Joao Control & Monitoring Systems, LLC v. Chrysler Corporation

Filing 53

OPINION and ORDER Construing Disputed Claim Terms. Signed by District Judge Mark A. Goldsmith. (CHad)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
JOAO CONTROL & MONITORING
SYSTEMS, LLC,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 13-cv-13957
v.
HON. MARK A. GOLDSMITH
CHRYSLER GROUP LLC,
Defendant.
__________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER
CONSTRUING DISPUTED CLAIM TERMS
I. INTRODUCTION
This is a patent infringement case in which Plaintiff Joao Control & Monitoring Systems,
LLC (“JCMS”) alleges that Defendant Chrysler Group LLC has infringed upon four of its
patents.
Pursuant to this Court’s Scheduling Order (Dkt. 25), the parties have identified the
disputed claim terms within the four patents that they feel are material to the infringement and
validity issues in this case. The parties have submitted extensive written briefs explaining their
positions on how the disputed claim terms should be construed (Dkts. 36, 38, 40). On March 24,
2015, the Court held oral argument.
In this opinion and order, the Court will construe the disputed claim terms identified by
the parties, pursuant to Markman v. Westview Instruments, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
II. OVERVIEW OF THE ASSERTED PATENTS
Plaintiff JCMS has asserted four patents against Defendant Chrysler Group LLC: (i) U.S.
Patent No. 5,917,405 (‘405 Patent), entitled “Control Apparatus and Methods for Vehicles”; (ii)

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U.S. Patent 6,549,130 (‘130 Patent), entitled “Control Apparatus and Method for Vehicles and/or
Premises”; (iii) U.S. Patent No. 6,542,076, entitled “Control, Monitoring and/or Security
Apparatus and Method”; and (iv) U.S. Patent No. 7,397,363, entitled “Control and/or Monitoring
Apparatus and Method.”
The four patents are all part of the same family of patents and are thus related. The
parties agree that that the written description sections of the asserted patents are largely the same
for purposes of construing the disputed claim terms. The parties also agree that the Court need
only refer and cite to the written description of the ‘405 Patent in construing the disputed claim
terms where the patents contain common claim terms. See Markman Hr’g Tr. at 13 (Dkt. 49).
The asserted patents relate inter alia to security systems that prevent theft of a motor
vehicle and facilitate recovery of the vehicle after the theft. In one example embodiment, the
asserted patents teach a system that allows an owner, after theft of his vehicle, to turn off the
vehicle or lock-out the thief from the vehicle by controlling vehicle systems via an online web
site or a central security office. The web site or central security office would then communicate
with the vehicle’s onboard computer thereby allowing the vehicle’s owner to control systems of
the vehicle.
More specifically, the patented system allows the vehicle’s owner to turn off or activate
various vehicle systems to thwart theft of the vehicle, such as turning off the fuel supply system,
the exhaust system, or the ignition system; locking the vehicle hood; turning on an interior or
exterior siren, alarm, or horn; activating an intercom system for providing communications
between vehicle owner and the vehicle occupants; and/or activating a video and/or audio
recording device within the vehicle. The patented system would only allow the vehicle owner to

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turn off these vehicle systems when it safe to do so, such as when the thief turns the engine off or
the vehicle is stopped.
The patent also teaches that the patented system can have a vehicle position and locating
device that can be utilized to allow the vehicle’s owner to determine the position and/or location
of the vehicle after it is stolen.
Figure 11B of the ‘405 Patent illustrates the patented system, which has been reproduced
below. Reference number 150 shows a home and/or personal computer that communicates with
an online web site 954, a central security office 950, or directly with a receiver 3 on the vehicle.

III. LAW OF CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
Claims of a patent are short and concise statements, expressed with great formality, of the
metes and bounds of the patented invention. Each claim is written in the form of a single
sentence. Claim construction is the manner in which courts determine the meaning of a disputed

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term in a claim. “The construction of claims is simply a way of elaborating the normally terse
claim language: in order to understand and explain, but not to change, the scope of the claim.”
Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
The construction of key terms in patent claims plays a critical role in nearly every patent
infringement case. Claim construction is central to both a determination of infringement and
validity of a patent. The judge, not a jury, is to determine the meaning of the disputed claim
terms as a matter of law. Markman, 517 U.S. at 372, 391.
A judge has two primary goals in construing the disputed claim terms. The first goal is to
determine the scope of the invention by interpreting the disputed claim terms to the extent
needed to resolve the dispute between the parties. The second goal is to provide a construction
that will be understood by the jury, who might otherwise misunderstand a claim term in the
context of the patent specification and prosecution history of the patent. See, e.g., Power-One,
Inc. v. Artesyn Techns., Inc., 599 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“The terms, as construed by
the court, must ensure that the jury fully understands the court’s claim construction rulings and
what the patentee covered by the claims.”); U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc., 103 F.3d 1554,
1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Claim construction is a matter of resolution of disputed meanings and
technical scope, to clarify and when necessary, to explain what the patentee covered by the
claims, for use in the determination of infringement.”). The Court’s claim construction ruling
forms the basis for the ultimate jury instructions, although that is not to say that the Court cannot
modify its wording for the jury instructions after ruling on claim construction. See IPPV Enters.,
LLC v. Echostar Commc’ns Corp., 106 F. Supp. 2d 595, 601 (D. Del. 2000).
The seminal case setting forth the principles for construing disputed claim terms is
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). According to Phillips, the

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words of the claim are generally given their “ordinary and customary” meaning, i.e., “the
meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of
the invention.” Id. at 1312-1313. The person of ordinary skill in the art views the claim term in
light of the entire intrinsic record, which is the entire claim, the other parts of the patent, and, if
in evidence, the prosecution history of the patent before the United States Patent and Trademark
Office. Id. at 1313-1314. Although a claim must be construed in view of the entire patent, the
court should normally not read limitations or features of the exemplary embodiments discussed
in the patent specification into the claims. Id. at 1323-1324.
The prosecution history of the patent can often inform the meaning of the claim language
by demonstrating how the inventor understood the invention and whether the inventor limited the
invention during the course of prosecution by his statements, making the claim scope narrower
than it would otherwise be. However, because the prosecution history is an ongoing negotiation
between the patent office and the patent owner, rather than the final product of that negotiation, it
often lacks the clarity of the patent itself and is generally less useful for claim construction
purposes. Id. at 1317.
In discerning the meaning of claim terms, resorting to dictionaries and treatises also may
be helpful. Id. at 1320-1323. However, undue reliance on extrinsic evidence poses the risk that
it will be used to change the meaning of claims in derogation of the indisputable public records
consisting of the claims, the specification of the patent and the prosecution history, thereby
undermining the public notice function of patents. Id. In the end, the construction that stays true
to the claim language and most naturally aligns with the patent’s description of the invention will
be the correct construction. Id. at 1316.

