Seales v. Detroit, City of et al

Filing 82

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING WAYNE COUNTY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 70 AND DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR AN ADVERSE INFERENCE 77 . Signed by District Judge Gershwin A. Drain. (TBan)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
MARVIN SEALES,
Case No. 12-cv-11679
Plaintiff,
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
GERSHWIN A. DRAIN

v.
CITY OF DETROIT, et al.,

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
DAVID R. GRAND

Defendants.
/
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING WAYNE COUNTY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT [70] AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR AN ADVERSE
INFERENCE [77]
I. INTRODUCTION
On April 16, 2012, Marvin Seales (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint and
Demand for Trial by Jury against the City of Detroit and unnamed officers for
violating his constitutional rights when he was arrested and detained for fourteen
days because of mistaken identity. See Dkt. No. 1.
Presently before the Court is Defendant Wayne County’s Motion for
Summary Judgment, filed on August 26, 2016, Dkt. No. 70, and Plaintiff’s Motion
to Add an Adverse Inference filed on September 19, 2016, Dkt. No. 77. The matter
is fully briefed and a hearing was held on December 5, 2016.

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For the reasons discussed herein, the Court will GRANT Wayne County’s
Motion for Summary Judgment [70] and DENY Plaintiff’s Motion to Add an
Averse Inference [77].
II. BACKGROUND
On January 18, 2012, officers from the U.S. Marshals Service Detroit
Fugitive Apprehension Team (“the Team”), including Defendant Thomas Zberkot,
executed an arrest warrant for attempted murder for a “Roderick Siner.” Dkt. No.
70-2. Roderick Siner used several aliases, including “Marvin Seals.” Id. The Team
arrested Plaintiff, Marvin Seales, at his workplace, Reinhart Food Service, in
Warren, Michigan. Id. at 2.
Plaintiff was then taken to the Detroit Police Department Northeast/3rd
Precinct lockup. Id. At the precinct, Plaintiff was photographed and fingerprinted.
Dkt. No. 70-3, p. 5 (Pg. ID No. 380). He was held in the City of Detroit Police
Department facility until his video arraignment with Magistrate Millicent D.
Sherman of the 36th District Court on January 20, 2012. Dkt. No. 70-4, p. 2 (Pg.
ID No. 385). At Plaintiff’s video arraignment, he stated his name was “Marvin
Seals,” [sic] and acknowledged that he heard the charges against him, understood
the penalties that applied to those charges, and understood his right to remain silent
and retain counsel. Id. at 4–5. He did not make any statements about mistaken
identity during the arraignment.

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Magistrate Sherman set bond in the amount of $500,000 dollars, “given the
nature of the charges and the seriousness of the allegations.” Id. at 5. Sherman then
issued a mittimus ordering that Plaintiff be held in the Wayne County Jail until his
scheduled preliminary examination of February 1, 2012. Dkt. No. 70-5, p. 2 (Pg.
ID No. 391).
Plaintiff was then transferred to the Wayne County Jail. Wayne County
Sheriff’s Deputy Denie Marks was acting as the supervisor for the registry/booking
area of the Wayne County Jail on the afternoon of January 20, 2012. Dkt. No. 754, pp. 3–4 (Pg. ID No. 552–53). Marks has no independent recollection of Plaintiff
and was not involved in his specific booking. Id. at 4.
The standard procedure at the Wayne County Jail was to compare the
“Livescan” generated by the local arresting agency—the Team in the present
case—with the mittimus ordered by the court. Dkt. No. 70-7, p. 4 (Pg. ID No. 399).
The Livescan also typically includes the arrestee’s name, aliases, Social Security
number if available, system ID number, and arrest charges. Dkt. No. 75-4, p. 9 (Pg.
ID No. 558). The arresting agency fingerprints arrestees when they are first taken
into custody, and compares those fingerprints with individuals in the Livescan
system. Id. If the arrestee’s fingerprints are not already present in the Livescan
system, a new profile is created. Id. at 10. Marks testified that booking photographs

