Acord v. Social Security, Commissioner of

Filing 32

OPINION AND ORDER (1) Accepting The Recommendation Contained In The Magistrate Judge's Report And Recommendation Dated July 17, 2014 27 , (2) Overruling Plaintiff's Objections To The Report And Recommendation 31 , (3) Denying Plaintiff's Motion To Dismiss 28 , (4) Denying Plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment 1 , 13 , And (5) Granting Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment 20 . Signed by District Judge Mark A. Goldsmith. (JCur)

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
RICHARD ACORD,
Plaintiff,

Civil Action No.
13-CV-12059

vs.
HON. MARK A. GOLDSMITH
COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
___________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER (1) ACCEPTING THE RECOMMENDATION CONTAINED IN
THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION DATED JULY
17, 2014 (DKT. 27), (2) OVERRULING PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS TO THE REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATION (DKT. 31), (3) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO
DISMISS (DKT. 28), (4) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT (DKTS. 1, 13), and (5) GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DKT. 20)
I.

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

This is a Social Security case. Plaintiff Richard B. Acord, proceeding pro se, appeals
from the final determination of the Commissioner of Social Security denying his application for
disability benefits under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1381(a), et seq. The case was
referred to Magistrate Judge R. Steven Whalen (Dkt. 3). The parties have filed cross motions for
summary judgment (Dkts. 1, 13, 20).1

Magistrate Judge Whalen issued a Report and

Recommendation (R&R), recommending that the decision of Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
Philip E. Moulaison be affirmed, that Defendant’s motion be granted, and that Plaintiff’s motion

1

Plaintiff filed a brief attached to his initial complaint, arguing that he is entitled to an award of
disability benefits (Dkt. 1). He also filed a brief in response to Defendant’s answer to the
complaint (Dkt. 13). In the Report and Recommendation (Dkt. 27), Magistrate Judge Whalen
addresses the arguments Plaintiff raises in both briefs.
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be denied (Dkt. 27). Plaintiff has filed objections to the R&R (Dkt. 31).2
The factual and procedural background of this case, along with the standard of review
and legal principles governing Social Security appeals, have been adequately set forth by the
Magistrate Judge in his R&R and need not be repeated in full here. Plaintiff, who was born on
February 13, 1962, has previously worked as a production manager and sales manager.
Administrative Record (“A.R.”) at 147, 212 (Dkt. 11). Plaintiff asserts that the conditions
limiting his ability to work include lumbar fusion, joint dysfunction, degenerative disc disease,
“sacrum disorders,” and skin cancer. Id. at 38-39, 176. On April 29, 2011, the ALJ issued his
decision that Plaintiff was not disabled from June 11, 2008, through the date of the decision. Id.
at 16. Plaintiff requested a review of this decision, id. at 11, and the Appeals Council denied this
request.

Id. at 2.

At that point, the ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the

Commissioner. Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 543-544 (6th Cir. 2004).
The ALJ based his decision on an application of the Commissioner’s five-step sequential
disability analysis to Plaintiff’s claim.3 The ALJ’s findings were as follows:


Under Step One, Plaintiff met the insured status requirements through December 31,

2

Plaintiff initially submitted an unsigned document entitled “Plaintiff Appeal’s the Trial Court’s
Recommendation.” (Dkt. 29.) The Court construed this document as Plaintiff’s objections to the
R&R. See Boswell v. Mayer, 169 F.3d 384, 387 (6th Cir. 1999) (“Pro se plaintiffs enjoy the
benefit of a liberal construction of their pleadings and filings.”). The Court subsequently issued
an order directing Plaintiff to submit a signed copy of his objections by August 20, 2014;
otherwise his objections would be struck (Dkt. 30). Plaintiff timely submitted a signed document
entitled “Plaintiff’s Objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation.” (Dkt.
31.) This new submission contains objections identical to those submitted previously, and the
Court now addresses each in turn.
3

“Disability” is defined as “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of
any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in
death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12
months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The ALJ’s decision and the R&R adequately set forth the
applicable five-step analysis. A.R. at 17-18; R&R at 12-13. See also 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)
(explaining the five-step sequential evaluation process).
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2013, and Plaintiff had not engaged in any substantial gainful activity since June 11,
2008. A.R. at 18.


Under Step Two, Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: lumbar degenerative
disc disease status post two lumbar fusion surgeries and sacroilitis. Id.



Under Step Three, Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments
that met or medically equaled the severity of a listed impairment. Id. at 19.



Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to “perform light work as defined
in 20 C.F.R. [§] 404.1567(b) except the claimant is unable to climb ladders, ropes, and
scaffolds. The claimant can only occasionally kneel, crouch, or crawl. The claimant
should avoid concentrated exposure to hazards.” Id.



Under Step Four, Plaintiff was capable of performing past relevant work as a production
worker and a salesperson. Id. at 24.

Therefore, at Step Four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not disabled. Id. at 25.
Plaintiff filed a complaint in this Court to contest the ALJ’s decision (Dkt. 1). Magistrate
Judge Whalen issued his R&R recommending that Plaintiff’s summary judgment motion be
denied, and Defendant’s summary judgment be granted, on the grounds that the ALJ’s
determination properly applied the Social Security regulations and the treating physician rule,
and was supported by substantial evidence (Dkt. 27). For the reasons that follow, the Court will
accept the recommendation contained in the R&R, overrule Plaintiff’s objections to the R&R,
deny Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, and grant Defendant’s motion for summary
judgment.
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court reviews de novo those portions of the R&R to which a specific objection has
been made. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this
Court’s review is limited to determining whether the Commissioner’s decision “is supported by
substantial evidence and was made pursuant to proper legal standards.” Ealy v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 594 F.3d 504, 512 (6th Cir. 2010) (citation and quotation marks omitted). “Substantial
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evidence is ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.’” Lindsley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 560 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). In determining whether substantial evidence
exists, the Court may “look to any evidence in the record, regardless of whether it has been cited
by [the ALJ].” Heston v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 245 F.3d 528, 535 (6th Cir. 2001). “[T]he
claimant bears the burden of producing sufficient evidence to show the existence of a disability.”
Watters v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 530 F. App’x 419, 425 (6th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted).
III.

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff raises objections to the following alleged errors by the ALJ and the Magistrate
Judge: (i) the claimed failure to discuss Plaintiff’s narcotic pain medications and their side
effects, Obj. at 1-6 (Dkt. 31); and (ii) the extension of time afforded to Defendant to file a motion
for summary judgment. Id. at 6-7. The Court will address each objection in turn and, for the
reasons that follow, will overrule each objection.
A. Objection One
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in failing to consider the type, dosage, effectiveness,
and side effects of his narcotic medication. Obj. at 1. Plaintiff asserts that the limitations caused
by the side effects should have been incorporated into the RFC determination. Id. at 2. Plaintiff
further argues that the fact that his treating physicians prescribed him narcotics demonstrates that
Plaintiff’s impairments caused him chronic pain. Id. at 3-4. Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ
never inquired as to the side effects of the narcotics or whether Plaintiff could work without his
medications. Id. at 6. Plaintiff contends that he could not perform any job due to the side effects
of his medications; in particular, Plaintiff contends that he would not be able to drive for the job
of sales representative. Id. at 8.

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The ALJ’s opinion contained several references to Plaintiff’s narcotic medications. The
ALJ noted that Plaintiff was prescribed Tramadol and Vicodin, and that he subsequently reported
an improvement in his pain. A.R. at 20. The ALJ further noted that although Plaintiff reported
continued back pain, he also indicated improvement and increased productivity with the use of
Percocet. Id. at 21. The ALJ referenced evidence that Plaintiff’s pain was well managed with
OxyContin. Id. The ALJ explained that while conservative treatment such as narcotic pain
medication “would normally weigh somewhat in [Plaintiff’s] favor,” the record shows that this
treatment has been generally successful in controlling his pain. Id. at 22.
As an initial matter, the Court construes Plaintiff’s objection regarding his narcotic
medications to raise two arguments: (i) the fact that Plaintiff was prescribed narcotic medications
shows that he has a disabling pain condition and (ii) the ALJ erred in not discussing or
considering the side effects of these medications in making the determination as to Plaintiff’s
functional limitations. The Court addresses each argument in turn.
The Court, first, rejects Plaintiff’s argument that his prescriptions for narcotic
medications, in and of themselves, suffice to demonstrate that his impairments caused him severe
chronic pain, thus rendering him incapable of working. Although prescriptions for narcotic pain
medications are consistent with symptoms of chronic pain, substantial evidence supports the
ALJ’s conclusion that his medications have been generally successful in controlling his pain and
increasing his ability to function. For example, Plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. Jeff Dare,
indicated in March 2009 that Plaintiff was seeking something to control his pain, and that
Plaintiff reported good results with Vicodin in the past. A.R. at 330. Plaintiff was prescribed
Vicodin, and in May 2009, Dr. Dare stated that Plaintiff reported good pain management with
Vicodin and wanted to continue with his medications. Id. at 322, 324. Although Plaintiff

