Conway v. Purves et al
Filing
96
OPINION AND ORDER denying 81 Motion to intervene. Signed by District Judge Linda V. Parker. (DPer)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
CHARLES CONWAY, ANTONIO
HUDSON, JOSE RODRIGUEZ, and
JEFFREY BROWN,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Case No. 13-cv-10271
Honorable Linda V. Parker
BRAD PURVES, DON SPAULDING,
GLEN KUSEY, LLOYD RAPELJE,
DANIEL H. HEYNS, DENNIS STRAUB,
MITCH PERRY, JEFFREY LARSON,
TOM BURKETT, CATHERINE S. BAUMAN,
RICC RICCIARDI, and UNIDENTIFIED
DEFENDANTS NOS. 1-3,
Defendants.
___________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING MU’EEM RASHAD’S
MOTION TO INTERVENE (ECF NO. 81)
This lawsuit challenges the nutritional adequacy of the meals provided to
Michigan Department of Corrections’ prisoners during the Islamic month of
Ramadan. Presently before the Court is a motion for leave to intervene, filed July
25, 2014 by “Mu’eem Rashad” (“Rashad”). (ECF No. 81.) Rashad is a Michigan
Department of Corrections (“MDOC”) inmate, currently incarcerated at the
Kinross Correctional Facility in Kincheloe, Michigan.1 For the reasons set forth
below, the Court denies Rashad’s motion.
Background
Charles Conway (“Conway”), another MDOC prisoner, initiated this
lawsuit, pro se, on January 22, 2013. Conway named as defendants: MDOC
Central Office Food Service Program Manager Brad Purves; MDOC Food Service
Director Don Spaulding; MDOC Food Service Worker Glenn Kusey; and Lloyd
Rapelje, Warden of the Saginaw Correctional Facility (“SRF”) where Conway was
then incarcerated. Conway subsequently obtained counsel to represent him in this
matter and Lena Masri from the Council on American-Islamic Relations entered
her appearance on his behalf on April 23, 2014. On May 3, 2013, attorneys from
the law firm Akeel & Valentine, PLC entered the litigation as co-counsel for
Conway.
On June 20, 2013, an Amended Complaint was filed which added three
additional MDOC inmates as plaintiffs: Antonio Hudson (previously an inmate at
MDOC’s Newberry Correctional Facility but currently housed at the West
Shoreline Correctional Facility), Jose Rodriguez (subsequently paroled on May 28,
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According to MDOC’s Offender Tracking Information System (“OTIS”),
Rashad’s legal name is Virgil Ray Green and Mu’eem Rashad is an alias. See
http://mdocweb.state.mi.us/otis2/otis2profile.aspx?mdocNumber=189440. Rashad
was incarcerated at MDOC’s Chippewa Correctional Facility when he filed his
motion.
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2014), and Jeffrey Brown (previously an inmate at MDOC’s Alger Correctional
Facility, but subsequently transferred to its Chippewa Correctional Facility)
(hereafter collectively referred to, with Conway, as “Plaintiffs”). Plaintiffs’
Amended Complaint named ten additional defendants: MDOC Director
Daniel H. Heyns; MDOC Correctional Facilities Administration Deputy Director
Dennis Straub; Tom Burkett, former Warden of MDOC’s Central Michigan
Correctional Facility (“STF”) (where Rodriguez was then housed); Mitch Perry,
Warden of MDOC’s Newberry Correctional Facility (where Hudson was then
housed); Jeffrey Larson, then the current STF Warden; Catherine S. Bauman,
Warden of MDOC’s Alger Correctional Facility (“LMF”) (where Brown was then
housed); LMF Food Service Director Ricciardi; and three unidentified
defendants.
As indicated, the pending motion for leave to intervene, which Rashad
signed and dated July 22, 2014, was filed on July 25, 2014. Rashad seeks leave to
intervene pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a).
Applicable Law
Rule 24(a) provides:
(a) Intervention of Right. On timely motion, the court must permit
anyone to intervene who:
(1) is given an unconditional right to intervene by a federal statute; or
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(2) claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the
subject of the action, and is so situated that disposing of the action
may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant’s ability to
protect its interest, unless existing parties adequately represent that
interest.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 24. A motion to intervene “must state the grounds for intervention
and be accompanied by a pleading that sets out the claim or defense for which
intervention is sought.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(c).
The Sixth Circuit interprets Rule 24(a) as setting forth four elements which
must be satisfied before intervention as of right will be granted:
“(1) timeliness of the application to intervene, (2) the applicant’s
substantial legal interest in the case, (3) impairment of the applicant’s
ability to protect that interest in the absence of intervention, and (4)
inadequate representation of that interest by parties already before the
court.”
Stupak-Thrall v. Glickman, 226 F.3d 467, 471 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting Michigan
State AFL-CIO v. Miller, 103 F.3d 1240, 1245 (6th Cir.1997)); see also Grutter v.
Bollinger, 188 F.3d 394, 397-98 (6th Cir. 1999) (same). “ ‘Failure to meet any one
of the four criteria will require that the motion to intervene be denied.’ ” StupakThrall, 226 F.3d at 471 (brackets omitted) (quoting Grubbs v. Norris, 870 F.2d
343, 345 (6th Cir. 1989)); see also Blount-Hill v. Zelman, 636 F.3d 278, 283 (6th
Cir. 2011) (providing that “[e]ach of these elements is mandatory, and therefore
failure to satisfy any one of the elements will defeat intervention under the Rule.”).