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It is proper for the Court to construe the disputed claim terms in the context of the
infringement or invalidity dispute by viewing the accused device or prior art. Viewing the
accused device or prior art allows the Court to construe the claims in the context of the dispute
between the parties, not in the abstract. “While a trial court should certainly not prejudge the
ultimate infringement analysis by construing claims with an aim to include or exclude an accused
product or process, knowledge of that product or process provides meaningful context for the
first step of the infringement analysis, claim construction.” Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v.
Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 442 F.3d 1322, 1326-1327 (Fed. Cir. 2006). The Federal Circuit has
held that without “the vital contextual knowledge of the accused products,” a court’s claim
construction decision “takes on the attributes of something akin to an advisory opinion.” Lava
Trading, Inc. v. Sonic Trading Mgmt, LLC, 445 F.3d 1348, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
IV. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION ANALYSIS FOR DISPUTED CLAIM TERMS
The parties have requested that the Court construe a number of claim terms. The Court will
address each disputed claim term in the following sections.
A. “Control Device”
Disputed Term

“control device”

Plaintiff’s Proposed
Construction

Defendant’s
Court’s
Proposed
Construction
Construction
A device that directs A device that directs
the activity of another the activity of another
device
device

A device or a
computer, or that part
of a device or
computer, which
performs an
operation, an action,
or a function, or
which performs a
number of operations,
actions, or functions

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The parties request that the Court construe the term “control device” in Claims 15, 17,
and 20 in the ‘405 Patent; Claims 64, 85, 92, and 144 in the ‘130 Patent; and Claims 13, 17, 18,
28, 65, and 68 in the ‘076 Patent.
Claim 1 of the ‘405 Patent is reproduced below to illustrate the use of “control device”:
1. A control apparatus for a vehicle, which comprises:
a first control device, wherein said first control device one of
generates and transmits a first signal for one of activating,
deactivating, enabling, and disabling, one of a vehicle component,
a vehicle device, a vehicle system, and a vehicle subsystem,
wherein said first control device is located at the vehicle;
wherein said first control device is responsive to a second signal,
wherein the second signal is one of generated by and transmitted
from a second control device, wherein the second control device is
located at a location which is remote from the vehicle, and further
wherein the second control device is responsive to a third signal,
wherein the third signal is one of generated by and transmitted
from a third control device, therein the third control device is
located at a location which is remote from the vehicle and remote
from the second control device.
(Emphasis added).
Plaintiff argues that “control device” should be construed to mean “a device or computer,
or that part of a device or a computer, which performs an operation, or a function, or which
performs a number of operations, actions, or functions.”
Defendant argues that “control device” should be construed to mean “a device that directs
the activity of another device.”
The Court agrees with Defendant and construes “control device” to mean “a device that
directs the activity of another device.” This construction most naturally aligns with the intrinsic
evidence of claim language and written description of the patent.

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Starting with the claim language itself, the Court notes that “control device” uses the
adjective “control” to modify “device.” Thus, the claim language means that a device that
controls or directs the activity of another device.
The Court’s construction is supported by how the claim term “control device” is used in
the context of the claims. The claim language itself clearly states that the first, second, and third
control devices generate and transmit signals for directly or indirectly controlling a vehicle
component or system. In the typical embodiment, when the vehicle is stolen, the vehicle’s owner
through his personal computer (i.e., the third control device) accesses and sends commands to a
remote web site or central security office (i.e., the second control device) in order to control
vehicle functions. The web site or central security office system then sends commands to the
vehicle’s computer (i.e., the first control device), which in turn sends commands to the vehicle
systems, such as the ignition system or fuel system, to disable the vehicle. This claim language
makes clear that the “control device” sends control commands or directs the activities of another
device.
The Courts finds that Plaintiff’s proposed construction for “control device” is too broad.
Plaintiff argues that “control device” should be construed to mean “a device or computer, or that
part of a device or a computer, which performs an operation, or a function, or which performs a
number of operations, actions, or functions.” Plaintiff’s proposed construction would encompass
any device that performs a function.
Plaintiff argues that, by implication, Claim 2 supports its proposed construction for
“control device.” Claim 2 states:
2. The apparatus of claim 1, which further comprises:
a monitoring device for monitoring at least one of the vehicle,
vehicle operational status, vehicle operation, said one of a vehicle

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component, a vehicle device, a vehicle system, and a vehicle
subsystem, a vehicle one of fuel supply, water supply, and coolant
supply, one of electrical generator and alternator operation, battery
charge level, engine temperature level, one of an electrical circuit
and an electrical device, activity inside the vehicle, and activity
outside the vehicle.
Plaintiff argues that Claim 2 states that the control device also monitors and, therefore, is
simply performing a function, not directing the activity of another device. The Court finds that
Plaintiff’s argument is misplaced. Claim 2 does not further define “control device,” but rather
introduces a new device into the system, a “monitoring device.”

According to the claim

language, the monitoring device is a separate device.
Plaintiff also argues that the Court should adopt its definition of “control device,”
because the Plaintiff explicitly submitted its definition in the prosecution history of different,
although related, patent applications. Specifically, Plaintiff submitted its explicit definition in
2006 and 2007 in the prosecution histories of different patent applications. The Court does not
find Plaintiff’s arguments persuasive in this case. While statements made in related patent
applications can be used in construction of claim terms, a court must be careful to consider
whether or not the patent owner is trying to broaden or even redefine the construction of the
claim term after the issuance of the patent. The ‘405 Patent issued in 1999, and the ‘130 and
‘076 Patents issued in 2003. Plaintiff did not submit its proposed definition of “control device”
until after the issuance of the ‘405, ‘130, and ‘076 Patents, specifically in 2006 and 2007 in the
prosecution histories of different, though related, patent applications. Therefore, The United
States Patent and Trademark Office did not have the benefit of Plaintiff’s definitions before it
granted the ‘405, ‘130, and 076 Patents.
Broadening of a patent is to take place through a reissue patent application which is to be
filed within two years after the issuance of the patent. 35 U.S.C. § 251; See ArcelorMittal