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continued to report episodes of back pain, in July 2009, Plaintiff indicated that he had been
managing his back pain with Percocet and requested a refill of Percocet; he further reported that
he had been more productive and able to do some activities, such as painting. Id. at 370, 396.
In October 2010, Dr. David Tom, one of Plaintiff’s treating physicians, indicated that he would
initiate Plaintiff on opiate pain medications, id. at 381-382; in January 2011, Plaintiff reported
that his pain interfered with personal care, standing, and sleeping (even when he took his
medications), but that “[p]ain killers give moderate relief from pain” and that he could walk and
sit for unlimited periods of time. Id. at 436. At the hearing before the ALJ, Plaintiff explained
that he drives three days per week, that he was taking morphine and oxycodone, and that the
medications have helped him. Id. at 36, 40, 43.
The Court concludes that the above-referenced medical reports and testimony constitute
substantial evidence that Plaintiff’s narcotic pain medications were at least generally successful
at controlling his pain and increasing his functioning. The improvement of Plaintiff’s condition
with medication undercuts the claimed severity of the limiting effects of his back pain. See
Torres v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 490 F. App’x 748, 754 (6th Cir. 2012) (noting that improvement
of a condition with medication and treatment weighs against the claimed severity of the
condition). For these reasons, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s argument that his prescriptions for
narcotic medications, in and of themselves, suffice to demonstrate the existence of disabling
pain. See Francis v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 414 F. App’x 802, 806 (6th Cir. 2011)
(“[Plaintiff] argues that consuming pain medication is itself evidence that he experiences
moderate to severe pain . . . . But it is just as consistent with a finding that [Plaintiff’s]
medications adequately manage his pain and enable him to work full time with some restrictions.
This . . . is all that the substantial-evidence standard requires.”).

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The Court next turns to Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ erroneously failed to consider
the side effects of narcotic medications in determining Plaintiff’s functional limitations. As an
initial matter, the Court has carefully reviewed the briefs Plaintiff presented to the Magistrate
Judge (Dkts. 1, 13), and in those briefs, Plaintiff did not squarely raise any argument that the
ALJ failed to consider the side effects of his medications. Because Plaintiff failed to raise this
argument before the Magistrate Judge, the Court may properly deem this argument waived. See,
e.g., Murr v. United States, 200 F.3d 895, 902 n.1 (6th Cir. 2000) (noting that parties are not
permitted “to raise at the district court stage new arguments or issues that were not presented to
the magistrate”); Swain v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 379 F. App’x 512, 517-518 (6th Cir. 2010)
(“[A] claim raised for the first time in objections to a magistrate judge’s report is deemed
waived.” (citations and quotation marks omitted)).
Regardless, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s argument as to the side effects of the
narcotic medications lacks merit. It is true, as Plaintiff contends, that vocationally-limiting side
effects of medications must be considered in assessing a claimant’s RFC. See SSR 96-8p (“The
RFC assessment must be based on all of the relevant evidence in the case record, such as . . .
[T]he effects of treatment, including limitations or restrictions imposed by the mechanics of
treatment (e.g., frequency of treatment, duration, disruption to routine, side effects of
medication). . . . ”); Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 247 (6th Cir. 2007) (noting
that “side effects of any medication taken to alleviate the symptoms” is a relevant factor to
consider in evaluating a claimant’s symptoms). However, here, there is insufficient evidence in
the record to show that any side effects from Plaintiff’s medications interfered with his ability to
perform light work with limitations on climbing, kneeling, crouching, crawling, and exposure to
hazards.

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Upon a review of the medical records, although there is evidence that the prescribed
narcotics may cause side effects of drowsiness and sleepiness, there is little evidence in the
record as to the functionally limiting effects of such side effects as experienced by Plaintiff;
indeed, as the Court concluded above, substantial evidence in the record supports the ALJ’s
conclusion that the narcotic medications generally improved Plaintiff’s symptoms and
functioning.4 See, e.g., A.R. at 394 (noting that the restrictions of Plaintiff’s medication regime
include no driving, no use of hazardous machinery, no use of medicine at work, and no
unprotected heights); but see id. at 413 (reporting that Plaintiff’s medications help reduce his
pain, that Plaintiff can perform his personal self-care and household activities, and that Plaintiff
is able to drive).5
Furthermore, Plaintiff has not shown that the asserted side effects of the medication, such
as drowsiness, would preclude his performance of past relevant work as a production manager or
salesperson, as such work is performed in the national economy. A review of the descriptions
for these positions set forth in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”) does not reveal
4