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are not used “[b]ecause appearances can change, but fingerprints are constant.” Id.
at 9.
Marks also testified to the procedure for when an inmate complains of
mistaken identity. Id. at 8. Arrestees have complained that the arresting agency
arrested the wrong person “a handful” of times in the three years Marks worked as
a supervisor. Id. If an inmate insisted that he or she had been wrongfully arrested,
Wayne County Jail employees would re-fingerprint the arrestee to check identity,
taking another Livescan for identification purposes only, and sometimes contact
the court. Id. If it was determined that an innocent person had been arrested, the
arrestee would be immediately released. Id.
Plaintiff testified that he did not verbally inform any employee at the Wayne
County Jail of his mistaken identity claim. Dkt. No. 70-3, pp. 6, (Pg. ID No. 381,
383). Plaintiff testified in his deposition as follows:
Q: Okay. So you didn’t tell the booking officer that you’re not
Roderick Siner; correct?
A: Correct.
…
Q: So you had already told— you already—strike that. So in your
mind, by the time you get up to the—your housing unit, you’re
pretty much not telling any deputies that you’re not Roderick Siner
because you believe nobody is going to believe you?
A: Correct.
…
Q: We’re almost done, sir, with the questions I have for you. And so,
sir, just to recap, you didn’t tell the booking officer at Wayne
County, at the—at the Wayne County Jail that you’re not Roderick

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Siner; correct? You already told me that, you didn’t tell the
booking officer; right?
A: No.
Q: Okay. And you didn’t tell any officers on the floor that you weren’t
Roderick Siner, because by that time you didn’t think anybody was
going to believe you; correct?
A: Correct.
Id. Wayne County Jail records indicate Plaintiff submitted a grievance dated
January 24, 2012 describing “wrong booking name.” Dkt. No. 70-9, pp. 2–3 (Pg.
ID No. 424–25). Wayne County now maintains that, despite diligent search, it has
been unable to locate the original copy of the grievance. Dkt. No. 70-10, pp. 2–3
(Pg. ID No. 427–28).
On February 1, 2012, Plaintiff appeared at a scheduled preliminary
examination before 36th District Court Judge Deborah G. Bledsoe Ford on the
charges of Assault with Intent to Murder, Felony Assault, and Felony Firearm, as
Rodrick Siner. Dkt. No. 75-3. Plaintiff was represented by counsel, Earl
Washington, at the hearing. Id. at 4. At the start of the hearing, Wayne County
Prosecutor Shannon Walker orally moved to dismiss the matter because the victim
of the crime informed her before the hearing that Plaintiff was not the individual
who shot at him. Id. That same day, Judge Deborah Ford of the 36th Judicial
District signed an order of Dismissal, which states that Plaintiff was not the correct
defendant and that he was wrongfully arrested. Dkt. No. 75-6.

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Plaintiff filed the present suit on April 16, 2012. Dkt. No. 1. Plaintiff
amended his complaint for the first time on April 9, 2013, adding Wayne County
as a defendant. Dkt. No. 28. The case was stayed on July 29, 2013, to
accommodate the City of Detroit bankruptcy filing. Dkt. No. 41. On November 17,
2015, the stay was lifted and the case was reopened. Dkt. No. 49. Wayne County
filed for partial summary judgment on June 8, 2016, Dkt. No. 63, and Plaintiff
agreed to dismiss Counts II, III, and IV against Wayne County on August 29,
2016, Dkt. No. 71. The sole remaining count against Wayne County is Count VI,
alleging municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of Plaintiff’s
rights under United States Constitution, Amendments I, IV, V and XIV, and
Article 1, §§ 5, 6, 11 and 17 of the Michigan Constitution. Dkt. No. 28, pp. 16–19
(Pg. ID No. 136–39).
III. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) “directs that summary judgment shall
be granted if ‘there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’ ” Cehrs v. Ne. Ohio Alzheimer’s
Research Ctr., 155 F.3d 775, 779 (6th Cir. 1998). The court must view the facts,
and draw reasonable inferences from those facts, in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). No
genuine dispute of material fact exists where the record “taken as a whole could
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not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.” Matsushita Elec.
Indus., Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Ultimately, the court
evaluates “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require
submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a
matter of law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251–52.
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Wayne County’s Motion for Summary Judgment
Plaintiff’s Monell claim against Wayne County alleges violations under the
First Amendment, Fourth Amendment, Fifth Amendment, and Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Sections 5, 6, 11, and
17 of the Michigan Constitution. Dkt. No. 28, pp. 16–19 (Pg. ID No. 136–39).
Since Plaintiff at no point makes any argument or presents any evidence that
his First Amendment rights were violated, the Court will not analyze this claim.
Additionally, because § 1983 only protects rights secured by the United States
Constitution and federal law, the Court will not review Plaintiff’s claims that
Defendants violated his rights under the Michigan Constitution under the § 1983
framework. See Lambert v. Hartman, 517 F.3d 433, 439 (6th Cir. 2008) (“A prima
facie case under § 1983 has two elements: “(1) the defendant must be acting under