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France v. AK Steel Corp., 786 F.3d 885 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (holding that a claim that is broadened
through claim construction after the two year period to file a broadening reissue application is
invalid). The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has repeatedly instructed that it is
important to remember that there is a “public notice” function in patent law. Allowing a patent
owner to broaden claim language years after the issuance of the patent would be contrary to the
public notice principle in patent law and allow a patent owner to broaden the meaning of claim
terms without filing a reissue patent application within two years of the issuance of the patent
contrary to the statutory scheme.
In this case, the Court finds that the definitions submitted in the related patent
applications years after issuance of the ‘405, ‘130, and ‘076 patents would broaden the claims
and, therefore, be improper.
B. “Processing Device”
Disputed Term

processing device

Plaintiff’s Proposed
Construction
“A device or a
computer, or that part
of a device or a
computer, which
performs an
operation, an action,
or a function, or
which performs a
number of operations,
actions or functions.”

Defendant’s
Proposed
Construction
Plain and ordinary
meaning applies.
OR
“a device that
performs operations
on data”

Court’s
Construction
“A device or a
computer, or that part
of a device or a
computer, which
performs an
operation, an action,
or a function, or
which performs a
number of operations,
actions or functions.”

The parties request that the Court construe the claim language “processing device” in
Claims 21, 22, 24, 25, 33, and 36 of the ‘363 Patent.
The parties agree that the term “processing device” in the ‘363 Patent is the same element
as “control device” in the ‘405, 076, and ‘130 Patents and does the same thing in the invention.

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In the ‘363 Patent, the patent owner chose to use a different term “processing device,” instead of
“control device,” to describe the element of the invention. Markman Hr’g Tr. at 50, 53.
Claim 21 of the ‘363 Patent is reproduced below with examples of the disputed claim
terms underlined:
21. An apparatus, comprising:
a first processing device, wherein the first processing device at
least one of generates a first signal and transmits a first signal for
at least one of activating, de-activating, disabling, re-enabling, and
controlling an operation of, at least one of a vehicle system, a
vehicle equipment system, a vehicle component, a vehicle device,
a vehicle equipment, and a vehicle appliance, of or located at a
vehicle, wherein the first processing device is associated with a
web site, and further wherein the first processing device is located
at a location remote from the vehicle,
wherein the first processing device at least one of generates the
first signal and transmits the first signal in response to a second
signal, wherein the second signal is a at least one of generated by a
second processing device and transmitted from a second
processing device, wherein the second processing device is located
at a location which is remote from the first processing device and
remote from the vehicle, wherein the first processing device
determines whether an action or an operation associated with
information contained in the second signal, to at least one of
activate, de-activate, disable re-enable, and control an operation of,
the at least one of a vehicle system, a vehicle equipment system, a
vehicle component, a vehicle device, a vehicle equipment, and a
vehicle appliance, is an authorized or an allowed action or an
authorized or an allowed operation, and further wherein the first
processing device at least one of generates the first signal and
transmits the first signal to a third processing device if the action or
the operation is determined to be an authorized or an allowed
action or an authorized or an allowed operation, wherein the third
processing device is located at the vehicle,
wherein the second signal is transmitted to the first processing
device via, on, or over, at least one of the Internet and the World
Wide Web, and further wherein the second signal is automatically
received by the first processing device, wherein the first signal is
transmitted to and automatically received by the third processing
device, wherein the third processing device at least one of

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generates a third signal and transmits a third signal for at least one
of activating, de-activating, disabling, re-enabling, and controlling
an operation of, the at least one of a vehicle system, a vehicle
equipment system, a vehicle component, a vehicle device, a
vehicle equipment, and a vehicle appliance, in response to the first
signal. (Emphasis added.)
Plaintiff argues that the claim term “processing device” should be construed to mean “a
device or a computer, or that part of a device or a computer, which performs an operation, an
action, or a function, or which performs a number of operations, actions or functions.”
Defendant argues that this claim term does not need to be construed because a jury would
understand the term or, in the alternative, Defendant argues that “processing device” should be
construed to mean “a device that performs operations on data.”
During prosecution of the ‘363 Patent, before the United States Patent and Trademark
Office took any action on the patent application that resulted in the ‘363 Patent, the patent owner
submitted an explicit definition to the United States Patent and Trademark Office for the term
“processing device.” Specifically, the patent owner submitted the exact definition it is proposing
now. See 11/23/2007 Supp. to the Remarks for the Am. Filed on October 24, 2007, Ex. A to
Pl.’s Markman Br. (Dkt. 36-2).
The Court finds that the term processing device” should be construed to be consistent
with the definition set forth in the prosecution history of the ‘363 Patent. By submitting the
definition early in the prosecution history of the ‘363 Patent, the patent owner acted as his own
“lexicographer.” CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(holding that to be a lexicographer a patentee must “clearly set forth a definition of the disputed
claim term” other than its plain and ordinary meaning).

The Court also finds that this

construction is consistent with the written description section of the patent because embodiments
disclosed in the written description section of the patent are computers. For example, the

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embodiment of Figure 11B, reproduced below, shows computers at reference numbers 150, 952,
970, and 4. Moreover, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s definition may be more understandable for
a jury than Defendant’s alternative construction because it explicitly makes clear that a
“processing device” may be a computer.1

C. “Remote”
Disputed Term

“remote”

Plaintiff’s Proposed
Construction
“separate and apart
from”

Defendant’s
Proposed
Construction
No construction
necessary. Plain
meaning applies.
Alternatively:

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Court’s
Construction
No construction
necessary at this time.
If this terms needs
construction, the
Court will construe

In their briefs, the parties did not explain why this claim term needs to be construed in light of
the infringement or invalidity issues in the case. The Federal Circuit has cautioned that, without
“the vital contextual knowledge of the accused products” or invalidity issues in the case, a
court’s claim construction decision “takes on the attributes of something akin to an advisory
opinion.” Lava Trading, Inc., 445 F.3d at 1350. Accordingly, the Court reserves the right to
modify its construction.
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“distant in space”

the term at summary
judgment or before
trial.

The parties request that the Court construe the term “remote” in Claims 15, 17, and 20 of
the ‘405 Patent; Claims 64, 85, 92, and 144 of the ‘130 Patent; Claims 13, 17, 18, 28, 65, and 68
of the ‘076 Patent; and Claims 21, 22, 24, 25, 33, and 36 of the ‘363 Patent.
Plaintiff argues that the Court should construe “remote” to mean “separate and apart
from.”
Defendant on the other hand argues that the term “remote” is clear and does not need to
be construed.

