Zsenyuk v. Kamps, Inc. et al
Filing
44
ORDER Denying Defendant's 29 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by District Judge Gershwin A. Drain. (Bankston, T)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
LISA ZSENYUK,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 12-14625
HON. GERSHWIN A. DRAIN
vs.
KAMPS, INC. et al.,
Defendants.
_____________________________/
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [#29]
I.
INTRODUCTION
On October 18, 2012, Plaintiff, Lisa Zsenyuk (“Zsenyuk”), filed the instant
employment discrimination action pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et. seq., (“Title VII”) and Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights
Act,
MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 37.2101 et. seq., (“MELCRA”). Zsenyuk alleges Defendants,
Kamps Pallets, Inc. (“Kamps”) and Bernard M. Kamps (“Mr. Kamps”), discriminated against
her based on her gender and religion culminating in her March 22, 2011 termination.
Presently before the Court is the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on
August 15, 2013. On September 20, 2013, Zsenyuk filed her Response in Opposition and
Defendants filed a Reply Brief on October 11, 2013. Upon review of the parties’ briefing,
the Court concludes that oral argument will not end in the resolution of Defendants’ present
motion, accordingly, the Court will resolve the motion on the briefs. See E.D. MICH. L.R.
7.1(f)(2).
For the reasons that follow, the Court denies Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment as to both Counts in the Complaint.
II.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Kamps, a Grand Rapids based company, manufactures and recycles pallets and
wooden boxes. Kamps has approximately 600 employees spread out over 10 locations. Mr.
Kamps, the owner and CEO of Kamps, has been associated with Kamps since 1973. Mr.
Kamps is an active member of the Protestant Reformed Church and takes a traditional view
on women in the workplace - believing that a mother’s primary role is to be home caring for
her husband and children.
Kamps is historically a male dominated corporation. Kamps employs 12-15
salespeople total, and throughout Zsenyuk’s ten year employment with the company, she
was the only female salesperson. Before being hired by Kamps, Zsenyuk received her a
Bachelor of Science degree in Marketing and had ten years of sales experience, including
working for Matthews Enterprises (“Matthews”), a pallet selling company bought by Kamps
in 2001. When Zsenyuk accepted the salesperson position at Kamps, she signed a
noncompete/nonsolicitation clause and entered into an agreement that made her an at-will
employee after six months. Zsenyuk was assigned to work out of Kamps’ manufacturing
facility located in Taylor, Michigan along with salesman Mike McMillan (“McMillan”), who
was hired in 2003. Zsenyuk understood that she was being hired to bring in sales for the
company and handle her regular accounts.
In 2009, a struggling economy caused virtually all of Kamps salespersons’ sales
numbers to drop. Overall, Kamps sales dropped 20% in 2009. Kamps admits that
Zsenyuk’s sales were particularly hit hard given the auto industry losses that affected her
Detroit customers and potential market. From 2008 to 2009, Zsenyuk’s sales went down
25%, from 2.8 million to 2.1 million. Additionally, in November 2009 Zsenyuk had a baby.
2
Zsenyuk argues that the birth of her child was a turning point in Mr. Kamps’ determination
that she was no longer a good fit for his company.
Mr. Kamps was very open about his religious beliefs, particularly in regard to female
roles. For instance, the company handbook recognized Sunday as a “day of worship” and
free from work. Furthermore, Mr. Kamps repeatedly referred to God and Jesus in writing
and quoted scripture and lead prayer during business meetings. Additionally, Mr. Kamps
frequently voiced his opinion that mothers should be home raising their children. Multiple
employees agreed that Mr. Kamps showed preferential treatment towards those who
shared his religious beliefs and attended his church.1 Zsenyuk is Catholic.