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The determination of whether a motion to intervene is timely “should be
evaluated in the context of all relevant circumstances.” Jansen v. City of
Cincinnati, 904 F.2d 336, 340 (6th Cir. 1990). The Sixth Circuit has identified
several factors relevant to the court’s evaluation:
(1) the point to which the suit has progressed; (2) the purpose for
which intervention is sought; (3) the length of time preceding the
application during which the proposed intervenors knew or should
have known of their interest in the case; (4) the prejudice to the
original parties due to the proposed intervenors’ failure to promptly
intervene after they knew or reasonably should have known of their
interest in the case; and (5) the existence of unusual circumstances
militating against or in favor of intervention.
Id.
With respect to the movant’s interest in the litigation, the Sixth Circuit has
adopted “a ‘rather expansive notion of the interest sufficient to invoke intervention
of right.’ ” Grutter, 188 F.3d at 398 (quoting Michigan State AFL-CIO, 103 F.3d at
1245). The party seeking intervention “need not possess the standing necessary to
initiate [the] lawsuit.” Purnell v. City of Akron, 925 F.2d 941, 948 (6th Cir. 1991)
(citing Trbovich v. United Mine Workers, 404 U.S. 528 (1972)). To satisfy Rule
24(a)’s third requirement, the would-be intervenor’s “burden is minimal” in that it
need only show “that impairment of its substantial legal interest is possible if
intervention is denied[.]” Michigan State AFL-CIO, 103 F.3d at 1247.
The Sixth Circuit also has described as “minimal” the moving party’s burden
to satisfy the final requirement-- that its interest is not adequately protected by the
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existing parties to the action. Michigan State AFL-CIO, 103 F.3d at 1247 (quoting
Linton v. Comm’r of Health & Env’t, 973 F.2d 1311, 1319 (6th Cir.1992)
(explaining that, “[a]lthough a would-be intervenor is said to shoulder the burden
with respect to establishing that its interest is not adequately protected by the
existing parties to the action, this burden ‘is minimal because it is sufficient that
the movant prove that representation may be inadequate.’ ”) (emphasis added)). In
other words, the party seeking intervention “is not required to show that the
representation will in fact be inadequate.” Id. (emphasis added). For example, it
may be enough to show that the movant and existing party have inconsistent
interests in the litigation, Linton, 973 F.3d at 1319, or that the existing party “will
not make all of the prospective intervenor’s arguments.” Michigan State AFL0CIO, 103 F.3d at 1247.
Analysis
In his affidavit submitted in support of his motion to intervene, Rashad
indicates that MDOC recognizes him as an Orthodox Sunni Muslim and approved
his receipt of meals for the Ramadan fast in June 2014. (ECF No. 81, Affidavit
¶¶ 3, 4.) Rashad asserts that he is similarly situated to the named Plaintiffs and that
MDOC did not provide adequate daily calories in the meals provided to inmates
fasting during Ramadan. (Id. ¶¶ 1, 5.) He states that he wishes “to intervene to
prevent continuing injury to [his] fundamental rights and interest.” (Id. ¶ 7.)
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The Court believes that Rashad’s assertions (although neither presented in a
proper brief submitted in support of his motion nor addressed specifically to the
required factors) demonstrate satisfaction of the first four factors required before
intervention as of right will be granted. However, Rashad fails to show that his
interests are not adequately protected by Plaintiffs. The Court is confident that
Plaintiffs, particularly where they now are represented by counsel, will adequately
protect Rashad’s rights and interests in this litigation.
Rashad and Plaintiffs share the same ultimate objective in this litigation-assuring that Muslim MDOC inmates observing the Ramadan fast receive meals
with adequate calories without having to forego their Halal diet or other tenets of
their religion. The relief Plaintiffs are seeking will impact all Muslim inmates
observing Ramadan and they have sued MDOC officials capable of guaranteeing
that any relief is afforded across the prison system. The Sixth Circuit recognizes
that a presumption of adequacy of representation arises “ ‘when the proposed
intervenor and a party to the suit . . . have the same ultimate objective.’ ” Bradley
v. Milliken, 828 F.2d 1186, 1192 (6th Cir. 1987) (quoting Wade v. Goldschmidt,
673 F.2d 182, 186 n. 7 (7th Cir.1982) (per curiam)); see also United States v.
Michigan, 424 F.3d 438, 444 (6th Cir. 2005) (indicating that “applicants for
intervention must overcome the presumption of adequate representation that arises
when they share the same ultimate objective as a party to the suit” and holding that
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the movants failed to overcome the presumption). Rashad fails to present any facts
or arguments to overcome this presumption and the Court finds no indication that
Plaintiffs, with the assistance of their counsel, will not adequately represent his
rights and objectives.
Because a showing of inadequate representation is a necessary requirement
to intervene as of right, the Court concludes that it must deny Rashad’s motion to
intervene.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED, that Mu’eem Rashad’s motion for leave to intervene
(ECF No. 81) is DENIED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that the Clerk of the Court shall remove
Mu’eem Rashad as a named Intervenor Plaintiff on the docket and from a recipient
of the filings in this action after service of this Opinion and Order.
s/ Linda V. Parker
LINDA V. PARKER
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: January 13, 2015
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed to counsel of
record and/or pro se parties on this date, January 13, 2015, by electronic and/or
U.S. First Class mail.
s/ Richard Loury
Case Manager
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