Seales v. Detroit, City of et al

Filing 168

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT [#155], DENYING PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED MOTION FOR SANCTIONS [#148] AND FINDING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS MOOT[#147]. Signed by District Judge Gershwin A. Drain. (TBan)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
MARVIN SEALES,
Plaintiff,
Case No.: 4:12-cv-11679
Honorable Gershwin A. Drain

v.

CITY OF DETROIT, et al.,
Defendants.
___________________________/
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR ENTRY OF
JUDGMENT [#155], DENYING PLAINTIFF’S AMENDED MOTION FOR
SANCTIONS [#148] AND FINDING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR
SANCTIONS MOOT[#147]
I.

INTRODUCTION
On July 27, 2018, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the Plaintiff in the

amount of $3,500,000.00.

Presently before the Court is Plaintiff’s Amended

Motion for Sanctions, filed on July 21, 2018 and Plaintiff’s Motion for Entry of
Judgment, filed on August 8, 2018. Defendants’ filed Responses 1 to Plaintiff’s
present motions and Plaintiff filed a Reply in support of his Amended Motion for
Sanctions. A hearing on these matters was held on September 4, 2018. For the
Defendant improperly includes a Counter-Motion for Sanctions in his Response to
Plaintiff’s Amended Motion for Sanctions. See Electronic Filing Policies and
Procedures for the E.D. of Mich., R5(f) (“[A] response or reply to a motion must
not be combined with a counter-motion.”). As such, Defendant’s improperly filed
Counter-Motion will be denied without prejudice.

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reasons that follow, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s Amended Motion for Sanctions
and will grant Plaintiff’s Motion for Entry of Judgment.
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On June 26, 2018, after oral argument, the Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion

in Limine to preclude evidence of Plaintiff’s outstanding warrants. This matter
originally started trial on July 17, 2018. On the second day of trial, Defendant
Zberkot began his testimony. During Plaintiff’s counsel’s direct examination,
Zberkot brought to the jury’s attention that Plaintiff had outstanding warrants when
he said: “Well, there were other reasons to arrest Mr. Seales.” Plaintiff’s counsel
immediately requested a sidebar to discuss Zberkot’s failure to comply with this
Court’s June 26, 2018 Order. Thereafter, counsel moved for a mistrial, which the
Court granted after oral argument from the parties. The second trial in this matter
began a week later, on July 24, 2018.
III.

LAW & ANALYSIS
A.

Plaintiff’s Amended Motion for Sanctions

Plaintiff argues that the conduct of Defendant and his counsel have wasted
significant resources of both this Court and Plaintiff. By causing the mistrial,
Plaintiff incurred thousands of dollars in costs and expenses. Plaintiff’s counsel

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seeks sanctions in the amount of the attorney’s fees incurred in preparation of trial
and during trial totaling $113,100.00 and costs in the amount of $13,487.61.
Defendant counters that sanctions are unwarranted because Plaintiff’s
counsel, at the very least, opened the door for Zberkot’s testimony regarding
Plaintiff’s warrants and, at worst, attempted to get Zberkot to lie under oath.
Moreover, Defendant maintains that sanctions are inappropriate because the Court
should not have granted the mistrial, but instead provided a curative instruction.
Title 28 U.S.C. § 1927 states that “[a]ny attorney or other person admitted to
conduct cases in any court of the United States or any Territory thereof who so
multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be
required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and
attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.”

The Court’s

inherent power also permits it to sanction a party. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper,
447 U.S. 752 (1980). The Sixth Circuit has held that a district court may assess
attorney’s fees under its inherent powers when a party’s conduct is “tantamount to
bad faith.” Metz v. Unizan Bank, 655 F.3d 485, 489 (6th Cir. 2011).
Here, an award of sanctions is inappropriate. While Defendant violated this
Court’s order, it is also true that Plaintiff’s counsel asked a very non-precise
question during the following exchange:
Q:

This man spent 14 nights and 15 days in jail; is that correct?
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A:
Q:
A:

Yes, sir.
And when he should have been free?
Well, there were other reasons to arrest Mr. Seales.