Alternatively, Defendant argues that “remote” should be construed to mean

“distant in space.”
The parties point to Claim 12 of the ‘405 Patent as an example of a claim using the term
“remote”. Claim 12 states:
12. A control apparatus for a vehicle, which comprises:
a first control device, wherein said first control device one of
generates and transmits a first signal for one of activating,
deactivating, enabling, and disabling, one of a vehicle component, a
vehicle device, a vehicle system, and a vehicle subsystem, [w]herein
said first control device is located at a location remote from the
vehicle;
wherein said first control device is responsive to a second signal,
wherein the second signal is one of generated by and transmitted
from a second control device, wherein the second control device is
located at a location which is remote from said first control device
and remote from the vehicle,
wherein said first signal controls a third control device, wherein the
third control device is located at the vehicle, and further wherein the
third control device one of generates and transmits a third signal for
one of activating, deactivating, enabling, and disabling, said one of a
vehicle component, a vehicle device, a vehicle system, and a vehicle
subsystem, in response to said first signal. (Emphasis added).

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The Court finds that the term “remote” is clear and does not need to be construed at this
time, because the claim term is clear when read in the context of the claim and the patent. The
claim states that a second control device (e.g., a person using his personal computer or
telephone) sends a command to a first control device (e.g., a web site or central security location)
to control a vehicle system. The claim states that the first control device and second control
device are “remote” from each other and the vehicle. The second control device then sends a
command signal to a third control device (e.g., the vehicle’s on-board computer), which is
located at the vehicle. The third control device then sends a command signal to one or more
vehicle components or systems such as to turn-off the vehicle’s fuel supply or ignition system if
the vehicle is stolen. The claim states that while the first and second control devices are
“remote”, the third control device is located at the vehicle. Thus, in the context of the claim
language and in context of the patent in general, the term “remote” means remote from the
vehicle as opposed to being located at the vehicle.
The Court’s understanding is supported by the written description sections of the asserted
patents. The written description section of the patent supports the notion that term “remote”
means remote from the vehicle.

For example, the following two sections of the written

description support the Court’s understanding that “remote” simply means the first and second
control devices are remote from the location of the vehicle, as opposed to being located at the
vehicle.
“The present invention enables an owner . . . to exercise and/or
perform convenient control, monitoring and/or security
functions . . . over . . . vehicles . . . from a remote location. For
example, an individual may conveniently provide control over and
monitor, the state and/or status of a vehicle parked at a location
distant from his present location.” ‘405 Pat. col. 74 ll. 33-44
(emphasis added).

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“The transmitter system 2 is a remote system, which is not
physically connected to the remainder of the apparatus 1. Further,
the transmitter system 2, in the preferred embodiment, is not
located in the motor vehicle, but rather, is located external from,
and separate and apart from, the motor vehicle. In the preferred
embodiment, the transmitter system 2 or transceiver, is designed to
be capable of transmitting signals over long distances, i.e. tens,
hundreds, and/or thousands of miles or farther.” ‘405 Pat. col. 18
ll. 58-66 (emphasis added).
Defendant states that the ultimate issue in the case is whether a device located in the
vehicle (e.g., a cell-phone) is “remote” from the vehicle. Based on the claim language and the
portions of the written description, “remote” from the vehicle would not encompass within the
vehicle or at the vehicle. However, the Court will address this particular claim construction issue
further at the summary judgment stage of this case or at trial, in the context of any infringement
or invalidity issues.
D. “Located At”
Disputed Term

“located at”

Plaintiff’s Proposed
Construction
“situated at, or situated
in, or situated on”

Defendant’s
Proposed
Construction
No construction
needed. Plain and
ordinary meaning.

Court’s
Construction
No construction
needed.

Alternatively:
“situated at.”

The parties request that the Court construe the term “located in” in Claims 15, 17, 20 of
the ‘405 Patent; Claims 13, 17, 18, 28, 65, and 68 of the ‘076 Patent; and Claims 21, 22, 24, 25,
33, and 36 of the ‘363 Patent.
In the claims, the term “located at” is used simply to describe the location of the control
devices in relation to the vehicle and other control devices.

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For example, in the typical

embodiment discussed in the patent, when the vehicle is stolen, the vehicle owner uses his
personal computer (i.e., the second control device), which the claim states is “located at a
location remote from the vehicle. . . .” As an example of the disputed claim language, Claim 12
is reproduced below with the disputed claim term underlined:
12. A control apparatus for a vehicle, which comprises:
a first control device, wherein said first control device one of
generates and transmits a first signal for one of activating,
deactivating, enabling, and disabling, one of a vehicle component,
a vehicle device, a vehicle system, and a vehicle subsystem,
[w]herein said first control device is located at a location remote
from the vehicle;
wherein said first control device is responsive to a second signal,
wherein the second signal is one of generated by and transmitted
from a second control device, wherein the second control device is
located at a location which is remote from said first control device
and remote from the vehicle,
wherein said first signal controls a third control device, wherein
the third control device is located at the vehicle, and further
wherein the third control device one of generates and transmits a
third signal for one of activating, deactivating, enabling, and
disabling, said one of a vehicle component, a vehicle device, a
vehicle system, and a vehicle subsystem, in response to said first
signal. (Emphasis added).
Plaintiff argues that the Court should construe “located at” to mean “situated at, situated
in, or situated on”.
Defendant, on the other hand, argues that the term “located at” is clear and does not need
to be construed. Alternatively, Defendant argues that “located at” should be construed to mean
“situated at.”
The Court finds that the term “located at” is clear and does not need to be construed at
this time, especially when the claim is read in the context of the claim and the written description
of the patent. The parties have not explained why a particular nuanced construction is relevant to

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a disputed issue of infringement or invalidity. The Court will further construe this claim at
summary judgment or trial, if necessary. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 442 F.3d at 1326-1327
(holding that it is proper to construe disputed claim language in the context of the infringement
or validity issues in the case).
E. “Signal” and “Signal For”
Disputed Term

“Signal”

“Signal for”

Plaintiff’s Proposed
Construction
Plain and ordinary meaning
understood by a person of
ordinary skill in the art, and
further in view of the
definition for “signal” below.
“Signal” means “an
indication or an indication
having or conveying data,
information, or a message, or
a conveyer of data,
information, or a message, or
an indication representing
data or information.”
Plain and ordinary meaning
understood by a person of
ordinary skill in the art, and
further in view of the
definition for “signal” above.

