Wortmann v. Ann Arbor Public Schools et al
Filing
76
OPINION and ORDER Granting Defendants' 63 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by District Judge Linda V. Parker. (RLou)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
VINCENT WORTMANN,
Plaintiff,
Civil Case No. 13-14350
Honorable Linda V. Parker
v.
ANN ARBOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS,
et. al,
Defendants.
__________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF NO. 63]
Plaintiff Vincent Wortmann (“Plaintiff”) brings this 42 U.S.C. § 1983
lawsuit against Defendants, alleging deprivation of his Fourteenth Amendment
liberty interest in his reputation and good name.1 This Court previously issued an
Opinion and Order denying a motion to dismiss filed by Defendants Ann Arbor
Public Schools, Patricia P. Green, Dottie Davis, Cory Gildersleeve, and David
Comsa and granting Defendant Professional Contract Management, Inc.’s motion
to dismiss. (ECF No. 49.) That Opinion and Order involved the same facts and
legal claim at issue in the motion for summary judgment currently before the Court,
brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 by Defendants Ann Arbor
In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleged state law claims, as well, which subsequently
were voluntarily dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2).
(ECF No. 47.)
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Public Schools, Patricia Green, Dottie Davis, Corey Gildersleeve, and David
Comsa (collectively “Defendants”).2 (ECF No. 63.) The Court will not reiterate the
factual background information set forth in its prior opinion, except as necessary to
resolve the summary judgment motion. For reasons to follow, the Court is granting
Defendants’ summary judgment motion.
I.
Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 is
appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). The central inquiry is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient
disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one
party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 251-52 (1986). After adequate time for discovery and upon motion, Rule 56
mandates summary judgment against a party who fails to establish the existence of
an element essential to that party’s case and on which that party bears the burden
of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
The movant has the initial burden of showing “the absence of a genuine
issue of material fact.” Id. at 323. Once the movant meets this burden, the
“nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a
The parties subsequently stipulated to an order dismissing Defendant Gildersleeve
from this action. (ECF No. 71.)
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genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Electric Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To
demonstrate a genuine issue, the nonmoving party must present sufficient evidence
upon which a jury could reasonably find for that party; a “scintilla of evidence” is
insufficient. See Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252.
“A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed” must
designate specifically the materials in the record supporting the assertion,
“including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or
declarations, stipulations, admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). The court must accept as true the non-movant’s evidence
and draw “all justifiable inferences” in the non-movant’s favor. See Liberty Lobby,
477 U.S. at 255.
II.
Background & Argument
This action arises from Defendants’ actions in connection with Plaintiff’s
suspension and termination from his position as an assistant football coach at
Pioneer High School. Specifically, Plaintiff takes issue with the following excerpt
of a written statement issued by the Superintendent of Ann Arbor Public Schools,
Defendant Patricia Green, subsequent to the altercation at issue:
The Ann Arbor Public Schools has completed the initial phase of the
investigation concerning the incident surrounding the football game
between Ann Arbor Huron High School and Ann Arbor Pioneer High
School on Friday, October 12, 2012. This unfortunate incident started
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when a verbal confrontation began between the two head coaches
during the late phases of the game. The ensuing heated conversation
carried on after the game when the coaches met mid-field. An
assistant coach from Pioneer became involved in the verbal altercation
between the head coaches and reacted in an aggressive and physical
manner, allegedly pushing the Huron head coach. This assistant coach
has been released from his coaching duties at AAPS and is not on
staff with AAPS in any other capacity. This type of behavior will not
be tolerated.
(ECF No. 63-9 at Pg. ID 844.)
Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Green’s statement was knowingly false
because Defendant Green, as well as other school officials, knew the head coach
from Huron High School pushed the head coach from Pioneer High School, and
that Plaintiff therefore intervened in a verbal and physical altercation, rather than
solely a verbal altercation. (Compl., ECF No. 1 at Pg. ID 8; Pl.’s Resp. Br., ECF
No. 66 at Pg. ID 926.) Plaintiff further asserts that because Defendant Green’s
statement included this purportedly inaccurate factual allegation, the publication of
the statement concerning his termination was false and amounted to a deprivation
of a liberty interest without due process of law, given that he did not receive a
name clearing hearing following his termination. (Compl., ECF No. 1 at Pg. ID
11.) Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claim “lacks any factual or legal basis and
therefore should be dismissed.” (Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 63 at Pg. ID 709.)
III.
Applicable Law and Analysis
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“The Fourteenth Amendment forbids state actors from depriving individuals
of life, liberty or property without due process of law.” Quinn v. Shirey, 293 F.3d
315, 319 (6th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). “ ‘A person’s reputation, good name,
honor, and integrity are among the liberty interests protected by the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment.’ ” Id. (brackets omitted) (quoting Chilingirian
v. Boris, 882 F.2d 200, 205 (6th Cir. 1989)). However, as the Sixth Circuit has
explained, defamation alone will not invoke due process concerns. Id. (citing Paul
v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 711-12 (1976)). “Some alteration of a right or status
‘previously recognized by state law,’ such as employment, must accompany the
damage to reputation.” Id.; see also Ferencz v. Hairston, 119 F.3d 1244, 1249 (6th
Cir. 1997) (holding that publication of defamatory comments did not deny the
plaintiff of a liberty interest since publication was not accompanied by the
deprivation of any tangible interest such as continued employment). Thus due
process concerns may be implicated when a defendant makes a voluntary, public
dissemination of false information about the plaintiff in the course of the
defendant’s decision to terminate the plaintiff’s employment. Quinn, 293 F.3d at
319-20 (citations omitted). In such a case, due process guarantees the plaintiff the
opportunity to clear his or her name. Id. at 320.