In 2010, while other salespeople were able to recover their losses from the previous
year, Zsenyuk’s numbers decreased by 26%, from 2.1 to 1.5 million. Mr. Kamps hired Rick
Wierenga (“Wierenga”), a friend, fellow church member, and former banker to work as a
consultant in the hopes of improving sales. Although Wierenga admitted he had no prior
knowledge of pallet sales, he met with Zsenyuk to discuss her work and presumably
strategize areas in which she could improve. While Wierenga stated that he thought
Zsenyuk was capable, knew the pallet industry, and recognized that her significant
decrease in numbers was primarily due to the economic downturn and could take years for
her sales to recover, he also assumed Zsenyuk’s work would be limited given her “family
1
Zsenyuk regularly met with Timothy Kearly (“Kearly”), plant manager at Kamps’
Taylor location, and Bob MacDonald (“MacDonald”), Kearly’s boss, for discussions
in which favoritism at Kamps on the basis of gender and religion was addressed. In
their depositions, Kearly and MacDonald indicated they shared Zsenyuk’s
observations that Mr. Kamps showed favoritism and preferential treatment on the
job toward men that were Protestant Reformed and/or attended his church.
3
situation” and tied her low quotes to maternity leave.2 Wierenga also questioned whether
Zsenyuk had the “desire or ability to attract new business,” and recommended that
Zsenyuk’s and Dave Stout’s (“Stout”), another salesperson who was struggling,
performance be monitored for the next three months to make sure they were making
improvements on sales volume and quoting activity.
Mr. Kamps also assigned Kearly to work closely with Zsenyuk and McMillan and
monitor their progress. There is some dispute as to whether or not Kearly gave Zsenyuk
and McMillan personal goals for 2011. Defendants argue that Kearly provided personalized
goals for both individuals;
a $2,400,000.00 total sales number for Zsenyuk and a
$900,000.00 increase for McMillan (whose 2010 numbers were about $3,000,000).
Zsenyuk, however, asserts that she was not given a personal goal, but instead a
$1,000,000.00 total goal increase was given to the Taylor plant and split equally between
Zsenyuk and McMillan.
By March 2011, Zsenyuk was recording approximately $120,000.00 a month, which
if continued throughout 2011 would have resulted in $1,400,000.00 in sales for the year,
which would have been not only below any goal increase set by Kamps or Kearly, but
would have also been Zsenyuk’s lowest number to date. However, while Zsenyuk
acknowledges her lower sales in 2009-2010, she also argues that she was closing a
$2,000,000.00 deal with GM at the time of her termination. Zsenyuk had been working
closely with GM, a client she had brought to Kamps, and the day before her termination
Zsenyuk was informed by GM via conference call that they were going to go with her for
2
Zsenyuk argues that she never took any maternity leave.
4
a $ 2,000,000.00 contract. Defendants dismiss this sale because it did not go through, but
Zsenyuk argues that the fall-through was not because of her, but because when she was
terminated the bid was left to Kearly to finish the deal. Kearly, a manager, had no sales
experience and failed to complete the sale. Were Zsenyuk permitted to stay at Kamps and
follow through on the GM deal she would have made a significant bounce back towards her
2008 sales numbers and would have met and exceeded the $ 2,400,000.00 goal
Defendants claim Zsenyuk was assigned for 2011. On March 22, 2011, Mr. Kamps
terminated Zsenyuk for poor performance. Zsenyuk argues she was wrongfully terminated
based on unlawful gender and religious discrimination.
III.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
A.
Standard of Review
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) permits a party to:
[M]ove for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense-or the part
of each claim or defense-on which summary judgment is sought. The court
shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.
The Supreme Court has affirmed the use of summary judgment and recognized it as an
integral part of the fair and efficient administration of justice. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 327 (1986).
The party seeking summary judgment “bears the initial burden of specifying the
basis upon which it contends judgment should be granted and of identifying that portion of
the record which, in its opinion, demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material
fact.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. The evidence and all reasonable inferences must be
construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.,
5
Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to produce “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” First
Nat’l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 270 (1968). The evidence presented must be
such on which a jury could reasonably find for the defendant; mere denials, unsupported
allegations, or speculations will not be enough to meet this burden. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986).
B.