Defendant’s
Proposed
Construction
No construction
necessary. Plain
and ordinary
meaning applies.

Court’s
Construction
No construction
needed at this time.

Alternatively: “the
physical
embodiment of a
message.”

“Signal for the
purpose of”

No construction
necessary at this time.

In their briefs, the parties request that the Court construe the term “signal” and “signal
for” in Claims 15, 17, 20 of the ‘405 Patent; Claims 64, 85, 92, and 144 of the ‘130 Patent;
Claims 13, 17, 18, 28, 65, and 68 of the ‘076 Patent; Claims 21, 22, 24, 25, 33, and 36 of the
‘363 Patent.
In the claims, the term “signal” is used to describe the electro-magnetic message that is
sent from one control device to another control device or vehicle component. The term “signal
for” is used in the claims to give the instruction contained in the electronic message or the

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purpose of the signal. For example, when the vehicle is stolen, the vehicle owner uses his
personal computer or telephone (i.e., a control device) to generate and transmit a “signal” or
electronic communication to a web site or central security office that contains an instruction to
deactivate the vehicle’s ignition system or fuel system. The web site or central security office
then sends an electronic communication to vehicle’s on-board computer, instructing the vehicle
to activate or deactivate a vehicle system, such as the ignition system or fuel system.
As an example of the disputed claim language, Claim 12 of the ‘405 Patent is reproduced
below with the disputed claim term underlined:
12. A control apparatus for a vehicle, which comprises:
a first control device, wherein said first control device one of
generates and transmits a first signal for one of activating,
deactivating, enabling, and disabling, one of a vehicle component, a
vehicle device, a vehicle system, and a vehicle subsystem, [w]herein
said first control device is located at a location remote from the
vehicle;
wherein said first control device is responsive to a second signal,
wherein the second signal is one of generated by and transmitted
from a second control device, wherein the second control device is
located at a location which is remote from said first control device
and remote from the vehicle,
wherein said first signal controls a third control device, wherein the
third control device is located at the vehicle, and further wherein the
third control device one of generates and transmits a third signal for
one of activating, deactivating, enabling, and disabling, said one of a
vehicle component, a vehicle device, a vehicle system, and a vehicle
subsystem, in response to said first signal. (Emphasis added).
Plaintiff argues that the Court should construe the terms “signal” and “signal for” as
having their plain and ordinary meanings to a person of ordinary skill in the art. Plaintiff does,
however, propose a definition of the word “signal.” Plaintiff defines “signal” as “an indication

19

or an indication having or conveying data, information, or a message, or a conveyer of data,
information, or a message, or an indication representing data or information.”
Defendant on the other hand argues that the terms “signal” and “signal for” are clear and
do not need to be construed. Alternatively, Defendant argues that “signal” should be construed
to mean “the physical embodiment of a message,” and that “signal for” should be construed to
mean “signal for the purpose of.”
At oral argument, the parties agreed that the term “signal” may not be an issue in the
trial. See Markman Hr’g Tr. at 61 (“There’s no dispute that I can see in invalidity or none it
would be viewed so we think signal should just be construed as signal.”).
After considering the claim term and the claims as a whole, the Court finds that the terms
“signal” and “signal for” do not need to be construed, at least at this time. The Court believes
that jurors will understand the terms. The Court does, however, find that Plaintiff’s proposed
definition of “signal” is consistent with the normal understanding of the term. At trial, the Court
may use Plaintiff’s proposed definition of “signal” depending on the particular infringement and
invalidity issues presented to the jury.
The Court does find that Plaintiff’s proposal of giving these claim terms the meaning
understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art to be confusing and not helpful to a jury. One
of the purposes of claim construction is to make claim terms that are written for persons of
ordinary skill in the particular technology area (e.g., engineers) understandable for a jury. By
stating that the disputed claim terms should have their plain and ordinary meaning “to a person
of ordinary skill in the art,” Plaintiff is not actually proposing a construction for the jury, because
the jury is not a person of ordinary skill in art. Such a proposed claim construction is not helpful
for the jury. See, e.g., Power-One, Inc. v. Artesyn Techns., Inc., 599 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir.

20

2010) (“The terms, as construed by the court, must ensure that the jury fully understands the
court’s claim construction rulings and what the patentee covered by the claims.”).
The Court finds that Defendant’s proposed alternative of “signal” could be confusing to
a jury. Defendant proposes the construction “the physical embodiment of a message.” The Court
finds that this construction could be confusing for the jury because the term “signal” can be
electric or electromagnetic in nature. See, e.g., ‘405 pat. col. 3 ll. 13-17. Laypeople may not
understand an electronic or electromagnetic message to be “physical” in nature.
The Court finds that Defendant’s proposed construction for “signal for” to be consistent
with how the term is used in the claim. However, the Court does not believe a construction is
needed because a jury will understand what the term “signal for” means when reading the
entirety of the claim.
F. “First Signal,” “Second Signal,” and “Third Signal”
Disputed Terms

Plaintiff’s Proposed
Construction

“first signal,”
“second signal,” and
“third signal”

The “first signal,”
“second signal,” and
“third signal” are
each different signals
with content that is
not identical to the
content of the other
signals.

Defendant’s
Proposed
Construction
No construction
necessary. Plain and
ordinary meaning
applies.
Alternatively:
First signal: “a signal
sent by a first
device.”
Second signal: “a
signal sent by a
second device.”
Third signal: “a
signal sent by a third
device.”

21

Court’s
Construction
No construction
necessary. Plain and
ordinary meaning
applies.

