Galka v. Cooper et al

Filing 27

ORDER Accepting and Adopting the 22 Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation, Overruling Plaintiff's 25 Objections and Dismissing the Case With Prejudice. Signed by District Judge Mark A. Goldsmith. (Goltz, D)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

EDWARD CHRISTOPHER GALKA,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil Action No. 11-13089
HON. MARK A. GOLDSMITH

WILLIAM COOPER, ET AL.,
Defendants.
________________________________/
ORDER (1) ACCEPTING AND ADOPTING THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION, (2) OVERRULING PLAINTIFF’S
OBJECTIONS and (3) DISMISSING THE CASE WITH PREJUDICE
Plaintiff filed this case, alleging that his civil rights were violated and invoking 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants are Hamtramack City Manager William Cooper, Hamtramack
Police Officer Dennis Janowicz, the City of Hamtramack, and the Hamtramack Police
Department. Plaintiff Christopher Galka claims that his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights were violated when he was issued two speeding tickets by the Hamtramack Police
Department and his subsequent efforts to contest the tickets.
This matter is presently before the Court on the Report and Recommendation
(“R&R”) of Magistrate Judge R. Steven Whalen, issued on August 20, 2012. The Magistrate
Judge recommends that the motion to dismiss (Dkt. 13) be granted and that the complaint be
dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).
Specifically, the Magistrate Judge recommends (i) that the claims against Defendants Cooper
and Janowicz be dismissed on the basis of qualified immunity; and (ii) that Defendant City of
Hamtramack be dismissed because it does not have municipal or respondeat superior

liability.1 The Magistrate Judge also held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and collateral
estoppel barred Plaintiff’s complaint, and that any new constitutional issues that were raised
by Plaintiff were barred by res judicata.
The Court reviews de novo those portions of the R&R to which a specific objection
has been made. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Plaintiff filed timely objections to the R&R (Dkt. 25).2
Plaintiff contends that Defendant’s motion to dismiss should be denied and raises three
specific objections. The Court considers each, in turn.
First, Plaintiff objects by arguing that the issuance of the speeding tickets violated his
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. According to Plaintiff, the tickets were a form of
harassment by the Hamtramack Police and forcing him to defend them in state traffic court
violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Furthermore, Plaintiff alleges that he was denied due
process under the Fourteenth Amendment in the hearings related to the tickets. As there is no
dispute to the underlying facts,3 the Court overrules Plaintiff’s objections for the reasons
explained in the R&R; Plaintiff was afforded due process and the issuance of a traffic ticket is
not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

1

Although the Magistrate Judge did not address Defendant Hamtramack Police Department,
the analysis for municipal liability is the same for components of cities, such as police
departments, as it is for municipalities. See e.g., Sova v. City of Mt. Pleasant, 142 F.3d 898,
904 (6th Cir. 1998) (explaining that for “municipal defendants, a plaintiff who sues a city and
its police department for constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must establish that
a governmental policy or custom caused the alleged injury”); Petty v. United States, 80 F.
App’x 986, 990 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding no municipal liability in relation to Detroit Police
Department).
2

In this case, Plaintiff submitted an application to proceed in forma pauperis which he signed
under penalty of perjury (Dkt. 2) and which was granted by the Court. (Dkt. 3). In the
affidavit, Plaintiff certified that: (i) he is not employed, (ii) he has received no income – none
– from “business, profession or other self-employment,” and (iii) he owns no valuable
property – real or otherwise. In stark contrast to his affidavit, however, Plaintiff states in his
objections to the R&R that he is a “successful business owner” and “homeowner.” Pl.’s
Objections to R&R at 5 (Dkt. 25) (emphasis supplied). The Court notes this inconsistency
and will issue an appropriate show cause order.
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Plaintiff accepts the R&R’s recitation of the facts. Pl.’s Objections to R&R, 2 (Dkt. 25).
2

Second, Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that his complaint is
barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. As the R&R explains, the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
holds that “lower federal courts are precluded from exercising appellate jurisdiction over final
state-court judgments.” In re Smith, 349 F. App’x 12, 14 (6th Cir. 2009). This doctrine of
abstention “occupies ‘narrow ground,’ namely, that it ‘is confined to cases of the kind from
which the doctrine acquired its name: cases brought by state-court losers complaining of
injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings
commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.’”