Prima Facie Case under Title VII and MELCRA
Defendants argue that their Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted
because Zsenyuk fails to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII or
MELCRA. Title VII prohibits discrimination in the workplace while MELCRA specifically
prohibits discrimination based on sex/gender or religion. A plaintiff can inferentially prove
discrimination claims under both Title VII and MELCRA by following the burden-shifting
framework set forth in McDonnell-Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973). Under
a McDonnell-Douglas analysis, a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination
if she shows: (1) she is a member of a protected class, (2) she was qualified for the position
at issue, (3) she suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) she was replaced by a
person outside her protected class. Id., see also White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533
F.3d 381, 391 (6th Cir. 2008). Alternatively the fourth element may be satisfied by showing
that the adverse action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of unlawful
discrimination. Debrow v. Century 21 Great Lakes, Inc., 463 Mich. 534, 538, n.8 (2001).
Here, there is no dispute that Zsenyuk is a member of a protected class and she
suffered an adverse employment action. Thus, Defendants’ maintain Zsenyuk cannot meet
the second and fourth elements of her prima facie case; specifically that she was qualified
6
for her position and that she was treated differently than her similarly situated counterparts.
1.
Zsenyuk’s Qualifications for the Position at Issue
According to the Defendants, Zsenyuk was not qualified for a salesperson position
at the time of her termination. To show “qualification,” Defendants argue that Zsenyuk must
show that she was “performing at a level which met Defendants’ legitimate expectations.”
Jacklyn v. Schering-Plough Healthcare Prods. Sales Corp., 176 F.3d 921, 929 (6th Cir.
1999). Because Zsenyuk was terminated for her failure to meet Kamps sales quota,
Defendants contend it is impossible for Zsenyuk to be “qualified.”
Conversely, Zsenyuk argues that she was very qualified for the position she
successfully held for ten years after previously working in sales for ten years and being
recruited by her prior company. In response to Defendants’ definition of “qualification,”
Zsenyuk points to Defendants’ expectations and asks the Court to consider whether or not
they were “legitimate” given the strong circumstantial evidence suggesting the presence
of discrimination by Defendants against Zsenyuk.
While Defendants continue to rely on the explanation that Zsenyuk’s termination was
for poor performance, the figures and circumstances they rely on are not as straightforward
as suggested. In 2009 Zsenyuk ranked 4th out of 8 in sales, despite being the salesperson
hardest hit by the economic downturn. In 2010, the year that Defendants point out the other
salespeople went up in sales while Zsenyuk again experienced a loss, Zsenyuk retained
her 4th place rank. Additionally, Kamps sales data omits a significant amount of money that
Zsenyuk was responsible for bringing into the company that she is not credited for. For
example, Zsenyuk brought in General Motors (“GM”) as a valuable client and arranged for
7
Kamps to receive inbound scrap/recycled pallets from GM at no cost. This arrangement
was highly lucrative for Kamps, who could resell the restored pallets, however none of the
profit was reflected in Zsenyuk’s reports.3 There is ample evidence for the Court to find that
Zsenyuk has successfully made a prima facie case of discrimination. Therefore, based on
the above considerations, the Court concludes that a question of fact exists as to whether
Plaintiff was qualified for her position.
2.
Did Zsenyuk’s Termination occur under Circumstances giving rise to
an Inference of Unlawful Discrimination?
Additionally, a jury could reasonably find that Zsenyuk was treated differently than
her male co-workers and that her termination stemmed from a situation of unlawful
discrimination. To successfully make this argument, Zsenyuk must show that she was
similarly situated to a comparative employee outside her protected class who received
more favorable treatment. Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 154 F.3d 344, 35253 (6th Cir. 1998), see also Gielda v. Bangor Twp. Schs., 505 Fed. Appx. 550, 555 (6th Cir.
2012). Defendants argue there is no such employee, as McMillan, who also worked at the
Taylor site and held the same position as Zsenyuk with the same sales expectations, also
had the same supervisor covering the same territory, substantially outperformed Zsenyuk.
McMillan increased his sales by 18% in 2010 and averaged $300,000.00 in sales per
month in March 2011. Instead, Defendants argue that Zsenyuk was similarly situated to
Stout, who was terminated a few weeks before Zsenyuk for similar reasons and who did
not receive more favorable treatment than Zsenyuk.
