Davis v. Crutcher
Filing
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OPINION and ORDER DISMISSING 1 Complaint, and Concluding That An Appeal Cannot Be taken In Good Faith. Signed by District Judge Mark A. Goldsmith. (SJef)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
LEON DAVIS,
Plaintiff,
CASE NO. 11-CV-14347
HONORABLE MARK A. GOLDSMITH
v.
BRYANT L. CRUTCHER,
Defendant.
_______________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER DISMISSING CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT AND
CONCLUDING THAT AN APPEAL CANNOT BE TAKEN IN GOOD FAITH
I. Introduction
Plaintiff Leon Davis, a Michigan prisoner, has filed a pro se civil rights complaint pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Bryant L. Crutcher, a Case Manager for the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Because Plaintiff names a federal employee as the sole defendant in
this action, the Court construes his complaint as one brought pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). In his complaint, Plaintiff
appears to challenge the denial of his motion to file a second or successive habeas petition and the
rejection of his pleadings for reconsideration, as well as the validity of his state criminal
proceedings. He seeks monetary damages and injunctive relief. The Court has granted Plaintiff
leave to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).
Having reviewed the complaint, the Court concludes that it must be dismissed due to the
named defendant’s quasi-judicial immunity and for failure to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted. The Court also concludes that an appeal cannot be taken in good faith.
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II. Discussion
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996)
(“PLRA”), the Court is required to sua sponte dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint before service
if it determines that the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(c); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The Court is similarly required to dismiss a
complaint seeking redress against government entities, officers, and employees which it finds to be
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks relief from
a defendant who is immune from suit. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. A complaint is frivolous if it lacks
an arguable basis either in law or in fact. See Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992); Neitzke
v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
To state a federal civil rights claim, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the defendant is a person
who acted under color of state or federal law, and (2) the defendant’s conduct deprived the plaintiff
of a federal right, privilege, or immunity. See Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155-57 (1978);
Harris v. Circleville, 583 F.3d 356, 364 (6th Cir. 2009). A pro se civil rights complaint is to be
construed liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Jones v. Duncan, 840 F.2d
359, 361 (6th Cir. 1988). Despite the liberal pleading standard accorded pro se plaintiffs, the Court
finds that the complaint is subject to summary dismissal.
Plaintiff names Sixth Circuit Case Manager Bryant L. Crutcher as the sole defendant in this
action. It is well-established, however, that judges and judicial employees are entitled to absolute
judicial immunity on claims for damages. See Mireles v Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9-10 (1991) (per curiam)
(judge performing judicial functions is absolutely immune from suit seeking monetary damages even
if acting erroneously or corruptly); Lyle v. Jackson, 49 F. App’x 492, 494 (6th Cir. 2002) (court
clerks who did not provide prisoner with copies of previous filings and transcripts were entitled to
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quasi-judicial immunity); Collyer v. Darling, 98 F.3d 211, 221 (6th Cir. 1996); Bush v. Rauch, 38
F.3d 842, 847 (6th Cir. 1994) (court administrator executing court order entitled to absolute
immunity); Foster v. Walsh, 864 F.2d 416, 417 (6th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (court clerk who issued
erroneous warrant on judge’s order was immune from suit). Moreover, absolute immunity in a
Bivens action has been extended to requests for injunctive or equitable relief. See Kipen v. Lawson,
57 F. App’x 691 (6th Cir. 2003); Kircher v. City of Ypsilanti, 458 F. Supp. 2d 439, 446-47 (E.D.
Mich. 2006). Plaintiff’s claims regarding his federal habeas proceedings involve the performance
of judicial and quasi-judicial duties. Defendant Crutcher is absolutely immune from suit for such
conduct. Plaintiff’s complaint against him must therefore be dismissed.
Additionally, to the extent that Plaintiff challenges his state criminal proceedings and current
incarceration, he fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted in this action. A claim
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is an appropriate remedy for a state prisoner challenging a condition of his
imprisonment, see Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499 (1973), not the validity of his continued
confinement. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994) (holding that a state prisoner
does not state a cognizable civil rights claim challenging his imprisonment if a ruling on his claim
would necessarily render his continuing confinement invalid, until and unless the reason for his
continued confinement has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared
invalid by a state tribunal, or has been called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254). This holds true regardless of the relief sought by the
plaintiff. Id. at 487-89. Heck and other Supreme Court cases, when “taken together, indicate that
a state prisoner's § 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation) – no matter the relief sought
(damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner’s suit (state conduct leading to
conviction or internal prison proceedings) – if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate
the invalidity of confinement or its duration.” Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005). To
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the extent that Plaintiff contests his state criminal proceedings and continued confinement, his civil
rights complaint is barred by Heck and must be dismissed.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated, the Court concludes that Defendant Crutcher is entitled to absolute
quasi-judicial immunity in this action and that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted in his complaint. Accordingly, the Court dismisses his civil rights complaint. The
Court also concludes that an appeal from this order would be frivolous and cannot be taken in good
faith. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 610-11 (6th Cir. 1997).
SO ORDERED.
Dated: November 10, 2011
Flint, Michigan
s/Mark A. Goldsmith
MARK A. GOLDSMITH
United States District Judge
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record
and any unrepresented parties via the Court’s ECF System to their respective email or First Class
U.S. mail addresses disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on November 10, 2011.
s/Deborah J. Goltz
DEBORAH J. GOLTZ
Case Manager
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