Id.

(internal citations omitted). As recounted in the allegations of his complaint, the facts of this
case are intertwined with the state-court judgment regarding the speeding ticket and Plaintiff
seeks to have this Court review the judgment in that case. See Kelly v. Marlow, No. 09–
2749, 2010 WL 529497 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2010) (finding Rooker-Feldman barred civil
action attacking state-court judgment for a traffic ticket); Jenkins v. New Jersey, No. 10–
2805, 2011 WL 1466124 (D.N.J. Apr. 15, 2011) (barring civil action based on state-court
judgment relating to failure to obey a stop sign). The Court declines to review the traffic
court case and overrules Plaintiff’s objection.
Third, Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that the doctrines of
collateral estoppel and res judicata apply to his action. This Court is bound by the Full Faith
and Credit Act, which requires federal courts to “give the same preclusive effect to a statecourt judgment as another court of that State would give.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic
Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 293 (2005); Price v. Cox, No. 10-14224, 2011 WL 163372, at *3
(E.D. Mich. Jan. 18, 2011).
Under Michigan law, collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of the same issue,
while res judicata precludes relitigation of the same claim. McCoy v. Cooke, 419 N.W.2d
44, 45 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988). Collateral estoppel has three elements: (1) “a question of fact

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essential to the judgment must have been actually litigated and determined by a valid and
final judgment”; (2) “the same parties must have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the
issue”; and (3) “there must be mutuality of estoppel.” Monat v. State Farm Ins. Co., 677
N.W.2d 843, 845-46 (Mich. 2004). Mutuality of estoppel requires that a party must have
been a party, or in privy to a party, in the prior action. Id. at 846. Here, Plaintiff had a full
and fair opportunity to litigate the factual question of the speeding ticket, which he lost in the
prior action. Also, Plaintiff has filed suit against the City of Hamtramack and its employees
and one of its subdivisions, thus there is mutuality of estoppel.
Likewise, Michigan’s doctrine of res judicata applies to a claim when (1) the prior
action must have been decided on its merits, (2) the issues raised in the second case must
have been resolved in the first, and (3) both actions must have involved the same parties or
their privies. Limbach v. Oakland Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. R. Comm’n., 573 N.W.2d 336, 340
(Mich. Ct. App. 1997). Claims are identical under res judicata when the same facts and
evidence are essential for asserting the claims. Hugget v. Dep’t of Natural Res., 590 N.W. 2d
747, 752 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998). Plaintiff’s first action was decided on the merits, where, as
alleged in his Complaint and discussed in the R&R, Plaintiff raised the issuance of the
speeding ticket and the litigation relating to it.

That action was between the City of

Hamtramack and Plaintiff, just as is the present action. Consequently, the Court overrules
Plaintiff’s objection.
Having reviewed Plaintiff’s objections and the R&R, the Court concludes that
Magistrate Judge Whalen correctly analyzed the issues presented and reached the proper
result for the proper reasons.

Therefore, the Court accepts and adopts the R&R, over

Plaintiff’s objections, as the findings and conclusions of the Court. The Court grants the
motion to dismiss on both Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) grounds
(Dkt. 13) and dismisses the complaint with prejudice.

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SO ORDERED.
Dated: September 21, 2012
Flint, Michigan

s/Mark A. Goldsmith
MARK A. GOLDSMITH
United States District Judge
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served upon counsel of
record and any unrepresented parties via the Court's ECF System to their respective email or
First Class U.S. mail addresses disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on September 21,
2012.
s/Deborah J. Goltz
DEBORAH J. GOLTZ
Case Manager

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