Plaintiff requests that the Court construe the terms “first signal,” “second signal,” and
“third signal” in Claims 15, 17, 20 of the ‘405 Patent; Claims 64, 85, 92, and 144 of the ‘130
Patent; Claims 13, 17, 18, 28, 65, and 68 of the ‘076 Patent; and Claims 21, 22, 24, 25, 33, and
36 of the ‘363 Patent.
As an example of the disputed claim language, Claim 12 of the ‘405 Patent is reproduced
below with the disputed claim term underlined:
12. A control apparatus for a vehicle, which comprises:
a first control device, wherein said first control device one of
generates and transmits a first signal for one of activating,
deactivating, enabling, and disabling, one of a vehicle component, a
vehicle device, a vehicle system, and a vehicle subsystem, [w]herein
said first control device is located at a location remote from the
vehicle;
wherein said first control device is responsive to a second signal,
wherein the second signal is one of generated by and transmitted
from a second control device, wherein the second control device is
located at a location which is remote from said first control device
and remote from the vehicle,
wherein said first signal controls a third control device, wherein the
third control device is located at the vehicle, and further wherein the
third control device one of generates and transmits a third signal for
one of activating, deactivating, enabling, and disabling, said one of a
vehicle component, a vehicle device, a vehicle system, and a vehicle
subsystem, in response to said first signal. (Emphasis added).
Plaintiff argues that the Court should construe the terms “first signal,” “second signal,”
and “third signal” as being different signals with content that is not identical to the content of the
other signals.
Defendant on the other hand argues that the terms “first signal,” “second signal,” and
“third signal” are clear and do not need to be construed. Alternatively, Defendant argues that
“first signal” should be construed to mean “a signal sent by a first device;” “second signal”

22

should be construed to mean “a signal sent by a second device;” and “third signal” should be
construed to mean “a signal sent by a third device.”
The issue for the Court is whether the claim terms “first signal,” “second signal,” and
“third signal” should be construed to mean different signals with content that is not identical to
the content of the other signals. Plaintiff also argues that the claims should be construed to not
include “relay” devices, which the Court understands merely regenerate and forward the same
electronic signal, although Plaintiff did not extensively explain relay devices and how they
operate. In other words, Plaintiff argues that the claims should be construed to mean that when
one control device receives a signal from the first control device and then sends a signal to
another control device, the control device receiving and sending the message must send a
different signal with a non-identical message.
After considering the claim term and the claims as a whole, the Court finds that the terms
“first signal,” “second signal,” and “third signal” do not need to be construed, at least at this time,
because the claim language is clear. The Court believes that jurors will understand the terms in
the context of the claim language and the entire claim. The Court does, however, find that
Defendant’s proposed alternative constructions are consistent with the normal understanding of
the claim terms. In fact, the parties agree that the “first signal” is a signal sent by the first device,
the “second signal” is sent by the second device, and the “third signal” is sent by the third device.
Koperda Dep. at 139, 141-143, Ex. O to Def’s Markman Br. (Dkt. 38-19).
As to the issue of whether the “first signal,” “second signal,” and “third signal” need to
be different signals with content that is not identical, the Court does not believe that Plaintiff’s
proposed narrow construction is proper. According to Federal Circuit case law, a court must
give a claim term its ordinary and customary meaning from the perspective of a person of

23

ordinary skill in the art, unless the patent owner gave the claim term a special definition in the
written description section of the patent or the prosecution history, or unless the patent owner
made a clear disclaimer of broader claim scope in the written description or prosecution history
of the patent. See, e.g., CCS Fitness, Inc., 288 F.3d at 1366; Scimed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced
Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1339, 1342-1343 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
Starting with the claim language, the Court finds that the claim language is clear in that
the first signal, second signal, and third signal are signals generated by different control devices.
The claim language does not say that the content of the signals is not identical to each other as
Plaintiff proposes.
Moving on to the written description, the written description does not state that the
signals generated by the control devices must have non-identical content. Nor does the written
description disclaim or distinguish the patented invention from relay devices. In fact, the written
description section of the patent does not discuss relay devices. If Plaintiff’s construction was
correct, one would expect a lot of discussion that the control device could not be a relay device
and that the signals from the control devices could not have identical content, yet there is no such
discussion. For example, at column 20 lines 43-49, the ‘405 Patent simply states in the preferred
embodiment that the signal generated is indicative of the signal received and does not say that
every embodiment must produce a non-identical signal.
In the preferred embodiment, upon receiving the signal, the
receiver 3, generates a distinct signal which may be a digital, an
electrical, an electronic and/or an electromagnetic or other suitable
signal, which signal is indicative of the signal transmitted from the
transmitter 2B of the transmitter system 2 and received by the
receiver 3. (Emphasis added).
Turning to the prosecution history, Plaintiff has not identified statements in the
prosecution history that define or clearly limit the natural scope of the claim language. It appears

24

that Plaintiff is requesting the Court redraft the claim language or otherwise define the claim
language so as to preserve the validity of the claims or otherwise defeat an invalidity argument
that Plaintiff anticipates that Defendant will make in the future. The parties have alluded to such
at oral argument. See, e.g., Markman Hr’g Tr. at 65 (“[I]f they’re a pioneering patent, they are
they trying to narrow it. We found a lot of prior art. This is their way around the prior art[.]”)
However, the Federal Circuit has admonished district courts from rewriting claims to preserve
their validity. Rhine v. Casio, Inc., 183 F.3d 1342, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that the
Federal Circuit has “admonished against judicial rewriting of claims to preserve validity”).
Accordingly, the Court will not rewrite or redefine claim terms which are otherwise clear
to preserve the validity of the claims or defeat an anticipated invalidity argument.
G. “An Interface Device”

Disputed Term

Plaintiff’s Proposed
Construction

“an interface device”

“The junction or
point of
interconnection
between two systems
or devices.”

Defendant’s
Proposed
Construction
“A device that allows
the first control
device and the at least
one of a vehicle
system, a vehicle
component, a vehicle
device, a vehicle
equipment, a vehicle
equipment system,
and a vehicle
appliance to work
together.”

Court’s
Construction
“A device that allows
two things work
together or
communicate.”
This claim
construction is
limited to Claim 18.

The parties request that the Court construe the term “an interface device” in Claim 18 in
the ‘076 Patent.
Claim 18 of the ‘076 Patent is reproduced below with the disputed claim term underlined:

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18. The apparatus of claim 3, further comprising: an interface
device, wherein the interface device provides an interface between
the first control device and the at least one of a vehicle system, a
vehicle component, a vehicle device, a vehicle equipment, a
vehicle equipment system, and a vehicle appliance. (Emphasis
added.)
In the typical embodiment of Claim 18, when a vehicle is stolen, a vehicle’s owner using
his personal computer or telephone, through a web site or central security office, instructs the
vehicle’s on-board computer (i.e., first control device) to turn-off the ignition system, fuel
system, or other system so as to disable the vehicle. The vehicle’s on-board computer system
then sends an instruction to an interface device, which then communicates directly with the
vehicle system such as the ignition system, fuel system, or other system. For example, Claim 18
states that “the interface device provides an interface between the first control device and the at
least one of a vehicle system[.]”
Figure 1 of the ‘076 patent, reproduced below, illustrates the ignition interface device 8,
the fuel pump system interface device 10, and vehicle equipment systems interface devices 12,
which communicate with the vehicle ignition system 7, vehicle fuel pump system 9, and vehicle
equipment systems 11.