Ex. A, Zberkot Testimony at p.48. The Court finds that the resulting mistrial
cannot be attributed solely to the bad faith conduct of Defendant or his counsel.
Moreover, while there may have been some duplication with regard to trial
preparation, the trial was rescheduled to begin the next week. As such, this is not a
situation where counsel would have to wholly duplicate his trial preparation
because a lengthy period of time elapsed between the first and the second trials.
Therefore, the Court declines to impose sanctions.
B.

Plaintiff’s Motion for Entry of Judgment

Defendant seeks to prevent the entry of Plaintiff’s proposed judgment by
raising various objections: (1) Plaintiff is not entitled to prejudgment interest, (2)
Plaintiff is not entitled to prepetition attorney fees, and (3) Plaintiff is not entitled
to attorney fees between the lifting of the bankruptcy stay and the dismissal of the
City of Detroit.
The purpose of prejudgment interest is “to compensate the plaintiff for the
delay between the time the cause of action arose and the verdict.” Conte v.
General Housewares Corp., 215 F.3d 628, 640 (6th Cir. 2000). Prejudgment
interest “serves to compensate for the loss of the use of money due as damages
from the time the claim accrues until judgment is entered, thereby achieving full
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compensation for the injury those damages are intended to redress.” West Virginia
v. United States, 479 U.S. 305, 312 n.4 (1987). “[T]he determination of the
prejudgment interest rate [is] within the sound discretion of the district court.”
Ford v. Uniroyal Pension Plan, 154 F.3d 613, 619 (6th Cir. 1998). Courts have
considered the following factors in exercising this discretion:
(1) the need to fully compensate the wronged party for actual
damages suffered; (2) consideration of fairness and the relative
equities of the award; (3) the remedial purpose of the statute involved;
and/or (4) such other general principles as are deemed relevant by the
court.
Beck v. Manistee Cty., No. 1:97-CV-533, 2005 WL 2620194, at *7 (W.D. Mich.
2005) (noting that “prejudgment interest is often a component of complete
compensation and that in light of § 1983’s remedial purpose, interest is often
included in the damages award.). “[P]rejudgment interest should ordinarily be
granted unless exceptional or unusual circumstances exist making the award of
interest inequitable.” Laborers Pension Trust Fund-Detroit and Vicinity v. Family
Cement, 677 F. Supp. 896, 898 (E.D. Mich. 1987).
Defendant argues that Plaintiff is not entitled to prejudgment interest
because he received a verdict for noneconomic compensatory damages. Citing to
an Eastern District of Pennsylvania case, Defendant argues that because there was
no evidence presented that Plaintiff suffered any economic damages, he is not
entitled to prejudgment interest. See Robinson v. Fetterman, 387 F. Supp.2d 483
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(E.D. Pa. 2005). Robinson is not controlling on this court. The Court has searched
for an analogous case on point from the Sixth Circuit and it appears that no such
authority exists.

Without controlling authority precluding an award of

prejudgment interest, it would appear that the Court may, in its discretion award
such interest. However, the Court need not address this issue at this juncture as
Plaintiff intends to file a separate motion seeking pre-judgment interest. With that
in mind, the Court notes that if Plaintiff is aware of any §1983 cases involving
false arrest and unlawful detention where the court awarded prejudgment interest,
he should apprise the Court of these decisions.
Defendant’s remaining arguments concern the Plaintiff’s right to attorney
fees. Without citing any authority, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff is not entitled to
pre-petition attorney fees nor attorney fees from the lifting of the bankruptcy stay
until the dismissal of the City of Detroit. However, these arguments are premature
similar to the Defendant’s argument concerning prejudgment interest. Entry of the
proposed judgment does not set an award amount concerning attorney fees and
prejudgment interest, rather it merely states that the Court retains jurisdiction to
determine the amounts of prejudgment interest and attorney fees. None of the
arguments raised by Defendant present a justification for delaying entry of
Plaintiff’s proposed judgment in this matter.

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IV.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the reasons articulated above, Plaintiff’s Amended Motion
for Sanctions [#148] is DENIED, Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions [#147] is
MOOT, and Plaintiff’s Motion for Entry of Judgment [#155] is GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: September 5, 2018

/s/Gershwin A. Drain
GERSHWIN A. DRAIN
United States District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Copies of this Order were served upon attorneys of record on
September 5, 2018, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
/s/ Tanya Bankston
Deputy Clerk

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