The Sixth Circuit has identified five factors a plaintiff must establish to
show that he was deprived of a liberty interest in his good name or reputation and
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was entitled to a “name-clearing” hearing. Id. (citing Brown v. City of Niota, 214
F.3d 718, 722-23 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Ludwig v. Bd. of Trustees, 123 F.3d 404,
410 (6th Cir. 1997)).
First, the stigmatizing statements must be made in conjunction with
the plaintiff's termination from employment. Second, a plaintiff is not
deprived of his liberty interest when the employer has alleged merely
improper or inadequate performance, incompetence, neglect of duty or
malfeasance. Third, the stigmatizing statements or charges must be
made public. Fourth, the plaintiff must claim that the charges made
against him were false. Lastly, the public dissemination must have
been voluntary.
Id. (ellipsis removed). With respect to the second factor, the Sixth Circuit
explained in Ludwig:
“A charge that merely makes a plaintiff less attractive to other
employers but leaves open a definite range of opportunity does not
constitute a liberty deprivation.” Chilingirian, 882 F.2d at 205-06 n. 8.
Rather, to implicate the Due Process Clause, the employer must have
made a statement in the course of the employee’s discharge “that
might seriously damage his standing and associations in his
community” or that might impose “on him a stigma or other disability
that [would] foreclose[ ] his freedom to take advantage of other
employment opportunities.” Roth, 408 U.S. at 573, 92 S.Ct. at 2707.
Ludwig, 123 F.3d at 410 (brackets in original, emphasis added.) If the plaintiff
satisfies all five factors, “ ‘he is entitled to a name-clearing hearing if he requests
one.’ ” Quinn, 293 F.3d at 320 (quoting Brown, 214 F.3d at 723).
Relying on Board of Regents v. Roth, Plaintiff essentially alleges that
Defendant Green’s stigmatizing statement foreclosed his freedom to take
advantage of other employment opportunities. 408 U.S. 564, 574 (1972).
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Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that he was foreclosed from assignment to positions
in the District and its three high schools. He alleges that “[Pioneer Athletic
Director Eve] Claar made clear that he was to have no further contact with the
District – a position the District has never altered.” (ECF No.66 at Pg ID 930.)
There is no evidence in the record– and notably a lack of supporting citations in
Plaintiff’s response to the instant motion– to support Plaintiff’s claim that Claar
gave such a directive.
Plaintiff further alleges that when Coach Harrison, another coach at Pioneer
High School, was approached to become a defensive coordinator at other area
schools, Harrison expressed his interest in bringing Plaintiff along as an assistant
coach. (Id.) According to Plaintiff, Harrison was advised in each instance that he
would not be permitted to do so. (Id.)
Even assuming that either of Plaintiff’s assertions is true, neither scenario
approaches the level of foreclosing Plaintiff’s freedom to take advantage of other
employment opportunities as contemplated by case law. The Sixth Circuit has held
that “the loss of one job and certain future opportunities does not constitute
deprivation of a protected liberty interest. … [I]t is only where the defendant’s
action effectively precludes the plaintiff from practicing his trade with all
employers or customers that the plaintiff’s liberty interest in pursuing his
occupation is infringed. Jackson v. Heh, No. 98-4420, 2000 WL 761807, at *4 (6th
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Cir. 2000); see also Chilingiriam, 882 F.2d at 205 n.8 (citation omitted) (“A charge
that merely makes a plaintiff less attractive to other employers but leaves open a
definite range of opportunity does not constitute a liberty deprivation.”).
Plaintiff offers no evidence to show that the alleged stigmatizing statement
resulted in the refusal of public school employers to allow Coach Harrison to bring
Plaintiff in as an assistant coach. Nor does Plaintiff show that the statement
foreclosed a range of coaching opportunities. More importantly, Plaintiff submits
no evidence showing that he initiated any employment search efforts on his own
behalf or that any such efforts have been foreclosed because of the stigmatizing
statement. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to meet the evidentiary showing
required to demonstrate his Fourteenth Amendment claim.
Given that the failure of any one of the five Ludwig factors precludes the
advancement of Plaintiff’s claim, the Court finds it unnecessary to engage in
further analysis.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is
GRANTED. (ECF No. 63.)
s/ Linda V. Parker
LINDA V. PARKER
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: September 29, 2016
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I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed to counsel of
record and/or pro se parties on this date, September 29, 2016, by electronic and/or
U.S. First Class mail.
s/ Richard Loury
Case Manager
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