United States of America v. Vehicle 2011 BMW 5 Series 535i VIN: WBAFU7C55BC777710, et al

Filing 424

AMENDED ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT BABUBHAI PATELS MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO RULE 60(B) [#418] Signed by District Judge Gershwin A. Drain. (Bankston, T)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,

v.

Case No. 11-cv-15432
Honorable Gershwin A. Drain

ONE 2011 BMW 5 SERIES 535i VIN:
WBAFU7C55BC777710, et al.,
Defendants in Rem.
/
AMENDED ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT BABUBHAI PATEL’S MOTION
FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO RULE 60(B) [#418]
The Court initially denied Defendant Babubhai Patel’s Motion for Relief from Judgment
Pursuant to Rule 60(B) on April 15, 2015. See Dkt. No. 422. In denying the Motion, the Court
noted that Defendant Patel failed to file a Reply in accordance with the Court’s Local Rules. See
id. at 1-2 (citing E.D. Mich. L.R. 7.1(f)(2)). However, it has come to the Court’s attention that
Defendant Patel did file a timely Reply in accordance with the Court’s Local Rules, even though
it was not uploaded to the docket until April 16, 2015. See Dkt. No. 423.
The Court has reviewed Defendant Patel’s Reply to the Government’s Response. In his
Reply, Patel argues (1) that he does, in fact, have standing to challenge the Judgment, id. at 1-3;
(2) that the Plaintiff’s action is barred by res judicata, id. at 3; (3) that Rule 60(b)(6) provides a
basis for challenging the summary judgment in this case, id. at 4-5; and (4) that Plaintiff’s civil
forfeiture action is based on “evil motive and intent.” Id. at 5-6. After reviewing these
arguments, the Court will still DENY Defendant’s Motion for Relief from Judgment Pursuant to
Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [#418].

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1. Plaintiff still lacks standing to challenge the judgment.
Plaintiff still does not demonstrate that he has standing to challenge the Default
Judgment. In a conclusory fashion, Defendant Patel argues that “[t]he facts show that Babubhai
Patel does have standing to challenge the default judgment order entered in this case[.]” Dkt. No.
423 at 3. However, for the reasons discussed in this Court’s original Order denying Defendant
Patel’s Motion, Defendant Patel is without standing to challenge the government’s Motion. See
Dkt. No. 422 at 3 (noting Defendant Patel received proper notice and failed to comply with the
requirements to assert an interest in the property in this case); see also United States v. One 2001
Cadillac Deville Sedan, 335 F. Supp. 2d 769 (E.D. Mich. 2004).
2. Res Judicata is not applicable and the action is not based on “evil motive and
intent.”
Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s action is barred by res judicata because Plaintiff
“‘bumbled’ the attempted criminal forfeiture proceedings in Patel’s criminal case.” Dkt. No. 423
at 2 (citing United States v. Liquidators of European Fed. Credit Bank, 630 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir.
2011). However, as this Court explained in its original Order denying Defendant Patel’s Motion,
“[i]t is well established that ‘[s]ince the earliest years of this Nation, Congress has authorized the
Government to seek parallel in rem civil forfeiture actions and criminal prosecutions based upon
the same underlying events.” Dkt. No. 422 at 5 n.1 (citing Dkt. No. 421 at 5, which quotes
United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 274, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 135 L. Ed. 2d 549 (1996)).
The case cited by Defendant Patel only stands for the proposition that “a final judgment
against the government in a civil forfeiture proceeding acts as res judicata against a criminal
forfeiture proceeding with respect to the same property when the claims in the latter proceeding
arise from the same transactional nucleus of facts.” Liquidators of European Fed. Credit Bank,
630 F.3d at 1151-52.

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Here, there was no acquittal in Defendant Patel’s criminal case, and the government
elected to proceed with a civil forfeiture case against Defendant Patel in this case. However, the
Plaintiff did not, as Defendant Patel contends, wrongfully “attempt[]

criminal forfeiture,

administrative forfeiture, and finally civil forfeiture proceedings.” Dkt. No. 423 at 2. As Plaintiff
explained, “Patel was convicted by a jury in the criminal case, forfeiture was included in the
Indictment, a civil case was also initiated, and the government elected to proceed with civil
forfeiture as to Patel. The government is not foreclosed from the course it took in this case.” Dkt.
No. 421 at 6.
The Court finds Plaintiff did not “bumble” the forfeiture action, and res judicata is not
applicable here. The authority cited by Defendant Patel only supports both of these conclusions.
See Liquidators of European Fed. Credit Bank, 630 F.3d at 1152 (“[A] civil forfeiture action
permits the government to seize the property in question while it pursues a criminal investigation
and possible prosecution and, even if the criminal prosecution fails (or is not begun), the
government still may pursue civil forfeiture (by asking the court to dissolve the stay in the civil
action). This system also promotes the goals of res judicata: fairness, finality, and avoidance of
duplicate judicial proceedings. Only when the government bumbles its forfeiture proceedings . . .
will res judicata pose any sort of obstacle to obtaining a person's crime-connected property.”).
3. Exceptional circumstances still do not exist.
As this Court assumed, Defendant Patel sought to argue that Rule 60(b)(6) provides relief
from this Court’s Judgment Order. Moreover, as this Court predicted, Defendant Patel contended
that the criminal forfeiture proceedings and civil forfeiture proceedings in this case made this an
“exceptional circumstance.” However, as the Court explained, “principles of equity do not
mandate relief,” because “nothing unusual or extreme has occurred in this action so that
principles of equity mandate relief.” See Dkt. No. 422 at 5 citing Dkt. No 421 at 12.
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Thus, the Court would still deny Defendants Rule 60(b)(6) Motion for the reasons
previously discussed. See Dkt. No. 422 at 4 (quoting Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. Trustees of
UMWA Combined Ben. Fund, 249 F.3d 519, 524 (6th Cir. 2001), to note that this Court will only
“apply Rule 60(b)(6) relief in ‘unusual and extreme situations where principles of equity
mandate relief.’”); see also id. at 5 (quoting Blue Diamond Coal Co., 249 F.3d at 524, “relief
under Rule 60(b) is ‘circumscribed by public policy favoring finality of judgments and
termination of litigation.’”).
In sum, Defendant Patel provides no reason for this Court to reverse its previous finding
Denying Defendant Patel’s Motion. As such, with respect to this Court’s April 15, 2015 Order
Denying Defendant Babubhai Patel’s Motion for Relief from Judgment Pursuant to Rule 60(b),
the Court will only VACATE its finding that Defendant Patel filed his Reply Motion in an
untimely manner.
Otherwise, the Court HEREBY INCORPORATES the rest of the findings from its
April 15, 2015 Order Denying Defendant Babubhai Patel’s Motion for Relief from Judgment
Pursuant to Rule 60(b) into this Amended Order; and again DISMISSES Defendant Babubhai
Patel’s Motion for Relief from Judgment Pursuant to Rule 60(b)[#18] for the reasons discussed
herein.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: April 20, 2015
/s/Gershwin A Drain
Hon. Gershwin A. Drain
United States District Court Judge

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