3
Kamps openly admits that GM delivered 15-20 semi trucks full of scrap/recycled
pallets each week.
8
Zsenyuk alternatively contends that her termination occurred under circumstances
giving rise to unlawful discrimination because there was a double standard with respect to
the sales opportunities she was offered and those offered to her Protestant Reformed, male
counterparts. While Zsenyuk acknowledges her decrease in sales numbers, she attributes
it to the roadblocks she encountered when attempting to move forward with sales.
Specifically, she argues that Mr. Kamps reassigned Zsenyuk’s accounts to her male coworkers, only gave leads to male employees, prevented Zsenyuk from expanding her sales
territory, and implemented other practices and processes that made it virtually impossible
for her to remedy lackluster sales numbers.
When Zsenyuk came to Kamps from Matthews, some of her accounts were taken
from her and identified as “house accounts.” However, when McMillan was hired two years
later, he was given access to Zsenyuk’s surrendered accounts as part of his base.
Additionally, in 2010 one of Zsenyuk’s accounts was taken from her and given to Mr.
Kamps’ son, a plant manager who was rarely assigned accounts. In 2011, when a new
Detroit office was opened, two more of Zsenyuk’s accounts, including her largest, were
reassigned to a new salesman.
Rather than equally distributing the leads Kamps received across its salespeople,
Mr. Kamps permitted two salesmen, Jordan Pipe (“Pipe”) and Joel Engelsma
(“Engelsma”),4 to screen the leads and keep the best ones for themselves. Once Pipe and
Engelsma were done with the leads, any leads that did make it to the Taylor facility were
immediately forwarded to McMillan rather than Zsenyuk. McMillan also received preferential
4
Both Pipe and Engelsma are members of the Protestant Reformed Church.
9
access to cold call leads and ad inquires that came into the Taylor plant.
While Defendants assert that it is not company policy to require their salespeople
to remain within their territory limitations, Zsenyuk’s attempts to break outside her assigned
Southeast (“SE”) Michigan market were repeatedly denied. Not only did Mr. Kamps strike
down every sales opportunity Zsenyuk presented that was outside her territory, but he
specifically told her that it would be best if she were to stay at home and be closer to her
family. Consequently, Zsenyuk lost a key account when the customer began to do
packaging out of California rather than Detroit. While male salespeople were allowed and
encouraged to broker deals in other states, Mr. Kamps told Zsenyuk not to pursue outside
opportunities and leave the out-of-state markets to the men who could do a better job
handling such circumstances and travel, especially when required to stay over night.
Zsenyuk even faced limitations within SE Michigan. Each time Kamps acquired a
new plant location, Engelsma and Pipe were sent to the new market to pursue sales rather
than Zsenyuk. Additionally, while Zsenyuk was discouraged from calling on customers
outside of SE Michigan, the Grand Rapids salesmen were repeatedly permitted to sell in
her marketplace.
Mr. Kamps limited Zsenyuk’s client interactions, but did not apply similar limitations
to his salesmens’ client interactions. For example, Mr. Kamps told Zsenyuk that he was not
comfortable with her taking clients out to lunch or entertaining them - especially male
clients. When Zsenyuk had the opportunity to meet with Amish mills, Mr. Kamps instructed
her to wear a dress to fit in and strongly questioned whether an Amish man would even be
receptive to “a woman doing a man’s job.”
10
Kamps used software to track the salesperson assigned to a certain account.
Consequently, an account could be in someone’s name indefinitely, even if they had not
made any contact with the customer for years. An account under a certain salesperson’s
name was rendered “unaccessible” to the remaining salespeople and they were prevented
from calling on the customer. Additionally, if a sale was made with an account, the
assigned sales representative received the commission even if the representative had
nothing to do with the sale. Zsenyuk told Kearly that it was frustrating to drive by numerous
accounts in her territory that she could not call on because they were “unaccessible.”