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the color of state law, and (2) the offending conduct must deprive the plaintiff of
rights secured by federal law.”) (emphasis added).
1. Whether Employees of Wayne County Violated Plaintiff’s
Constitutional Rights
“The Constitution does not guarantee that only the guilty will be arrested.”
Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145 (1979). In Baker, the Supreme Court noted
that law enforcement officers are not “required by the Constitution to investigate
independently every claim of innocence,” or to “perform an error-free investigation
of such a claim,” even when that claim is based on mistaken identity. Id. at 145–46
(finding that where there is a valid warrant for arrest, a three-day detention of the
wrong person based on mistaken identity does not give rise to a constitutional
violation).
However, an individual cannot “be detained indefinitely in the face of
repeated protests of innocence even though the warrant under which he was
arrested and detained met the standards of the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 144. In
Gray v. Cuyahoga County Sheriff’s Department, the Sixth Circuit found that it was
a question for the jury whether the individual defendants “acted with something
akin to deliberate indifference in failing to ascertain that the [person] they had in
custody was not the person wanted by the Michigan authorities on the outstanding
parole-violation warrant.” 150 F.3d 579, 583 (6th Cir. 1998). The plaintiff in Gray
was detained for forty-one days and presented evidence that he repeatedly
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protested his innocence, the deputies possessed a photograph from the beginning of
plaintiff’s detention that “bore virtually no resemblance [to the plaintiff],” and the
deputies provided insufficient proof that “they conducted reasonable inquiry into
the apparent discrepancy.” Id. at 582–83. Conversely, in Thurmond v. County of
Wayne, the Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of three individual
defendants where the plaintiff, who was arrested based on mistaken identity,
neither protested his innocence to deputies at any time, nor were any of the
deputies in possession of any potentially exculpatory evidence. 447 F. App’x 643,
650 (6th Cir. 2011).
In the present case, Plaintiff has provided the Court with photographs of
himself and Siner that show differences in their facial features. Dkt. No. 75-2.
Plaintiff argues that this mug shot and further identification of Siner were available
to Wayne County at the time of Plaintiff’s arrest. Dkt. No. 75, p. 11 (Pg. ID No.
522). Plaintiff’s photographic evidence is undated, and there is no evidence
confirming or disproving that Wayne County had these photographs at the time of
Plaintiff’s arrest.1

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Plaintiff’s response demonstrates some indifference to factual accuracy. For
example, Plaintiff alleges that the Wayne County Prosecutor “noticed the glaring
dissimilarity between the mug shot of Rodrick Siner and the appearance of
Marvin” during the preliminary examination, and that this is what led to the
charges being dismissed. Dkt. No. 75, pp. 11–12 (Pg. ID No. 522–23). Plaintiff’s
own attached exhibit—the transcript of the hearing—indicates that this is untrue,
and that the charges were dismissed after the victim indicated Plaintiff was not his
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Additionally, there is undisputed evidence that Plaintiff filed a grievance
during his detention at the Wayne County Jail. Dkt. No. 70-9. This grievance,
which Wayne County subsequently lost, was filed on January 24, 2012, four days
after Plaintiff was transferred to Wayne County and eight days before Plaintiff was
released from custody. See id. The only information known about this grievance is
that it was in reference to a “wrong booking name.” Id. Wayne County claims that
it could wait up to ten days under its policy to respond to a grievance. See Dkt. No.
70-11, p. 3 (Pg. ID No. 431) (“Staff members have up to 10 days, from the receipt
of the Grievance, excluding weekends and holidays, to act on the matter and
provide a written response to the inmate.”).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,
this evidence is enough to create a question of material fact as to whether
employees at the Wayne County Jail violated Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment
due-process rights. See, e.g., Gray, 150 F.3d at 582–83 (finding a jury could find
that defendants violated a plaintiff’s due process rights where there was no proof
that defendants had not received a photograph or had conducted sufficient inquiry
into a photograph of the actual person wanted by the Michigan authorities); Gant v.

