fifth claims, Steele argues that the prosecutor and police
fabricated evidence and coerced witnesses to lie in an attempt to secure a conviction.
A false-testimony claim falls under the Brady disclosure doctrine, which requires
the government to disclose evidence favorable to a defendant if it is “material either to
guilt or to punishment.” Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963). The
“contours of [a false-testimony] claim were predominantly shaped by two Supreme
Court cases: Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. at 269–72, 79 S.Ct. 1173, and Giglio v. United
States, 405 U.S. 150, 153–54, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972).” Brooks v. Tenn.,
626 F.3d 878, 894 (6th Cir. 2010).
The Sixth Circuit has developed a three-part test for determining if the
prosecution has committed a Brady–Napue–Giglio violation:
The knowing use of false or perjured testimony constitutes a denial of due
process if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could
have affected the judgment of the jury. In order to establish prosecutorial
misconduct or denial of due process, the defendants must show (1) the
statement was actually false; (2) the statement was material; and (3) the
prosecution knew it was false. The burden is on the defendants to show
that the testimony was actually perjured, and mere inconsistencies in
testimony by government witnesses do not establish knowing use of false
testimony.
Id. at 894-95, quoting Coe v. Bell, 161 F.3d 320, 343 (6th Cir.1998).
A false statement is material under this standard, and “[a] new trial is required[,] if
the false testimony could in any reasonable likelihood have affected the judgment of the
jury.” Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154, quoting Napue, 360 U.S. at 271.
Steele alleges that police coerced Gauthier to lie about what she witnessed prior
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to the accident. She argues that the police convinced Gauthier to change her statement,
from one initially involving a third vehicle striking Steele’s to one in which no third
vehicle was involved. She also argues that sheriff’s deputy Justin Revnell testified
falsely about a prior incident involving Gauthier’s vehicle. Deputy Revnell testified that
three days before accident he had been dispatched to a nearby grocery store for an
incident related to Steele. While there, he had the opportunity to observe her vehicle,
the same one that was later involved in the fatal accident. He testified that, when he
saw her vehicle in the grocery store parking lot, it had visible damage to its rear end.
Deputy Revnell also responded to the fatal accident scene. He testified that, at the
scene, the vehicle had the same pre-existing rear-end damage he previously observed.
This evidence was used by the prosecution to rebut Steele’s defense that her vehicle
was struck in the rear by another vehicle, causing the accident. Steele also makes
vague allegations about additional false testimony the prosecutor elicited and allowed to
go uncorrected.
Petitioner has highlighted some inconsistencies in Gauthier’s testimony, but has
failed to demonstrate that any of the testimony was false. In addition, defense counsel
extensively cross-examined Gauthier about the involvement of a third vehicle and the
possibility that her testimony had been influenced by the prosecutor and the victim’s
family. A prosecutor is not required to ensure that prosecution witnesses’ testimony be
free from all confusion, inconsistency, and uncertainty. In addition, while Steele finds
incredible Deputy Revnell’s testimony that her vehicle was damaged when he saw it
three days before the accident, she has not shown that testimony to be false. Again,
defense counsel thoroughly cross-examined Deputy Revnell about his report and
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testimony. He fails to show that Deputy Revnell’s testimony was false. Because
Petitioner has not shown that any false testimony was presented, habeas relief is
denied on these claims.
IV. Certificate of Appealability
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 22 provides that an appeal may not proceed
unless a certificate of appealability (COA) is issued under 28 U.S.C. § 2253. Rule 11 of
the Rules Governing Section 2254 Proceedings now requires that the Court “must issue
or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the
applicant.”
A COA may be issued “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of
the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. §2253(c)(2). A petitioner must show “that
reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition
should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were
adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S.
473, 484 (2000) (citation omitted). In this case, the Court concludes that reasonable
jurists would not debate the conclusion that the petition fails to state a claim upon which
habeas corpus relief should be granted. Therefore, the Court will deny a certificate of
appealability.
V. Conclusion
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is
DENIED and the matter is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a certificate of appealability is DENIED.
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/s/Gershwin A Drain
GERSHWIN A. DRAIN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
DATE: September 29, 2014
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