Kearly told Zsenyuk to put together a list of individuals she was prohibited from calling on
and he would support her argument for access to these accounts. Zsenyuk followed
Kearly’s instructions, however she received no support. Instead, McMillan was permitted
to call and sell to Faygo, a company that had been under salesperson Gene DeBoer’s
name for years. Yet, the previous year Zsenyuk was denied permission to contact and sell
to Faygo.
Crossover issues arose at Kamps when two salespeople went head to head claiming
the rights to an account. Throughout her ten years with Kamps, Zsenyuk never won a
crossover issue. Instead, Mr. Kamps consistently sided with the male counterpart who was
opposing Zsenyuk. In the case of Contact Steel, Mr. Kamps went so far as to insinuate that
Zsenyuk was not trustworthy because of her religious background. Mr. Kamps told Zsenyuk
that he was siding with Engelsma because Engelsma was a “church going man” and
therefore Kamps knew he would not lie.
11
While Defendants assert that Zsenyuk and McMillan are not similarly situated
employees because of McMillan’s superior sales performance, Zsenyuk bases their
dissimilarity on the fact that McMillan was held to a completely different set of rules and
standards than she was. Unlike Zsenyuk, McMillan was encouraged to seek business in
other markets, including those out of state, and was allowed to sell pallets wholesale while
Zsenyuk was not. McMillan often sold so many pallets wholesale that Zsenyuk was left
without sufficient available product to quote, let alone sell, at retail prices.
Unlike Zsenyuk, Stout’s termination, although similarly termed as a dismissal based
on poor performance, was handled completed differently. Helen Prindle (“Prindle”), Kamps
sole Human Resources employee, was always included in the decisional process
concerning employee terminations. However, Prindle was not notified of Zsenyuk’s
termination until after the fact. In Stout’s case and prior to his dismissal, his manager called
multiple times to complain about Stout’s lack of performance. Stout was given a specific
amount of time to improve his performance, and other salespeople were asked to reach out
to him and offer help, however Stout was not receptive and his performance did not
improve. Prindle was heavily involved in Stout’s termination. Additionally, unlike Stout’s and
other terminations, Zsenyuk had no discipline file and Prindle was unaware of the
company’s purported dissatisfaction with Zsenyuk’s performance prior to her termination.
When the aforementioned evidence is looked at in a light most favorable to Zsenyuk,
it is clear that a jury could find Defendants’ actions and attitudes amounted to unlawful
discrimination in violation of Title VII and MELCRA. Based on the foregoing, the Court
agrees with Plaintiff and concludes that Plaintiff has presented ample evidence from which
12
the jury could collude that her termination occurred under circumstances giving rise to an
inference of unlawful discrimination.
Moreover, Zsenyuk claims Mr. Kamps allowed his religious convictions to negatively
influence the way he treated her on a professional level and during meetings, he made it
clear he did not think she was capable of being aggressive about sales like her male
counterparts. He belittled her and attempted to push her out of his “mens-club” sales group
by repeatedly addressing emails to the “men” or “gentlemen” and making inappropriate
comments that singled her out based on her gender. For instance, during a sales meeting
Mr. Kamps announced Zsenyuk’s upcoming wedding , stating her live-in fiancé was
“making an honest woman out of her” given her pregnant state.
C.
Purported Reason for Zsenyuk’s Termination
If the Court finds that Zsenyuk has successfully proven a prima facie case of
discrimination, the burden then shifts to the Defendants to articulate a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action. Raytheon v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 5354 (2003). Defendants’ “explanation must be legally sufficient to justify a judgment for the
defendant. If the defendant carries this burden...then the presumption raised by the prima
facie case is rebutted.” Texas Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-256
(1981). There is no requirement that the defendant disprove the plaintiff’s claim. St. Mary’s
Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
Defendants argue that Zsenyuk knew she was an at-will employee, meaning that her
employment could be terminated at any time and for any reason, and that it is typical for
Kamps to terminate sales reps for continuous declining sales or failing to bring in new
13
accounts. It is an undisputable fact that Zsenyuk’s sales were declining. The Sixth Circuit
has held, that in the sales context, an employee’s “failure to develop appropriate client
contacts, to develop new business, to meet her quota on a regular basis, and to make
efforts to bring in sales” is a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for termination. Succarde
v. Federal Express Corp., No. 03-1227, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 16267, *338 (6th Cir. Aug.,
4 2004).