attacker. Dkt. No. 75-3, p. 4 (Pg. ID No. 541). Plaintiff has not presented facts that
indicate that Wayne County had Siner’s mug shot at the time of Plaintiff’s arrest.
See Dkt. No. 75-4, p. 5 (Pg. ID No. 554) (“Q: Do you know if Wayne County had
access to any mugshots of Rodrick Siner on January 18th when Mr. Seales was
lodged in jail? A: I don’t know.”).
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Cty. of Los Angeles, 772 F.3d 608, 622–23 (9th Cir. 2014) (finding evidence that
the plaintiff may have said “I’m not the person you’re looking for” was sufficient
to create an issue of material fact, even though the plaintiff testified at his
deposition that he did not complain to anyone about the issue of mistaken identity
during his custody).
2. Whether Plaintiff Has Produced Evidence of a Monell Claim
Having determined that a reasonable finder of fact could find that a
constitutional violation occurred, the Court now turns to whether Plaintiff raised a
genuine issue of a material fact on his municipal liability claim.
Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against Wayne County “must demonstrate that the
alleged federal violation occurred because of a municipal policy or custom.”
Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 478 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of
Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)); see also Miller v. Sanilac Cnty., 606 F.3d
240, 254–55 (6th Cir. 2010) (the plaintiff must show that his constitutional rights
were violated and that a policy or custom of the county was the “moving force”
behind the deprivation of his rights). Plaintiff must make this showing by
demonstrating one of the following:
(1) the existence of an illegal official policy or legislative enactment;
(2) that an official with final decision making authority ratified illegal
actions;
(3) the existence of a policy of inadequate training or supervision; or
(4) the existence of a custom of tolerance or acquiescence of federal rights
violations.
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Burgess, 735 F.3d at 478 (citing Thomas v. City of Chattanooga, 398 F.3d 426,
429 (6th Cir. 2005)). “A municipality ‘may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury
inflicted solely by its employees or agents.’ ” Id. (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at
694).
“Proof of a single incident of unconstitutional activity is not sufficient to
impose liability under Monell, unless proof of the incident includes proof that it
was caused by an existing, unconstitutional municipal policy, which policy can be
attributed to a municipal policymaker.” City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S.
808, 823–24 (1985). However, “the inadequacy of police training may serve as the
basis for § 1983 liability only where the failure to train amounts to deliberate
indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact.” City
of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989).
To succeed on a failure to train or supervise claim in the Sixth Circuit,
Plaintiff must prove the following:
(1) the training or supervision was inadequate for the tasks performed;
(2) the inadequacy was the result of the municipality’s deliberate
indifference; and
(3) the inadequacy was closely related to or actually caused the injury.
Ellis ex rel. Pendergrass v. Cleveland Mun. Sch. Dist., 455 F.3d 690, 700 (6th Cir.
2006).