The Court notes that, although Plaintiff asserts in a conclusory fashion that, “[t]he record will
show the Plaintiff complained of dizziness, drowsiness, and sleepiness,” obj. at 6, Plaintiff does
not actually provide record citations as to the side effects of his narcotic medications.
5

The record also contains a medical report from Dr. Tom, dated May 23, 2011, stating that
Plaintiff’s medication was reduced due to Plaintiff’s complaints of somnolence. A.R. at 445.
However, this report was not submitted to the ALJ and was, instead, submitted as additional
evidence to the Appeals Council. Id. at 6-7. The Sixth Circuit has “repeatedly held that
evidence submitted to the Appeals Council after the ALJ’s decision cannot be considered part of
the record for purposes of substantial evidence review.” Foster v. Halter, 279 F.3d 348, 357 (6th
Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). Accordingly, the Court does not consider this medical report for
the purposes of the present analysis. Even if the Court were to consider this evidence, it would
not override the Court’s prior conclusion that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s
determination that Plaintiff’s medications generally improved his functioning. See McClanahan
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 474 F.3d 830, 833 (6th Cir. 2006) (“The findings of the Commissioner
are not subject to reversal merely because there exists in the record substantial evidence to
support a different conclusion. This is so because there is a zone of choice within which the
Commissioner can act, without the fear of court interference.” (citations and quotation marks
omitted)).
8

required work activities, such as driving, operating heavy machinery, or exposure to heights, that
would arguably be precluded by side effects of narcotic medications.6 Although Plaintiff argues
that his past work as he performed it included substantial driving, obj. at 8, Plaintiff has not
shown that the side effects of the medications would preclude him from performing his past
relevant work as it is generally performed in the national economy. See SSR 82-61 (providing
that a claimant will be found not disabled if he has the RFC to perform either “[t]he actual
functional demands and job duties of a particular past relevant job” or “[t]he functional demands
and job duties of the occupation as generally required by employers throughout the national
economy”).
Because of the lack of evidence in the record regarding the functionally limiting side
effects of Plaintiff’s medications, the Court concludes that the ALJ did not err in failing to
reference such side effects in his decision. The cases on which Plaintiff relies, in which the
medical records contained significant evidence of the limiting side effects of the claimant’s
medications, are distinguishable. See Flores v. Massanari, 19 F. App’x 393, 400-401 (7th Cir.
2001) (concluding that where there was substantial record evidence of debilitating side effects of
the claimant’s medication, the ALJ’s failure to address such evidence was erroneous); Boddie v.
Colvin, No. 12-221, 2013 WL 3990684 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 2, 2013) (concluding that where the
record showed that the claimant spent the majority of the day lying down in drug-induced
drowsiness, the ALJ’s hypothetical to the VE erroneously failed to include limitations stemming
from the side effects of the medications).7
6

The DOT codes for Plaintiff’s past jobs include 166.227-010 (training representative), 279.357034 (sales representative), and 012.167-050 (production planner).

7

The Court notes, as well, that the ALJ has no obligation to expressly list and consider every
factor contained in the Social Security regulations governing determination of functional
limitations. See Storey v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 181 F.3d 104 (Table), at *3 (6th Cir. Apr. 27,
9

Finally, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ breached a duty to develop the
record at the hearing by specifically inquiring as to any side effects of Plaintiff’s medications.
Contrary to Plaintiff’s assumption, “[t]he burden of providing a complete record, defined as
evidence complete and detailed enough to enable the Secretary to make a disability
determination, rests with the claimant.” Landsaw v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 803 F.2d
211, 214 (6th Cir. 1986). It is true that when some “special circumstances” exist – namely,
“when a claimant is (1) without counsel, (2) incapable of presenting an effective case, and (3)
unfamiliar with hearing procedures,” the ALJ may have a special duty to develop the record.
Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 280 F. App’x 456, 459 (6th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).
However, these “special circumstances” are not present here; at the hearing, Plaintiff was
represented by counsel who examined Plaintiff and, therefore, had ample opportunity to adduce
information regarding side effects of the medications. For these reasons, the ALJ did not have a
special duty to develop the record in this matter. See also Cherry v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 1186,
1191 n.7 (11th Cir. 1985) (concluding that the ALJ did not have a duty to inquire into possible
side effects of the claimant’s medications, where the claimant “was represented at the hearing
and did not allege that side effects of drugs contributed to her disability. Moreover, the only
indication in the record of side effects is her statement before the ALJ that her medication made
her drowsy.”).8
Accordingly, because Plaintiff’s allegations of functionally limiting side effects are