26

Plaintiff argues that the Court should construe “an interface device” to mean “the
junction or point of interconnection between two systems or devices.”
Defendant, on the other hand, argues that the term “an interface device” should be
construed to mean “a device that allows the first control device and the at least one of a vehicle
system, a vehicle component, a vehicle device, a vehicle equipment, a vehicle equipment system,
and a vehicle appliance to work together.”
At oral argument, Plaintiff appears to admit that this claim term is not material for this
case and/or Claim 18, but rather other non-asserted claims that pertain to, for example, buildings
or premises. Markman Hr’g Tr. at 68 (“[A]lthough it may work within the context of certain
claims, it doesn’t work within the context of other unasserted claims. We look at, for example,
this construction proposed by Chrysler can’t be put into the premises claims or things of that
nature[.]”). It appears to the Court that Plaintiff is worried about the effects of collateral estoppel
on un-asserted claims in future cases.

27

At oral argument, Defendant stated that the issue with this claim term is whether
Plaintiff’s proposed construction should contain the word “device.”

Id. at 69 (“Their

construction leaves out device. That’s the fundamental problem.”). Defendant argues that the
Plaintiff’s construction only requires a point of intersection, while the claim language requires a
“device” be the interface.
For the time being, the Court will construe “interface device to mean “a device that
allows two things work together or communicate.” Id. at 70 (“The main point for us is that it’s a
device that allows two things to work together.”). This construction will only apply to Claim 18
and to this case for purposes of collateral estoppel. The Court finds that the claim term contains
the word “device,” so it is appropriate to include the word “device” in the proposed construction.
H. “Determine Whether an Action or an Operation Associated With Information
Contained in the Second Signal . . . is an Authorized or an Allowed Action or an
Authorized or Allowed Operation”
Disputed Term

Plaintiff’s Proposed
Construction

“Determines whether
an action or an
operation associated
with information
contained in the
second signal . . . is an
authorized or an
allowed action or an
authorized or allowed
operation”

Plain and ordinary
meaning as
understood by a
person of ordinary
skill in the art and
further in view of the
intrinsic evidence.

Defendant’s
Proposed
Construction
“Determines whether
the action or
operation indicated
by the second signal
is an action or
operation that the
apparatus recognizes
as valid.”

Court’s
Construction
The disputed claim
language refers to
whether the vehicle’s
owner (or other
authorized person)
has authorized the
action and whether
the action is
permitted.

The parties request that the Court construe the claim language “determines whether an
action or an operation associated with information contained in the second signal . . . is an
authorized or an allowed action or an authorized or allowed operation” in Claim 21 in the ‘363
Patent.

28

Claim 21 of the ‘363 Patent is reproduced below with the disputed claim language
underlined:
21. An apparatus, comprising:
a first processing device, wherein the first processing device at
least one of generates a first signal and transmits a first signal for
at least one of activating, de-activating, disabling, re-enabling, and
controlling an operation of, at least one of a vehicle system, a
vehicle equipment system, a vehicle component, a vehicle device,
a vehicle equipment, and a vehicle appliance, of or located at a
vehicle, wherein the first processing device is associated with a
web site, and further wherein the first processing device is located
at a location remote from the vehicle,
wherein the first processing device at least one of generates the
first signal and transmits the first signal in response to a second
signal, wherein the second signal is a at least one of generated by a
second processing device and transmitted from a second
processing device, wherein the second processing device is located
at a location which is remote from the first processing device and
remote from the vehicle, wherein the first processing device
determines whether an action or an operation associated with
information contained in the second signal, to at least one of
activate, de-activate, disable re-enable, and control an operation of,
the at least one of a vehicle system, a vehicle equipment system, a
vehicle component, a vehicle device, a vehicle equipment, and a
vehicle appliance, is an authorized or an allowed action or an
authorized or an allowed operation, and further wherein the first
processing device at least one of generates the first signal and
transmits the first signal to a third processing device if the action or
the operation is determined to be an authorized or an allowed
action or an authorized or an allowed operation, wherein the third
processing device is located at the vehicle,
wherein the second signal is transmitted to the first processing
device via, on, or over, at least one of the Internet and the World
Wide Web, and further wherein the second signal is automatically
received by the first processing device, wherein the first signal is
transmitted to and automatically received by the third processing
device, wherein the third processing device at least one of
generates a third signal and transmits a third signal for at least one
of activating, de-activating, disabling, re-enabling, and controlling
an operation of, the at least one of a vehicle system, a vehicle
equipment system, a vehicle component, a vehicle device, a

29

vehicle equipment, and a vehicle appliance, in response to the first
signal. (Emphasis added).
When the extra language is stripped away, the disputed claim language in Claim 21
becomes clearer: “21. An apparatus . . . wherein the first processing device determines whether
an action or an operation associated with the information contained in the second signal . . . is an
authorized or an allowed action or an authorized or an allowed operation, and . . . transmits the
first signal to a third processing device if the action or the operation is determined to be an
authorized or an allowed action or an authorized or an allowed operation. . . .”
In an example embodiment of the patented invention, the stolen vehicle’s owner uses his
computer to send a signal to a web site containing an instruction to turn-off the ignition system,
fuel system, or other system so as to disable the vehicle. The web site then sends a signal
containing the instructions to the vehicle.
An embodiment of this patented method is illustrated in Figure 6A and in the written
description of the ‘363 Patent. Figure 6A is reproduced below.