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“ ‘[D]eliberate indifference’ is a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof
that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action.”
Regets v. City of Plymouth, 568 Fed. App’x. 380, 394 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Bd.
of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997)). There are two ways to
demonstrate deliberate indifference. Plaintiff could “show prior instances of
unconstitutional conduct demonstrating that the [Wayne County] has ignored a
history of abuse and was clearly on notice that the training in this particular area
was deficient and likely to cause injury.” Plinton v. Cnty. of Summit, 540 F.3d 459,
464 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Fisher v. Harden, 398 F.3d 837, 849 (6th Cir. 2005)).
In the alternative, Plaintiff could show “a single violation of federal rights,
accompanied by a showing that a municipality has failed to train its employees to
handle recurring situations presenting an obvious potential for such a
violation. . . .” Id. (quoting Bryan Cnty., 520 U.S. at 409).
Wayne County has presented evidence that it has a policy in place to avoid
incidents of mistaken arrest and detention. Wayne County’s “Jail Operation
Manual” requires that all new prisoners will not be received until they have a
“proper holding document” and “LIVESCAN response.” Dkt. No. 70-7, p. 2 (Pg.
ID No. 397). The manual also addresses the situation where a holding document
does not match a Livescan submission. Id. at 7. The procedure requires immediate
action and states that “[u]nder no circumstances shall the wrong prisoner be

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allowed to remain in custody without proper holding authority, for any extended
period of time.” Id. Sergeant Marks testified to the procedure that was followed
when an inmate complained about mistaken identity. Dkt. No. 75-4, p. 8 (Pg. ID
No. 557). In such circumstances, the individuals were re-fingerprinted for
identification purposes, and immediately released upon a finding of innocence. Id.
Plaintiff’s

counsel alleged

at

the hearing that Wayne County’s

unconstitutional policy was the comparison of the Livescan with the mittimus. At
the hearing, Plaintiff’s counsel alleged, based on his opinion and without any
supporting evidence, that errors like what happened to Plaintiff occur more than
half of the time. However, Plaintiff has not provided evidence of any prior
instances where Wayne County knowingly held individuals who were wrongfully
arrested because of mistaken identity for extended periods of time. Plaintiff also
has not provided any evidence that establishes that Wayne County’s Jail
Operations Manual, requiring verification of identity through the Livescan system,
has been disregarded or ineffective in any instance other than the present case.
Mere conjecture is insufficient at the summary judgment stage. See Lewis v. Philip
Morris Inc., 355 F.3d 515, 533 (6th Cir. 2004) (“In order to survive a motion for
summary judgment, the non-moving party must be able to show sufficient
probative evidence [that] would permit a finding in [his] favor on more than mere
speculation, conjecture, or fantasy.” (internal quotations omitted)). Similarly,

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Plaintiff has not offered any evidence that Wayne County failed to train its
employees to handle recurring situations presenting an obvious potential for such a
violation.
The evidence showed the contrary: that County employees regularly
investigate mistaken identity claims and release detainees upon verification that
they are not the person named in the warrant. See Dkt. No. 75-4, p. 8 (Pg. ID No.
557). Plaintiff failed to controvert evidence that it was the Wayne County’s
practice to investigate a warrant arrestee’s claim of wrongful identity. That
employees apparently failed to implement a policy properly in this one instance is
not sufficient for Wayne County to be held liable under § 1983. A single instance
is not sufficient to show that a “practice is so widespread as to have the force of
law.” Bryan Cnty., 520 U.S. at 404.
Consequently, the Court will grant Wayne County’s motion for summary
judgment on the single count against it.
B. Plaintiff’s Motion for an Adverse Inference
Federal law of spoliation governs in this case. See Adkins v. Wolever, 554
F.3d 650, 652 (6th Cir. 2009). A federal court has “broad discretion to craft proper
sanctions for spoliated evidence.” Id. at 651. Sanctions may include “dismissing a
case, granting summary judgment, or instructing a jury that it may infer a fact
based on lost or destroyed evidence.” Id. at 653.
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In the present case, the Court has determined that Plaintiff has not raised a
genuine issue of material fact on his municipal liability claim against Wayne
County. Accordingly, the Court must deny Plaintiff’s Motion to Add an Adverse
Inference Against Wayne County as moot.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the Court will GRANT Wayne County’s
Motion for Summary Judgment [70] and DENY Plaintiff’s Motion for an Adverse
Inference as moot.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:

December 7, 2016
/s/Gershwin A Drain
HON. GERSHWIN A. DRAIN
United States District Court Judge

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