1999) (“Although the ALJ did not specifically mention these pain medications in his analysis,
the fact that he did not include a factor-by-factor discussion does not render his analysis invalid”
where other substantial evidence supported his conclusion).
8

Similarly, Plaintiff’s argument that his treating physicians and the consultative examiner did
not discuss the side effects of Plaintiff’s pain medications, obj, at 5, fails to demonstrate any
error in or the ALJ’s decision. It is Plaintiff, not his physicians, who has the burden of
developing a record sufficient to enable the ALJ to render a disability decision.
10

unsupported by record evidence, the ALJ did not err in failing to incorporate the asserted side
effects of these medications in the RFC determination or the hypothetical to the VE. See, e.g.,
Casey v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 987 F.2d 1230, 1235 (6th Cir. 1993) (“It is well
established that an ALJ may pose hypothetical questions to a vocational expert and is required to
incorporate only those limitations accepted as credible by the finder of fact.” (citation omitted)).
Further, for the reasons stated above, the ALJ’s determination as to the effects of Plaintiff’s
medications was supported by substantial evidence.9
B. Objection Two
In his second objection, Plaintiff argues that the Magistrate Judge erred in affording the
Defendant extensions of time to file an oversized summary judgment motion, and that such
extensions of time gave Defendant an unfair advantage. Obj. at 6-7. The Court rejects this
argument.
When a party objects to a Magistrate Judge’s non-dispositive order, the Court must
“modify or set aside any part of the order that is clearly erroneous or is contrary to law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72(a). Under Eastern District of Michigan Local Rule 72.1(a)(2)(D) and 72.1(b)(1), a
Magistrate Judge is authorized to “exercise general supervision of civil and criminal calendars”
in conformance with “the general procedural rules of this court.”
Plaintiff has not pointed to any part of the Magistrate Judge’s orders granting Defendant
9

Plaintiff also raises an argument premised on Dr. Dare’s conclusion in a function report that
Plaintiff was limited to sitting not more than two hours. Obj. at 5. Plaintiff contends that such a
restriction precludes him from performing his past relevant work, because in his past jobs, he had
to sit at meetings for more than two hours at a time. Id. The Court rejects this argument, for two
reasons. First, the ALJ explained that he gave limited weight to Dr. Dare’s opinion as to
Plaintiff’s sitting limitation, A.R. at 24, and Plaintiff does not object to the amount of weight
assigned by the ALJ. Second, as explained above, even if Plaintiff is unable to work at his past
actual jobs, he will be found not disabled if he remains capable of performing his past relevant
work as it is generally performed in the national economy.
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extensions of time to file a brief, and granting Defendant leave to file an oversize brief, that was
clearly erroneous or contrary to law. It is established that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and the Eastern District of Michigan Local Rules authorize judges to grant extensions of time
and page limit extensions. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b) (authorizing courts to extend deadlines for
parties to act); E.D. Mich. L.R. 7.1(d)(3) (authorizing parties to apply for a page limit extension
on briefs). Plaintiff has pointed to no error in the Magistrate Judge’s orders, and the Court
perceives none. Further, Plaintiff’s general argument that Defendant was given an “unfair
advantage” is unconvincing; after all, Plaintiff filed two separate briefs on the docket, and the
Magistrate Judge considered and addressed Plaintiff’s arguments in both briefs. See R&R at 1314.
For these reasons, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s second objection.
C. Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 28) and Miscellaneous Objections (Dkts. 17, 23)
Plaintiff also filed a motion to dismiss Defendant’s summary judgment motion (Dkt. 28)
and miscellaneous objections (Dkts. 17, 23); these documents assert the same challenges raised
in Plaintiff’s second objection to the Magistrate Judge’s orders affording Defendant extensions
of time and a page length extension. The Court has addressed, and rejected, these arguments in
this Opinion. Accordingly, the Court denies the motion to dismiss (Dkt. 28) and overrules
Plaintiff’s miscellaneous objections (Dkts. 17, 23).
IV.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court accepts the recommendation contained in the
R&R, overrules Plaintiff’s objections to the R&R, denies Plaintiff’s motion for summary
judgment, grants Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, denies Plaintiff’s motion to
dismiss, and overrules Plaintiff’s miscellaneous objections.

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SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 12, 2014
Detroit, Michigan

s:\Mark A. Goldsmith
MARK A. GOLDSMITH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record and
any unrepresented parties via the Court’s ECF System to their respective email or First Class
U.S. mail addresses disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on September 12, 2014.
s/Johnetta M. Curry-Williams
JOHNETTA M. CURRY-WILLIAMS
Case Manager

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