Smith v. Inkster, City of et al

Filing 36

ORDER Denying 9 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Dismissing Plainitiff's State Law Claims and Cancelling May 8, 2013 Hearing. Signed by District Judge Gershwin A. Drain. (Bankston, T)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

KEVIN SMITH,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 12-cv-15440
HON. GERSHWIN A. DRAIN

vs.

CITY OF INKSTER, et al.,
Defendants.
_____________________________/
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [#9],
DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S STATE LAW CLAIMS
AND CANCELLING MAY 8, 2013 HEARING
I.

INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff, Kevin Smith, filed the instant action claiming that Defendants, the City of Inkster,

the City of Inkster Policemen and Retirement System1 and Hillard Hampton, Jr., discriminated and
retaliated against him in violation of Title VII of the of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e et seq. and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, by denying his claim for duty disability retirement benefits
based on Plaintiff filing a complaint of race discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, filing a lawsuit in state court for race discrimination and for testifying on behalf of
other employees in their lawsuit alleging race discrimination against Defendants. Plaintiff also
brings state law claims under Michigan’s Elliot Larsen Civil Rights Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS §

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Plaintiff’s Complaint improperly identified this party as the “City of Inkster Pension

Board.”
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37.2101 et seq. (“ELCRA”), as well as for intentional infliction of emotional distress and for civil
conspiracy.
Presently before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on January
21, 2013. This matter is fully briefed2 and the Court concludes that oral argument will not assist in
the resolution of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. Accordingly, the Court will issue a
decision on the briefs submitted and cancels the hearing set for May 8, 2013. See E.D. Mich. L.R.
7.1(f)(2).
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a police officer for the City of Inkster. Plaintiff has an exemplary record and has

never been disciplined while employed as an officer and lieutenant in the police department. He has
been recognized as solving the most homicides in the City of Inkster and was named Officer of the
Year in 2001.

Plaintiff claims that Defendants have a long-term pattern and practice of

discriminating against Caucasian officers and employees with regard to the terms and conditions of
employment within the police department.
According to Plaintiff, the pervasive nature of the racial discrimination has led to numerous
lawsuits filed against the city and its police department, including an action initiated by Plaintiff in
September of 2008, which resulted in a jury verdict of more than $700,000.00 in Plaintiff’s favor.
Additionally, Plaintiff has testified on behalf of other employees asserting race discrimination claims
against the city and others. Lastly, on or about March 6, 2012, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the

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On April 15, 2013, Defendants filed a Motion to Strike Supplemental Brief arguing that
Plaintiff already filed his response to Defendants’ Summary Judgment motion, therefore his
supplemental brief should be stricken. The Court agrees with Defendants, therefore Plaintiff’s
supplemental brief is stricken.
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EEOC alleging racial discrimination and retaliation by the city.
Plaintiff claims that Defendants have retaliated and discriminated against him because of his
lawsuit against the city, as well as due to the fact that he has testified in other employees’
discrimination lawsuits, and lastly, based on Plaintiff filing a complaint with the EEOC.
Specifically, Plaintiff argues that Hillard Hampton, Jr., the Mayor for the City of Inkster, as well as
one of the Trustees on the Board of Trustees for the City of Inkster Policemen and Firemen
Retirement System, has discriminated and retaliated against Plaintiff by conspiring to deny
Plaintiff’s request for duty disability retirement pension benefits, which he applied for shortly after
the jury returned a verdict in his favor.
Plaintiff maintains that his treating physicians have determined that he is unable to return to
his job due to heart related stress and physical strain caused by Defendants’ discriminatory and
retaliatory actions. However, Hillard has conspired to deny Plaintiff his benefits by requiring
Plaintiff to go to other doctors, which Hillard knew would side with Hillard and would determine
that Plaintiff does not meet the medical requirements for receiving duty disability retirement
benefits. Plaintiff further claims that Defendants have delayed making a final decision on his
request for duty disability retirement benefits or have denied his request for benefits outright, while
granting the benefit claims of similarly-situated African American employees. Plaintiff claims that
Hillard has stated that because Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the city, he will never permit Plaintiff
to receive his pension from the city.
III.

LAW & ANALYSIS
A.

Standard of Review

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) empowers the court to render summary judgment “if

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the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." See Redding v. St. Eward, 241 F.3d 530, 532 (6th
Cir. 2001). The Supreme Court has affirmed the court's use of summary judgment as an integral part
of the fair and efficient administration of justice. The procedure is not a disfavored procedural
shortcut. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986); see also Cox v. Kentucky Dept. of
Transp., 53 F.3d 146, 149 (6th Cir. 1995).
The standard for determining whether summary judgment is appropriate is "'whether the
evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so onesided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.'" Amway Distribs. Benefits Ass’n v. Northfield
Ins. Co., 323 F.3d 386, 390 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
251-52 (1986)). The evidence and all reasonable inferences must be construed in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Redding, 241 F.3d at 532 (6th Cir. 2001). "[T]he mere existence of some
alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion
for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986) (emphasis in original); see also National
Satellite Sports, Inc. v. Eliadis, Inc., 253 F.3d 900, 907 (6th Cir. 2001).
If the movant establishes by use of the material specified in Rule 56(c) that there is no
genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the opposing
party must come forward with "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." First
Nat'l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 270 (1968); see also McLean v. 988011 Ontario, Ltd.,

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224 F.3d 797, 800 (6th Cir. 2000). Mere allegations or denials in the non-movant's pleadings will
not meet this burden, nor will a mere scintilla of evidence supporting the non-moving party.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 252. Rather, there must be evidence on which a jury could reasonably
find for the non-movant. McLean, 224 F.3d at 800 (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252).
B.