If the court finds that Defendants have successfully rebutted Zsenyuk’s claim of
discrimination, the burden shifts back to Zsenyuk to establish that Defendants’ reasoning
was a pretext for discrimination. A plaintiff’s ultimate burden is to prove discrimination
through direct or circumstantial evidence to a sufficiency that a reasonable trier of fact
could conclude that discrimination was a motivating factor for the adverse action taken by
the employer towards the plaintiff. Dubey v. Stroh Brewing Co., 185 Mich. App. 561, 565-66
(1990). Speculation or assumption is not enough to create or support a reasonable
inference of pretext. Cly v. United Parcel Service Inc., 501 F.3d 695. 704-705 (6th Cir.
2007).
In the instant case, the Court concluded that Zsenyuk’s evidence establishes that
at the very least, a question of fact exists with respect to whether or not Defendants’ reason
for firing Plaintiff is pretext for unlawful discrimination. Additionally, the case law
demonstrates that summary judgment is inappropriate here given the compelling facts
presented by Plaintiff.
For instance, in Tabenske v. NSO, Inc., No. 07-CV-12594, 2009 WL 36482 (E.D.
Mich. Jan. 6, 2009), a seasoned female salesperson was purportedly fired for failing to
14
meet her sales quotas. Id. at *5. The plaintiff provided evidence of the preferential
treatment given to her male colleagues and argued that she was treated differently with
respect to sales quotas and relief from meeting sales quotas because of her gender. Id. at
*6-7. When the plaintiff’s supervisor learned she was pregnant he stated that she should
stay home and take care of her children. Id. at *5. Base on these facts, the district court
held that questions of material fact existed as to whether the plaintiff was treated differently
than her male colleagues and consequently summary judgment was improper. Id. at *7.
Likewise, in Grassmyer v. Shred-It, 392 Fed. Appx. 18 (3d Cir. 2010), the Federal
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed a decision granting summary judgment in
favor of the defendant employer, a Title VII case wherein three female sales
representatives were allegedly fired for failing to meet their sales quotas. Id. at 20. The
plaintiffs never denied their failure to meet the quotas set by their employer, but argued
they were discriminated against based on gender in regards to the enforcement of quotas,
training, assignment of territories, discipline, and a “mens-club” atmosphere. Id. at 25.
Finally, in Stokes v. Xerox Corporation, No. 05-71683, 2008 WL 2109576 (E.D.
Mich. July 23, 2007), the district court denied summary judgment to Xerox despite evidence
that the plaintiff’s performance was largely unsatisfactory during her four years of
employment and management involved in the plaintiff’s termination were women. Id. at *3.
The Stokes court based its determination on the fact that evidence pointed to a certain
Caucasian male sales representative, who received unwarranted favoritism to the plaintiff’s
detriment with respect to performance related discipline. Id. at *1.
The facts of this case are analogous to those of Tabenske, Grassmyer, and Stokes.
15
Zsenyuk is a female employee who was terminated for the plausible reason of declining
sales. However, she has presented ample evidence from which the jury could conclude
Defendants’ reason for firing her is pretext for unlawful gender and religious discrimination.
In addition to the aforementioned facts establishing Defendants different treatment of
Zsenyuk compared to her male counterparts, Defendants’ argument with respect to her
decreasing sales is substantially underminded by the major account she had in progress
at the time of her termination. Finally, while Defendants repeatedly argue that Zsenyuk
knew what her job was and failed to do it, the facts presented by Zsenyuk suggest
Defendants are primarily responsible for Zsenyuk’s struggle to improve her sales.
Therefore, Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment.
III.
CONCLUSION
For the above stated reasons, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [#29] is
DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
___
/s/Gershwin A Drain_
GERSHWIN A. DRAIN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: November 4, 2013
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Copies of this Order were served upon attorneys of record on
November 4, 2013, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
/s/ Tanya Bankston
Deputy Clerk
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