Williamson v. Hass et al

Filing 90

OPINION and ORDER Denying Plaintiff's 71 MOTION for Relief from Judgment. Signed by District Judge Linda V. Parker. (Loury, R)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
RODNEY WILLIAMSON,
Plaintiff,

Civil Case No. 13-11066
Honorable Linda V. Parker

v.
RONDALD HASS et al.,
Defendants.
__________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RELIEF
FROM JUDGMENT (ECF NO. 71.)
This is a pro se prisoner civil rights case. Presently before the Court is
Plaintiff, Rodney Williamson’s motion for relief from judgment, pursuant to
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 60 (b)(2), (c)(1), and (d)(1). For reasons below,
the motion is DENIED.
Background
On March 8, 2013, Plaintiff, Rodney Williamson, sued defendants Randall
Hass, Joe Scott, Todd Vonhiltmayer, Meaghan Walters, and Mary Lou Kraft for
(1) placing him in Administrative Segregation (“ADSEG”) at the Macomb
Correctional Facility (“MRF”) without due process; (2) transferring him from
MRF to the Chippewa Correctional Facility (“URF”) in retaliation for filing
grievances; and, (3) denying him a therapeutic diabetic diet. (Pl.’s Compl. 1–15.)

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Subsequently, on August 9, 2013, Hass, Scott, Vonhiltmayer and Walters filed a
motion to dismiss or alternatively, for summary judgment. (ECF No. 16.) About
one month later, on September 4, 2013, Kraft filed a motion to dismiss. (ECF No.
20.) On October 10, 2013, Judge Thomas L. Ludington issued an order granting in
part and denying in part Kraft’s motion to dismiss and Defendants Hass, Scott,
Vonhiltmayer, and Walters’s motion to dismiss or, alternatively, for summary
judgment. (ECF No. 25.) Williamson’s conspiracy claim was dismissed with
prejudice. (Id.) Thereafter, on May 28, 2014, Williamson filed this motion for
relief from judgment. (ECF No. 71.)
Applicable Law and Analysis
In his complaint, Williamson asserts that Defendants Joe Scott, Mary Lou
Kraft, and Warden Randall Hass conspired to increase his security level from II to
IV, without justification, notice, or an opportunity to be heard, and based on their
submission of a false and misleading transfer order. (Compl. at 5–6.) Williamson
also alleges that Defendants Warden Hass and Todd Vonhiltmayer conspired to
transfer him from Macomb Correctional Facility (MRF) to the Chippewa
Correctional Facility (URF). Id. In Williamson’s motion for relief from judgment,
he asserts that the email correspondence he has attached as an exhibit to his motion
warrants relief from judgment. He explains that the emails are “from Defendant
Vonhiltmayer to Bernard G. Scott, MDOC CFA, requesting that plaintiff’s

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(ADSEG) status continue and/or placement in a single man cell, per the MRF
(SCC) committee Kraft, Scott and Hass.” (Pl.’s Mot. 5.) Williamson argues that the
“email demonstrates: (1) that a single plan existed; (2) the alleged co-conspirators
shared in the general [conspiracy] objectives; and (3) an overt act was committed
in furtherance of the conspiracy.” (Id.)
Relief from a judgment or order on the grounds of newly discovered
evidence may be obtained by motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
60(b)(2) or by independent action under Rule 60(d)(1). On motion and just terms,
the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order,
or proceeding on the grounds of newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable
diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under
Rule 59(b). Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2). In order to prevail on a Rule 60(b)(2) motion,
the movant must demonstrate that: 1) he exercised due diligence in obtaining the
information; and 2) the evidence is material and clearly would have produced a
different result if presented before the original judgment. McFall v. Patton, 238
F.3d 422 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Good v. Ohio Edison Co., 149 F.3d 413, 423 (6th
Cir.1998)). A motion under Rule 60(b)(2) must be made within a reasonable time
no more than a year after the entry of judgment or order or the date of the
proceeding. Fed. R. Civ. P 60(c)(1).

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Although Williamson’s motion is timely, he does not present any new
evidence that justifies the granting of Rule 60(b)(2) relief. The email
correspondence upon which Williamson relies on as the basis for his motion for
relief from judgment fails to clearly demonstrate that it would have produced a
different result if presented before the original judgment. The email
correspondence shows only that Bernard G. Scott declined to support the transfer
of Williamson to ADSEG, or the classification of a single cell to Williamson for
security needs, because the sexual assault at issue occurred seven years prior to the
transfer request. (Pl.’s Mot. 13–14.) Williamson’s assertion that the email
demonstrates that a single plan existed, that the alleged co-conspirators shared in
the general conspiracy objectives, and that an overt act was committed in
furtherance of the conspiracy, is conclusory and does not describe some meeting of
the minds. Williamson fails demonstrate some evidence of coordinated actions
between the alleged conspirators, as required under § 1983. See Collyer v. Darling,
98 F.3d 211, 229 (6th Cir. 1996).
Williamson also seeks relief from judgment by way of an independent action,
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(d)(1). Rule 60 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure provides for “Relief from a Judgment or Order” by motion (Part
(b)) or by independent action (Part (d)). Mitchell v. Rees, 651 F.3d 593, 594–95
(6th Cir. 2011). Part (d) is commonly referred to as Rule 60's “savings clause” and

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states: “This rule does not limit a court's power to entertain an independent action
to relieve a party from a judgment, order, or proceeding....” Id. at 595 (citing Fed.
R. Civ. P. 60(d)(1)). Such actions arise infrequently, given that “an independent
action is ‘available only to prevent a grave miscarriage of justice,’” Id. (quoting
United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 47 (1998)), and “when enforcement of the
judgment is ‘manifestly unconscionable.’” Id. (quoting Pickford v. Talbott, 225
U.S. 651 (1912)). A grave miscarriage of justice is a stringent and demanding
standard. Id. (citation omitted). The email correspondence submitted to the Court
by Williamson does not demonstrate a grave miscarriage of justice, nor does it
demonstrate that enforcement of the judgment is manifestly unconscionable. The
email correspondence merely shows that Bernard G. Scott declined to support the
transfer of Williamson to ADSEG. Accordingly, Williamson’s motion for relief
from judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)(2), (c)(1), and (d)(1) is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
s/ Linda V. Parker
LINDA V. PARKER
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: November 18, 2014
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed to counsel of
record and/or pro se parties on this date, November 18, 2014, by electronic and/or
U.S. First Class mail.
s/ Richard Loury
Case Manager
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