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

The gist of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies with respect to his claim for duty disability retirement benefits, thus the
Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this matter. Defendants’ argument is wholly without
merit. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs only remedy is an appeal of the Board’s decision denying
his claim for retirement benefits to the appropriate circuit court. Here, Plaintiff has alleged a
violation of his rights under Title VII and §1983.

Under Title VII, proper exhaustion of

administrative remedies requires plaintiffs to obtain a right to sue letter from the EEOC. See Steiner
v. Henderson, 354 F.3d 432, 437 (6th Cir. 2003) (noting that Congress established a comprehensive
administrative procedure for Title VII claims and that a lawsuit under Title VII may be brought
“only after these procedures have been exhausted and the plaintiff has received a ‘right-to-sue’ letter
. . . .”).
Here, Plaintiff received his right to sue letter from the EEOC on November 20, 2012.
Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff was required to file his discrimination claims in the state circuit
court is misplaced as Michigan Court Rule 7.105 has no relevance to Plaintiff’s federal civil rights
claims. In any event, even if M.C.R. 7.105 were applicable here.
To the extent, Defendants maintain that Plaintiff has failed to state valid claims under Title
VII and §1983, such an argument similarly lacks merit. Title VII’s anti-discrimination provision

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makes it “an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of its
employees . . . because [the employee] has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment
practice by [Title VII] or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any
manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing” allowed for by Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-3(a). In order to set forth a prima facie case of retaliation, Plaintiff must show that: (1) he
engaged in activity protected by Title VII; (2) this exercise of protected rights was known to the
government; (3) the government thereafter took a materially adverse action against Plaintiff or
subjected him to severe and pervasive retaliatory harassment; and (4) there was a causal connection
between the protected activity and the materially adverse action. See Morris v. Oldham County
Fiscal Ct., 201 F.3d 784 (6th Cir. 2002). This Court has previously determined that “refusing
worker’s compensation benefits and delaying [a] request for duty disability retirement benefits likely
fit the definition of adverse action . . . .” Hearn v. County of Wayne, No. 11-15221, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 21965, *28 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 19, 2013).
Similarly, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides that: “Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law.” 42 U.S.C. §
1983. “Because both Title VII and §1983 prohibit discriminatory employment practices by public
employers,” the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has explained “this court looks
to Title VII disparate treatment cases for assistance in analyzing race discrimination in the public
employment context under § 1983.” Weberg v. Franks, 229 F.3d 514, 522 (6th Cir. 2000).
Plaintiff has sufficiently stated claims under Title VII and § 1983 by alleging that he has

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previously filed a lawsuit based on Defendants’ discriminatory practices, filed a complaint with the
EEOC, as well as testified on behalf of other employees asserting claims of discrimination against
the City of Inkster, the City of Inkster Policemen and Retirement System and Hillard Hampton, Jr.
Further, he has plausibly set forth allegations that Defendants’ adverse employment actions are
causally connected to his protected activities.
C.

State Law Claims

Although the Court may, under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
the state law claims ancillary to the relief sought, for the reasons set forth below, the Court declines
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims.
Under the standard enunciated in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966), and
codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), this Court has broad discretion to exercise its supplemental
jurisdiction. Even where the district court “arguably ha[s] supplemental jurisdiction over the state
law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), the [district] court has discretion to decline to exercise
its supplemental jurisdiction.” Cirasuola v. Westrin, No. 96-1360, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 2242, *3
(6th Cir. April 18, 1997). Section 1367(c) provides that district courts may decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over related state claims if:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law,
the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the
district court has original jurisdiction,
the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction, or
in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for
declining jurisdiction.

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). The United States Supreme Court has stated that:
Our decisions have established that pendent jurisdiction ‘is a doctrine of discretion,
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not of plaintiff’s right,’ and that district courts can decline to exercise jurisdiction
over pendent claims for a number of valid reasons.
*

*

*

Accordingly, we have indicated that district courts should deal with cases involving
pendent claims in the manner that best serves the principles of economy,
convenience, fairness, and comity which underlie the pendent jurisdiction doctrine.

City of Chicago v. International College of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 172-73 (1997) (internal
citations and quotations omitted). In determining whether to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction,
this Court must consider judicial economy, convenience, fairness and comity, and also avoid
needless decisions of state law. Id. at 173; Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726.
“[A] federal court with pendent jurisdiction should normally dismiss state claims without
prejudice when it appears that the state issues ‘substantially predominate’ over the federal issues in
terms of proof, scope, or comprehensiveness of the remedy sought.” Bodenner v. Graves, 828
F.Supp. 516, 518 (W.D. Mich. 1993). In this instance, the Court declines to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims because his state claims substantially predominate over
his federal claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2). Plaintiff’s ELCRA, intentional infliction of emotional
distress and civil conspiracy claims will either require elements of proof distinct from his federal
claims, or cause a substantial expansion of the suit beyond that necessary and relevant to his federal
claims.
While analysis of Plaintiff’s state law ELCRA claim will overlap with the analysis for his
claims under Title VII and §1983, there remains a potential for prolonged pre-trial practice,
lengthened jury instructions and jury confusion that will impair judicial economy and trial
convenience. While there will be some duplication of effort required by Plaintiff if he pursues his

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claims in the state court, the Court concludes that any advantages to be gained by trying all his state
claims together with his federal claims are outweighed by the potential for confusion of the issues
and prolonged litigation proceedings. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s state law
claims without prejudice.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [#9] is DENIED.
Defendants’ Motion to Strike Supplemental Brief [#28] is GRANTED.
The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims.
Plaintiff’s state law claims are hereby DISMISSED without prejudice.
Plaintiff’s claims under Title VII of the of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
et seq. and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 remain.
SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 7, 2013

/s/Gershwin A Drain
GERSHWIN A. DRAIN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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