30

Upon the theft of a vehicle, the written description section of the patent teaches that the
patent owner may control a vehicle system, by sending a signal containing an instruction to the
vehicle. The written description of the ‘363 Patent discloses that the signal may contain two
types of codes: (1) an access code and (2) a command code. The written description states that
the access code “provide[s] for security measures which may be taken in conjunction with the
use of the apparatus.” ‘363 pat. col. 4 ll. 11-13. In effect, the access code is a type of password
confirming that the use of the patented apparatus is authorized by the vehicle’s owner. The
command code is an instruction to control a vehicle system, such as to turn-off the ignition
system to disable the vehicle. Id. at col. 6 ll. 28-30.
According to the example embodiment of Figures 6A and 6B, starting at reference
number 60, the authorized user starts the patented apparatus by entering a valid access code. Id.
at col. 6 ll. 20-27 , col. 7 ll. 12-20, and col. 38 ll. 40-43. In effect, by using a valid access code,
31

the system verifies that the user is authorized and that the use is not accidental such as by
accidentally pressing buttons on a transmitter. Id. At step 61, the patented apparatus receives
the command code from the vehicle’s owner. The command code can be of a variety of codes to
control a number of vehicle systems. At steps 62 and 62A, the patented apparatus will read the
command code and identify the command code. “At step 63, the CPU will determine if the
[command] code is a valid code . . . If the code is invalid, the CPU 4 will return to step 76
thereby exiting the operational program . . . and the apparatus 1 will await a next access code and
command code transmission.” Id. at col. 39 ll. 11-16.
Plaintiff argues that the disputed claim language should be given its “plain and ordinary
meaning as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art and further in view of the intrinsic
evidence.” Beside this general instruction, Plaintiff does not propose any specific construction
for this claim term.
Defendant argues that this claim term should be construed to mean that the first
processing device “determines whether the action or operation indicated by the second signal is
an action or operation that the apparatus recognizes as valid.”
At oral argument, the parties agreed that the only issue that needs to be decided for this
claim term is whether “authorized” in this claim language means that the web site is determining
whether the command code entered is an “authorized” command or whether the construction
should include determining whether a particular user is “authorized.”
The Court finds that the disputed claim language refers to whether the vehicle owner has
“authorized” the action (e.g., through an access code) and whether the command is “allowed.”
Specifically, the written description teaches that safeguards may be employed in order to prevent
a wrong or misdialed number from accidentally accessing and activating the patented apparatus.

32

Id. at col. 7 ll. 12-20. The written description also teaches that the patented apparatus serves to
prevent an “unauthorized” disabling of a vehicle system through the use of security measures. Id.
and col. 4 ll. 11-13. Accordingly, the Court finds that the disputed claim language refers to
whether the vehicle owner or other authorized person has authorized the action and whether the
action is permitted by the patented apparatus.
I. “At Least One of a Central Office Control and a Central Office Monitoring of
the Vehicle”
Disputed Term

“at least one of a
central office control
and a central office
monitoring of the
vehicle”

Plaintiff’s Proposed
Construction
“control and/or
monitoring of the
vehicle from a
location or office that
provides centralized
control and/or
centralized
monitoring of
multiple vehicles.”

Defendant’s
Proposed
Construction
“control or
monitoring of the
vehicle by personnel
who are located at a
central office.”

Court’s
Construction
“control and/or
monitoring of the
vehicle from a
location or office that
provides centralized
control and/or
centralized
monitoring of
multiple vehicles.”

The parties request that the Court construe the claim language “at least one of a central
office control and a central office monitoring of the vehicle” in Claim 28 of the ‘076 Patent.
Claim 28 of the ‘076 Patent is reproduced below with the disputed claim language
underlined:
28. The apparatus of claim 27, wherein the first control device is at
least one of a server computer, a computer, a network computer,
and a central processing computer, and further wherein the first
control device provides at least one of a central office control of
and a central office monitoring of the vehicle on or over at least
one of the Internet and the World Wide Web. (Emphasis added).

33

Plaintiff argues that this claim term should be construed to mean “control and/or
monitoring of the vehicle from a location or office that provides centralized control and/or
centralized monitoring of multiple vehicles.”
Defendant argues that this claim term should be construed to mean “control or
monitoring of the vehicle by personnel who are located at a central office.”
At oral argument and in their briefs, the parties agreed that the issue for the Court is
whether this claim limitation requires actual human personnel at the central security office
control or monitor the vehicles. Defendant did say at oral argument that the human personnel
could be remote from the physical structure of the central security office.

According to

Defendant, “The issue is whether you have some, how do you say, some human intelligence
that’s helping to process the activity that happens. . . The issue is whether there’s some
interaction, some human, non-automatic interaction associated with it.” Markman Hr’g Tr. at 77.
The Court will not construe the disputed claim language to require actual human
personnel be controlling or monitoring the vehicles at the central security office. The claim
language does not require actual human personnel be controlling or monitoring the vehicles at
the central security office. Moreover, the written description section of the patent contemplates
that the central security office may be “automatic.” For example, the ‘363 Patent states:
While operation of the apparatus 950 may be automatic, authorized
personnel may enter commands so as to provide control over, or
operate, the apparatus 950 via the user interface 975, if desired. . . .
In this regard, authorized personnel at the central security office or
agency could locate or track the vehicle and alert the proper
authorities.
‘363 pat. col. 56 ll. 14-27 (emphasis added). The above quotation also makes clear that although
a human can be involved, human control is not mandatory: “personnel may enter commands so

34

as to provide control over, or operate the apparatus 950 . . ., if desired.” (Emphasis added).
Accordingly, the Court adopts Plaintiff’s proposed construction.
The main evidence that Defendant submitted in support of its proposed construction is that
the patent contains an example embodiment illustrating that personnel can control the computer
system at the central security office through a user interface. For example, Defendant notes that
Figure 11B shows a central security office having a user interface device 975 where personnel at
the central security office could control the computer system.

Defendant also points to the above quotation from the written description section of the patent
describing an example embodiment where a human is monitoring the operation.
The Federal Circuit has repeatedly instructed courts not to limit the scope of claims based
on example embodiments disclosed in the written description section of the patent. Phillips v.
AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1323-1324 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). In this case, while the
35

written description of the patent clearly implies that human control is possible, the written
description does not say that it is required. The Court does not believe that the plain and
ordinary meaning of claim term “office” means that a human must do the control or monitoring
of vehicles.
V. CONCLUSION
The Court hereby construes the disputed claim terms as set forth above. The Court
reserves the right to modify its claim constructions as the infringement and validity issues of the
asserted patents become clearer. Lava Trading, Inc., 445 F.3d at 1350.
SO ORDERED.
Date: August 26, 2015
Detroit, Michigan

s/Mark A. Goldsmith
MARK A. GOLDSMITH
United States District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record and
any unrepresented parties via the Court's ECF System to their respective email or First Class U.S.
mail addresses disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on August 26, 2015.
s/Carrie Haddon
Case Manager

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